Results

The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice case, claiming the emergency room physician failed to appropriately treat her elevated blood sugar and groin abscess, leading to necrotizing fasciitis. The evidence presented to the jury supported the argument that the emergency room physician appropriately treated the small spontaneously draining groin abscess as presented, there were no signs of systemic infection, and the physician gave appropriate instructions for the plaintiff to return to the hospital if her symptoms changed or worsened. She did not require admission for treatment of her elevated blood sugar as she was a long-time diabetic and the glucose level of 497 was not abnormal for her. The plaintiff stayed home for seven days with her condition worsening, and when she finally returned to the hospital, she had developed the necrotizing fasciitis. The trial lasted four days, and the jury returned the verdict in 16 minutes. 

We presented medical evidence, including a record review of all diagnostic study films and medical records from a Board-certified physiatrist, to establish that the claimant’s physiological complaints were unrelated to a work injury. The judge accepted our evidence as fully competent, persuasive and credible, and, as a result, terminated the claimant's benefits.

We successfully prosecuted a termination petition, securing a full recovery opinion from the court with reference to a Medicare eligible claimant who worked for a local Philadelphia financial institution. The claimant suffered a knee injury during the course and scope of employment. She ultimately required knee surgery for a torn meniscus. We presented evidence from the claimant’s treating surgeon, coupled with an independent expert, to produce an evidence record that demonstrated by preponderance of the evidence that the knee injury had fully resolved.

We represented a national internet retailer in the successful denial of a proposed lumbar fusion surgery and indemnity benefits. The claimant was awarded the injury and conservative medical treatment, however, the lumbar spine fusion surgery was denied, as were total and partial disability benefits. The client avoided a complex multi-level lumbar spine fusion surgery (L3-S1), total and partial disability benefits, and the post-surgical care. Because the surgery will not occur, the client is also relieved of a large post-operative permanent impairment award and surgical disfigurement. Key to the Board’s determination was our defense medical expert casting doubt on the surgery; our cross-examination of the claimant and his spine surgeon; and our closing argument, which was quoted by the Industrial Accident Board in their decision on the merits. 

We obtained summary judgment on a construction defect claim in Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant, a homebuilder, in their entirety for the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately prove breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, fraud in the inducement, wrongful conversion and various alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of an orthopedic surgeon based on the statute of limitations despite the plaintiff’s claimed application of the discovery rule. After conducting written discovery and deposing the plaintiff to solidify that the medical professional liability action was untimely commenced, we early on filed a motion for summary judgment in an effort to avoid the incurrence of significant additional expense in defending the case through the remainder of the discovery process. At oral argument, the presiding judge commented that the matter was “extraordinarily briefed” and “even better presented.” Our success on the timeliness issue, which is almost always reserved for decision by the jury, brought a quick end to the litigation, in which there were significant liability concerns.

A unanimous panel of the the Third Circuit affirmed an order of the U.S.E.D. Pa., which had granted a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in favor of a former Assistant District Attorney. The plaintiff had plead guilty to murder and other offenses in 1990 after shooting a man in the back four times. In 1993, the plaintiff filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The crux of his argument being his counsel failed to object when the court incorrectly stated the meaning of life imprisonment. According to the original transcript, the court said, “Life implies 17 ½ to 35 years.” Our client, a former Assistant District Attorney, worked on the opposition to the plaintiff’s PCRA petition and contacted the court stenographer about that line in the transcript. The stenographer admitted the transcripts contained an error and filed a certified copy of the corrected page to reflect that the court said, “Life plus 17 ½ to 35 years.” The PCRA petition was denied. Then, in 2019, the plaintiff obtained a handwritten note by our client which referenced needing a “new and improved version” of the transcript. The plaintiff filed another PCRA petition. The current administration of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and the plaintiff reached a stipulated agreement to resolve the case. The plaintiff’s 1990 guilty plea was vacated, he re-pleaded to third-degree murder and robbery, and was sentenced to 17 ½ to 35 years’ imprisonment, and was then released for time served.  The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against our client under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that our client’s ex parte communication with the stenographer violated his right to due process and to a jury trial. We moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing our client’s actions were protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity. The District Court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed. Writing for a unanimous panel, the Judge concluded the claims asserted by the plaintiff “lack merit[.]” Affirmance was decided solely on the issue of qualified immunity. The court concluded the claims were “fatally deficient” because: (1) the plaintiff defined his right to due process and jury trial at too high a level of generality; and (2) the plaintiff failed to cite authority establishing that his rights to due process and a jury trial entitled him to protection from our client’s ex parte communication with a court stenographer. Thus, our client was entitled to qualified immunity, as argued by us in the District Court.   

