Results

We secured summary judgment in an auto negligence case, in which we represented a car sharing app and an individual vehicle owner who rented our his car using the app. The plaintiff alleged that, under Florida’s Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine, the app and the owner were vicariously liable for the renter of the vehicle, who allegedly struck the plaintiff’s vehicle. We successfully argued that the Graves Amendment preempts the application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and exempts our clients from vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of the driver.

We were granted summary judgment in a $1.3 million construction defect subrogation case involving allegedly improperly sealed roof openings. The subcontractor contested its liability on the theory that our client chose the sealing method, and that the contract itself was deficient. Our motion, that was eventually granted, successfully argued that the contract language met the standard set in Pennsylvania’s Perry-Ruzzi rule.

We obtained a defense verdict in a premises liability case where the plaintiff alleged that she tripped and fell on the defendant’s row home stairs outside the property. After less than an hour of deliberations, the jury found negligence, but no causation for the plaintiff’s injuries.

We obtained a defense verdict in a Fourth Amendment civil rights trial before Judge Michael Baylson in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that a public agency violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching and seizing his personal property after his vehicle was impounded. The defense witnesses each testified that the vehicle was never searched by the public agency and that the public agency does not have a policy or custom of searching vehicles once they are impounded, which was an essential element of plaintiff’s constitutional violation claim. After less than 15 minutes of deliberation, the jury unanimously found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the public agency violated his constitutional rights, granting judgment in favor of the public agency defendant.  

We secured summary judgment in a four-year-old federal copyright matter filed against a national publication for elementary school principals. The plaintiff alleged that her work was improperly published because it was plagiarized. Through discovery, we were able to prove that this article was authored outside of the three-year statute of limitations.

In a unanimous precedential opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with our attorneys that a law enforcement officer’s attempted arrest of the plaintiff did not constitute an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Our client was instructed by a neighboring police department to hold a burglary suspect who was subject to a search warrant, but not an arrest warrant. After the officer tried to detain the suspect, he fled, and a fight ensued. While the district court held that the officer’s initial attempt to detain the plaintiff was an unlawful seizure, the Third Circuit accepted our reasoning that no seizure occurred because the plaintiff never submitted to the officer.

We obtained a denial for workers’ compensation in a claim that involved alleged injuries to the entire left upper extremity and neck from a work accident. Through the use of an expert witness, we were able to prove that the claimant had sought treatment for his injuries well prior to his employment with our client. As a result, all claims for compensation were denied.

We obtained dismissal of our insurance broker client on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on the basis of a statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff alleged a failure to procure insurance that would cover an employee’s death in the course of business operations. We successfully argued that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract claims barred plaintiff’s claims based upon several instances of notice of the insurance policy terms and coverages, and a claim determination, all of which preceded the suit inception by more than four years. 

We secured a motion for summary judgment in a significant workplace injury case involving a Laidlow claim. The court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to establish that his employer had committed an intentional and malicious act sufficient to circumvent the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision.

We obtained complete dismissal of all medical malpractice claims against a hospitalist physician where the plaintiff’s demand was $23.9 million. As our client treated the plaintiff, a 53-year-old who had a stroke, promptly and within the standard of care, in addition to her not being on shift at the time of alleged malpractice, the court dismissed our client outright.

We obtained a defense verdict following a 10-day jury trial on behalf of a national home improvement company and garden center, where the plaintiff’s demand was over seven figures. The plaintiff, a 79-year-old female, was using a rollator (walker) to assist her walking when she fell at a garden center. Plaintiff claimed that the front wheel of her rollator struck and got caught on the raised baseplate bolts of a column, causing her to fall.  The plaintiff was taken out on a stretcher with a fractured leg that required ORIF surgery and a recommendation for future hip replacement.     The defense established—via an in-store surveillance video, forensic engineering expert and cross-examination—that it was very unlikely that the plaintiff's rollator ever came into contact with the baseplate.  Furthermore, even if  the plaintiff did contact the baseplate, it was due to her being inattentive and not as a result of any alleged negligence by the garden center. The jury returned a defense verdict after only 35 minutes of deliberation.

