Results

The defense prevailed on summary judgment for a nail salon owner against negligence and product liability claims by a plaintiff who slipped and fell off-site while still wearing pedicure slippers. The plaintiff had received a pedicure at our client’s nail salon. When she left the premises, she continued to wear the disposable pedicure slippers. The plaintiff then walked in the rain and eventually slipped and fell upon entering a retail store. The plaintiff brought general negligence and product liability claims against the nail salon’s owner. At the conclusion of discovery, the court granted our motion for summary judgment based upon the plaintiff’s admission that there was nothing wrong with the slippers and her failure to provide expert opinion as to the existence of any defect in the slippers.

We obtained summary judgment for a national concert promoter and public entity venue owner. The plaintiff purchased outdoor lawn seats for a concert at the PNC Bank Arts Center in Holmdel, New Jersey. After the show started, it began to rain, and the plaintiff alleged the lawn area became slippery, wet and muddy. The plaintiff attempted to walk down the sloped lawn toward the stage to buy her husband a beer. While doing so, her foot got stuck in mud which formed with the rain, and she suffered a severe ankle fracture that was surgically repaired. The trial judge dismissed the case on summary judgment and found the plaintiff’s expert’s report to be unsupported. The court reasoned the plaintiff could not present a claim of liability against the operator for failing to prevent the outdoor grassed seating area from becoming wet and slippery when it rained. He also reasoned the plaintiff could not prove the property was in a dangerous condition as defined by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.

Walter Klekotka (Mount Laurel, NJ) and Walter Kawalec (Mount Laurel, NJ) were successful in defending a grant of summary judgment in the New Jersey Appellate Division that resulted in a published opinion. Our clients were the owner and manager of an apartment complex for seniors. The plaintiff/resident had returned from walking her dog and alleged she received injuries entering the elevator. She had allowed the dog to enter first when the doors began to close. She alleged injuries occurred when the right door struck her arm and when she used her left arm and the left side of her body to slow the doors from closing while she leapt into the elevator. She sued our clients and the company hired to maintain the elevator, but she was unable to establish any proof of negligence. The trial judge dismissed the case, declining to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in part, because the plaintiff could not establish the third element of the doctrine: that the injury did not result from the plaintiff’s own voluntary act or neglect. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Appellate Division should eliminate this third element. The Appellate Division, in a published opinion, concluded that the third element is a well-established law in New Jersey and only the New Jersey Supreme Court could eliminate it, and that court has shown no inclination to do so. Because the plaintiff could not demonstrate the third prong, res ipsa was not applicable, and the failure of the plaintiff to establish negligence resulted in summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.

We won a case on appeal, reversing the judge’s decision. ​Our insurance carrier client issued a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable (NTCP), agreeing to pay both indemnity and medical benefits for a lumbar strain allegedly sustained by the claimant. The 90-day period began on April 22, 2018, and ended July 20, 2018. On June 21, 2018, the claimant filed a claim petition for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging a low back injury. On July 17, 2018, the carrier issued a Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation Payable, stopping benefits as of June 5, 2018, and a Notice of Compensation Denial. Thereafter, the claimant filed a petition for penalties, averring the carrier violated the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act by failing to stop benefits within five days of receipt of the last payment of benefits. Accordingly, the NTCP converted to a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). The judge issued an Interlocutory Decision, ordering the carrier to reinstate disability benefits due to its failure to stop the claimant’s benefits within five days of the last payment. The carrier appealed, arguing that the Interlocutory Order was a final adjudication, merely labeled as “Interlocutory.” The carrier argued that because the judge’s order drastically altered the procedure and burdens of the litigation, it was a final adjudication and the carrier had a right to appeal therefrom. The carrier further argued that, even when a defendant fails to file a notice stopping within five days after the last payment, but does so within the 90-day NTCP timeframe, the NTCP does not convert to a NCP. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board agreed and reversed the judge’s order.

