Results

We successfully defended a machine shop in the litigation of a claim petition involving post-concussion syndrome. The claimant was struck in the head with a wrench while repairing a machine for the employer. The carrier accepted a head laceration by way of medical only notice of compensation payable. The claimant was treated for a laceration to the side of his head and released to return to work. Several months later, he was taken out of work by his treating neurologist for symptoms allegedly related to post concussive syndrome. The claimant then returned to modified duties within new work release restrictions. He abandoned that job several weeks later, alleging he was totally disabled due to post concussive syndrome. We presented surveillance evidence demonstrating the claimant’s ability to perform all activities of daily living. A nationally renowned neurologist testified that, while the claimant suffered a mild concussion at the time of injury, he did not suffer from post concussive syndrome and was fully recovered. The claimant’s co-workers testified that they observed the claimant after the injury, and the claimant was able to continue working with no signs of post concussive problems. We cross examined the claimant, and it was discovered that he was performing work duties on his own in the carpentry field, despite alleging he was totally disabled. The workers’ compensation judge opined that the claimant’s injuries were limited to the head laceration and mild concussion, and then concluded that those injuries had fully recovered. The claimant was due no additional workers’ compensation benefits other than what he had already received. The claim petition for disability was dismissed.

We successfully prosecuted a termination petition on behalf of a national water company. ​After securing all prior medical records, the defense  uncovered a past medical history of similar complaints and treatment, and a later fall that was not disclosed by the claimant. After questioning, the claimant admitted to the nature and extent of his prior treatment, including office visits, prescription medication and MRIs, which supported our contention that his prior complaints were virtually identical. The workers’ compensation judge found that the claimant was not credible because his testimony contradicted the defense medical expert. Additionally, the judge found the defense medical expert to be competent, credible, persuasive and showed that the claimant was fully recovered from his work injuries, the resulting three surgeries, and all residuals. As such, the termination petition was granted.

We were successful in obtaining the dismissal of the plaintiff’s corporate negligence claims against an adult inpatient drug rehabilitation center. The plaintiff filed a complaint under wrongful death and survival acts, alleging that the decedent died of unspecified cardiac dysrhythmia while she was a voluntary inpatient resident at the facility. The complaint included claims of negligence/vicarious liability and corporate negligence. We filed preliminary objections seeking to dismiss the corporate negligence claim against the facility. We argued that the plaintiff’s cause of action for corporate negligence against it must be dismissed with prejudice because the doctrine of corporate negligence, as a matter of law, does not extend to drug and alcohol treatment facilities but, instead, applies only to hospitals, HMOs, nursing homes and professional medical corporations. In response, the plaintiff argued that the preliminary objections should be overruled because she alleged in the complaint that the defendant owed the same duties to the decedent that are owed to patients by hospitals, as set forth in Thompson v. Nason, the seminal corporate negligence case. The court ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s arguments, sustained our preliminary objections, and dismissed the plaintiff’s corporate negligence claim against the defendant, with prejudice.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a commercial tenant in a premises liability case. The plaintiff brought suit against our client, the commercial landlord and the City of Newark. The plaintiff alleged that the parties failed to maintain a condition of the sidewalk that caused a trip and fall. We moved for summary judgment for contractual indemnification, arguing that the co-defendant commercial landlord was obligated under the language of the lease to indemnify our client for the landlord’s own negligence. At oral arguments, we were able to establish that the language of the lease was clear and that it was undisputed that our client had no duty to the plaintiff. Furthermore, we were able to argue that the motion was not premature, as the co-defendant’s opposition conceded that, based on the language of the lease, we had no duty. The judge agreed with our arguments, and the court granted our motion for summary judgment and required the landlord to indemnify our client.

​The issue involved whether the injured employee was the statutory employee of our client, or of the subcontractor who actually hired him. The injured worker was hired by a subcontractor during the aftermath of the Category 5 storm, Hurricane Michael, that hit near Panama City, Florida on October 10, 2018. The subcontractor’s company could not provide hiring paperwork that would have confirmed workers’ compensation coverage by the employee leasing company due to lack of electricity, internet connections and cellular service. Therefore, the parties agreed that the hiring paperwork would be hand delivered to the risk manager for the employee leasing company. The worker was injured one day before the hiring paperwork was hand delivered, but after the parties had agreed on hand delivery of the paperwork. The court found this to be sufficient evidence of detrimental reliance and of a disputed issue of material fact that the motion for summary judgment was denied.

