Results

The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal our defense team obtained in a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) perceived disability claim, alleging COVID-19 to be a disability under this statute. This employment discrimination claim involved a matter of first impression in New Jersey and established that COVID-19 infection, without more, does not constitute a disability under the NJLAD. A former employee filed suit, asserting perceived disability discrimination under the NJLAD. The plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated based upon his employer’s perception that he had COVID-19. We filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, asserting the complaint did not set forth a cause of action as COVID-19 is not a recognized disability under the NJLAD. The court granted our motion and agreed that COVID-19 is not a disability under the NJLAD and, therefore, could not be the predicate for a perceived discrimination case. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, finding the plaintiff’s COVID-19-perceived disability claim failed to plead a viable cause of action under the NJLAD.  

We won summary judgment on behalf of a retail store in a slip and fall case in Ohio. The plaintiff alleged serious injuries as a result of slipping and falling on a spill of an oil substance in the parking lot, right outside the front entrance doors. The plaintiff argued that she was pushing a shopping cart and alleged that pushing a shopping cart creates an attendant circumstance that blocked her vision. We successfully argued that the act of pushing a cart does not qualify as an attendant circumstance, as the customer has the ability to see the parking lot ahead of a grocery cart and pushing a cart was a situation the plaintiff regularly encountered. Further, the oil spill was wide in nature and darker in color than the asphalt. It was observable had the plaintiff looked and, therefore, qualified as an open and obvious condition. Summary judgment was granted on behalf of our client. 

The plaintiff included a count seeking to pierce the corporate veil and pursue the principals of the liquor licensee under an enterprise theory of liability. We argued that there is no cause of action for corporate veil piercing under an enterprise theory; rather, these theories are used to recover if, and only if, the entity is not able to satisfy any judgment against it. The court dismissed the count.

The plaintiffs had hired our attorney client to represent them in a property damage case against contractors and an insurance company after, as they claimed, the roof of their property was left open and water damage was sustained. The plaintiffs argued that their attorney failed to faithfully represent them and caused them to lose their claims against the contractors. After a week-long trial, we successfully proved that our attorney client did not cause the plaintiffs to lose the underlying claims, and we obtained a unanimous defense verdict in favor of the attorney defendant and his law firm. 

We secured a unanimous defense verdict in a legal malpractice case stemming from underlying property damage litigation. The plaintiffs rejected a $350,000 settlement before the jury found for our client.

The claimant alleged issues with his speech, vision and balance. His treating physician diagnosed a concussion with post-concussion syndrome and cervicalgia resulting in gait, visual and speech dysfunction, headaches, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, sensitivity to light and sound, and difficulty walking. The judge limited the injury to a scalp contusion and traumatic Bell’s Palsy, awarded less than 11 weeks’ of benefits, and terminated benefits as of our IME.

We successfully defended a local school district and its board members in a lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The petitioner is a resident of the school district and a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board's appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court's original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Chris filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The Commonwealth Court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court's exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board's actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.  

The petitioner resides in the school district and is a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board’s appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court’s original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. We filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board’s actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

This was a wrongful death/survival action alleging malpractice against the primary care physician (PCP) and her practice, as well as numerous other physicians and two hospitals in Montgomery County, PA. The plaintiffs' decedent was a 42-year-old female with chronic respiratory problems including asthma, sinusitis, hypertension, morbid obesity, diabetes and other issues. The doctor was the plaintiff's long-standing PCP and saw the plaintiff three days prior to her emergent admission to the Emergency Department where she was diagnosed with a pulmonary embolism (PE). When the plaintiff was seen by the doctor, she showed no signs of leg swelling, which would be consistent with deep vein thrombosis (DVT). While in the hospital, the plaintiff suffered a massive event which left her pulseless. She was coded without success. The PCP and her practice group were sued for allegations of failure to diagnose a DVT and/or evolving PE. We negotiated a transfer from the civil trial attachment in January to binding arbitration. After a two-day arbitration, we received a defense verdict. The plaintiff's demand immediately preceding the trial attachment was $4 million, which included a $1.3 million future wage loss. No offer was ever extended. 

Our appellate attorneys successfully convinced a Philadelphia trial judge to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullify a $1.8 million jury verdict against a Philadelphia hospital. The case involved a fall in the hospital’s bathroom, and the trial judge determined that the plaintiff’s trial evidence failed to demonstrate that the hospital was responsible for the fall. 

We obtained the dismissal of a federal civil rights action alleging that a municipality retaliated against a real estate developer after the sale of a large tract of local property.

