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Case Law Alerts

The court holds that a medical-malpractice plaintiff lacks standing to advance the constitutional rights of non-medical-malpractice defendants.

Dockery v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Inc. 2021 Pa. Super. 23 (Feb. 22. 2021)

July 1, 2021

by Gabor Ovari

The case involved a medical-malpractice action in Philadelphia County brought by the plaintiff against Thomas Jefferson University Hospital along with various other individual medical providers. The alleged malpractice took place in Delaware County. The defendants filed preliminary objections based on venue, arguing that under Pennsylvania law, medical malpractice actions can only be brought in the county in which the cause of action arose. The preliminary objections were sustained, and the case was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County erred by refusing to declare 42 Pa.C.S.A 5101 and Pa.R.C.P. 1006(1) unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the statutes violated the equal protection clause because they are not applicable to any other classes of plaintiffs in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff also suggested that the statues create a subclass within the general defendant population by providing special provisions for medical defendants. However, the Superior Court found that the plaintiff’s arguments were fatally flawed. The court explained that the plaintiff was not a civil defendant; rather, she was a civil plaintiff; therefore, she could not assert that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure inflict an equal-protection violation upon non-medical-malpractice defendants by requiring them to satisfy the common law of forum non convenienes or other rules to transfer their cases to different venues. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to meet the necessary burden under the rational basis test because she could not show that the rules had no legitimate rationale. As such, the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge was flawed. Therefore, because the plaintiff did not properly mount a constitutional attack, the trial court’s order transferring venue was affirmed. The court held that a medical-malpractice plaintiff lacks standing to advance the constitutional rights of a non-medical-malpractice defendant.

This case demonstrates that, at least for now, the equal protection challenge to the medical malpractice venue statute failed because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Legislature and the courts lacked any legitimate interest in restricting venue in medical malpractice cases to the county where the cause of action arose. However, it is clear that the plaintiff’s bar will continue to explore various avenues to attack the current rules applicable to venue in medical malpractice cases.

 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.