.

Defense Digest

A Law Firm Defending a Named Physician Cannot Also Represent a Non-Party Treating Physician for Purposes of a Subpoenaed Deposition

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Daniel Dolente

Key Points:

  • The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure prevent a defendant from contacting or otherwise discussing the case with one of the plaintiff’s treating physicians.
  • Absent written approval from counsel for the plaintiff, if a law firm represents a named defendant physician in a medical malpractice case, different attorneys from that same law firm may not represent a non-party treating physician for purposes of a subpoenaed deposition.
  • The Superior Court has held that, allowing a defense firm to represent both would be the equivalent to having prohibited ex parte communications with the non-party treating physician.

During the course of discovery in many medical malpractice actions, after written discovery is exchanged between the parties and medical records are subpoenaed, there comes a point where one or more of the parties will want to question a plaintiff’s treating physician. While there is no rule preventing a plaintiff from contacting and discussing the case with his own doctors, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure prevent a defendant from contacting or otherwise discussing the case with one of the plaintiff’s treating physicians. Such a situation is addressed by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.6, “Discovery of Treating Physician,” which states:

Information may be obtained from the treating physician of a party only upon written consent of that party or through a method of discovery authorized by this chapter. This rule shall not prevent an attorney from obtaining information from:

(1) the attorney’s client;

(2) an employee of the attorney’s client; or

(3) an ostensible employee of the attorney’s client.

Pennsylvania courts have stated that the purpose of Rule 4003.6 is to prevent ex parte communications between opposing counsel and a plaintiff’s treating physician, meaning discussions outside of the normal course of discovery devices, such as written interrogatories or depositions where all parties are invited to attend. The courts have reasoned that there is a recognized privacy interest underlying the physician-patient relationship and a physician has a duty of loyalty to his patient that should be protected. Thus, there are only three exceptions to the rule prohibiting a defendant from speaking to a plaintiff’s physician.

Rule 4003.6 was recently examined by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Mertis v. Oh, 2022 WL 3036698 (Pa. Super. Aug. 2, 2022). In Mertis, the plaintiff underwent an orthopaedic procedure performed by surgeon Eugene Kim, M.D. Prior to the procedure, the anesthesiologist, Don-Joon Oh, M.D., administered a femoral nerve block. The plaintiff alleged that Dr. Oh administered the nerve block negligently, causing her a femoral nerve injury and leaving her partially disabled in the left leg. In the subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiff named Dr. Oh as a defendant but did not name Dr. Kim.

During the course of discovery, plaintiff’s counsel subpoenaed the surgeon, Dr. Kim, to appear for a deposition. When Dr. Kim received the subpoena, he asked his professional liability insurer to assign an attorney he knew, who also happened to work for the same law firm representing the defendant, Dr. Oh. The law firm appropriately advised Dr. Kim they were already representing a named defendant in the case, Dr. Oh, and that a conflict waiver would be required if a different attorney from the firm was to represent Dr. Kim for purposes of his deposition. Dr. Kim knowingly signed the waiver, allowing the law firm to represent him for purposes of the deposition. Additionally, the attorney assigned to represent Dr. Kim wrote to plaintiff’s counsel, notifying him that he would be representing Dr. Kim for purposes of the deposition. Counsel for the plaintiff did not respond to this letter for six months.

Approximately nine months later, the plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion for sanctions to disqualify the law firm from representing the defendants and to preclude further alleged ex parte communications with the plaintiff’s treating physician. This motion was based on Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.6. The trial court denied the motion for disqualification and sanctions, holding there was no evidence the attorney for Dr. Oh had any ex parte communications with the attorney for Dr. Kim. The plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Superior Court first looked at the Rule itself, which states that opposing counsel may only obtain information from a party’s treating physician by securing written consent of that party or through an authorized method of discovery, such as written interrogatories, request for production of documents or deposition. In applying Rule 4003.6, the Superior Court held that none of the exceptions applied and that the rule was violated.

In so ruling, the Mertis court did not adopt the defense’s argument that exception number 1, which provides that Rule 4003.6 does “not prevent an attorney from obtaining information from the attorney’s client,” applied in this case. That is, it did not matter that Dr. Kim was a client of the same firm that represented Dr. Oh. The Superior Court did not find persuasive the facts that: (1) Dr. Kim elected to have a different attorney from Dr. Oh’s law firm represent him; (2) Dr. Kim signed a waiver of the conflict of interest; (3) the trial court found no evidence of any ex parte communications between the lawyers for Dr. Oh and Dr. Kim; and (4) the plaintiff’s counsel was promptly notified of Dr. Kim’s representation and waited six months to raise any objection.

Rather, the Superior Court reasoned that Rule 4003.6 “never envisioned” the same law firm would represent both a defendant in the case and a treating physician. According to the Superior Court, allowing the defense firm to represent the surgeon, while also representing the anesthesiologist, was the same thing as having ex parte communications. On this basis, the court found the first exception to Rule 4003.6 inapplicable and held that the defense firm violated Rule 4003.6. The case is currently on remand to the trial court to determine whether defense counsel should be disqualified.

After Mertis, the Superior Court has laid down a clear, bright-line rule. Absent written approval from counsel for the plaintiff, if a law firm represents a named defendant in the plaintiff’s case, different attorneys from that same law firm may not represent a non-party treating physician for purposes of a subpoenaed deposition.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.