We prevailed at the trial court level and on appeal in a medical malpractice action filed against a Florida hospital and three of its trauma/critical care physicians. ​It was alleged that the patient was overmedicated with narcotics during her 64-day hospital stay, resulting in acute respiratory failure and other complications, which caused her death. The plaintiff’s sole expert on liability and causation was a retired internal medicine physician. On the eve of trial, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the plaintiff’s expert lacked the requisite qualifications under Florida law to render opinions against the hospital and its three specialist physicians. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the final judgment without an opinion and granted the defendants’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees.

We prevailed on an appeal to the 5th District Court of Appeal in a medical malpractice action filed against a hospital and three of its trauma/critical care physicians. ​It was alleged that the patient was over-medicated with narcotics during her 64-day hospital stay, resulting in acute respiratory failure and other complications, which caused her death. The plaintiff’s sole expert on liability and causation was a retired internal medicine physician. On the eve of trial, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff’s expert lacked the requisite qualifications under Florida law to render opinions against the hospital and its three specialist physicians. The Fifth District affirmed the final judgment without an opinion and granted the defendants’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees.

Prevailed at trial in Broward County in defense of a property management company of a tax-credit housing community in Lauderhill. The plaintiff, the corporate owner of the property, brought claims for negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory breaches in the management and operation of the property. The case was litigated over seven years, and the plaintiff had sought millions of dollars in damages. After a week of the plaintiff’s testimony, and eviscerating cross-examinations, we were successful in obtaining a directed verdict.   

We successfully defended a significant dog mauling case against a landlord defendant. ​The plaintiff was fortunate to have survived the attack and suffered severe permanent physical and emotional trauma. The parties stipulated to damages of $1.75 million and submitted the case to binding arbitration on liability only. The case rested entirely on the credibility of the landlord who claimed that he had no knowledge that the tenant had a dog on the property. The law requires that the landlord know that the dog is present on the leased property and has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. There was a lot of evidence that the dog had exhibited very aggressive behavior to anyone it came into contact with prior to the event. The plaintiff argued that the landlord had to know of the presence of the dog and its dangerous propensities given the number of times the landlord visited the property. The arbitrator found in favor of the plaintiff and against the tenant only.

We obtained a dismissal of a legal malpractice action arising from a Law Against Discrimination and Conscientious Employment Practices Act action against a municipality and its School Board. In this complex multi-party action, our client, an expert in school law, was retained by the school district to handle a hearing against the plaintiff, a teacher and coach. The plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among the lawyers and the school board to oust the plaintiff. There were also allegations of malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process against the town and its attorneys. The court granted our motion and dismissed based on the litigation privilege.

The decision was later affirmed by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, and we successfully argued both the summary judgment motion and the appeal. The plaintiff, a condominium association, filed suit against the sponsor of a newly constructed mixed-use residential and commercial building in Hoboken, New Jersey. The plaintiff also sued the property management company, the general contractor and various subcontractors involved in the construction. A temporary certificate of occupancy was issued in March 2004 and the plaintiff did not commence litigation until June 2014—more than ten years after substantial completion. Therefore, the claims were barred by the ten-year Statute of Repose, N.J.S.A. § 2A14-1.1. The former property manager for the building and the sponsor entity had common ownership. The plaintiff argued the sponsor maintained control of the property by virtue of its continued involvement through the property management entity, and that the Statute of Repose did not apply to a party in actual possession and control of the property at the time that the defective and unsafe condition caused the injury or damage at issue. The Appellate Division held that the plain language of the Statute of Repose precludes any “action, whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise, to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, surveying, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property, [and] any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury . . . more than [ten] years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction.” N.J.S.A. 2A14-1.1(a). The court found that the claims were also barred by the six-year statute of limitations as the plaintiff alleged that the first repairs at the building were undertaken in 2004, and the complaint was not filed until 2014.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a boxing gym. ​The plaintiff, a seasoned boxing coach, claimed to have been injured when he fell out of a boxing ring during a sparring match at the defendant’s gym. The plaintiff asserted that while standing on the apron with his back to the ring, he was struck by one of the fighters and propelled out and onto the floor. He alleged the defendant was negligent because the boxing ring was “too high” and the flooring surface “too hard.” In granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court found first that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff because Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on sports facilities to protect spectators from risks that are common, frequent, and expected, and that the circumstances surrounding the incident eliminate any duty on the part of the defendant. The court also held that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s contentions that the boxing ring was too high or that the lack of padding on the surrounding floor was a deviation from an established custom. In fact, the evidence established that the boxing ring complied with national boxing regulations. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff did not appeal the decision.