The plaintiffs contracted with a builder to construct a 5,000 sq. ft. home. In accordance with the Uniform Construction Code, the local township contracted with a privately-owned company to serve as a code enforcement and permit officer. The company issued a building permit, inspected the home at several points during construction, and eventually issued a certificate of occupancy. However, the plaintiffs claimed that the home had significant structural and aesthetic defects, and the code enforcement officer failed to conduct proper inspections during the construction process. The plaintiffs sued their builder, the code enforcement officer and the township. The township was alleged to have negligently hired and/or negligently supervised the code enforcement officer. Preliminary objections were filed in response, raising governmental immunity as a clear defense to the negligence claims against the township. Following oral argument, the court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the township from the action, finding there were no plausible claims for negligence based upon application of the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The defense prevailed on a motion for judgment on the pleadings in a declaratory judgment action seeking liability coverage in a catastrophic injury case. ​The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his wife when she veered off the road and struck a pedestrian, nearly killing him. The pedestrian sued the plaintiff in a separate action, alleging he got out of the vehicle, rolled the pedestrian over, saw he was “mortally wounded,” got back in the vehicle, and fled the scene without rendering aid or calling for help. The pedestrian sued the plaintiff for negligently failing to render aid and assistance. The plaintiff brought his declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that he was entitled to defense and indemnity under the liability coverage afforded by his homeowner’s policy. Mike and Julie argued there was no coverage in the first instance because the the insured’s conduct was not “accidental.” Subject to exclusions, the policy provides liability coverage for any occurrence that causes bodily injury. “Occurrence” is defined in the policy to mean an “accident” that results in bodily injury. In addition, they argued that certain exclusions would bar coverage, including an exclusion for bodily injury arising from the “use” of a motor vehicle and exclusions for expected or intended injury and willful or malicious acts. The court agreed and granted final judgment in favor of our client.

The plaintiff brought claims for negligent hiring/supervision, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of mental distress arising from an incident where she was allegedly lured to a residential apartment building in New York City under false pretenses and sexually assaulted by the desk security guard in a back room of the lobby. The guard involved was duly licensed and had no criminal history. At trial, he was criminally convicted and sentenced to prison. The plaintiff contended that the guard’s employer was negligent in its hiring of the guard and that it failed to properly supervise his actions at the building, particularly in light of the fact that during the criminal trial, some evidence surfaced that the guard may have committed a similar assault three days earlier while working at another building for a different company. After more than four years of discovery, we moved for summary judgment on behalf of the guard’s employer and the building owners/managers, which was granted, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims in their entirety.

Resolved a FINRA matter involving four private placement investments for a portion of the costs. ​At issue were alleged losses exceeding $200,000. Leveraging the panel’s favorable decision on an earlier Motion for Eligibility (untimeliness), we convinced claimants’ counsel of the futility of proceeding further. Claimants’ counsel agreed to resolve the case for his filing costs only, split among three respondents.

In an arbitration matter filed against our insurance company client, the applicant claimed our client owed him for the unpaid medical bills of the claimant totaling approximately $20,000. The claimant was purportedly involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for medical treatments/surgery. It was argued that our client owed the applicant’s client for the medical services, despite New York State being the improper venue for hearing such a claim. The policy of insurance was written in Pennsylvania, the accident occurred in Pennsylvania and the claimant lived in Pennsylvania. The applicant, the provider of the medical services, and the medical facility where the services were rendered were all located in New Jersey. There was no apparent connection to the state of New York, other than the fact that the surgeon performing the surgery maintains an office there. The arbitrator agreed that this single contact was insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the New York State no-fault system to adjudicate these no-fault claims in the state of New York.

Our appellate attorneys convinced Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal to affirm an administrative law judge’s final order finding a claim compensable under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Compensation Plan. ​A minor child was permanently and substantially brain damaged as a result of his complicated birth. The parents sought compensation pursuant to NICA under protest. The parents contended the brain injury that caused the child’s permanent and substantial mental and physical impairment occurred prior to the statutory period (i.e., during labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital). They claimed the injury occurred in the 34 minutes from when the cord prolapsed at home to when the mother arrived at the hospital, where she ultimately delivered the child via emergency cesarean section. NICA and the hospital argued that the permanent and substantial impairment occurred during the statutory period. The administrative law judge agreed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the final order determining the claim was compensable.

We secured a dismissal of a civil rights action against a Pennsylvania children and youth agency and several of its caseworkers and staff attorneys. ​The plaintiff parents brought their five-month-old baby to the hospital with a spiral fracture mid-shaft on his right humerus. The hospital team collectively concluded that the injury was probably accidental in nature, but a nurse reported the injury to the agency, concerned that it might have been caused by abuse. By law the agency is bound to investigate suspected child abuse and did so. A judge approved the request for a safety plan that required a chaperone to be with the parents and child, even in the home, while the merits of the abuse investigation continued. At the end of the investigation, the judge concluded the injury was accidental, and the safety plan was terminated. The plaintiffs then filed an action, alleging the safety plan violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding the plaintiffs’ allegations of interference with the family unit, even if true, do not rise to the level of “shocking to the conscience” necessary for a due process violation. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the nurse’s report of possible child abuse, in conjunction with other evidence to support suspicion of the same, make the defendants’ actions not “shocking to the conscience,” and so no substantive due process claim was stated. Dismissal was affirmed.

