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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Important and Interesting Litigation Achievements…We Are Proud of Our Attorneys for Their Recent Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021

June 1, 2021

CASUALTY DEPARTMENT
Ian Antonoff (New York, NY) obtained summary judgment and dismissal of a third-party action related to a construction site accident in New Jersey. The plaintiff, a temporary employee, alleged he was injured during demolition of an existing commercial space when he was electrocuted by a “hot” wire. The third-party defendant was a staffing company that supplied the plaintiff as a temporary worker to the job site. Once on site, the plaintiff was fully supervised by the third-party plaintiff, the construction manager. The plaintiff applied for, and received, workers’ compensation benefits following his accident. Common law claims against the staffing company (the employer) were barred under the workers’ compensation statute. While there was a purchase order between the construction manager and the staffing company requiring contractual indemnification, this document was not executed until close to a month after the date of the plaintiff’s accident. Additionally, the parties agreed in the purchase order that New York law applied to its terms and, therefore, the construction manager could not be indemnified for its own negligence under New York General Obligations Law Section 5-322.1.

Jason Banonis (Allentown, PA) obtained a unanimous defense verdict in a civil jury trial in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, under COVID restrictions. In this premises liability case, the plaintiff claimed he had slipped on snow and ice on a sidewalk and suffered a comminuted tri-malleolar fracture, requiring two surgeries. The demand was $130K, and Jason’s best offer was $75K. At trial, Jason demonstrated that the plaintiff failed to establish that the accident occurred on the property our client maintained as power-of-attorney or that our client breached any limited duty owed to a licensee. The socially-distanced jury returned its verdict in favor of the defense in one hour.

Carolyn Bogart (Mount Laurel, NJ) was successful in opposing a plaintiff’s appeal against our client, a former fraternity member and social guest at a party giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims. In 2014, the plaintiff was a 20-year-old college student and fraternity member attending a university in New Jersey. After consuming his own alcohol, he fell asleep at the dorm room that was the location of an on-campus party. In the early morning hours, he left the dorm room and proceeded to drive his vehicle home, unknown to anyone in attendance, as all of the party attendees had either left the party or were asleep when the plaintiff left. In addition to naming all attendees and fellow brothers in his fraternity, he also sued the university and its employees. In 2016, suit was filed and, after over 30 depositions, summary judgment was granted to all defendants. The appeal was filed in 2019, and a reported decision issued on March 25, 2021, affirming the Superior Court’s underlying decision as to our client. The appeal raised questions concerning the scope of the duty owed to an adult not old enough to drink legally but who, nonetheless, drank to excess and injures himself in a one-car accident, resulting in a traumatic brain injury and disfigurement claim. The appellate panel ruled that the Social Host Liability Act did not apply as it governs liability for third-party injuries resulting from the service of alcohol to an of-age adult.

Kathleen Carlson (Jacksonville, FL) obtained summary judgment for her retail client. The plaintiff alleged an injury following a slip and fall on a clear liquid in the client’s store. The plaintiff claimed that our client was liable for her injuries based upon actual or constructive notice of the transitory substance on the floor. We filed a motion for summary judgement, arguing the plaintiff could not establish notice based on the testimony and physical evidence available. Following a contentious hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of our client.

John Carty (Philadelphia, PA) prevailed on preliminary objections to have a case transferred from Philadelphia County to its proper venue in Allegheny County. This Jones Act case involved a seaman who worked for the defendant, whose business is located in Allegheny County. The defendant’s business provides river towing services in the waterways in and around Allegheny County. The plaintiff was injured there and received his medical treatment there. The defendant provides no services in Philadelphia and does no business in Philadelphia. The only connection the defendant has to Philadelphia is that payments for life and dental insurance are sent to Philadelphia. The court found that the insurance payments were not sufficient to establish regular contacts with the county and transferred the case to Allegheny County.