The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal our defense team obtained in a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) perceived disability claim, alleging COVID-19 to be a disability under this statute. This employment discrimination claim involved a matter of first impression in New Jersey and established that COVID-19 infection, without more, does not constitute a disability under the NJLAD. A former employee filed suit, asserting perceived disability discrimination under the NJLAD. The plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated based upon his employer’s perception that he had COVID-19. We filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, asserting the complaint did not set forth a cause of action as COVID-19 is not a recognized disability under the NJLAD. The court granted our motion and agreed that COVID-19 is not a disability under the NJLAD and, therefore, could not be the predicate for a perceived discrimination case. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, finding the plaintiff’s COVID-19-perceived disability claim failed to plead a viable cause of action under the NJLAD.  

We won summary judgment on behalf of a retail store in a slip and fall case in Ohio. The plaintiff alleged serious injuries as a result of slipping and falling on a spill of an oil substance in the parking lot, right outside the front entrance doors. The plaintiff argued that she was pushing a shopping cart and alleged that pushing a shopping cart creates an attendant circumstance that blocked her vision. We successfully argued that the act of pushing a cart does not qualify as an attendant circumstance, as the customer has the ability to see the parking lot ahead of a grocery cart and pushing a cart was a situation the plaintiff regularly encountered. Further, the oil spill was wide in nature and darker in color than the asphalt. It was observable had the plaintiff looked and, therefore, qualified as an open and obvious condition. Summary judgment was granted on behalf of our client. 

The plaintiff included a count seeking to pierce the corporate veil and pursue the principals of the liquor licensee under an enterprise theory of liability. We argued that there is no cause of action for corporate veil piercing under an enterprise theory; rather, these theories are used to recover if, and only if, the entity is not able to satisfy any judgment against it. The court dismissed the count.

The plaintiffs had hired our attorney client to represent them in a property damage case against contractors and an insurance company after, as they claimed, the roof of their property was left open and water damage was sustained. The plaintiffs argued that their attorney failed to faithfully represent them and caused them to lose their claims against the contractors. After a week-long trial, we successfully proved that our attorney client did not cause the plaintiffs to lose the underlying claims, and we obtained a unanimous defense verdict in favor of the attorney defendant and his law firm. 

We secured a unanimous defense verdict in a legal malpractice case stemming from underlying property damage litigation. The plaintiffs rejected a $350,000 settlement before the jury found for our client.

The claimant alleged issues with his speech, vision and balance. His treating physician diagnosed a concussion with post-concussion syndrome and cervicalgia resulting in gait, visual and speech dysfunction, headaches, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, sensitivity to light and sound, and difficulty walking. The judge limited the injury to a scalp contusion and traumatic Bell’s Palsy, awarded less than 11 weeks’ of benefits, and terminated benefits as of our IME.

We successfully defended a local school district and its board members in a lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The petitioner is a resident of the school district and a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board's appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court's original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Chris filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The Commonwealth Court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court's exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board's actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.  

The petitioner resides in the school district and is a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board’s appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court’s original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. We filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board’s actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

This was a wrongful death/survival action alleging malpractice against the primary care physician (PCP) and her practice, as well as numerous other physicians and two hospitals in Montgomery County, PA. The plaintiffs' decedent was a 42-year-old female with chronic respiratory problems including asthma, sinusitis, hypertension, morbid obesity, diabetes and other issues. The doctor was the plaintiff's long-standing PCP and saw the plaintiff three days prior to her emergent admission to the Emergency Department where she was diagnosed with a pulmonary embolism (PE). When the plaintiff was seen by the doctor, she showed no signs of leg swelling, which would be consistent with deep vein thrombosis (DVT). While in the hospital, the plaintiff suffered a massive event which left her pulseless. She was coded without success. The PCP and her practice group were sued for allegations of failure to diagnose a DVT and/or evolving PE. We negotiated a transfer from the civil trial attachment in January to binding arbitration. After a two-day arbitration, we received a defense verdict. The plaintiff's demand immediately preceding the trial attachment was $4 million, which included a $1.3 million future wage loss. No offer was ever extended. 

