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Defense Digest

New York’s Consumer Litigation Funding Act: New Protections, Continuing Questions

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 3, September 2026

September 30, 2026

by Deeba Haeri

Key Points:
• The Consumer Litigation Funding Act establishes New York’s first comprehensive regulatory framework governing consumer litigation funding transactions.
• The Act strengthens consumer protections through fee caps, attorney-independence safeguards, and limitations on funders’ involvement, among others, in litigation.
• Despite these reforms, questions remain regarding the discoverability of litigation-funding arrangements and the scope of the Act’s new confidentiality protections.


New York has joined a growing number of jurisdictions seeking to regulate the rapidly expanding litigation funding industry. On December 19, 2025, Governor Hochul signed the Consumer Litigation Funding Act ("CLFA"), A804-C/S1104A, into law. Following amendments in 2026, the statute took effect on June 17, 2026.

The CLFA provides a regulatory framework to govern consumer litigation funding transactions, in which a third-party funding company advances money to an individual with a pending or anticipated civil claim in exchange for a contingent right to repayment from any future recovery. The statute requires funding companies to register with the State, provide specified disclosures, use plain-language contracts, and comply with restrictions governing fees, recoveries, and business practices.

The CLFA's most significant consumer protection is its limitation on recoveries. A funding company cannot require a consumer to pay charges exceeding 25% of the gross proceeds of the legal claim, plus the funded amount. This cap encompasses all charges, including administrative fees, origination fees, underwriting fees, and interest, regardless of how those charges are denominated. Furthermore, the funded amount and charges are only payable from the proceeds of the resolution of the claim. As such, consumers are prohibited to pay anything that exceeds the available proceeds, establishing a true nonrecourse structure. Consumers are also afforded a 10-business-day right of rescission and may prepay without penalty.

The CLFA defines a consumer litigation funding company as one that enters into a contract of no more than $500,000 with a consumer. This figure operates as both a definitional ceiling and a substantive prohibition: transactions exceeding that amount fall outside the statute's regulatory framework and thus, are not governed by the statute. Consequently, high-value cases involving larger funding arrangements are not guaranteed the protections afforded by the CLFA.

Beyond regulating fees and recovery, the CLFA includes provisions designed to preserve attorney independence and ensure that litigation decisions remain exclusively with the consumer and its attorneys. To that end, litigation funding companies are prohibited from entering into contracts with consumers represented by attorneys holding a financial interest in the funding company. The law further prohibits funding companies from influencing, or attempting to influence, decisions concerning litigation strategy, settlement, or the disposition of a claim. Those decisions remain exclusively between the plaintiff and its attorney.

The statute also provides confidentiality protections for certain communications between attorneys and litigation funding companies. It provides that all communications between the consumer's attorney and the funding company pertaining to the legal funding falls within the scope of attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. While intended to facilitate funding-related discussions and protect sensitive information, those protections raise a question the CLFA does not directly answer: to what extent are litigation funding arrangements discoverable in civil litigation?

Even before the CLFA took effect, New York courts had begun addressing those questions. In Lituma v. Liberty Coca-Cola Beverages LLC, the First Department held that litigation funding information was discoverable because the defendants established that it was "material and necessary" to their defense. Lituma v. Liberty Coca-Cola Beverages LLC, 243 A.D.3d 504, 505 (1st Dep't 2025). The court relied on evidence suggesting a broader scheme involving suspicious accidents, medical providers, and other participants, concluding that funding information could reveal a financial motive for fabricating the accident.

Just three months later, however, the First Department clarified that litigation funding information is not automatically discoverable. In Perdomo v. 361 E. Realty Assoc. LLC, the court rejected efforts to compel disclosure absent a factual basis suggesting that the requested materials would reveal an improper motive or fraudulent conduct. Perdomo v. 361 E. Realty Assoc. LLC, 246 A.D.3d 541, 541-542 (1st Dep't 2026).

Together, Lituma and Perdomo establish that litigation funding agreements are neither automatically discoverable nor categorically protected from disclosure. Rather, discoverability depends on whether a defendant presents sufficient evidence suggesting fraud or an improper financial motive. Absent such a showing, courts are unlikely to permit broad inquiries into a plaintiff's funding arrangements. However, the enactment of the CLFA complicates this landscape by extending attorney-client privilege and work-product protections to communications regarding legal funding, leaving open questions regarding the interaction between those protections and existing discovery standards.

The CLFA represents an important step toward regulating an industry that previously operated with limited statutory oversight. By imposing consumer protections through its capped fees and recoveries, restrictions in funding company involvement in litigation decisions, and preservation of attorney independence, the statute creates a framework that did not previously exist. Yet significant questions remain. The statute does not resolve how litigation funding arrangements will be treated in discovery, particularly in light of its newly- enacted confidentiality provisions. As litigation funding continues to expand in New York, courts will play a central role in defining the practical limits of both the CLFA and the evolving case law surrounding third-party litigation funding more broadly.

Deeba is an Associate in our New York, NY office. She can be reached at 212-376-6436 or DDhaeri@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.