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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Important and Interesting Litigation Achievements…We Are Proud of Our Attorneys for Their Recent Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021

December 1, 2021

Casualty Department

Jason Banonis (King of Prussia, PA) obtained summary judgment on behalf of a client in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, in an apartment complex slip and fall on snow and ice case. The court determined that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff did not meet the requirements for the Hills and Ridges Doctrine (i.e., that snow and ice had accumulated on the ground in ridges or elevations of such size and character as to unreasonably obstruct travel and constitute a danger to pedestrians). The court also concluded that there was no proof of a dangerous condition or notice of the condition to establish a breach of duty. 

In a lawsuit seeking $279 million in alleged property damages, Tom Birris, Stuart Sostmann and Darren Newberry (Pittsburgh, PA) successfully defended their client, a subcontractor of a railroad repair shop, against any and all liability. The case involved the August 2016 rupture of a railroad tank car containing 178,000 lbs. of liquefied chlorine at the plaintiff’s chlorine manufacturing plant in West Virginia. The tank car had recently been returned to the plaintiff after undergoing extensive repairs in the spring of 2016. The plaintiff filed suit against three parties as a result of the chlorine release: its fleet maintenance manager, the railcar repair shop that performed the 2016 repairs to the tank car and our client, a subcontractor of the railroad repair shop involved in the aspect of the repairs which the plaintiff claimed were performed negligently. At the time of the 2016 repairs, the tank car was 37 years old and had several characteristics associated with it that were known in the railroad industry to cause cracks in the tank’s shell. It was undisputed at trial that there was a small, pre-existing crack in the tank shell prior to the 2016 repairs at issue and that, but-for this pre-existing crack, the tank car would not have ruptured in August of 2016, which was the first time the tank car was loaded with chlorine since the repairs had been completed. Allegations of comparative negligence were asserted by all of the defendants against the plaintiff for its decision to repair, rather than scrap, the tank car in 2016. During trial, the plaintiff asserted it was entitled to $278 million in replacement-value property damage associated with alleged damage to its equipment at its 500-acre chlorine manufacturing plant. The plaintiff requested, and the trial judge granted, a jury instruction providing that the jury could award replacement value damages. The nearly six-week trial encompassed over 30 witnesses and 10 expert witnesses. After deliberations, the jury awarded only $12.8 million in damages, assessing the railcar repair shop with 40% of liability, the plaintiff’s fleet maintenance manager with 20% of liability and the plaintiff itself with the remaining 40% of liability. No liability was assessed to our client. 

Joanna Buchanico (Philadelphia, PA) successfully briefed and argued for trial coordination of 23 lawsuits in Lebanon County. The 23 lawsuits, filed in five separate jurisdictions, stemmed from a 64-vehicle pileup in Lebanon County with three fatalities. Joanna’s clients were named defendants in every case. Five cases were filed in Philadelphia County, and all the plaintiffs requested the cases be tried in Philadelphia County. The plaintiffs’ arguments were rejected by Judge Bradford Charles, who wrote a 56-page opinion granting the defendants’ requests for coordination. 

Patrick Carey and Michael Garcia (Erie, PA) obtained summary judgment relief on behalf of an amusement park in a lawsuit for alleged personal injury sustained at the park’s lazy river attraction. The plaintiff, his wife, and three minor children were business invitees at our client’s amusement and water park. The plaintiff alleged he sustained injury when he attempted to board an inner tube on the lazy river attraction, which was staffed by certified lifeguards. The plaintiff claimed that the lifeguards negligently failed to assist and/or help him get onto the inner tube and were further negligent for failing to observe him while he attempted to do so. As a result of the lifeguards’ alleged negligence, the plaintiff claimed his inner tube flipped backwards, resulting in his head striking the floor of the shallow watercourse. During their depositions, the plaintiff and his wife conceded that the extent of the lifeguards’ assistance to visitors of the attraction was gathering vacant inner tubes and pushing them towards people waiting in line. Moreover, the plaintiff testified he made one initial unsuccessful attempt to climb on an inner tube before ultimately “over engineering it” on his second attempt, which caused the inner tube to flip backwards. The court agreed that under the “no-duty” rule, the lifeguards did not owe the plaintiff a duty because the alleged risks associated with climbing onto an inner tube in the lazy river attraction were common, inherent, expected or frequent risks associated with the activity. Furthermore, the plaintiff was unable to satisfy an exception to the “no-duty” rule because he could not prove the employees deviated from an established custom or duty. The trial court’s decision granting summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s claims, with prejudice, was ultimately affirmed on appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