Our appellate attorneys successfully convinced a Philadelphia trial judge to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullify a $1.8 million jury verdict against a Philadelphia hospital. The case involved a fall in the hospital’s bathroom, and the trial judge determined that the plaintiff’s trial evidence failed to demonstrate that the hospital was responsible for the fall. 

We obtained the dismissal of a federal civil rights action alleging that a municipality retaliated against a real estate developer after the sale of a large tract of local property.

The plaintiff was an Emergency Medicine Technician who was severely assaulted during an ambulance transport of a minor patient to a psychiatric facility. The client-physician had discharged the minor patient with orders for sedation and restraints, if needed, during transport. The plaintiff alleged these discharge orders were insufficient and violated standard of care. Our attorneys successfully argued that under Pennsylvania’s Mcare Act our client-physician did not owe a duty to the plaintiff-EMT, only to the minor patient. Further, they successfully argued that the plaintiff’s Emergency Medicine expert was not qualified to opine on the standard of care of our client, an Internal Medicine specialist, in that the plaintiff’s expert had no expertise in the long-term management of psychiatric patients. Without an expert to opine on the applicable standard of care, they reasoned the plaintiff’s claim must fail. As a result, the court granted their motion for summary judgment and dismissed the EMT’s claims.   

We obtained a summary judgment on behalf of our client in a trip and fall matter where the plaintiff tripped and fell on a raised sidewalk in front of the defendant’s private residence. The plaintiff suffered significant injuries, including a displaced fracture of the shoulder and humeral head fracture, requiring a complete shoulder reverse arthroplasty. The plaintiff’s demand was $750,000. The defendants asserted that it is undisputed they did NOT perform any work, maintenance or construction to the sidewalk prior to the plaintiff's alleged fall in May 2020, thereby, creating or exacerbating a condition on the sidewalk which would have contributed to or caused the plaintiff's fall. The general rule is that a residential property owner owes no duty to keep a sidewalk abutting his property in repair. Norris v. Borough of Leonia, 160 N.J. 427, 431 (1999). While the court has created an exception to the rule of non-liability in the case of an abutting commercial property owner, as in Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981), it has consistently declined to extend that liability rule to abutting residential and nonprofit owners. Additionally, New Jersey Courts have recognized that "[r]esidential homeowners can safely rely on the fact that they will not be liable unless they create or exacerbate a dangerous sidewalk condition…." Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 210 (2011). The judge found that there were no genuine issues of material fact to support a theory of liability on behalf of the defendants and granted our motion for summary judgment.

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled in favor of our employer client, holding that it was error to “erase” the 500-week employer credit provided by Act 111 for partial disability benefits paid beginning in 2008, and that the claimant’s 2019 reinstatement to total disability status did not retroactively convert those prior partial disability benefits into total disability benefits.  The claimant’s work injury, a contusion to the low back, occurred in 2006. Based on the results of a 2008 IRE that assigned a zero percent impairment rating, the claimant’s benefits were modified from total to partial. The employer filed a Notice of Change of Workers’ Compensation Disability Status, which was not challenged by the claimant. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Protz, however, the claimant filed a modification petition in 2018, seeking reinstatement of his total disability benefits. The petition was granted, and it was noted at the time that the claimant had not exhausted his 500 weeks of partial disability.  The employer filed a petition for modification, based on the results of a December 2019 IRE performed on the claimant, that was granted by the Workers’ Compensation Judge. The IRE was performed pursuant to Act 111. The parties cross-appealed, and the claimant took the position that Act 111 cannot be applied retroactively to injuries sustained prior to Act 111’s October 24, 2018, effective date and that Act 111 constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. The employer cross-appealed the judge’s failure to award a 500-week credit and to suspend the claimant’s benefits.  Citing prior cases that consistently held that Act 111 applies retroactively with respect to a calculation of a claimant’s weeks of partial disability paid prior to the effective date of the Act, the claimant’s appeal was dismissed.  The employer prevailed on its cross-appeal and the Appeal Board’s order was reversed to the extent that it denied a credit for the previously paid weeks of partial disability.   

