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Defense Digest

The Latest Guidance From Pennsylvania Courts on the Protections Afforded Under Pennsylvania’s Peer Review Privilege

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022

October 1, 2022

by Daniel Dolente

Key Points:

  • To keep discussions, materials, reports and other documents generated for peer review purposes protected from discovery in litigation, consider organizing a committee within the confines of the hospital comprised of physicians, nurses and hospital administrators to perform peer review.
  • Private medical practices meeting outside of the hospital context do not hold a privilege under the PRPA, whether or not the meeting addresses a peer review function.
  • Peer review reports authored by individual health care providers outside the confines of a hospital’s committee may be subject to disclosure.
  • Third-party vendors hired to perform peer review functions do not hold a privilege over the materials they generate. The health care provider who hired the third-party vendor to assist in their peer review process may still hold a privilege.

One of the most significant decisions to recently come out of Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the peer review privilege and confidential information protected from production in discovery was last summer’s Leadbitter opinion. See Leadbitter v. Keystone Anesthesia Consultants, Ltd., 256 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2021). Leadbitter discretely held that: (1) a hospital’s credentialing committee qualified as a “review committee” under the terms of Pennsylvania’s Peer Review Protection Act (PRPA), so long as the credentialing committee was performing a peer review function; and (2) information from the National Practitioner’s Data Bank was confidential and protected from discovery under the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act. More generally, however, the Leadbitter opinion suggested that the records, discussions, and proceedings of any hospital committee, regardless of whether it was classified as a “peer-review committee,” were protected from discovery so long as that hospital committee was performing a peer review function.

The question becomes, what materials are now protected under the PRPA after Leadbitter? Anticipating this question, the Leadbitter court advised Pennsylvania’s lower courts to review the PRPA’s definitions of “Peer Review” and “Professional Health Care Providers” when deciding whether certain documents, discussions and/or materials constitute information protected from discovery. See definitions in 63 P.S. § 425.4. Importantly, “Professional Health Care Provider” is a defined term under the PRPA and includes, among others, a physician, registered nurse, administrator of a health care facility or a corporation operating a health care facility. Leadbitter suggested that a “peer review function” could only be conducted by committees made up of “Professional Health Care Providers.”

Following Leadbitter, Judge Michael Baylson of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had the opportunity to comment on the scope of the PRPA’s protections in Lasheena Sipp-Lipscob v. Einstein Physicians Pennypack Pediatrics, 2020 WL 7353105 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2021). In Lasheena, the plaintiff brought suit against various defendants, including St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children and Teleradiology Services, P.C., a private group of radiologists who provided radiology services at St. Christopher’s Hospital. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to diagnose testicular torsion, which resulted in the loss of a testicle. Through the course of discovery, it was determined that Erica Poletto, a radiologist, authored a report reviewing the quality of care rendered to the minor-patient. The defendants sought to protect the Poletto Report, as it became known, citing Leadbitter for the premise that it expanded the protections afforded by the PRPA, so long as the documents sought to be protected were created for a “peer review purpose.”

Judge Baylson, however, disagreed with this interpretation of Leadbitter. First, the practice group, Teleradiology Services, P.C., could not assert privilege over the report because it was not a “Professional Health Care Provider.” That is, a private medical practice does not qualify as a “Professional Health Care Provider” as defined by the PRPA, so any materials generated by the practice, even if during the performance of a peer review function, would not be protected from discovery. Second, St. Christopher’s Hospital could not assert the privilege because, while the hospital certainly qualified as a “Professional Health Care Provider,” discovery revealed that Dr. Poletto did not author the report as a part of any hospital committee. Rather, Judge Baylson indicated that because Dr. Poletto authored the report alone and did not provide it to any committee that was performing a peer review function at St. Christopher’s Hospital, Leadbitter’s interpretation of the PRPA did not apply.

In December 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court placed further limitations on Leadbitter in its unpublished decision in Bousamra v. Excela Health, 2021 WL 6052296 (Pa. Super. Dec. 21, 2021). In Bousamra, Mercer Health and Benefits, LLC and American Medical Foundation for Peer Review and Education, Inc., the defendants, were hired to perform a study as to whether interventional cardiology procedures performed at Westmoreland Regional Hospital were medically necessary. Excela Health, the owner of Westmoreland, hired these companies. Through the course of discovery, the plaintiffs attempted to obtain the findings and reports of both Mercer and American. The defendants objected, arguing that Mercer and American acted as peer review committees hired by Excela, which was a “Professional Health Care Provider” by virtue of its status as a corporation operating a health care facility.

Ultimately, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Leadbitter, the Superior Court in Bousamra held that neither Mercer nor American were hospital committees that engaged in peer review activity as defined by the PRPA or Leadbitter because they were not “Professional Health Care Providers.” Essentially, under Bousamra’s reasoning, third-party vendors, such as Mercer and American, do not hold the privilege over the materials created. Significantly, however, the court suggested that Excela did hold a privilege over the documents created by Mercer and American because Excela qualifies as a “Professional Health Care Provider” who hired Mercer and American for the benefit of Excela’s peer review process. The documents generated by Mercer and American may be protected from disclosure “under the umbrella” of Excela. In Bousamra, however, the court indicated that Excela may still hold the privilege for materials produced by third-party vendors such as Mercer and American at the request of a protected entity such as Excela, but the issue was moot in this case because Excela waived the privilege.

As such, after Leadbitter, courts have acknowledged its holding, and held that any discussions or documents generated by a hospital committee meeting for the purposes of conducting peer review will remain confidential and protected from discovery, so long as that committee is comprised of Professional Health Care Providers, as defined by the PRPA.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.