Melissa Dziak and Robert Aldrich (Scranton, PA) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client, a car dealership. The dealership rented a vehicle to the co-defendant, who was having his personal vehicle serviced at the dealership. The co-defendant was involved in an auto accident with the plaintiff while operating the dealership’s rental. The plaintiff was operating a motorcycle, and significant damages were alleged. Melissa and Rob filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to the Graves Amendment, which states that an owner of a motor vehicle who rents a vehicle to a person shall not be vicariously liable for harm to persons or property that arises out of the use or operation of that vehicle during the period of the rental, so long as certain additional criteria is met. The court agreed with our arguments raised in the motion and dismissed our client with prejudice.

Matthew Gray (Melville, NY) successfully argued and obtained a full withdrawal of an arbitration matter filed against a major insurance company. The applicant/plaintiff-provider filed an arbitration matter, originally totaling $305,695.15 in medical expenses, claiming the insurer owed payment for unpaid medical bills stemming from a March 19, 2021, automobile accident. The applicant/plaintiff-provider’s position was that the entire amount was owed because our client had not reimbursed the medical provider for the services rendered. It was our client’s position that the treatment rendered was billed for in gross excess of the applicable New York State Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Schedule, and that after an internal fee scheduling audit, limited recovery and paid the applicant/plaintiff-provider in full, in the amount of $22,180.23. After many months of arguments, the applicant/plaintiff-provider recognized that the fee audit was proper and legitimate and withdrew, with prejudice, the entire matter.

Kimberly House (Philadelphia, PA) received an order granting in part and denying in part a motion for summary judgment in Philadelphia. This was an auto accident case where the plaintiff was a passenger on a bus owned and operated by our client, the only defendant. The bus backed into a pole in a parking lot, and the plaintiff claimed he was injured as a result. We moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including lack of an expert on causation, no evidence to support a negligent entrustment claim, and the claim against an “unknown driver” was improper under the law. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed the claim against the unknown driver as well as the claim for negligent entrustment. The claim for respondeat superior remains in the case. 

Timothy Jeager (Roseland, NJ) was successful in obtaining summary judgment on behalf of a restaurant client in a slip and fall case. The court ruled the restaurant, a tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center, owed no contractual duty or common law duty to the plaintiff, a customer of the restaurant, who fell in the parking lot of the shopping center while walking to the rear door of the restaurant.

Jennifer Meyers (Westchester, NY) won two appeals before the Appellate Division, Second Department. Jennifer represented an out-of-possession landlord in a personal injury action which became the subject of two appeals. The plaintiff worked in retail and was allegedly injured due to a claimed defect to the front door. After we moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff opposed our motion and made an entirely new allegation of liability against our client. She also sought to amend her bill of particulars to assert this new claim. The plaintiff’s motion to amend was granted, and our motion for summary judgment was denied with leave to renew after additional discovery relating to the plaintiff’s new claim. We appealed this decision, and the Appellate Court unanimously reversed the decision granting the plaintiff’s motion to amend and reversed its order denying summary judgment, finding that our insured was an out-of-possession landlord. With respect to the second appeal, after the plaintiff was given leave to amend her bill of particulars, we conducted further discovery and moved for summary judgment a second time, and we won this motion. The court agreed with our position that our client was an out-of-possession landlord and that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate notice. The plaintiff appealed this decision, which the Appellate Court unanimously dismissed. 

Thomas O’Malley and Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA) obtained dismissal via preliminary objections of all claims asserted against our client, a day care center, in a shooting case venued in Philadelphia. The case arose from the shooting death of a student’s father. The shooter had been previously convicted of manslaughter and assault and was an employee of the day care center’s long-time food service vendor. While the decedent was dropping off his youngest child at day care, he got into an argument with the shooter, who was on the premises delivering food. The decedent subsequently drove away with his seventeen-year-old son in the passenger seat, and the shooter followed in his work van. A few blocks away from the day care center, the shooter pulled up alongside the decedent’s vehicle and repeatedly fired a handgun at the decedent. The decedent’s son survived the shooting. The food service vendor, its affiliated entities, the day care center and the shooter were named as defendants. The claims against the day care center included negligence per se, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent undertaking to render services, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violations of the Unfair Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), negligent misrepresentation and negligent infliction of emotional distress as to the decedent’s seventeen-year-old son who witnessed the shooting. The plaintiffs’ negligence per se claims centered on alleged violations of the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL), the Public Welfare Law (PWL) and the Pennsylvania School Code (School Code). Among other things, the plaintiffs took the position that the day care center had a duty to ensure that its service vendor’s employees did not have criminal records because those employees foreseeably came into contact with children and parents. On behalf of the day care center, we filed preliminary objections seeking dismissal of all claims asserted against it. After briefing, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted our preliminary objections. The case subsequently resolved with no contribution whatsoever from our client.