The plaintiff, a major medical provider, filed suit in Suffolk County’s 3rd District Court in the total amount of $14,999.99, claiming our insurance company client owed it for the claimant’s unpaid medical billing. The claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for medical treatment. Counsel for the medical provider argued that, since the billing was never paid by the insurer, it was due in full—despite the same matter having been successfully argued and won in arbitration in June of 2021. However, after successful arguments and motion practice, and without significant opposition by plaintiff’s counsel, the matter was dismissed, in full, by the court, which found that both res judicata and collateral estoppel applied. Therefore, the court found in full favor of our client and dismissed the suit and its accompanying complaint.

We achieved an informal admonition, the lowest form of discipline which is non-public, for a lawyer client in a matter that involved alleged failures to appropriately represent clients and timely file appeals in six different criminal matters.

By Order dated April 5, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to review the Superior Court’s affirmance of a 2021 nonsuit obtained by Jack Delany in hotly contested litigation stemming from the death of a construction worker. John Hare and Shane Haselbarth handled the appeal along with Jack. The Supreme Court’s ruling ends more than five years of litigation that arose from the construction worker’s death while he was involved in the Pier 78 renovation project on the Delaware River in Philadelphia. The plaintiff sued the general contractor and others involved in the project and ultimately settled with the general contractor for $10.5 million. The general contractor then pursued a contractual indemnification claim against Jack Delany’s concrete subcontractor client on the Pier 78 project. The indemnification claim included the $10.5 million settlement plus approximately $1 million in attorneys’ fees.   The case proceeded to trial in 2021 and, at the close of the general contractor’s case-in-chief, Jack moved for and was granted a nonsuit on the basis that the general contractor was the deceased construction workers’ statutory employer pursuant to the five-element test set forth by the PA Supreme Court in McDonald v. Levinson Steel, 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930). The case was especially notable because, rather than retaining an attorney to address the reasonableness of the amount of the underlying settlement, which is typical, Jack retained an economist to explain that, based upon his analysis of comparable cases, the settlement amount was excessive. The general contractor appealed the nonsuit. In an unanimous decision dated September 30, 2022, the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court denial of allowance of appeal brings the lengthy litigation to an end.    

After the plaintiff was struck as a pedestrian by a motor vehicle, she recovered the bodily injury limits from the driver’s policy and her personal UIM policy. The plaintiff then submitted UIM claims under her daughter’s and granddaughter’s UIM policies. Both insurers denied the claims, citing to the “other insurance” clause in the policies, and claiming the plaintiff was not entitled to stacked coverage under her relatives’ policies as she and her relatives waived stacking under each of their respective policies. After the plaintiff responded to our motion for summary judgment, the court held argument on the motion. The court granted our motion, dismissing all claims against the insurer, including for breach of contract, bad faith and unjust enrichment. In granting the motion, the court adopted our arguments that: (1) the plaintiff and her relatives knowingly waived inter-policy stacking; (2) the “other insurance” clause applies to bar the plaintiff’s claims; and (3) the “other insurance” clause does not violate public policy or the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

We were successful in obtaining a dismissal of our client, a state interscholastic athletic association, by way of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff was a high school wrestler who was not permitted to wrestle due to an alleged violation of the rules concerning hair style and covering requirements. The wrestler had his hair cut by the athletic trainer in order to wrestle. This incident was recorded by a local reporter and went viral. As a result of the incident, most states, including New Jersey, amended their discriminatory laws to specifically identify hair style as a protected category. The plaintiff claimed that his constitutional rights were violated and that he was discriminated against based on his hair style. We were successful in arguing that the plaintiff did not set forth causes of action for negligence, constitutional violations and a violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.