The plaintiff was an Emergency Medicine Technician who was severely assaulted during an ambulance transport of a minor patient to a psychiatric facility. The client-physician had discharged the minor patient with orders for sedation and restraints, if needed, during transport. The plaintiff alleged these discharge orders were insufficient and violated standard of care. Our attorneys successfully argued that under Pennsylvania’s Mcare Act our client-physician did not owe a duty to the plaintiff-EMT, only to the minor patient. Further, they successfully argued that the plaintiff’s Emergency Medicine expert was not qualified to opine on the standard of care of our client, an Internal Medicine specialist, in that the plaintiff’s expert had no expertise in the long-term management of psychiatric patients. Without an expert to opine on the applicable standard of care, they reasoned the plaintiff’s claim must fail. As a result, the court granted their motion for summary judgment and dismissed the EMT’s claims.   

We obtained a summary judgment on behalf of our client in a trip and fall matter where the plaintiff tripped and fell on a raised sidewalk in front of the defendant’s private residence. The plaintiff suffered significant injuries, including a displaced fracture of the shoulder and humeral head fracture, requiring a complete shoulder reverse arthroplasty. The plaintiff’s demand was $750,000. The defendants asserted that it is undisputed they did NOT perform any work, maintenance or construction to the sidewalk prior to the plaintiff's alleged fall in May 2020, thereby, creating or exacerbating a condition on the sidewalk which would have contributed to or caused the plaintiff's fall. The general rule is that a residential property owner owes no duty to keep a sidewalk abutting his property in repair. Norris v. Borough of Leonia, 160 N.J. 427, 431 (1999). While the court has created an exception to the rule of non-liability in the case of an abutting commercial property owner, as in Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981), it has consistently declined to extend that liability rule to abutting residential and nonprofit owners. Additionally, New Jersey Courts have recognized that "[r]esidential homeowners can safely rely on the fact that they will not be liable unless they create or exacerbate a dangerous sidewalk condition…." Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 210 (2011). The judge found that there were no genuine issues of material fact to support a theory of liability on behalf of the defendants and granted our motion for summary judgment.

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled in favor of our employer client, holding that it was error to “erase” the 500-week employer credit provided by Act 111 for partial disability benefits paid beginning in 2008, and that the claimant’s 2019 reinstatement to total disability status did not retroactively convert those prior partial disability benefits into total disability benefits.  The claimant’s work injury, a contusion to the low back, occurred in 2006. Based on the results of a 2008 IRE that assigned a zero percent impairment rating, the claimant’s benefits were modified from total to partial. The employer filed a Notice of Change of Workers’ Compensation Disability Status, which was not challenged by the claimant. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Protz, however, the claimant filed a modification petition in 2018, seeking reinstatement of his total disability benefits. The petition was granted, and it was noted at the time that the claimant had not exhausted his 500 weeks of partial disability.  The employer filed a petition for modification, based on the results of a December 2019 IRE performed on the claimant, that was granted by the Workers’ Compensation Judge. The IRE was performed pursuant to Act 111. The parties cross-appealed, and the claimant took the position that Act 111 cannot be applied retroactively to injuries sustained prior to Act 111’s October 24, 2018, effective date and that Act 111 constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. The employer cross-appealed the judge’s failure to award a 500-week credit and to suspend the claimant’s benefits.  Citing prior cases that consistently held that Act 111 applies retroactively with respect to a calculation of a claimant’s weeks of partial disability paid prior to the effective date of the Act, the claimant’s appeal was dismissed.  The employer prevailed on its cross-appeal and the Appeal Board’s order was reversed to the extent that it denied a credit for the previously paid weeks of partial disability.   

The plaintiff, a major medical provider, filed suit in Suffolk County’s 3rd District Court in the total amount of $14,999.99, claiming our insurance company client owed it for the claimant’s unpaid medical billing. The claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for medical treatment. Counsel for the medical provider argued that, since the billing was never paid by the insurer, it was due in full—despite the same matter having been successfully argued and won in arbitration in June of 2021. However, after successful arguments and motion practice, and without significant opposition by plaintiff’s counsel, the matter was dismissed, in full, by the court, which found that both res judicata and collateral estoppel applied. Therefore, the court found in full favor of our client and dismissed the suit and its accompanying complaint.

We achieved an informal admonition, the lowest form of discipline which is non-public, for a lawyer client in a matter that involved alleged failures to appropriately represent clients and timely file appeals in six different criminal matters.