Christopher Power (Melville, NY) received a defense verdict in a New York Labor Law case in Suffolk County, New York. The plaintiff, a pipefitter employed at a construction site, claimed he tripped and fell over a 2’ x 4’ metal stud, causing him to sustain a shoulder injury and subsequent surgery. The plaintiff sued the owner and general contractor under the New York State Labor Law. At his deposition in 2018, the plaintiff produced a photograph showing a loose metal stud lying on the floor of the construction site. When questioned as to who took the photograph, he stated that his friend Brian, a co-worker, took the photo but that he was not there when it was taken. Four days later, Chris visited Brian and showed him the photograph produced. Brian denied ever taking the photograph and showed Chris the one photograph that he did take, of the plaintiff merely sitting on a bench after the incident. With Brian’s permission, Chris took a picture of that photograph and had Brian sign an affidavit stating that he did not take any photo of a loose stud. During trial, the plaintiff again produced the photograph (which was entered into evidence) and testified that it was taken by his friend and co-worker, Brian. The plaintiff also testified that he was not wearing sunglasses at the time of his fall, despite an email from a co-worker to his employer who witnessed the incident stating that he was. The email also stated that the plaintiff tripped and fell while trying to squeeze between two vertical metal studs while wearing a work backpack and carrying two energy drinks. When the plaintiff rested his case, Chris called the eyewitness to the stand, who testified that the plaintiff tripped and fell trying to fit through two vertical studs while wearing a backpack and sunglasses. He further testified that the plaintiff tripped over a fixed plate on the floor, not a loose stud. Chris then called the plaintiff’s friend and co-worker, Brian, to the stand, who testified that he did not take the photograph produced by the plaintiff and did not give the photograph to the plaintiff. Not surprisingly, the jury rendered a defense verdict.

Bradley Remick and Shane Haselbarth (Philadelphia, PA) prevailed on an appeal to the Third Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ request for class certification in a product liability and warranty action. The named plaintiffs were several property owners and communities of common ownership who alleged they have yellow-jacketed, corrugated stainless steel tubing (CSST) transporting natural gas through their structures. The flexible, yellow CSST is the modern heir to the black iron pipe formerly universal in the building industry. The flexible CSST offers advantages, including ease of installation, but the plaintiffs assert there are latent product defects that risk failure in the event an electrical surge makes its way to the tubing, either from an in-house event or nearby lightning strike. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ request for nationwide and Pennsylvania-wide class certification of their disparate claims because of a failure of record proof on the elements of ascertainability of a sufficiently numerous class, predominance of typical and common claims, and an inability to demonstrate proof of liability and damages issues on a class-wide basis. The Third Circuit granted the plaintiffs’ request for interlocutory review of the class certification decision, but nevertheless affirmed the district court’s ruling on largely the same bases. Without passing on the merits of the product defect claims, the Third Circuit recognized that there was no basis to grant class-wide treatment given the differences in everything from notification to putative class members, liability and damages proofs, and the law governing claims. Thus, the denial of class certification was affirmed, and the case will proceed on an individual basis only.
 

Health Care Department

Robert Aldrich (Scranton, PA) obtained an entry of judgment on behalf of his client, an urgent care physician. The plaintiff filed suit in magisterial district court in Wayne County. She alleged the physician negligently sutured a hand laceration, leading to dehiscence and the need for subsequent surgery. The plaintiff sought recovery of medical expenses and pain and suffering. At the bench trial, Rob sought dismissal based upon the plaintiff’s lack of expert support for her claims, as is required in medical malpractice claims. The court agreed and entered judgment in the defendant’s favor. 

Matthew Keris and Robert Aldrich (Scranton, PA) successfully obtained partial summary judgment on behalf of a nursing home and its corporate defendants. In the complaint and throughout discovery, the plaintiff raised claims of overarching neglect in addition to a fall that occurred during physical therapy. The plaintiff alleged negligence, corporate negligence, and punitive damages premised upon allegations of understaffing, Department of Health violations, and putting profits over patient care. The plaintiff sought to hold not only the nursing home, but also its management company and a holding company, liable for such claims. Matt and Rob sought partial summary judgment. They asked the court to limit the plaintiff’s claims to the fall only and argued that neither the record evidence nor the plaintiff’s expert reports supported the all-encompassing claims of neglect. The court agreed and narrowed the claims, thereby significantly hampering the plaintiff’s attorney’s “playbook,” often used in nursing home cases. The court limited the trial claims to the fall only. The court also dismissed punitive damages and dismissed the holding company defendant outright.

