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Case Law Alerts

A plaintiff has no obligation to choose one theory of liability, thereby excluding other theories.

Lageman v. Zepp, 266 A.3d 572 (Pa. 2021)

April 1, 2022

by Gabor Ovari

The plaintiff alleged an anesthesiologist, during a surgical procedure, incorrectly inserted into the carotid artery the central line, which allegedly caused the plaintiff to sustain a stroke. Specifically, the plaintiff underwent surgery for a small bowel obstruction. The defendant was responsible for monitoring the patient’s vital signs during the surgery. After the procedure, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a stroke in the distribution of the right internal carotid artery where the procedure was performed. The plaintiff’s theories of liability were based on negligence and on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The trial court declined to charge the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and the jury found for the defendant. The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the plaintiff adduced evidence to satisfy the elements for a charge of res ipsa loquitur

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the Superior Court. The Supreme Court grounded its rationale on an equitable foundation. The court held that under the circumstances of this case, where the evidence available to the plaintiff is less than conclusive on the elements of negligence, asking the plaintiff to choose which evidentiary approach to pursue is unfair. Significantly, the court held that the plaintiff was not precluded from presenting a theory of recovery based on res ipsa loquitur when also presented a theory based on direct evidence of negligence. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. 

The Supreme Court explained that the primary question that must be considered to determine whether a charge of res ipsa loquitur is appropriate is whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie showing of the factors outlined Section 328D found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, namely: (a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.

This case is significant in showing that it is important to consider the allegations of res ipsa loquitur presented by the plaintiffs early on. A plaintiff has no obligation to choose one theory of liability and thereby exclude other theories. This presents multiple avenues for plaintiffs to present their cases. Therefore, counsel should be prepared to contest allegations based on multiple theories early on in a lawsuit in order to make every effort take away additional option from plaintiffs. 
 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, April 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.