We successfully defended a survivor’s claim for Federal Black Lung Benefits. The miner had worked 11 years in underground mining, had acknowledged simple coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (CWP), and died due to heart failure and COPD (per the death certificate). The judge credited the opinions of our medical expert that the miner’s simple CWP did not cause or hasten his death, and rejected the opinions of the claimant’s medical expert, who opined that the miner’s CWP resulted in inflammation and arteriosclerosis that resulted in his heart failure and death.

The case involved a compensable claim for right hip and shoulder fractures sustained in a fall. At issue was the level of permanent disability for the compensable injuries and the relatedness of a subsequent hip replacement surgery. The petitioner’s demand before trial was more than $450,000, plus almost $78,000 for medical expenses. The employer’s final offer was $180,000. After a three-day trial in Ocean County, the judge awarded permanency benefits totaling less than $153,000. Further, the judge determined that the hip replacement surgery was not related and denied the entire $78,000 medical bill claim.

We obtained summary judgment for a national trucking company in a lawsuit filed in Middlesex County, New Jersey, arising from a multi-vehicle trucking accident on the New Jersey Turnpike in which a young girl was killed and her mother seriously injured. In addition to being granted summary judgment, we recovered for our client all of its property damage, towing, and related costs from the other vehicles involved in the accident. A consolidated case filed by the County of Middlesex in which they sought to recover cleanup and environmental costs associated with the accident, was also dismissed, with prejudice.

We successfully appealed an emergency restrictive order issued by the Department of Health against a physician’s license. ​After allegations by a patient of sexual misconduct, the Department issued an emergency order restricting the physician’s license, thereby preventing him from treating any female patients in his practice. On appeal, the First District Court agreed that the emergency order was facially insufficient to demonstrate that sexual misconduct occurred or that an immediate threat of danger to the public existed, thereby quashing the emergency order and removing the restrictions on the physician’s license to practice medicine.

Our client owned a parcel of land upon which a building was being erected. The plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, was at the premises cleaning up the worksite on a Saturday morning. He was standing on top of a company-owned work van in the parking lot, securing ladders to the roof of the van, when he slipped and fell off the van to the ground, sustaining serious leg and knee injuries. He underwent two knee surgeries and was also told he needed back surgery. The plaintiff sued our client, as the owner of the property, and the general contractor under Labor Law sections 200, 240 and 241(6). Labor Law section 240, also known as the “scaffold law,” imposes absolute liability to the landowner for height-related injuries that occur at construction sites when someone falls off a building or building under construction. Section 241(6) involves violations of the Industrial Code. At the close of depositions, we filed a summary judgment motion to dismiss all allegations of the Labor Law in that our client was not directing or controlling the plaintiff when he was injured. We further argued that the plaintiff fell off a motor vehicle, not from a building or anything construction-related, as the vehicle was in the parking lot adjacent to the construction and, therefore, the scaffold law did not apply. The court granted our motion in its entirety.

In this employment law lawsuit, the plaintiff was a former employee who filed suit against our non-profit agency client, asserting claims of gender discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act. This matter involved a long and contested period of discovery, including extensive discovery demands, complex e-discovery and extensive motion practice. During the course of discovery, we were successful in obtaining a motion for reconsideration concerning the production of e-discovery data and other documentation lacking in relevance and proportionality to the matter. We thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment as to both counts in the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination on the basis of gender, as the plaintiff failed to present any evidence demonstrating discrimination or mistreatment on the basis of gender. We further argued that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim of retaliation under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act because the plaintiff failed to establish any nexus between the termination and the filing of a workers’ compensation claim. Our motion for summary judgment was granted in its entirety, with the court finding that the plaintiff was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

We successfully defeated a workers’ compensation appeal involving a claim penalty/termination petition on behalf of a worldwide youth adult development organization. ​A Medical Only Notice of Compensation Payable acknowledged liability for a skull contusion and denied any associated disability. The claimant alleged injuries to the cervical spine, head, eyes, a concussion and post concussive syndrome, resulting in total disability. It was the claimant’s position that the judge failed to render a well-reasoned decision in favoring the opinions of the three defense expert doctors and seven fact witnesses who challenged the mechanism of injury as well as disability. The Appeal Board concluded that the judge summarized the relevant evidence, rendered credibility determinations, provided objective explanations for those credibility determinations and was justified in granting the termination petition.