 

Professional Liability Department

Brigid Alford (Harrisburg, PA) and Pooja Mehta (Philadelphia, PA) successfully tried an uninsured motorist case in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The jury returned a $15,000 verdict, $10,000 below the offer of judgment in place at at the time trial began. The plaintiff’s last demand before trial had been $1,250,000. The court had dismissed the bad faith count earlier in the case.

Brigid Alford and Brian Wauhop (Harrisburg, PA) received an order and opinion from the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting our client carrier’s motion to dismiss a bad faith count, which had been raised as part of a property damage/contract claim under a homeowner’s policy.

Samuel Cohen (Philadelphia, PA) and Jeremy Zacharias (Mount Laurel, NJ) were successful in opposing a motion for recusal before the Honorable Linda Grasso Jones, J.S.C. The plaintiff, a pro se litigant and a former financial advisor, sued individuals over the sale of his book of business. The first case was the subject of a comprehensive bench trial before Judge Grasso Jones, resulting in a defense verdict. While the first case was pending on appeal, the plaintiff filed the instant matter, alleging the parties and their attorneys from the first case fraudulently concealed documents and committed fraud upon the court, leading to an improper defense verdict. In this matter, the plaintiff sought to recuse Judge Linda Grasso Jones from presiding over this matter based on her alleged bias and incapacity to sit fairly. The motion argued that the judge disregarded inconvenient facts, the New Jersey Court Rules, binding precedent, the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Sam and Jeremy successfully opposed the plaintiff’s motion, arguing that the plaintiff did not meet the standard under New Jersey law to move for recusal of a sitting judge. They further argued that the plaintiff’s motion was simply an improper collateral attack on the judge’s various orders of the first case. The court agreed and denied the plaintiff’s motion.

Scott Dunlop, Christian Marquis, Nicole Carnevale and Morgan Randle (Pittsburgh, PA) successfully obtained judgment in favor of a local borough and its employees/agents following numerous rounds of motions to dismiss in the Western District. The plaintiff, a construction contractor, brought suit alleging the borough violated its constitutional civil rights by failing to issue it a grading permit in the time it perceived as reasonable. The matter is more generally described as a land use dispute, involving the plaintiff’s excessive dumping and destruction of a local sewer line, thus jeopardizing the health and safety of the local residents. In support of dismissal, we argued that no substantive due process rights were violated and that the civil conspiracy claim as to the individual defendants failed as a matter of law. The court agreed and granted the plaintiff leave to amend. Failing to heed our position, the plaintiff filed an additional complaint, to which we again moved to dismiss. The court agreed with our arguments and dismissed the federal claims, with prejudice.

Ray Freudiger (Cincinnati, OH) recently received dismissal of two charges filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The charging party had been removed from two of the employer’s stores. He claimed it was due to discrimination because of his race and disability (he had a service animal with him). Ray submitted a position statement along with affidavits of employees and managers, explaining that the charging party was removed because he was videoing other customers without their consent and making racially charged comments to employees and customers.

In a case handled by Ray and Brad Haas (Pittsburgh, PA), they won summary judgment on behalf of an insurance agent and broker in the Franklin County Ohio Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiff, who owns a restaurant, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000 and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier who had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The court granted our motion for summary judgment on several bases: (1) the statute of limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the accident occurred; (2) despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and (2) the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact. 

Karen Grethlein and Josh Byrne (Philadelphia, PA) obtained dismissal of a declaratory judgment action against our clients, a national firm and its principal who specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers who do not realize such lost property exists. The plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action on the heels of having suffered a smarting defeat in an attempted class action lawsuit against our clients. In that underlying litigation, the lower court dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit twice, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal. The plaintiff brought this action to preempt any attempts by our clients to someday bring a Dragonetti claim against him for filing the class action lawsuit in the underlying litigation without probable cause. We filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action, asserting that his lawsuit was improper because it was asking the court to make a decision on an issue that had not yet arisen. The court granted our motion and soundly rejected the plaintiff’s claims, issuing an opinion that decisively stated, “No amendment would save [plaintiff’s] Amended Complaint.” The lawsuit against our clients was dismissed with prejudice.

