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Defense Digest

The Latest Guidance From Pennsylvania Courts on the Protections Afforded Under Pennsylvania’s Peer Review Privilege

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022

October 1, 2022

by Daniel Dolente

Key Points:

  • To keep discussions, materials, reports and other documents generated for peer review purposes protected from discovery in litigation, consider organizing a committee within the confines of the hospital comprised of physicians, nurses and hospital administrators to perform peer review.
  • Private medical practices meeting outside of the hospital context do not hold a privilege under the PRPA, whether or not the meeting addresses a peer review function.
  • Peer review reports authored by individual health care providers outside the confines of a hospital’s committee may be subject to disclosure.
  • Third-party vendors hired to perform peer review functions do not hold a privilege over the materials they generate. The health care provider who hired the third-party vendor to assist in their peer review process may still hold a privilege.

One of the most significant decisions to recently come out of Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the peer review privilege and confidential information protected from production in discovery was last summer’s Leadbitter opinion. See Leadbitter v. Keystone Anesthesia Consultants, Ltd., 256 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2021). Leadbitter discretely held that: (1) a hospital’s credentialing committee qualified as a “review committee” under the terms of Pennsylvania’s Peer Review Protection Act (PRPA), so long as the credentialing committee was performing a peer review function; and (2) information from the National Practitioner’s Data Bank was confidential and protected from discovery under the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act. More generally, however, the Leadbitter opinion suggested that the records, discussions, and proceedings of any hospital committee, regardless of whether it was classified as a “peer-review committee,” were protected from discovery so long as that hospital committee was performing a peer review function.

The question becomes, what materials are now protected under the PRPA after Leadbitter? Anticipating this question, the Leadbitter court advised Pennsylvania’s lower courts to review the PRPA’s definitions of “Peer Review” and “Professional Health Care Providers” when deciding whether certain documents, discussions and/or materials constitute information protected from discovery. See definitions in 63 P.S. § 425.4. Importantly, “Professional Health Care Provider” is a defined term under the PRPA and includes, among others, a physician, registered nurse, administrator of a health care facility or a corporation operating a health care facility. Leadbitter suggested that a “peer review function” could only be conducted by committees made up of “Professional Health Care Providers.”

Following Leadbitter, Judge Michael Baylson of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had the opportunity to comment on the scope of the PRPA’s protections in Lasheena Sipp-Lipscob v. Einstein Physicians Pennypack Pediatrics, 2020 WL 7353105 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2021). In Lasheena, the plaintiff brought suit against various defendants, including St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children and Teleradiology Services, P.C., a private group of radiologists who provided radiology services at St. Christopher’s Hospital. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to diagnose testicular torsion, which resulted in the loss of a testicle. Through the course of discovery, it was determined that Erica Poletto, a radiologist, authored a report reviewing the quality of care rendered to the minor-patient. The defendants sought to protect the Poletto Report, as it became known, citing Leadbitter for the premise that it expanded the protections afforded by the PRPA, so long as the documents sought to be protected were created for a “peer review purpose.”

Judge Baylson, however, disagreed with this interpretation of Leadbitter. First, the practice group, Teleradiology Services, P.C., could not assert privilege over the report because it was not a “Professional Health Care Provider.” That is, a private medical practice does not qualify as a “Professional Health Care Provider” as defined by the PRPA, so any materials generated by the practice, even if during the performance of a peer review function, would not be protected from discovery. Second, St. Christopher’s Hospital could not assert the privilege because, while the hospital certainly qualified as a “Professional Health Care Provider,” discovery revealed that Dr. Poletto did not author the report as a part of any hospital committee. Rather, Judge Baylson indicated that because Dr. Poletto authored the report alone and did not provide it to any committee that was performing a peer review function at St. Christopher’s Hospital, Leadbitter’s interpretation of the PRPA did not apply.

In December 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court placed further limitations on Leadbitter in its unpublished decision in Bousamra v. Excela Health, 2021 WL 6052296 (Pa. Super. Dec. 21, 2021). In Bousamra, Mercer Health and Benefits, LLC and American Medical Foundation for Peer Review and Education, Inc., the defendants, were hired to perform a study as to whether interventional cardiology procedures performed at Westmoreland Regional Hospital were medically necessary. Excela Health, the owner of Westmoreland, hired these companies. Through the course of discovery, the plaintiffs attempted to obtain the findings and reports of both Mercer and American. The defendants objected, arguing that Mercer and American acted as peer review committees hired by Excela, which was a “Professional Health Care Provider” by virtue of its status as a corporation operating a health care facility.

Ultimately, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Leadbitter, the Superior Court in Bousamra held that neither Mercer nor American were hospital committees that engaged in peer review activity as defined by the PRPA or Leadbitter because they were not “Professional Health Care Providers.” Essentially, under Bousamra’s reasoning, third-party vendors, such as Mercer and American, do not hold the privilege over the materials created. Significantly, however, the court suggested that Excela did hold a privilege over the documents created by Mercer and American because Excela qualifies as a “Professional Health Care Provider” who hired Mercer and American for the benefit of Excela’s peer review process. The documents generated by Mercer and American may be protected from disclosure “under the umbrella” of Excela. In Bousamra, however, the court indicated that Excela may still hold the privilege for materials produced by third-party vendors such as Mercer and American at the request of a protected entity such as Excela, but the issue was moot in this case because Excela waived the privilege.

As such, after Leadbitter, courts have acknowledged its holding, and held that any discussions or documents generated by a hospital committee meeting for the purposes of conducting peer review will remain confidential and protected from discovery, so long as that committee is comprised of Professional Health Care Providers, as defined by the PRPA.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.