We defended a Claim Petition, successfully proving that a claimant’s injury was not work-related. After a thorough investigation and review of the medical records, we were able to present witnesses and evidence that confirmed that the alleged injury had gone unreported and was inconsistent with the mechanism of injury. The Workers’ Compensation Judge found our witnesses credible that the claimant did not report his knee condition as work-related. Their testimony was supported by the medical records, which indicated that for six months after the alleged injury, the claimant had nine office visits with five doctors but never indicated that he had suffered a work-related injury. In addition, the claimant never told his own expert that he suffered a work-related injury until several months later. Finally, the judge believed our expert that the knee condition was inconsistent with the mechanism of injury.

Our appellate attorneys were victorious in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullified a $5.6 million judgment in a construction accident case. In a unanimous, precedential opinion, the court ruled that the general contractor represented by our attorneys was the plaintiff’s statutory employer and, thus, immune from suit. Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc., 2023 PA Super 13 (Pa. Super. 2023).

The agent was sued by a condominium association, that alleged the insurance agent inappropriately and unlawfully inserted himself into the insurance company’s investigation and tortuously interfered with a contract that resulted in the insurance company paying far less than the $1.3 million in damages alleged by the condominium association. After taking depositions of the individuals from the condominium association, the insurance company and defending his client’s deposition, we convinced the plaintiff’s attorney to dismiss all claims against the insurance agent.

Our appellate attorneys were victorious in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullified a $5.6 million judgment in a construction accident case. In a unanimous, precedential opinion, the court ruled that our client, a general contractor, was the plaintiff’s statutory employer and thus immune from suit.  

We achieved dismissal of a disciplinary complaint brought against our attorney client who was the victim of a sophisticated scam and sent IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts) funds belonging to another client out of the country.

The real estate agent represented a buyer in the purchase of a home in Adams County. Prior to closing, the buyer had the property’s septic system inspected, and the system passed the inspection. Several months after closing, the real estate agent’s client decided to sell the property. When the new prospective buyers had the septic system inspected, the system failed the inspection, and they would not agree to close until the client fixed the system. The client then learned after the fact that the original sellers had experienced many issues with the septic system, that the system had failed several prior inspections because the ground would not perc, and that the sellers failed to disclose this information when they sold the property to the client. The client filed a complaint against the real estate agent with the BPOA under the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, alleging the agent engaged in misrepresentation and unprofessional conduct, and claimed that the agent allegedly had knowledge of the prior history with the septic system but failed to disclose it to her. We were able to demonstrate to the BPOA investigator that the real estate agent had no knowledge of the prior history with the septic system, that neither the sellers nor their agent ever disclosed information about the system, and that if she was aware, she would have advised the client not to close on the purchase until the septic system was repaired. The BPOA declined to prosecute and closed its investigation.  

The plaintiff alleged that his client and a neighboring property owner were responsible for water and septic intrusions onto the plaintiff’s property. The three Bucks County properties formed a large triangle between two roads in Perkasie, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff’s complaints against his neighbors went back over seven years. We argued the trespass onto the plaintiff’s property was permanent in nature and was barred under the statute of limitations, and that the plaintiff’s experts failed to establish the intrusion emanated from our client’s property.

We obtained a defense verdict in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case where the plaintiff sought $24.1M for alleged property damages and lost revenue.     In 2014, our client defendant, a marine construction company, was retained by the U.S. Navy to conduct pile driving activities at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The plaintiff, a neighboring commercial property owner, alleged that our client's pile driving and related activities damaged its property and caused it to lose revenue. All other defendants settled before trial. The plaintiff claimed $20 million in damages against our client. A bifurcated trial began on January 17, 2023. The plaintiff’s demand dropped throughout the nine-day liability phase, which involved numerous scientific and engineering experts and other witnesses. On January 27, 2023, the jury returned its unanimous verdict, attributing 60% of the fault to plaintiff itself and 25% to the Navy, which resulted in a defense verdict for our client. As a result of the defense verdict on liability, there will be no damages phase.  