Erica Goldring (Roseland, NJ) obtained summary judgment for a nationwide truck leasing company in a case pending in the Law Division of Somerset County, New Jersey. The plaintiff commenced this suit as the result of a motor vehicle accident with a leased truck driven by a party whom the plaintiff failed to successfully serve with the pleadings. After Erica defeated the plaintiff’s motion for substituted service on the driver via our client’s insurance carrier, she moved for summary judgment for the truck leasing company based on principles of agency. The court agreed that there was no agency relationship between the driver and our client, the truck leasing company, and dismissed the case as to all parties, with prejudice.

In a case pending in the Law Division of Morris County, Erica successfully barred all of the plaintiffs’ liability expert reports and testimony against our client, a septic installer, as sanctions for intentional spoliation of evidence in the case. The plaintiffs brought suit against our client for alleged negligent installation of a septic system they claimed caused them bodily injuries and economic damages. During the pendency of this litigation, and well into the discovery period, the plaintiffs and their experts performed extensive and invasive environmental testing on the property for longer than three months that was intentionally concealed from the defendants. Erica obtained this information through a third-party fact witness at deposition, who then provided Erica with a draft copy of the plaintiffs’ liability report that was supplied to him. That report detailed the many months of destructive testing the plaintiffs and their experts had performed. Erica then moved to bar all of the plaintiffs’ liability reports and testimony at the time of trial due to their egregious discovery violations. The court agreed and granted all requested relief.

Dan McDermott (Westchester, NY), Jay Hamad (New York, NY) and Christopher DiCicco (Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction, New York Labor Law case pending in Supreme Court Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, which was a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor, and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case. They sought contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client causing the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused in whole or in part the injuries the plaintiff sustained.

Megan Nelson (Orlando, FL) prevailed on a motion for summary judgment related to the duty owed to a minor business invitee in an alleged wrongful death. The plaintiff, the personal representative of the estate of a minor, filed a wrongful death claim alleging the defendant, a daycare center, breached its duty to exercise the reasonable care owed to the minor while he was under the care and supervision of the defendant’s employees as a business invitee. The plaintiff alleged the defendant breached this duty by failing to render aid when the minor collapsed, including failing to train its employees and failing to notify emergency personnel in a timely manner. Megan successfully argued that the defendant did not breach its duty to exercise reasonable medical care as its employees were CPR certified and immediately responded when an employee witnessed the minor collapse. The mother of the minor arrived immediately after the collapse and held onto him until EMS arrived. The call to the EMS team was made within three minutes of the collapse. The employees reassessed the minor while he was in the mother’s arms and determined the minor was breathing. The minor was breathing until EMS arrived. The minor passed away of natural causes. After reviewing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and hearing Megan’s argument, the judge granted the motion for summary judgment, and the case was dismissed.

Drew Thebaud (New York, NY) obtained dismissal of a premises liability claim with costs and disbursements. The plaintiff alleged that he tripped and fell on the exterior steps of a residential building in New York City due to poor staircase lighting. The plaintiff filed suit against numerous defendants, including our insured, a construction company responsible for installing the flooring within the building three years prior to the incident. Since the insured was not responsible to maintain the staircase’s lights at the building, Drew demanded that the plaintiff dismiss the insured from the case. When plaintiff’s counsel refused, Drew filed a motion to dismiss all claims asserted against the insured and sought costs for filing the motion. In response, the court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint in its entirety against the insured, and also awarded costs and disbursements for filing the motion.

HEALTH CARE DEPARTMENT
Michael Kelly (Long Island, NY) obtained dismissal of a medical malpractice/wrongful death action involving claims that the defendants failed to properly treat vascular compromise to the lower extremities, resulting in prolonged hospitalization during which pressure ulcers developed, progressed and became septic, causing death. Motions for summary judgment brought by five other defendants were granted. Although we had not moved for this relief, we were able to convince the court to “search the record” and dismiss the claims against our client hospital since it had no liability independent of the co-defendants.

