Results

The verdict came within 30 minutes of deliberation in a five-day Bradford County PA fire-loss subrogation trial. Social distancing protocols were in place: all participants had their temperatures taken before entering the courthouse; jury selection took place at a local school auditorium; everyone in the courtroom was required to wear masks or face shields; and the jurors were spread out to the gallery section of the courtroom instead of the jury box. Witnesses could appear via Zoom. Two witnesses were flawlessly broadcasted to the courtroom with help from the firm’s Allentown and Mount Laurel offices.

Our appellate attorneys succeeded in convincing the Pennsylvania Superior Court to vacate a $40.2 million medical malpractice verdict and remand for a new trial. ​In its unanimous, precedential decision, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court had erroneously allowed plaintiffs’ counsel to utilize hearsay medical literature as substantive evidence. The case involved a spinal cord birth injury and was tried in Delaware County.

​The defendants were two family-owned companies that grow, process and sell mushrooms. One defendant, our client, owned the property, and the other operated the business there. The plaintiff worked for an independent company that was contracted to load compost into the defendants’ mushroom beds. The plaintiff encountered a problem with the equipment used to lift the compost (the source of the problem is in dispute). A connection between components broke, and a metal pan fell on the plaintiff’s arm, crushing it. The plaintiff alleged he had previously reported the problem to the defendants. Our attorneys successfully argued that the defendant who owned the property was a “landlord out of possession” and not responsible for injuries to third parties on the premises. The plaintiff argued that his complaint to one defendant about the equipment problem was notice to both, because both companies were owned by the same family. The court ruled that the shared ownership of the companies did not impose a legal duty on a defendant that was not otherwise responsible for the property.

We obtained a no cause verdict following a one day non-jury trial (conducted virtually) in the Law Division of Hudson County for our client, a national trucking company. The plaintiff alleged the truck swerved into his lane causing property damage. The defense successfully argued that the plaintiff’s identification of the trailer as belonging to our client was not dispositive on the issue of the identification of the company responsible for operation of the truck which was pulling the trailer at the time of the accident. The judge further found the police report was not admissible on the identification of the operator of the vehicle and also that regardless of identification, the plaintiff failed to establish the operator was negligent.

Marshall Dennehey’s appellate attorneys filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and Pennsylvania Association of Defense Counsel in a case pending in the Pennsylvania Superior Court that involved interpretation of a “regular use” exclusion that commonly appears in underinsured motorist coverage in automobile policies. The Superior Court enforced the exclusion, as PDI and PADC had requested. The plaintiff regularly used a company vehicle for his daily work. But one or two days before the accident, the specific vehicle he had been driving was taken out of service for repairs, and his employer rented a replacement vehicle for the plaintiff’s use. The insurer denied the UIM claim, based on the “regular use” exclusion, because the plaintiff was driving a company vehicle, which was his regular practice. The plaintiff countered that the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident had not, in fact, been made “regularly” available to him because he only began using it a day or two prior. Relying on its prior decision in Brink v. Erie Ins. Group, 940 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2008), which held that the “regular use” exclusion properly barred coverage for a plaintiff injured in a “fleet vehicle,” even though the plaintiff may have driven a different specific vehicle each day, the Rawl court held that the employer’s temporary rental of a replacement vehicle triggered application of the “regular use” exclusion and barred coverage. “Stated simply,” Rawl explains, “it does not matter whether Mr. Rawl had regular use of a particular vehicle furnished by his employer, but whether he regularly used a vehicle supplied by his employer.” The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the carrier.

Obtained a dismissal at trial in Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County. ​The plaintiff, an acupuncture facility, alleged wrongful denial of personal injury protection/no-fault benefits relating to acupuncture services rendered to its assignee, a claimant who sought benefits under the defendant-carrier’s policy. The trial judge granted dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the carrier’s defense, that payments were issued in accordance with the applicable fee schedule and, therefore, nothing further was owed to the plaintiff.