By Order dated April 5, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to review the Superior Court’s affirmance of a 2021 nonsuit obtained by Jack Delany in hotly contested litigation stemming from the death of a construction worker. John Hare and Shane Haselbarth handled the appeal along with Jack. The Supreme Court’s ruling ends more than five years of litigation that arose from the construction worker’s death while he was involved in the Pier 78 renovation project on the Delaware River in Philadelphia. The plaintiff sued the general contractor and others involved in the project and ultimately settled with the general contractor for $10.5 million. The general contractor then pursued a contractual indemnification claim against Jack Delany’s concrete subcontractor client on the Pier 78 project. The indemnification claim included the $10.5 million settlement plus approximately $1 million in attorneys’ fees.   The case proceeded to trial in 2021 and, at the close of the general contractor’s case-in-chief, Jack moved for and was granted a nonsuit on the basis that the general contractor was the deceased construction workers’ statutory employer pursuant to the five-element test set forth by the PA Supreme Court in McDonald v. Levinson Steel, 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930). The case was especially notable because, rather than retaining an attorney to address the reasonableness of the amount of the underlying settlement, which is typical, Jack retained an economist to explain that, based upon his analysis of comparable cases, the settlement amount was excessive. The general contractor appealed the nonsuit. In an unanimous decision dated September 30, 2022, the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court denial of allowance of appeal brings the lengthy litigation to an end.    

After the plaintiff was struck as a pedestrian by a motor vehicle, she recovered the bodily injury limits from the driver’s policy and her personal UIM policy. The plaintiff then submitted UIM claims under her daughter’s and granddaughter’s UIM policies. Both insurers denied the claims, citing to the “other insurance” clause in the policies, and claiming the plaintiff was not entitled to stacked coverage under her relatives’ policies as she and her relatives waived stacking under each of their respective policies. After the plaintiff responded to our motion for summary judgment, the court held argument on the motion. The court granted our motion, dismissing all claims against the insurer, including for breach of contract, bad faith and unjust enrichment. In granting the motion, the court adopted our arguments that: (1) the plaintiff and her relatives knowingly waived inter-policy stacking; (2) the “other insurance” clause applies to bar the plaintiff’s claims; and (3) the “other insurance” clause does not violate public policy or the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

We were successful in obtaining a dismissal of our client, a state interscholastic athletic association, by way of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff was a high school wrestler who was not permitted to wrestle due to an alleged violation of the rules concerning hair style and covering requirements. The wrestler had his hair cut by the athletic trainer in order to wrestle. This incident was recorded by a local reporter and went viral. As a result of the incident, most states, including New Jersey, amended their discriminatory laws to specifically identify hair style as a protected category. The plaintiff claimed that his constitutional rights were violated and that he was discriminated against based on his hair style. We were successful in arguing that the plaintiff did not set forth causes of action for negligence, constitutional violations and a violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 

The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice case, claiming the emergency room physician failed to appropriately treat her elevated blood sugar and groin abscess, leading to necrotizing fasciitis. The evidence presented to the jury supported the argument that the emergency room physician appropriately treated the small spontaneously draining groin abscess as presented, there were no signs of systemic infection, and the physician gave appropriate instructions for the plaintiff to return to the hospital if her symptoms changed or worsened. She did not require admission for treatment of her elevated blood sugar as she was a long-time diabetic and the glucose level of 497 was not abnormal for her. The plaintiff stayed home for seven days with her condition worsening, and when she finally returned to the hospital, she had developed the necrotizing fasciitis. The trial lasted four days, and the jury returned the verdict in 16 minutes. 

We presented medical evidence, including a record review of all diagnostic study films and medical records from a Board-certified physiatrist, to establish that the claimant’s physiological complaints were unrelated to a work injury. The judge accepted our evidence as fully competent, persuasive and credible, and, as a result, terminated the claimant's benefits.

We successfully prosecuted a termination petition, securing a full recovery opinion from the court with reference to a Medicare eligible claimant who worked for a local Philadelphia financial institution. The claimant suffered a knee injury during the course and scope of employment. She ultimately required knee surgery for a torn meniscus. We presented evidence from the claimant’s treating surgeon, coupled with an independent expert, to produce an evidence record that demonstrated by preponderance of the evidence that the knee injury had fully resolved.