We successfully defended a late answer against a claimant’s Yellow Freight motion by convincing the judge that the claimant’s claim petition was not well-pled and did not meet the claimant’s burden of proof with respect to disability. The claim petition alleged that the claimant did not return to work for the employer and sought payment of ongoing disability. In defense of the motion, we submitted evidence showing that the claimant returned to work for the employer within days of the alleged work injury, arguing that the claimant was not disabled as alleged. Accordingly, the judge was convinced that, although the employer’s answer was late, the claim petition was not well-pled and the Yellow Freight motion was denied.

The plaintiff pet owners brought claims of emotional/bystander distress and recklessness against the delivery service after personally witnessing the incident that tragically killed their family dog. We filed a Motion to Strike (equivalent of 12b(6) in State of Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport), citing appellate authority that, because dogs are personal property and bystander distress arises out of human-to-human relationships, plaintiffs were barred from alleging and recovering any kind of emotional distress damages. Only the fair market value purchase cost of the pet should be permitted. The plaintiffs cited recent trial court decisions allowing such claims and going against the grain of older appellate cases. After oral argument the court sided with the defense, agreeing that for important policy concerns the plaintiff cannot prevail because the plaintiffs were asking the court to legislate and make law beyond its authoritative powers.

A panel of the the Third Circuit unanimously affirmed an order of the U.S.D.C. for the District of Delaware which granted a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in favor of law enforcement officials. The plaintiff filed suit under Section 1983, seeking damages for the alleged violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights following a traffic stop, for driving under the influence of alcohol, and the lawful seizure of blood alcohol evidence. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were barred by the claim accrual rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The district court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff appealed.  Counsel argued on appeal that the plaintiff was convicted of “reckless driving” and was subject to the “alcohol-related” penalty provision of Delaware’s reckless driving statute. As such, the imposition of the plaintiff’s sentence requires his willful or wanton disregard for safety of others be related to alcohol use. The Third Circuit agreed. In affirming, the court explained, “[c]onsidering that alcohol involvement was the basis for the alcohol-related penalty provision and considering the evidence obtained through the challenged search was integral to establishing the involvement of alcohol, any error in the search would not be harmless.” Because the plaintiff failed to show his sentence has been set aside, the court agreed that the plaintiff cannot bring his claims at this time.  

We obtained dismissal of both bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) claims in a case filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case arose from a UIM claim presented after a motor vehicle accident. In an extensive footnote to the order, the court included a fairly comprehensive overview of the standards for pleading viable bad faith in UTPCPL claims in Pennsylvania. The court did not allow the plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint in order to cure the pleading defects.

We obtained dismissal of our client, a car dealership, from a suit pending in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, on the basis of a lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff, who had addresses in Pennsylvania and Florida, had purchased a used Range Rover that allegedly experienced ongoing maintenance issues. The plaintiff sought repairs from various car dealerships, including our client. When the repairs were unsuccessful, she brought claims for breach of warranty, breach of contract and unfair trade practices against each of them. Our client had serviced the vehicle once, in Florida, and had no meaningful connections with Pennsylvania. The court was not impressed with the plaintiff’s arguments regarding our client’s website (accessible everywhere, including Pennsylvania) and unspecified, unrelated sales and shipments to Pennsylvania. The court dismissed our client, alone among the defendants, for lack of personal jurisdiction.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of a township client. The Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the township, dismissing with prejudice the plaintiff’s negligence and negligent supervision claims. Counsel argued, and the court agreed, the township was immune from liability pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541 et. seq.

We obtained a dismissal of an ethics grievance against a matrimonial attorney in northern New Jersey. The ethics grievance alleged that money in the grievant’s trust account was improperly handled since the ledger cards were completed incorrectly. Upon interviewing our client, the ethics investigator determined that no ethical violation was present since the money at issue was fully accounted for in the Trust account, despite the allegations by the grievant.