Michael also obtained dismissal of claims in a negligence action in which our client’s EMTs “dropped” the plaintiff while transporting him to a rehab facility from a hospital after bilateral knee replacement surgery. The plaintiff was placed on a stretcher in his hospital room, but when the EMTs began lifting it to height, the plaintiff leaned over, causing it to tip over. Although an issue of fact existed as to the manner of the accident, we argued the injuries claimed (ruptured cecum, gall bladder removal and incisional hernia repair) could not have been proximately caused by the minor trauma of the stretcher tipping over. We supported our position with an affidavit from a colorectal surgeon, which the plaintiff opposed with one from a general practitioner. The court found the plaintiff’s opposition failed to raise an issue of fact and dismissed all claims against our client.

Missy Minehan (Harrisburg, PA) obtained summary judgment in a medical malpractice action in Dauphin County. This case was filed against a surgery center concerning the alleged failure to timely diagnose and treat squamous cell carcinoma in the patient’s nasal cavity.

PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY DEPARTMENT
Kevin Bright and Lila Wynne (Mount Laurel, NJ) secured dismissal of a case involving a claim of negligence that allegedly occurred in the process of a commercial fumigation for insects at a co-defendant’s property. Kevin and Lila sent a R. 1:4-8 letter to plaintiffs’ counsel, arguing the case should be dismissed because the plaintiffs would be unable to establish causation as a matter of law based on their discovery. Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Tracy Burnley (Mount Laurel, NJ) argued and was granted summary judgment based on the contractual one-year statute of limitation. Our client, a home inspector, referred a matter out to an independent, separate home inspector. All of this information was disclosed in an email from our client to the plaintiff with an attached pre-inspection agreement. The plaintiff initially denied the existence of a contract. When that was proven to be false, he then argued the contract was between the plaintiff and the other inspector, and our client could not avail itself of the one-year limitation to sue. The court agreed with Tracy’s arguments that the e-mail and attached pre-inspection agreement must be construed as a whole and that our client was entitled to dismissal.

Adam Calvert (New York, NY) won an appeal before the Appellate Division, Second Department where he represented a mall owner. The plaintiff was a pedestrian who was struck by a car in the parking lot. She sued the mall, claiming the parking lot was negligently designed, which lead to the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the mall, saying there was no evidence that the parking lot was negligently designed or that the design lead to the accident. A unanimous appellate court affirmed.

Christopher Conrad (Harrisburg, PA) obtained a defense verdict following a non-jury trial. This case was brought under Pennsylvania’s Sunshine Act, which governs the meetings of Commonwealth public agencies, including school boards. The plaintiffs were residents of a Centre County school district, and they sued the school board and its board president, claiming they violated the Act in the manner by which they conducted public meetings. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the board failed to state with sufficient specificity during the open portion of its meetings the reasons why it was convening privately in executive session and because the board did not allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its executive session meetings. After trial and post-trial briefing, the court found for the defendants, concluding the board complied with the Act as it routinely and appropriately announced, in general terms, when it was convening in executive session to discuss contract, personnel and non-litigation legal matters. Finally, the trial court found as matter of law that the board was not required to allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its work sessions because the work sessions are non-voting meetings at which the board does not “deliberate” or take any “official action,” as those terms are specifically defined by the Act. Chris was assisted in this case by Lara Bream (Harrisburg, PA), who was instrumental in helping to narrow the claims for trial through her preparation of a motion for summary judgment and a motion in limine, both of which were granted in part by the trial judge.

Michael Detweiler (King of Prussia, PA) and Benjamin Levine (Philadelphia, PA) prevailed on a motion for summary judgment on behalf of a large city. The plaintiff presented significant personal injury and earnings loss claims predicated upon his claim of a brachial plexopathy injury, allegedly suffered as a result of a fall owing to jet fuel or a fuel-like substance. In addition to making premises liability arguments, Benjamin and Michael successfully argued that the plaintiff failed to establish the requisite elements required to prevail on the street exception to the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. While the motion for summary judgment of the co-defendant airline was denied, all claims and cross-claims as to the city were dismissed.