We represented a plumbing subcontractor in a case venued in Supreme Court, Bronx County. ​The plaintiff alleged he sustained serious neck and back injuries as a result of falling pipes. The plaintiff had been hired by a subcontractor involved with boiler replacement work at a large residential building located in Manhattan. The plaintiff alleged violations of Labor Law Section 200, 240 and 241(6). These claims were alleged against the building owner, management company and various subcontractors at the site. The plaintiff alleged he sustained cervical and lumbar injuries resulting in a cervical fusion and lumbar discectomy. He also allegedly sustained a fracture of the thoracic spine. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff claimed he could not return to work. The settlement demand made before the motions were filed was in excess of $10 million. The court granted our summary judgment motion in its entirely and dismissed all claims against our client on the basis that our client had absolutely no involvement with the accident, having only performed work on the upper floors of the building. The court order also granted the cross motions by the other defendants, resulting in a complete dismissal of all claims against all defendants.

We were successful on a motion for summary judgment, thereby barring the application of the mode of operations in a slip and fall case where an alleged partially eaten sandwich was found in the aisle of the retailer. ​The facts indicated that the sandwich came from a fast-food sandwich shop within the premises and was dropped by an unidentified customer, who took the item to go and dropped it in the aisle before the plaintiff fell. The court ruled that the mode of operations did not apply because the aisle, which contained greeting cards and the like, and did not create an extension of the cafeteria within the retailer’s premises. Further, the court ruled there was no nexus to any self-serve component of the fast food restaurant’s business to the area in the retailer’s store proper where the accident occurred.

The claimant had established that he had worked in the coal mining industry and was exposed to coal dust for a period over 17 years. ​Medical evidence also established that the miner did indeed have coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (Black Lung). However, the judge found that the miner was not totally disabled due to his pneumoconiosis. Therefore, he was not entitled to benefits, and the claim was denied. In another Federal Black Lung benefits claim, we presented testimony to prove, through pulmonary function testing, arterial blood gas testing and medical opinion evidence, that a coal miner who had begun work in the coal mines at the age of twelve did not suffer from a totally disabling respiratory impairment that precluded him from engaging in his usual coal mine employment.

The plaintiff, a suspended high school principal, claimed that the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act had been violated when the doors to the administration building had been locked at the start of the first day of her termination hearing. The court considered the issues of whether a plaintiff is denied a right under the Pennsylvania School Code when access to the hearing room by the public is barred, and whether a public hearing qualifies as “official action” within the meaning of the Sunshine Act. The court found that the public hearing required by the school code is not concurrently a “meeting” within the meaning of the Sunshine Act and subject to its provisions. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district.

We secured the dismissal of a New York no-fault/personal injury protection (PIP) lost wages suit that carried a potential judgment of more than $1.37 million. The suit commenced in 2014, and over several years, the plaintiff was not cooperative in providing requested information. In 2018, the defense served a 90-day notice on the plaintiff, which advised that we would move for dismissal if the plaintiff did not take action or file a notice of trial within 90 days. The Rockland County Supreme Court Judge recognized that there was no activity in the case for years, but was apprehensive about dismissing the case on the spot. He scheduled an additional hearing and required the plaintiff and new counsel, if retained, to appear to discuss the case status and activity. When they did not appear, Scott successfully moved for dismissal.