We represented a national internet retailer in the successful denial of a proposed lumbar fusion surgery and indemnity benefits. The claimant was awarded the injury and conservative medical treatment, however, the lumbar spine fusion surgery was denied, as were total and partial disability benefits. The client avoided a complex multi-level lumbar spine fusion surgery (L3-S1), total and partial disability benefits, and the post-surgical care. Because the surgery will not occur, the client is also relieved of a large post-operative permanent impairment award and surgical disfigurement. Key to the Board’s determination was our defense medical expert casting doubt on the surgery; our cross-examination of the claimant and his spine surgeon; and our closing argument, which was quoted by the Industrial Accident Board in their decision on the merits. 

We obtained summary judgment on a construction defect claim in Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant, a homebuilder, in their entirety for the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately prove breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, fraud in the inducement, wrongful conversion and various alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of an orthopedic surgeon based on the statute of limitations despite the plaintiff’s claimed application of the discovery rule. After conducting written discovery and deposing the plaintiff to solidify that the medical professional liability action was untimely commenced, we early on filed a motion for summary judgment in an effort to avoid the incurrence of significant additional expense in defending the case through the remainder of the discovery process. At oral argument, the presiding judge commented that the matter was “extraordinarily briefed” and “even better presented.” Our success on the timeliness issue, which is almost always reserved for decision by the jury, brought a quick end to the litigation, in which there were significant liability concerns.

A unanimous panel of the the Third Circuit affirmed an order of the U.S.E.D. Pa., which had granted a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in favor of a former Assistant District Attorney. The plaintiff had plead guilty to murder and other offenses in 1990 after shooting a man in the back four times. In 1993, the plaintiff filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The crux of his argument being his counsel failed to object when the court incorrectly stated the meaning of life imprisonment. According to the original transcript, the court said, “Life implies 17 ½ to 35 years.” Our client, a former Assistant District Attorney, worked on the opposition to the plaintiff’s PCRA petition and contacted the court stenographer about that line in the transcript. The stenographer admitted the transcripts contained an error and filed a certified copy of the corrected page to reflect that the court said, “Life plus 17 ½ to 35 years.” The PCRA petition was denied. Then, in 2019, the plaintiff obtained a handwritten note by our client which referenced needing a “new and improved version” of the transcript. The plaintiff filed another PCRA petition. The current administration of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and the plaintiff reached a stipulated agreement to resolve the case. The plaintiff’s 1990 guilty plea was vacated, he re-pleaded to third-degree murder and robbery, and was sentenced to 17 ½ to 35 years’ imprisonment, and was then released for time served.  The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against our client under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that our client’s ex parte communication with the stenographer violated his right to due process and to a jury trial. We moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing our client’s actions were protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity. The District Court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed. Writing for a unanimous panel, the Judge concluded the claims asserted by the plaintiff “lack merit[.]” Affirmance was decided solely on the issue of qualified immunity. The court concluded the claims were “fatally deficient” because: (1) the plaintiff defined his right to due process and jury trial at too high a level of generality; and (2) the plaintiff failed to cite authority establishing that his rights to due process and a jury trial entitled him to protection from our client’s ex parte communication with a court stenographer. Thus, our client was entitled to qualified immunity, as argued by us in the District Court.   

We defended a Claim Petition, successfully proving that a claimant’s injury was not work-related. After a thorough investigation and review of the medical records, we were able to present witnesses and evidence that confirmed that the alleged injury had gone unreported and was inconsistent with the mechanism of injury. The Workers’ Compensation Judge found our witnesses credible that the claimant did not report his knee condition as work-related. Their testimony was supported by the medical records, which indicated that for six months after the alleged injury, the claimant had nine office visits with five doctors but never indicated that he had suffered a work-related injury. In addition, the claimant never told his own expert that he suffered a work-related injury until several months later. Finally, the judge believed our expert that the knee condition was inconsistent with the mechanism of injury.

Our appellate attorneys were victorious in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullified a $5.6 million judgment in a construction accident case. In a unanimous, precedential opinion, the court ruled that the general contractor represented by our attorneys was the plaintiff’s statutory employer and, thus, immune from suit. Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc., 2023 PA Super 13 (Pa. Super. 2023).

Our appellate attorneys were victorious in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullified a $5.6 million judgment in a construction accident case. In a unanimous, precedential opinion, the court ruled that our client, a general contractor, was the plaintiff’s statutory employer and thus immune from suit.  

The agent was sued by a condominium association, that alleged the insurance agent inappropriately and unlawfully inserted himself into the insurance company’s investigation and tortuously interfered with a contract that resulted in the insurance company paying far less than the $1.3 million in damages alleged by the condominium association. After taking depositions of the individuals from the condominium association, the insurance company and defending his client’s deposition, we convinced the plaintiff’s attorney to dismiss all claims against the insurance agent.