Scott Dunlop and Morgan Randle (Pittsburgh, PA) successfully obtained dismissal, with prejudice, on behalf of a township and an individual township manager via a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint. The plaintiff raised a single First Amendment count on the basis that the defendants allegedly retaliated against his exercise of his First Amendment right to petition by preemptively refusing to listen to him on the subject of traffic controls. More specifically, he had presented petitions, spoken publicly on the issue at township meetings, and sent the township commissioners packets of information requesting that the township reduce the speed limit and install speed bumps as a traffic regulation, claiming the traffic was too high. Despite addressing his concerns via a traffic study that revealed there was not unusually high traffic for the road, the plaintiff continued to petition the township. Given the evidence contrary to the plaintiff’s position, the township heard the plaintiff out and responded to the substance of his petitions, but ultimately did not agree with his concerns and did not implement his requests. The plaintiff alleged that he was “retaliated” against for expressing his concerns because he did not feel comfortable continuing to raise the issue at public meetings. The court agreed with our position that no retaliatory conduct occurred, thus precluding the First Amendment retaliation claim, and dismissed the defendants, with prejudice.

Ray Freudiger (Cincinnati, OH) won summary judgment for a housing authority in a political subdivision matter in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio, Western Division at Dayton. The plaintiff sought over $20 million in damages, alleging the housing authority violated the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminatorily blocking funding for and financing of 60 units of project-based affordable housing for homeless veterans, most of whom are disabled. The court had previously awarded summary judgment to Ray’s client on all but one claim, but ruled that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the plaintiff’s “reasonable accommodation” claim under the ADA and FHA. In an unusual turn of events, the court recently held that it had erred in not granting Ray’s previously filed summary judgment on all claims. It, therefore, dismissed all claims against the housing authority.

Howard Mankoff and Pauline Tutelo (Roseland, NJ) successfully moved on the pleadings, in lieu of an answer, to dismiss a complaint against our client, a law firm, that was sued for not filing a personal injury claim within the applicable statute of limitations. Our client sent the plaintiff a letter two months before the statute expired, explaining the firm declined to pursue the claim. The plaintiff claimed he did not receive the letter. The court accepted our argument that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that a properly addressed letter was received by the addressee. The brief was written by Pauline Tutelo.

Howard Mankoff (Roseland) obtained several other wins recently. He successfully moved on the pleadings, in lieu of an answer, to dismiss a complaint against our client, a law firm, that was sued for malicious abuse of process and conspiracy. Our client represented a board of education that was sued by an assistant principal for employment discrimination. After the suit settled, the plaintiff sued our client and the board of education, claiming they conspired to falsely attack his professional credentials by filing a false claim with the State Department of Education. Howard successfully argued that the law does not permit a claim that an attorney conspired with his client.

Howard obtained summary judgment on behalf of a dentist who sold her practice in an employment and contract claim. The plaintiff, also a dentist, was employed by our client. He claimed his contract automatically renewed and that he was entitled to two years of pay. The plaintiff also claimed he was entitled to be compensated because our client allegedly prevented him from taking records of patients he was treating. The court accepted our argument that the plaintiff waived the extension of his contract and that the patient records belonged to the practice and the patients, not the plaintiff.

Dante Rohr (Mount Laurel, NJ) obtained summary judgment in a complex third-party coverage action. The declaratory judgment complaint was filed against the landlord that leased three quarries to the insured tenant. The landlord sued its tenant for breach of contract and environmental clean-up costs. The landlord sought coverage as an additional insured to the tenant’s CGL policy. The insurer denied coverage. The court granted Dante’s motion for summary judgment in favor of the insurer, agreeing that the counterclaims alleged intentional acts that were not occurrences as defined in the policy, nor did the claims fall within the personal or advertising coverage under the policy. The court further held that, even if coverage were found, it is limited to such damage or injury “caused in whole or in part by the insured’s acts or omissions or the acts or omissions of those acting on the insured’s behalf in the performance of its ongoing operations for the additional insureds.” In light of this clear language in the policy, it follows that coverage was denied because the counterclaims were based solely on the acts or omissions of the landlord, not on the acts or omissions of the tenant or those acting on its behalf. Lastly, the court agreed that there would be no coverage available to the landlord as exclusions apply.