We obtained summary judgment in Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County. ​The plaintiff commenced an action seeking reimbursement of PIP benefits under the defendant-carrier's policy for anesthesia rendered to the claimant during a surgical procedure. After establishing that the claimant failed to appear at multiple, duly-scheduled independent medical examinations—a condition precedent to coverage—the complaint was dismissed.

We successfully defended a workers’ compensation case that was transferred from the insurance carrier’s staff counsel after litigation and motion practice. ​After a settlement offer in excess of $16 million was rejected, the case went to trial. At trial, we were able to prove that an uninsured subcontractor was hired by the general contractor, who was the actual employer of the injured worker. Under New Jersey Law, this means that the general contractor is responsible for the workers' compensation benefits for the petitioner. The case was dismissed with prejudice, and the general contractor was also ordered to reimburse the carrier approximately $2.8 million that they had paid out, based upon a previous order to provide medical and temporary benefits to the petitioner.

Marshall Dennehey successfully argued pre-trial motions to dismiss in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County in a matter involving a $10 million tortious interference and defamation case filed on behalf of investors against an attorney and bank counsel arising out of a multi-million dollar loan for a commercial land transaction. The allegations against the attorney included slander and a claim for tortious interference, with prospective economic advantage for a contract that the plaintiff entered into with the investor. With regard to slander, we argued that the established case law in New Jersey holds that the subject pejorative was simply name calling and did not rise to the level of actionable defamation or slander in New Jersey. The court agreed and dismissed the defamation claims. Additionally, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim, rejected the plaintiff’s claims of willful misconduct of the bank’s attorney and found that the plaintiff’s damages claims, although supported by expert reports, were speculative. The court agreed with the defense argument that the plaintiff’s claims for lost profits were barred by New Jersey’s New Business Rule. Under the New Business Rule, prospective profits of a new business are considered too remote and speculative to meet the legal standard to recover damages. As a result, the court entered a dismissal of the entire case.

Marshall Dennehey was successful in the New Jersey Appellate Division, which affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint under New Jersey’s Charitable Immunity Act. The defendant operated a shelter for battered women, their dependent children and the homeless. The plaintiff and her child were residents at the shelter and beneficiaries of its charitable goals when the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on the shelter’s property. She argued that she was not a beneficiary of the charity because she did administrative tasks and volunteered in the charity’s thrift store. However, the trial court and Appellate Division rejected those arguments, holding that the plaintiff’s presence on the defendant’s property was due to her being a resident beneficiary of the charity, not as a result of any volunteer work she may have performed for the defendant. Thus, because her volunteer activities were incidental to her residency at the shelter, the Charitable Immunity Act applied and the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.

The plaintiff was named as a defendant in a debt collection action for failing to pay her attorney’s legal bills. Judgment was entered against her but never fully enforced. More than five years later, our client filed a Praecipe to Issue Writ of Revival and then mistakenly filed a Praecipe for Writ of Execution before the judgment was revived by the court. Although the Sheriff’s Sale of the plaintiff’s home never proceeded, she nonetheless sued our client for due process violations, abuse of process, conspiracy, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act. Most of the claims were dismissed early in the proceedings. Thereafter, we successfully argued in a summary judgment motion that the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that our client acted in a manner to harass, oppress or abuse her, or that our client engaged in any other activity in violation of the FDCPA or FCEUA. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims.

Marshall Dennehey successfully obtained summary judgment, dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction New York Labor Law case in the Supreme Court in Rockland County. ​The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case, all seeking contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client in causing the injuries sustained to the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused, in whole or in part, the injuries the plaintiff sustained. The plaintiff and general contractor filed motions to reargue, which were denied.

We obtained a defense verdict after a one-week trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case involved alleged race, gender and/or “intersectional” (race and gender) discrimination claims by two women against a Philadelphia area school district.