​Our client was the roofing contractor on a project in Philadelphia. The plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor of our client. The plaintiff was injured when he fell through a skylight cutout in the roof. He fell approximately 15 feet and sustained injuries, including a broken hip (requiring ORIF) and fractured vertebra. The plaintiff was hospitalized for one month. The last settlement demand was $2.5 million. We moved for summary judgment based upon arguments that our client, the roofing contractor who did not occupy the site nor control the work, breached no duty of care to the plaintiff. The court granted summary judgment.

​The defendants were two family-owned companies that grow, process and sell mushrooms. One defendant, our client, owned the property, and the other operated the business there. The plaintiff worked for an independent company that was contracted to load compost into the defendants’ mushroom beds. The plaintiff encountered a problem with the equipment used to lift the compost (the source of the problem is in dispute). A connection between components broke, and a metal pan fell on the plaintiff’s arm, crushing it. The plaintiff alleged he had previously reported the problem to the defendants. Our attorneys successfully argued that the defendant who owned the property was a “landlord out of possession” and not responsible for injuries to third parties on the premises. The plaintiff argued that his complaint to one defendant about the equipment problem was notice to both, because both companies were owned by the same family. The court ruled that the shared ownership of the companies did not impose a legal duty on a defendant that was not otherwise responsible for the property.

We initially successfully defended a bifurcated claim petition filed by the claimant, an independent contractor. Opposing counsel appealed, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed and remanded the decision for evidence on the medical component of the claim. However, contrary to the defendant’s argument, on remand, the judge granted the claim petition, finding she was “constrained” to reaffirm the Board on the independent contractor issue. The defendant once again appealed, and the Board re-affirmed the claim petition. We took the case up on appeal, and the Commonwealth Court agreed that the record did not demonstrate a “high level of control” such that an employment relationship has been established. Accordingly, the court reversed the order affirming the claim petition.

This was a high-stakes FINRA arbitration case, motion to vacate the defense award in federal district court, and a precedential decision in the First Circuit following oral argument. The claimant retired early with a pension and 401(k) and rolled the funds into a securities account in 2002. On a tip from a friend, he invested his nest egg with a registered representative who years later was charged by the SEC and convicted of securities violations. Through the registered representative’s bad advice and improper conduct between 2002 and 2016, the claimant’s retirement account was drained to zero, though the total amount was distributed to the claimant himself. The claimant sued the registered representative and the rep’s former broker-dealers through whom the representative was affiliated (prior to his residency with the Bureau of Prisons). The FINRA arbitration panel granted a complete defense award in favor of our broker-dealer client, seeing no improper or negligent conduct on the broker dealer’s part, and finding all improper conduct of the registered representative to be outside the scope of his affiliation with the broker-dealer. The claimant then moved to vacate the award in favor of our broker-dealer client in federal district court in Boston, which was denied. He then appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In both courts, Shane briefed and orally argued the case. The First Circuit handed down a published opinion even stronger than the district court victory, adopting word-for-word many of the arguments Shane made so as to secure confirmation of the FINRA award in its entirety for the benefit of our client.

The agents/agency represented the buyer/plaintiff in his purchase of a home in Dauphin County. ​The plaintiff claimed the agents failed to disclose to him prior to settlement that there were alleged defects in the A/C system and heat pump, and that the roof was old and needed to be replaced. The plaintiff paid for a home inspection report of the property, which noted the age and condition of the A/C, heat pump and roof, but the plaintiff claimed he never received the report, even though he discussed the report with one of the agents and authorized the agent to reply to the report on his behalf. The reply specifically asked the sellers to make repairs to the roof. As part of the defense, we argued that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the release language in the agreement of sale, which specifically stated that the plaintiff agreed to release the agency and its agents from claims relating to any defects or conditions on the property, and that the release by its terms survived settlement. In addition, we argued that the plaintiff waived his claims, at least as to the costs to replace the A/C and heat pump, when he declined in writing a home warranty plan that was offered to him prior to settlement by the agents. By signing the home warranty application form stating he was declining the plan, the plaintiff agreed in writing not to hold the agency and agents liable for the repair or replacement of a system that would otherwise have been covered by the plan. We introduced testimony that that the A/C and heat pump would have been covered if they did need to be repaired or replaced. The court found for the agency and agents and entered judgment in their favor.