Mark Kozlowski (Scranton, PA) obtained summary judgment in Carbon County, Pennsylvania, in a negligence action brought against a local school district. The plaintiff, a former high school athlete, was working out in the District’s weight lifting facility when a cable snapped on a leg curl machine, striking his head and causing significant injury. In his suit against the District, the plaintiff alleged negligence in the operation, inspection, and maintenance of the gym and, more specifically, the leg curl machine. Following discovery, the District moved for summary judgment, arguing that the leg curl machine at issue was personalty and not part of the District’s real property and, accordingly, the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) prevented recovery. The court agreed and concluded the District was immune under the PSTCA since all evidence showed that the leg curl machine was not a fixture of the building and, therefore, the “real property” exception to local governmental immunity did not apply.

Trish Monahan (Pittsburgh, PA) successfully handled a pension rights action before the Commonwealth Court on behalf of a municipality. A police chief in a small municipality alleged that a scrivener’s error in his employment contract erroneously referencing Act 600 entitled him to an Act 600 pension plan upon retirement, even though his existing pension plan had been organized pursuant to Act 15. The police chief had never contributed to an Act 600 pension plan, which would have provided for much higher benefits and for which the municipality had no funds set aside to pay because it had never established an Act 600 plan. The Commonwealth Court held that the police chief’s pension rights existed only under Act 15 because the municipal pension ordinance was established under Act 15, not Act 600. Pennsylvania law requires an ordinance to establish pension rights, which cannot be conferred only by agreement, without an ordinance. This decision was very important to the municipality we represented, which did not have funds to pay Act 600 pension benefits to the police chief upon his retirement. The opinion affirms well-established law that a municipality cannot contract for benefits if there is no enabling law for the benefits.

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias (Mount Laurel, NJ) obtained the dismissal of an ethics grievance on behalf of an attorney specializing in special education law. The grievant filed her ethics grievance based upon allegations of fraudulent and unethical practices, accusing the attorney of taking legal fees from a settlement, and alleging the attorney was prohibited from doing so based on the terms of the settlement agreement. Specifically, the grievant alleged that the attorney failed to safeguard funds from an irrevocable trust for a special needs child, the grievant’s son. In fully investigating this grievance, the District Ethics Investigator concluded that, based on the evidence received, the interviews conducted and the submissions prepared on behalf of the attorney, the investigation did not reveal clear and convincing evidence that the attorney engaged in unethical conduct.

In another case handled by Jack and Jeremy, they successfully argued before the Appellate Division that the trial court was correct in dismissing a case on summary judgment. The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in a $10 million tortious interference and defamation case filed by borrowers against the attorneys for a lender bank. This case arose out of an underlying deficiency and foreclosure action filed by a bank due to the plaintiff’s failure to repay a multi-million dollar loan used to finance the purchase of real estate. During the course of negotiations to resolve the debt, the bank’s counsel had discussions with the plaintiff’s new lender. The plaintiff alleged that during these discussions, the defendant attorney called the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster.” The Appellate Division held that the trial judge correctly concluded that a statement made by the bank’s attorney to a potential new lender calling the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster” was mere name calling and not actionable defamation. Jack and Jeremy argued on appeal that this pejorative was simply name calling and did not rise to the level of actionable defamation or slander. The claims for tortious interference were based upon the lost opportunity since the new lender rescinded its conditional commitment after the alleged statement was made. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court was correct in holding that the statements were protected under the litigation privilege. The Appellate Division held that the litigation privilege is not confined to the courtroom, but extends to all statements or communications in connection with judicial proceedings. 

 

Workers’ Compensation Department

Ross Carrozza (Scranton, PA) prevailed on an appeal of a black lung decision. The case involved a coal miner who worked underground mining for over 23 years. The claimant originally appealed the Administrative Law Judge’s decision denying benefits, contending that the judge erred in weighing the evidence in failing to find total disability. After careful consideration, the Benefits Review Board found that the judge’s denial of the claimant’s benefits was appropriate and that the claimant had not established total disability, a change in condition, or a mistake in fact on the appeal. Consequently, the employer prevailed. 

Benjamin Durstein (Wilmington, DE) won on appeal that affirmed a decision of the Industrial Accident Board which denied a claimant’s petition for a recurrence of total disability benefits due to a worsening of her complex regional pain syndrome. The Delaware Superior Court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s ultimate determination and preference for the employer’s medical expert’s and vocational expert’s opinions, over those of the claimant’s experts.