The plaintiff’s wife reported to police that the plaintiff tried to kill her by firing a shotgun at her while she slept. Following a thorough investigation and witness interviews, police arrested the plaintiff and charged him with attempted murder. The next day, the wife recanted her story and told police that she was the one who fired a shotgun in the couple’s home in an effort to frame her husband for attempted murder. Police immediately had the plaintiff released from prison. The wife was later charged with, and pleaded guilty to, making false statements to authorities. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the police department and arresting officer, claiming the defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him and maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause in violation of his 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Following discovery, a motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the defendants. The court found that the undisputed facts of record clearly showed the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.

We successfully obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a dentist in a dental malpractice action in Luzerne County. ​The plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence and lack of informed consent. Regarding negligence, the plaintiff alleged the dentist used excessive force in extracting a lower third molar, thereby causing a fracture of the mandible and alleged permanent paresthesia. In response, the defense admitted that the mandible was fractured during the extraction, but offered expert testimony that the fracture was an extremely rare complication and was not caused by negligence. The defense argued there was no evidence of the use of excessive force, such as TMJ disorders or dislocation, lacerations or broken adjacent teeth. As for informed consent, the plaintiff argued the dentist did not obtain informed consent because he did not discuss the risk of fracture. The dentist testified that he discussed the possibility of permanent numbness as a risk, but he admitted that fracture was a risk of the extraction and that he did not discuss this risk because the chances of it occurring were astronomically low. The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s experts both agreed that the chances of a fracture occurring were less than 0.0009%. The jury returned a defense verdict on all causes of action in less than one hour.

​The petitioner filed a motion for additional medical and temporary disability benefits, essentially alleging she was permanently and totally disabled from prior compensable shoulder and leg injuries. After a three-day trial and extensive briefing, the judge dismissed the motion. He determined that, despite the compensable injuries, the petitioner had plateaued medically and was not entitled to any further benefits.

We obtained a per curiam affirmance in the Fourth District Court of Appeal in a suit against a campground/RV park. The suit alleged that the campground negligently maintained the campsite and failed to keep the electrical up to code, forcing an RV owner to abandon her RV at the site. The campground countersued for writ of distress to remove the unsightly vehicle from the campsite. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings and declined to amend the complaint, finding an amendment would be futile. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s entry of final judgment in favor of the campground on the main claim as well as the counterclaim. The court also conditionally granted the campground’s motion for appellate attorney's fees and remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the validity of the unaccepted proposal for settlement.

​The homeowners claimed the homeowners association’s response to their request to mediate the dispute violated the applicable mediation statutes. They sued the association for declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, had affirmed the final judgment in favor of the association and awarded it appellate attorney’s fees and costs. The homeowners then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, alleging the circuit court deprived them of due process and committed an error of law that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Fifth District Court of Appeal denied the petition and awarded the association its appellate attorney’s fees. This prompted the homeowners to dismiss another pending appeal and resolve all claims for attorney’s fees in favor of the association without further litigation.

Marshall Dennehey succeeded in having the Pennsylvania Superior Court reverse, as excessive, a $10 million wrongful death award. ​The jury had also awarded $10 million in survival damages, but that award was reversed in post-trial motions.

We obtained a unanimous 12-0 defense verdict after a two-week trial in Santa Fe County, New Mexico, where the plaintiff was seeking approximately $40 million in damages. In this asbestos litigation case, it was alleged that the decedent contracted mesothelioma and died at the age of 76 as a result of being exposed to asbestos-containing joint compound manufactured and sold by our client. The decedent worked as an electrician for 40 years and contended he worked in the vicinity of drywall workers at various commercial worksites throughout Albuquerque and New Mexico. The plaintiff claimed that our client’s joint compound was defective because it was sold without a warning of the well-established dangers of asbestos. Further, the plaintiff argued that our client was negligent because it knew or should have known of the dangers of asbestos, which were readily known from as early as the 1930s. The defense argued that the asbestos fiber used in our client’s joint compound was safe because the fibers were short fibers and not known to increase the risk of disease. It was further argued that our client acted reasonably and in a timely manner when it placed a government-mandated warning on their product in the early 1970s. Lastly, it was argued that the only product identification witness called by the plaintiff was not credible because he gave three depositions in 2017 and did not identify our client’s product. He first identified our client’s product during his fourth deposition in late 2019, when our client was the only remaining defendant. The jury found our client’s product was not defective, but that they were negligent. However, the jury found the negligence was not a cause of the decedent’s mesothelioma.