​The claimant worked as a coal miner for approximately nine years in underground mining. The administrative law judge denied benefits, finding the claimant had failed to establish that he suffered from a totally disabling respiratory condition. The claimant appealed. The denial of benefits was affirmed on appeal. The Benefits Review Board dismissed the claimant’s arguments that he had additional coal mine employment that would have entitled him to a presumption that his total disability was related to his coal mine employment. The BRB noted that the claimant had failed to prove a total respiratory disability and, therefore, the presumption would not apply irrespective of the number of years of coal mine employment that he proved.

Our appellate attorneys succeeded in convincing the Pennsylvania Superior Court to vacate a $40.2 million medical malpractice verdict and remand for a new trial. ​In its unanimous, precedential decision, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court had erroneously allowed plaintiffs’ counsel to utilize hearsay medical literature as substantive evidence. The case involved a spinal cord birth injury and was tried in Delaware County.

The verdict came within 30 minutes of deliberation in a five-day Bradford County PA fire-loss subrogation trial. Social distancing protocols were in place: all participants had their temperatures taken before entering the courthouse; jury selection took place at a local school auditorium; everyone in the courtroom was required to wear masks or face shields; and the jurors were spread out to the gallery section of the courtroom instead of the jury box. Witnesses could appear via Zoom. Two witnesses were flawlessly broadcasted to the courtroom with help from the firm’s Allentown and Mount Laurel offices.

We obtained an order of Dismissal in favor of a municipality in connection with a lawsuit filed by a worker. ​The worker sustained catastrophic injuries as a result of a mishap on the job which caused him to fall from the roof of a condominium project under construction. This was a multi-party action in which our client, the municipality, issued the permits but failed to carry out the inspections. Notwithstanding, we were able to demonstrate immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, and the court entered the order of dismissal.

The claimant slipped and fell at work, injuring his head and neck. The carrier accepted a contusion injury. The claimant alleged multiple additional injuries including cognitive maladies, memory loss, speech problems, vision convergence, photophobia, cranial nerve injuries and balance issues. The claimant testified while wearing sunglasses due to his alleged photophobia condition. Thirteen hours of surveillance video disputed the claimant’s alleged symptoms (including his need for sunglasses). Prior health records revealed the claimant to be treating for all of his alleged cognitive problems before the work incident ever took place. The claimant’s first treating neurologist records supported the claimant’s symptoms to be non-anatomical. The carrier’s IME physician found the claimant to have suffered non-disabling contusion injuries which resolved. The judge found in favor of the employer and carrier, ruling that the claimant’s injuries were limited to contusions and had fully resolved. The claimant appealed the case to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, arguing the judge capriciously disregarded the evidence. The Board held that the claimant’s appeal was a veiled collateral attack on the workers’ compensation judge’s credibility determinations and affirmed the judge. At issue were potential life-time indemnity benefit payments and over $1 million of medical expenses.

We obtained a no cause verdict following a one day non-jury trial (conducted virtually) in the Law Division of Hudson County for our client, a national trucking company. The plaintiff alleged the truck swerved into his lane causing property damage. The defense successfully argued that the plaintiff’s identification of the trailer as belonging to our client was not dispositive on the issue of the identification of the company responsible for operation of the truck which was pulling the trailer at the time of the accident. The judge further found the police report was not admissible on the identification of the operator of the vehicle and also that regardless of identification, the plaintiff failed to establish the operator was negligent.

Marshall Dennehey’s appellate attorneys filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and Pennsylvania Association of Defense Counsel in a case pending in the Pennsylvania Superior Court that involved interpretation of a “regular use” exclusion that commonly appears in underinsured motorist coverage in automobile policies. The Superior Court enforced the exclusion, as PDI and PADC had requested. The plaintiff regularly used a company vehicle for his daily work. But one or two days before the accident, the specific vehicle he had been driving was taken out of service for repairs, and his employer rented a replacement vehicle for the plaintiff’s use. The insurer denied the UIM claim, based on the “regular use” exclusion, because the plaintiff was driving a company vehicle, which was his regular practice. The plaintiff countered that the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident had not, in fact, been made “regularly” available to him because he only began using it a day or two prior. Relying on its prior decision in Brink v. Erie Ins. Group, 940 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2008), which held that the “regular use” exclusion properly barred coverage for a plaintiff injured in a “fleet vehicle,” even though the plaintiff may have driven a different specific vehicle each day, the Rawl court held that the employer’s temporary rental of a replacement vehicle triggered application of the “regular use” exclusion and barred coverage. “Stated simply,” Rawl explains, “it does not matter whether Mr. Rawl had regular use of a particular vehicle furnished by his employer, but whether he regularly used a vehicle supplied by his employer.” The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the carrier.