Benjamin again prevailed before the Industrial Accident Board in a matter where the Board denied the claimant’s petition for additional compensation due on all counts and granted the employer’s petition for review to terminate total disability benefits. Specifically, the Board concluded that: (1) a proposed left ankle reconstruction surgery was not reasonable and necessary; (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove a compensable left knee injury; (3) there was insufficient evidence to prove a compensable lumbar spine injury; and (4) the claimant was capable of unrestricted return to work.

In a final victory for Benjamin, he successfully contested an evidentiary motion before the Industrial Accident Board. The Board denied a claimant’s motion to exclude surveillance evidence produced after the “30-day deadline,” reasoning that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudice to the claimant. The evidence was deemed admissible for impeachment purposes.

Keri Morris-Johnson (Wilmington, DE) successfully defended a workers’ compensation claim where the Delaware Superior Court affirmed the Industrial Accident Board, finding that the claimant was not in the course and scope of employment when the injury occurred. 

Tony Natale (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended a regional energy efficiency service agency against a claim petition wherein the claimant attempted to use the COVID pandemic to support payments of disability. The claimant alleged that a work-related auto accident disabled him from employment at the time he was subject to an economic lay-off due to the pandemic. Tony convinced the court that, at the time of layoff, the claimant was capable of performing his pre-injury job duties despite alleged restrictions due to the motor vehicle accident. The judge also found the claimant to have made a full and complete recovery from the work injury during the pandemic lay-off and that the claimant demonstrated no good reason for his failure to return to work once the pandemic restrictions dissipated. The claim petition was denied and dismissed.

In another matter handled by Tony on behalf of a Berks County mushroom farm, he succeeded in arguing for dismissal of a claimant’s appeal to a Workers’ Compensation Judge’s decision that terminated and suspended benefits awarded for injuries to the claimant’s head, neck, and back while in the course and scope of employment. The central allegation on the claimant’s appeal was that he had a reasonable excuse to continue to miss work, despite being released to return to work by various experts. The claimant argued that obligations to sick members of his family trumped the employer’s request for him to return to work. The claimant also argued that he was not fully recovered from his work injuries and tried to convince the Appeal Board that other injuries existed which were not addressed by the judge. The appeal was dismissed in its entirety based on Tony’s argument that the claimant attempted to undermine credibility determinations made by the judge regarding medical experts and further tried to amend the Workers’ Compensation Act by changing the law as to refusal of available employment.

Finally, Tony successfully prosecuted two cases involving abandonment of available employment and ultimate full recovery from an accepted work injury. In the first case, Tony successfully prosecuted termination and suspension petitions on behalf of a Berks County food distributor. He was able to use the claimant’s own treating physician to certify that she fully recovered from her work-related injuries and that she was fully capable of continuing to work in a job position she had abandoned without just cause. The termination and suspension petitions were both granted by the judge.

In the second case, Tony successfully defended a Berks County can corporation in a claim petition involving a hand injury with subsequent discharge from employment due to abandonment of open and available work. The claimant sustained a thumb injury while working as a machine operator, and the employer accepted a medical only injury. The claimant continued to work his full-duty job, despite the injury, until he was discharged for cause—walking off of the job. The claimant tried to convince the court that he left work due to “high blood pressure” issues and that he was entitled to disability benefits. However, the employer’s fact witnesses disputed this allegation. The claimant then underwent surgery and alleged that his surgery disabled him from all employment and that he was still entitled to benefits. The employer presented fact witness testimony confirming that one-armed work was available to the claimant, despite his surgery, and that had he not been discharged for cause, but for job abandonment. The judge dismissed the claimant’s request for disability benefits.

Rachel Ramsay-Lowe (Roseland, NJ) successfully defended an appeal where the Judge of Workers’ Compensation found the claimant not credible. The judge also found that the claimant’s expert was not competent, as the expert rendered an opinion in reliance upon an incomplete medical history. 

Andrea Rock (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended a claim by limiting liability of benefits based upon strong medical expert testimony. In her claim petition, the claimant alleged that she sustained a contusion to the back of her head, a concussion, bilateral shoulder pain and neck pain. The judge found the claimant credible and that an incident did occur in the course and scope of her employment. However, the judge also found the employer’s medical expert credible. The employer’s medical expert found that the claimant was fully recovered as of the date of the Independent Medical Examination. This limited the receipt of indemnity and medical to fourteen months, rather than an ongoing claim.