We successfully defended a legal malpractice claim where the plaintiffs alleged their former attorneys caused them to sustain more than $1.3 million in damages. ​The plaintiffs, a collection of property developers, were named as defendants in a series of debt collection actions brought by their lender. Our attorney client represented them in those matters and sought to renegotiate the debt; however, they were unsuccessful, and the lender prevailed. In the legal malpractice matter, the plaintiffs sought to recover amounts they were required to reimburse the bank for its legal fees, their own expert witness fees and the legal fees they paid to our client. In a matter of first impression, the Delaware Superior Court held that a legal malpractice plaintiff who was a defendant in an underlying matter must demonstrate that it was caused to lose a judgment in order to prevail on its legal malpractice claim. It was insufficient to suggest that the attorneys should have settled the cases before the attorneys’ fees escalated. Because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that they would have prevailed in the underlying cases, they could not prevail on their subsequent legal malpractice claim.

The 55-year-old plaintiff underwent tarsal tunnel surgery. She developed post-operative complications, including infection, and required two additional surgeries, including a sural artery flap graft. The plaintiff gained over 100 pounds after the podiatric surgeries and underwent gastric bypass surgery. She alleged it was required as the result of being sedentary from the podiatric surgeries and complications. The plaintiff has significant lower extremity surgical scarring, chronic pain and a gait abnormality. She was never able to return to work. She  alleged that the defendant intentionally kept fraudulent, incomplete and untimely electronic medical records. The defense argued that the podiatric surgeries were indicated and performed within the standard of care, and that the plaintiff developed post-operative complications resulting in the need for additional surgeries due to her own noncompliance—prematurely and repeatedly walking on her surgical foot and getting her surgical dressings wet.

We obtained an appellate decision affirming the dismissal, with prejudice, of a wrongful death lawsuit filed against a long-term acute care hospital in Florida. ​The claim alleged the hospital improperly transferred the patient to another hospital without an adequate handoff and appropriate medications, resulting in the death of the patient shortly after arrival at the receiving hospital. The plaintiff sought damages for medical negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, with prejudice, on the basis that the plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory pre-suit screening procedures required by statute and failed to assert an actionable claim for an intentional tort against the hospital.

We obtained a defense verdict in a Bucks County case on behalf of a driver despite his conviction for driving at the time under the influence of alcohol and drugs. The accident occurred at an intersection controlled by a flashing traffic light. The defendant was traveling in the direction of the yellow flashing light. The plaintiff testified that he stopped at the painted stop block for the red flashing light. The plaintiff looked both ways, and believing that all was clear, proceeded into the intersection. The plaintiff saw the defendant coming from his left at a high rate of speed, only an instant before the accident. The defense argued that the plaintiff’s position at the painted stop block did not allow for adequate sight lines, and that under Section 3323(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code he was obligated to move forward to a point where he had a clear view of approaching traffic.

​In its order, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Superior Court that had affirmed a Board decision regarding the compensability of travel expenses for trips to and from medical appointments. The claimant had petitioned for parking and toll expenses incurred during her trips to visit a doctor at University of Pennsylvania from her residence in Dover, Delaware. Although the amounts in question were low, the case is significant as it potentially applies to every Delaware workers’ compensation case. Specifically, the court agreed with the employer’s arguments that the plain language of the applicable Delaware statute provides that mileage expenses are to be reimbursed by the employer for travel to and from compensable medical appointments.