We obtained a unanimous decision in the New Jersey Supreme Court reversing an order for a new trial. ​In this medical malpractice action, the defendant was a physician who allegedly committed malpractice when he prescribed a drug to a patient. According to the plaintiff's experts, she was not an appropriate candidate for the drug. The matter was tried by another law firm before a jury, which reached a defense verdict. However, on appeal to the Appellate Division, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the defendant's change of testimony at trial, from what it had been in his deposition, prejudiced the plaintiff. The matter was then transferred to Marshall Dennehey for further appeal in the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the defense’s argument that the precedent which the Appellate Division had relied upon in ordering the new trial was distinguishable. Further, the fact that plaintiff's counsel failed to object to the changed testimony at trial was likely strategic and, therefore, did not prejudice the plaintiff sufficiently to compel the reversal. The court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict. 

We successfully tried a premises liability action to a defense verdict in favor of a resident’s association in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, and also successfully defended against the plaintiff’s appeal. ​The plaintiff, who was a community resident (formerly married to a unit owner but not an owner herself), claimed that she tripped and fell on a tree branch on common area steps at night as a result of a burned out PECO-owned lamp, and that the Association failed to ensure that the light was fixed. The plaintiff had asked for either invitee status or a hybrid charge on duty, but the court agreed with the defense that she was able to use the common areas by permission, not by invitation, making her a licensee only. This resulted in the duty owed being only to make the property as safe as it appeared. The defense presented multiple instances of notice to PECO of the burned-out light, and the plaintiff conceded the defense contention that it could not change the bulb itself because PECO owned the lamp. The plaintiff also conceded that she had been aware of the light being out for some time. The jury unanimously found in favor of the Association and, on appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment on the jury verdict, finding that the trial court did not err by charging the jury that the plaintiff was entitled only to the care due to a licensee on the property, and not an invitee.

We were successful on a motion for summary judgment that was granted dismissing all claims against our client, an environmental compliance services and tank testing company, in a case where the plaintiff made an $8.75 million settlement demand. ​The plaintiffs, a minor mother and child, were at a gas station in Philadelphia when a vehicle inadvertently struck a fuel dispenser, knocking it over and causing a fire and explosion. The claims and cross-claims asserted against our client alleged it should have installed or advised the gas station owners to install a valve that would have prevented the fuel leakage that exacerbated the fire. We filed a summary judgment motion arguing that the claims and cross-claims asserted against our client went beyond the scope of the environmental compliance services it was hired to perform such that our client had no duty to either install or advise of installing different valves. The court granted our motion dismissing all claims and cross-claims against our client.

We obtained a defense verdict in a three-day jury trial  in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. ​The 81-year-old plaintiff, who was staying at her daughter's home, alleged that she slipped and fell on water in the basement of the rental property and injured her hip. The property was owned by our clients. The plaintiff's daughter and son-in-law claimed they repeatedly complained to our clients of leaks from the ceiling in the basement, without response. They were in the midst of eviction proceedings with our clients for failure to pay rent for several months when the fall occurred. Our clients denied any knowledge of the leaking problem alleged by the tenants, though they did admit that they were aware of leaks in other areas which they attempted to fix. The jury deliberated for 2 ½ hours, had two questions, and asked for the negligence charge to be read back to them. They then returned a finding of no negligence. There was a nuisance value settlement offer made prior to trial, which was rejected.

The defense prevailed on a motion for summary judgment in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on behalf of a local school district. The plaintiff, a former teacher, asserted claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The defense argued in their motion that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie age discrimination claim or retaliation claim because she could not establish that she suffered from an adverse employment action. The court agreed and determined that the plaintiff's transfer to a new grade level, placement on an improvement plan, and voluntary resignation did not constitute adverse employment actions in order to establish her claims. Consequently, the court granted the school district's motion and dismissed all claims.

We obtained a defense verdict in a legal malpractice case affirmed on appeal. Our client was an attorney who represented a plaintiff in a civil rights case against a New Jersey municipality. The underlying facts were complex, involving fraud claims against the municipality, and claims based on contract, inverse condemnation, civil rights and negligence. In the legal malpractice case, the jury found deviation but no proximate cause. In the legal malpractice case, the plaintiff sought recovery of the legal fees and punitive damages to which he claimed he was entitled in the underlying case, plus prevailing party counsel fees, which can be recovered in a legal malpractice case in New Jersey. We also successfully handled the appeal, which involved all of the issues from the underlying case and the malpractice trial. 