Robin Romano (Philadelphia, PA) successfully prosecuted multiple petitions. They included a petition to terminate benefits regarding an accepted and infected lower leg laceration, a petition to review to expand the nature of injuries on the notice of compensation payable to include the lower back, a petition to review the average weekly wage, two utilization review petitions regarding treatment to the low back, and a petition to modify and suspend based upon the claimant’s return to work without the knowledge of the carrier. Also at issue were two penalty petitions, one alleging late wage loss payments, which, after testimony by the adjuster, was dismissed by the judge as baseless. 

Michael Sebastian (Scranton, PA) successfully defended claim and penalty petitions filed that alleged a left hand and thumb injury requiring surgery. The judge granted the claim petition and awarded the payment of medical benefits. However, he did not order the payment of any indemnity benefits based on a post-injury termination for cause and based upon the testimony of the employer’s witnesses that work, even one-armed work, was available to the claimant. The judge terminated the claimant’s benefits based upon an IME report.

Michael also successfully defended a claim petition that alleged a work-related hernia. His defense expert found the claimant fully recovered, and the court agreed. He also successfully defended an appeal in this case, alleging that the claimant did not provide notice of the hernia within 120 days. The Appeal Board reversed the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s finding that the claimant did not provide notice that the hernia was work-related.

Judd Woytek (King of Prussia, PA) successfully defeated a claim petition and obtained a termination of benefits. The injury was accepted for a foot contusion for medical benefits only. The claimant claimed much more severe injuries and sought wage loss benefits after his termination from employment. Judd successfully argued that the injury was limited to a contusion from which the claimant had recovered and that his termination was for cause. The Workers’ Compensation judge denied the claim petition and granted our termination petition. 

Judd also successfully obtained withdrawal of a claim petition based upon jurisdiction. In this case, the claimant was a truck driver who lived in Delaware. His injury occurred in Tennessee, where the employer is based. The claimant had attended orientation at the employer’s facility in Pennsylvania, but was not hired there or directed out of that location. Judd was able to convince claimant’s counsel to withdraw the claim petition based upon lack of jurisdiction for a claim in Pennsylvania.

Finally, Judd, along with Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) in our appellate department, obtained a favorable decision from the Commonwealth Court in a case involving a pre-Protz Impairment Rating Evaluation. The claimant had stipulated to a change in his benefit status from total to partial based upon an IRE performed in 2014. After Protz, the claimant sought reinstatement of total disability status. The Workers’ Compensation Judge granted the claimant’s petition and reinstated temporary total disability status as of the date the claimant had filed his petition in 2018. The Appeal Board affirmed. The Commonwealth Court, however, agreed with Judd and Audrey’s arguments that the claimant was not entitled to a reinstatement to total disability status because he had stipulated to the change in his disability status. The court held that the claimant was bound by the stipulation despite the intervening change in the law.

*Results do not guarantee a similar result.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Reaffirms That Actual Cash Value Includes Labor and Overhead, Not Just Materials

Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-1964, (Fla. 2nd DCA May 8, 2026). The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract suit against Universal for refusal to pay for all of plaintiffs’ damages from a storm in November 2020. Universal filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning both actual cash value and replacement cost value of the loss. They argued that the plaintiffs did not complete repairs or incur any expenses in repairing the damaged property, thus being limited to actual cash value as their measure of damage and the plaintiffs’ submitted estimate of damages contained labor costs necessary for repair and, therefore, not an actual cash value estimate. Universal further asked for a directed verdict at the hearing because the plaintiffs would have no evidence to support the claim for damages. The trial court agreed and granted Universal’s motion, entering a final judgment in Universal’s favor.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration due to the court improperly converting Universal’s motion in limine to a motion for final summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the trial court improperly entered a final judgment based on a pretrial ruling in limine, advising there was recognized procedures, including summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and default judgment that could have been exercised. Further, the court continued that the improper procedure was not the only reason for the judgment to be reversed. They noted the insurance policy did not provide a definition of actual cash value nor how to calculate it, and the parties disputed the definition and calculation of such.  Universal argued that actual cash value is defined as the value of the property that suffered the direct physical loss less depreciation and deductible, i.e. costs of physical materials that were damaged.  The plaintiffs argued that actual cash value includes the amount of repair costs in addition to the value of the property that suffered direct physical loss because it is calculated as the replacement cost minus depreciation.  The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that Universal’s definition was not supported by the insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor decisional authority.  The court noted that Universal “cherry-picked” the phrase “direct physical loss” from the perils insured against provision and applied it to the loss settlement provision, which doesn’t state “direct physical loss,” but instead states “insured loss.”  Further, the court conveyed that application of “direct physical loss” would be used on both actual cash value and replacement cost value, as they are both present in the loss settlement provision, which would mean insureds never got payments beyond costs of physically damaged material, which is contradictory to the replacement cost value definition.  The court advised that the Florida Supreme Court had approved the court’s interpretation of actual cash value as including costs other than damaged physical property, including overhead and profit, noting that these costs can be included in actual cash value to which a portion, like all other costs, could be depreciated. The court noted the difference between actual cash value and replacement cost value is not between types of costs, i.e. materials vs. labor, but between the valuation of the costs with the distinction of being a depreciated vs. undepreciated value. The court refused to exclude intangible costs such as labor, profit and overhead from actual cash value, finding these costs inclusions were consistent with statutory and contractual language as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court.

