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Case Law Alerts

Courts will not give the benefit of doubt, even in the face of a pandemic, to excuse lack of good faith effort to serve a complaint.

Bellan v. Penn Presbyterian Medical Center, 2022 WL 515805 – Feb. 22, 2022

April 1, 2022

by Gabor Ovari

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s nursing staff failed to adequately treat his pressure wounds. The plaintiff filed a complaint on September 23, 2020, and failed to serve the defendant within 30 days after filing the complaint. The plaintiff also failed to reinstate the complaint. 

The defendant filed preliminary objections based on improper service of process. In opposition to the preliminary objections, the plaintiff argued that he attempted to serve the complaint, but his process server was informed that there was no one available at the defendant’s offices to accept service due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the plaintiff argued that service could not be completed due to the defendant’s failure to leave anyone in charge to accept service. The plaintiff contended that he was unable to find an agent of the defendant who would accept service of his complaint. The trial court was not receptive to this argument and dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania observed that the law requires that a plaintiff must make a good-faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on a defendant. When a defendant presents a factual dispute as to whether a plaintiff fulfilled this duty, the plaintiff carries an evidentiary burden to demonstrate that he met this requirement. If a plaintiff presents credible evidence that there was a good faith attempt at service, then the requirement is fulfilled. However, in contrast, if a plaintiff does not present such evidence, then he fails this evidentiary burden, regardless of whether his actions (or inaction) were intentional, unintentional or otherwise. 

In this case, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to show he acted diligently in making a good-faith effort to serve the defendant with notice that he had filed his complaint. The court observed that lack of due diligence was apparent in this case and the attempt to blame the COVID-19 pandemic was not a sufficient excuse. 

This  case demonstrates that courts will not give the benefit of doubt, even in the face of a pandemic, to excuse a lack of good faith effort to serve a complaint. Defense counsel should be careful about evaluating what efforts a plaintiff has made to serve the complaint and, if appropriate, this argument should be raised via preliminary objections. Based on the facts outlined in this case, courts seem to require more than just a singular attempt to effectuate service. 
 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, April 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.