The defense prevailed on a motion to dismiss our real estate agency client. The plaintiff filed counts of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, conspiracy, conversion, invasion of privacy-false light, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel against the agency regarding an allegedly fraudulent transfer of a private residence by the co-defendant seller of the property. We filed preliminary objections, arguing that the plaintiff's claims lacked sufficient specificity and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court dismissed all claims against our client. 

Several police cadets were not allowed to take the state licensing exam after the municipality learned that those cadets had been cheating to complete academy requirements. The cadets were referred for disciplinary charges and then terminated. They brought suit, alleging due process violations for allegedly holding sham post-disciplinary hearings, predetermining termination, and not allowing them access to the evidence against them. Select plaintiffs also alleged racial discrimination. The plaintiffs' entire suit was dismissed on summary judgment when the Northern District of Ohio found that the plaintiffs had not completed their probationary period and, thus, did not have a property interest in their employment with the municipality. The court further found that the municipality's decision to terminate the employees for failure to take the state test was a reasonable decision and did not violate their substantive due process rights. Finally, the plaintiffs were unable to present any evidence to support a racial discrimination claim.

We successfully defended a superintendent of a Pennsylvania School District. The elementary teacher plaintiff was disciplined following an investigation into allegations that she struck a student. The plaintiff raised claims against the superintendent for intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and violation of procedural due process. The defense argued that, as a superintendent, he was afforded high public official immunity and, therefore, the court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court also dismissed the loss of consortium claim as it was a derivative claim of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court further held that the plaintiff was not deprived of her procedural due process rights, as she was given the opportunity through the teacher's union to arbitrate a grievance over her suspension. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, with prejudice. 

​The plaintiff was a high school junior who alleged he was physically abused by a special education teacher. He sued the teacher, the school district and several administrators, alleging violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Statute. After a long period of discovery and many depositions, the court granted our summary judgment motion. 

We obtained summary judgment in a legal malpractice action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiff, a Philadelphia police officer, was arrested after failing to appear in court following a hit-and-run car accident involving his motor vehicle. After proving that he was not the driver of the vehicle, the charges were dismissed. The plaintiff then sought damages from the township, police department and individual police officers for alleged violations of his civil rights. Our client, an attorney, represented the plaintiff in connection with responding to summary judgment and appealing the dismissal of his civil rights claims. When the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims was affirmed, he sued the attorney for alleged malpractice. We successfully argued on summary judgment that the plaintiff's claims were time-barred and failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff could not have prevailed in the underlying litigation. In fact, the plaintiff brought similar civil rights claims in three separate lawsuits, all of which failed. The court agreed, dismissing the legal malpractice claims as time-barred and further stating that, even if they were not barred by the Statute of Limitations, the plaintiff's claims failed as a matter of law because he cannot demonstrate that he would have prevailed but for something the attorney did or failed to do.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of our homeowner clients in a case involving an alleged “attack” by our client’s dog. ​As the plaintiff walked past the client's property on a public sidewalk, the dog ran out to the edge of the sidewalk barking loudly. The plaintiff became "startled" and stepped back, falling into the street and sustaining a seriously displaced left distal radius fracture that required open reduction and internal fixation. Upon review of the summary judgment motion, the court found no evidence that the dog was a "dangerous dog" or that the dog had ever left the confines of the insured's property. Interestingly, the court ruled that the dog's barking and charging the sidewalk did not represent a breach of duty by the homeowner to the public on the sidewalk under the applicable statutory and case law.

We successfully defended a Philadelphia-based law firm in litigation surrounding an alleged work injury with resultant post-concussion syndrome. ​The claimant tripped and fell at work, alleging that he struck his head during the fall. He donned sunglasses at the hearing and depositions, claiming his injury led to photophobia and post-concussion syndrome. During discovery, it was determined that the claimant had suffered and was treated for headache symptoms and memory loss prior to the alleged work injury. Surveillance revealed that the claimant did not use sunglasses when carrying out everyday activities. The claimant's medical expert admitted on cross-examination that he was unaware of the claimant's pre-existing medical condition and was not aware of the surveillance evidence when arriving at his opinions and conclusions. The workers’ compensation judge found that the claimant and the medical expert were not credible, leading to the successful resolution of the claim.