We won dismissal of a professional negligence case against a surveyor filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. ​This action was filed by two title companies that had paid a title insurance claim to a property purchaser and sought subrogation from our client, a surveying company. They alleged that a defective survey was the cause of the title insurance claim. Ohio has a four-year statute of limitations for professional negligence claims against surveyors, and this case was filed more than four years after the allegedly defective survey was completed, rendering it untimely. The plaintiffs attempted to avoid dismissal by captioning their claims as claims for breach of contract, in order to take advantage of a longer limitations period. We argued that, despite how the claims were captioned, they were, in substance, claims for professional negligence and time-barred. The court agreed and dismissed the case.

In this medical malpractice action, the defendant, a New York doctor with no connection to New Jersey, was sued in New Jersey by a former patient who was a New Jersey resident. The court first found that the defendant did not waive consideration of the issue by waiting until after a dispute concerning the sufficiency of the affidavit of merit was resolved. The court then found that the evidence presented by the plaintiff was simply insufficient to establish either general or specific jurisdiction. The fact that the doctor had no connection to New Jersey and that the treatment occurred in New York were key to the decision, as the advertising activity by the New York hospital where the doctor is on staff, which the plaintiff relied upon, was insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the physician, especially as those activities had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s decision to treat with the defendant. In a published decision, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

We were successful on a motion to dismiss an action against a financial planning and investment firm and its employee, a certified financial planner, filed in Federal District Court in Maryland. The plaintiffs claimed that the financial planner advised them to purchase a life insurance policy that was indexed to the stock market and that he made certain representations about the expected return on investment, which never came to fruition. Instead, according to the plaintiffs, the value of the policy plummeted, and they lost significantly on their investment. The court dismissed all claims against the firm, agreeing that the company could not be liable for the alleged advice given to the plaintiffs by the financial planner, inasmuch as the firm did not exist at the time the alleged advice was given. Also, the court dismissed a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the financial planner, agreeing that both federal and state courts in Maryland do not recognize a standalone cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty when only monetary damages are sought. As well, the court dismissed a conversion claim against the financial planner, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate the financial planner wrongfully exercised ownership or dominion over their finances.

A water heater leak in a garage caused direct physical damage to the property, and our client paid the plaintiffs $956.95 for damages sustained to the garage, after applying the $1,000 policy deductible. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant breached the contract of insurance by failing to fully indemnify them for all the property damage caused by the water leak. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed: (1) the defendant underpaid for the garage by not allowing for “detach and reset of the water heater” in the amount of $600; (2) water from the water heater leak into the garage traveled through the crawlspace of the garage and caused the master bathroom vanity to warp; and (3) there was damage to “one” loose tile located on the toe-kick of the vanity that cannot be matched, requiring the replacement of the entire continuous tile in the home. The plaintiffs claimed total damages in the amount of $52,930.95. We defended the case at trial, arguing that the damages were limited to only the garage. Furthermore, we presented a case to the jury premised upon science, that is, water could not have traveled through the crawlspace of the garage for nine feet and caused damage to the master bathroom vanity, as the plaintiffs claim, without defying the laws of gravity.

We obtained a ruling granting summary judgment in favor of an insurance broker and two Lloyds syndicates in a case pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. ​The case involved a claim arising from a fall from a tree stand at a hunting camp. The plaintiff suffered spinal fractures when he fell out of the tree stand. He obtained judgment against the owner of the hunting outfitter business and then sought to recover under two policies of insurance issued to the business and a hunting club operated by the same individual. There was a stipulated judgment of $2 million, and a supplemental complaint was brought where the only issue was coverage under two $1 million policies. Accepting Marshall Dennehey’s arguments, the court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the grounds that the broker had no obligations under the policies and that the policies were not written to insure commercial hunting activities or the premises where the accident occurred.