We obtained a published decision in the New Jersey Appellate Division reversing the denial of a motion to dismiss because of a lack of duty. The plaintiff’s ex-husband drove through the gate at a large, high-rise apartment complex, waited for plaintiff to arrive, and then shot her in the face. Our client was the former management company which ceased its management obligations 17 days before the shooting, when a successor management company took over. The plaintiff argued that our client was negligent based on procedures for securing the lot it put in place when it managed the property. We sought summary judgment, arguing a lack of duty due to the expiration of a management contract. The Law Division judge denied that motion, asserting there were genuine issues of fact and that the jury had to decide whether a duty existed. We persuaded the Appellate Division to grant interlocutory appeal, and then we successfully argued for a reversal. First, the Appellate Division agreed with us that the trial judge erred by holding that the existence of a duty was a jury question and not a question for the court to decide as a matter of law. Second, the Appellate Division held that, since our client no longer had any rights or responsibilities over the security of the premises when the shooting happened, and because there was no indication that the successor management company or the owner of the property could not have changed the procedures which our client had put in place, the former management company owed no duty to the plaintiff and that summary judgment was therefore appropriate.

The action was brought against an out-of-state insurer based on the plaintiff’s failure to arbitrate. The plaintiff filed suit against a New Jersey insurance company over treatment that occurred in Florida. However, the subject policy and the laws of New Jersey require mandatory arbitration prior to initiating litigation. On the defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, the court found that the doctrine of lex loci contractus applied, which required the plaintiff to comply with New Jersey law and policy and to submit to arbitration prior to filing suit. The court entered a final order dismissing the case and compelling the plaintiff to complete binding arbitration.

We successfully obtained from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmance of a district court order granting a township’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss. The panel agreed with the appellees and concluded the District Court exercised proper discretion in dismissing the complaint since the plaintiffs failed to assert under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plausible claims of federal constitutional violations.

We obtained a defense verdict in a one-week trial in Hudson County, New Jersey, in a case where the plaintiff alleged the defendant insurance producer failed to alert the plaintiff of a policy renewal coming up and then failed to advise him that the policy had lapsed, and he had no insurance.  The plaintiff claimed the defendant breached a contract to provide the plaintiff with notices by email and that the defendant breached a duty of care in a claim for professional negligence. Due to the breadth of the insurance policy at issue, the claim against the defendant was for $500,000. At trial, the plaintiff relied upon his testimony that he did not receive the notices or any calls from the defendants regarding the lapse. We argued and established that any potential breach of contract or breach of a professional duty of care was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages because he failed to take any steps to either calendar or diary his insurance renewal deadlines and also failed historically to timely renew his insurance policies in the eight years preceding this loss. After an hour and fourteen minutes of deliberation, the jury agreed with the defense and found that the plaintiff could not establish a proximate cause between the alleged breach of a duty of care and plaintiff’s damages.   

We successfully appealed a summary judgment in favor of an insurance client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6 million in damages arising out of a fire loss to an insured auto repair facility. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6 million in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County’s rejection of the claims against our client and agreed with our contention that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. 

In this case the plaintiff, after receiving legal invoices from our client, filed a legal malpractice complaint alleging fraudulent billing. At trial, the legal malpractice claims against our client were dismissed, leaving the fee claim we asserted in the counterclaim to be decided by the jury. The jury rendered a verdict in our favor within 15 minutes for the full amount of the invoices owed to the firm, $244,759.59. This victory is significant since, pursuant to the contract the plaintiff entered into with our client, the judgment on the counterclaim will total approximately $500,000.00 in interest and attorneys’ fees.

We prevailed on a motion for summary judgment with respect to the applicability of a UIM “step down” clause. Following an accident with an underinsured tortfeasor, the underlying plaintiff sought UIM recovery under three policies, including one issued by our client with limits of $500,000. The defense successfully argued that our client’s UIM limits of $500,000 “stepped down” to the $100,000 UIM limits of the plaintiff’s own policy, pursuant to our client’s policy language. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, granted our motion. 

We successfully defended a surgical center in a case involving the death of a 56-year-old woman after shoulder surgery. The plaintiff claimed that the procedure should not have been performed at the surgical center due to the decedent’s comorbidities. The plaintiff also claimed that the decedent was post-operatively given an overdose of opioids, which caused respiratory distress and death. The defense argued that the decedent was appropriately monitored after having been given pain medication and that her death was not a result of an opioid overdose.