Thought Leadership

Sixth DCA Rejects Prejudice Requirement for Excluding Late‑Disclosed Expert Opinions, Certifies Conflict with Sixteen DCAs

Michael John Crecelius v. Mildred Rizzitano; (February 27, 2026) Crecelius involved an appeal by a defendant of the trial court’s exclusion of its late disclosed experts at trial. The defendant was involved in a vehicle accident, in which he made a left turn into an intersection and collided with the plaintiff, killing him. Plaintiff’s estate sued for negligence. The defendant disclosed two experts after the deadline imposed by the court. The disclosure described each expert’s anticipated scope of work, but did not contain their respective substantive opinions. Approximately three-weeks before trial, both expert reports were provided. The plaintiff moved to strike the experts’ testimony, arguing it was prejudiced because their expert had insufficient time to prepare rebuttal testimony before trial. The defendant argued the late disclosures were due to the experts’ not diligently providing reports and opinions to the defendant and there was no bad faith. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The plaintiff obtained a verdict in its favor, finding the defendant 100% at fault, to which the defendant appealed. The defendant argued on appeal that the experts’ opinions were received three weeks before trial, so any prejudice to the plaintiff was insufficient to warrant exclusion of his experts, and any prejudice could have been cured by a brief continuance. The defendant argued that he suffered extreme prejudice, as striking his witnesses left the plaintiff’s experts uncontradicted. In reaching its decision in Crecelius, the 6th DCA addressed the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981) at length, which addressed late disclosed experts. The Crecelius court found that its sister courts have consistently misapplied the Binger opinion, which “has severely ambered the ability of trial judges to effectively manage civil lawsuits and . . . prevent surprises at trial and to assist arriving at the truth.” The court wrote, “if the trial court finds that the undisclosed witness will not prejudice the other party after considering the factors listed in Binger, then the witness should be allowed to testify – as binding holding,” highlighting that its sister courts improperly expanded the Binger opinion to apply to undisclosed opinions of disclosed experts. The court criticized this approach, finding it meant that a trial judge could not enforce pretrial orders and exclude undisclosed testimony without first finding that the opposing party was prejudiced. The court noted that approach puts the burden on the opposing party to make an adequate showing of prejudice, potentially in the middle of trial and with no notice, which is inappropriate and incentivizes non-disclosure. The court explained that completing a last-minute deposition prior to trial to cure any prejudice also places a burden on the non-offending party, and even offering a continuance, puts that party in a position of having to choose between inadequate time to prepare or delay the trial, none of which is proper. The Crecelius court found that “Binger concerned undisclosed witness testimony that was improperly allowed and should have been excluded due to prejudice to other party. Binger did not concern undisclosed testimony that was improperly excluded or what the trial court should have considered before excluding undisclosed testimony.” Additionally, the Crecelius court found the statement in the Binger opinion “about what a trial court considers before excluding an undisclosed witness’s testimony was pure dictum” and that nothing in that statement led to the judgment, and thus, was not binding on it or on trial courts. The court noted that Binger expressly stated trial courts can issue pretrial orders that prohibit the introduction of undisclosed opinions, and those orders do not derogate from its decision. Trial courts are permitted to strictly enforce pretrial orders and to require them to make a finding of prejudice before doing so makes the ability to enforce court orders meaningless. The court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s order, striking the defendant’s witnesses, finding that Binger imposes no requirement that a trial court find that the opposing party would be prejudiced by the introduction of an undisclosed or late-disclosed expert opinion before excluding the opinion and certified conflict with 16 decisions out of the 1st DCA, 2nd DCA, 3rd DCA and 4th DCA.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order

All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate.  The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.