Jack Slimm (Mount Laurel, NJ) obtained an order of dismissal in a multi-party toxic tort action. This claim was filed by a family who was exposed to mold during a design and reconstruction project. The court granted the motion, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs alleged intentional tort claims, including fraud and misrepresentation.

Jack obtained an order of dismissal, with prejudice, in favor of a law firm that represented a bank in a complex, wrongful repossession, UCC, fraud and legal malpractice action in the Superior Court, Law Division, Ocean County, New Jersey.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DEPARTMENT
Ashley Eldridge (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended a claim petition on behalf of a national communications carrier. The claimant was employed as a customer service representative who, as a result of the pandemic, transitioned to a work-from-home position. While carrying computers into his house, the claimant fell, sustaining a patellar tendon tear, PCL tear, meniscus tears and bone contusions. Arguing that the injuries were work-related, the claimant presented evidence from several orthopedic surgeons. Ashley was able to demonstrate that the injuries were neither work-related nor sustained in the course and scope of his employment. The judge accepted the defense evidence as credible and denied the claim petition in its entirety.

Bob Fitzgerald and Jeremy Zacharias (Mount Laurel, NJ) were successful before Judge Bradley W. Henson, Sr., J.W.C., who rendered a decision in favor of our insurance carrier client. The case involved a 2010 claim petition resulting from a knee injury sustained as a result of a work place accident at the employer’s restaurant. This claim was denied by our client as it did not provide workers’ compensation coverage on the date of loss. Prior to the date of loss, the employer retained a restaurant management company to handle all business-related issues for the restaurant, including obtaining workers’ compensation insurance coverage. However, the restaurant was not listed for coverage under the prior workers’ compensation policy. When the restaurant management company obtained a renewal policy through our client, that policy also failed to include the restaurant or its business address as a covered entity. Bob and Jeremy successfully argued the restaurant was never insured by our client since it was taken off of the policy prior to our client assuming coverage.

Michele Punturi (Philadelphia, PA) successfully prosecuted a termination petition on behalf of a well-known hospital and defended the claimant’s petition for review to expand the nature of the accepted injury. The injury was accepted as a right distal bicep strain, which included a partial tear that resulted in surgery. The claimant asserted the injury should be expanded to also include right carpal tunnel, right elbow sprain and trigger fingers. A detailed cross-examination of the claimant established the complaints referable to right carpal and trigger fingers began six months after the injury, which was corroborated by the claimant’s treating physician’s records. The IME expert, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon with specialized training in hand surgery, had the opportunity to perform a comprehensive physical examination and review the diagnostic studies, post- and pre-injury medical records, and the claimant’s family physician’s records. This review revealed non-work-related carpal tunnel risk factor conditions, including obesity, post-menopausal, non-insulin dependent diabetes and testing for hypothyroidism. It was further argued that the claimant’s medical expert did not have expertise in the surgery involved in the case and failed to review the claimant’s testimony and diagnostic films. Ultimately, the judge found the defense medical expert competent, credible and persuasive.

Michele successfully defended a claimant’s reinstatement petition on behalf of a multi-national car manufacturer. The claimant sustained a work injury on October 18, 2004, in the nature of bilateral strain/sprains, CMC osteoarthritis and bilateral DeQuervains, accepted through a Notice of Compensation Payable. Thereafter, the claimant received various periods of disability and periods of return to work for which benefits were suspended. The claimant’s benefits remained on suspension status as of March 31, 2011. On February 5, 2020, the claimant filed a reinstatement petition. Michele adamantly argued that the petition should be dismissed as the Statute of Repose bars entitlement to any benefits as the claimant had received in excess of 500 weeks of partial disability status (> 12.4 years) and had not filed the reinstatement petition within three years after the date of his most recent payment of benefits. The judge agreed that the petition was barred.

Kacey Wiedt (Harrisburg, PA) was successful in prosecuting a modification petition, changing the claimant’s indemnity benefits from temporary total to partial disability based upon a labor market survey. After showing that the injured worker had an earning power based upon the labor market survey, the judge modified the claimant’s future indemnity benefits, even though the claimant was unemployed due to the accepted work-related back injury. Kacey was also successful in defending the claimant’s review petition to expand the nature of his injury from the acknowledged injury of a lumbar sprain, even though claimant had a permanent spinal cord stimulator implant in his back.

Kacey also obtained a favorable decision from the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, reversing the underlying judge’s decision pertaining to the school district’s entitlement to a credit for wages paid to a school teacher pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The Board granted credits for wages received by the injured worker through the school district’s collective bargaining agreement, allowing offsets against the claimant’s future entitlement to wage loss benefits.

Judd Woytek (Allentown, PA) was successful in having a judge deny and dismiss a claim petition and grant our termination petition. In this matter, the claim was accepted as a medical-only for a low back strain. The claimant filed a claim petition seeking wage loss benefits after refusing a modified duty job offer by the employer. After obtaining an opinion of full recovery from our IME physician, Judd filed a termination petition. The judge denied the claim petition and granted our termination petition, finding that the employer had made a good faith offer of employment within the claimant’s restrictions that she refused to accept. Therefore, the claimant was not entitled to any wage loss benefits. The judge also found that the claimant had fully recovered as of the date of our IME and terminated benefits completely as of that date.

*Results do not guarantee a similar result. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order

All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate.  The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Court Reaffirms That Actual Cash Value Includes Labor and Overhead, Not Just Materials

Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-1964, (Fla. 2nd DCA May 8, 2026). The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract suit against Universal for refusal to pay for all of plaintiffs’ damages from a storm in November 2020. Universal filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning both actual cash value and replacement cost value of the loss. They argued that the plaintiffs did not complete repairs or incur any expenses in repairing the damaged property, thus being limited to actual cash value as their measure of damage and the plaintiffs’ submitted estimate of damages contained labor costs necessary for repair and, therefore, not an actual cash value estimate. Universal further asked for a directed verdict at the hearing because the plaintiffs would have no evidence to support the claim for damages. The trial court agreed and granted Universal’s motion, entering a final judgment in Universal’s favor.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration due to the court improperly converting Universal’s motion in limine to a motion for final summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the trial court improperly entered a final judgment based on a pretrial ruling in limine, advising there was recognized procedures, including summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and default judgment that could have been exercised. Further, the court continued that the improper procedure was not the only reason for the judgment to be reversed. They noted the insurance policy did not provide a definition of actual cash value nor how to calculate it, and the parties disputed the definition and calculation of such.  Universal argued that actual cash value is defined as the value of the property that suffered the direct physical loss less depreciation and deductible, i.e. costs of physical materials that were damaged.  The plaintiffs argued that actual cash value includes the amount of repair costs in addition to the value of the property that suffered direct physical loss because it is calculated as the replacement cost minus depreciation.  The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that Universal’s definition was not supported by the insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor decisional authority.  The court noted that Universal “cherry-picked” the phrase “direct physical loss” from the perils insured against provision and applied it to the loss settlement provision, which doesn’t state “direct physical loss,” but instead states “insured loss.”  Further, the court conveyed that application of “direct physical loss” would be used on both actual cash value and replacement cost value, as they are both present in the loss settlement provision, which would mean insureds never got payments beyond costs of physically damaged material, which is contradictory to the replacement cost value definition.  The court advised that the Florida Supreme Court had approved the court’s interpretation of actual cash value as including costs other than damaged physical property, including overhead and profit, noting that these costs can be included in actual cash value to which a portion, like all other costs, could be depreciated. The court noted the difference between actual cash value and replacement cost value is not between types of costs, i.e. materials vs. labor, but between the valuation of the costs with the distinction of being a depreciated vs. undepreciated value. The court refused to exclude intangible costs such as labor, profit and overhead from actual cash value, finding these costs inclusions were consistent with statutory and contractual language as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court.