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Erie

Erie, strategically located on Lake Erie between New York and Ohio, is Pennsylvania's third largest city and its only Great Lakes port. The firm's Erie office opened in 1996 and provides strong service to its clients through experienced local attorneys.

The Erie office is conveniently located in downtown Erie near the Erie County courthouse, the Erie Division of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and state administrative offices.  From Erie we handle cases throughout Northwestern Pennsylvania, including the counties of Erie, Crawford, Mercer, Warren, McKean, Venango, Forest, Elk, Potter and Cameron, in addition to cases assigned to the Erie Division of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

The Erie office provides our clients with an effective defense litigation team of local professionals backed by the intellectual property and broad-based experience of the entire firm, permitting localized and economical representation of insurers and self-insured clients.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Limiting Agent Liability in Pennsylvania: Knowledge, Reliance, and the E&O Landscape

May 7, 2026

Errors & Omissions (E&O) claims against real estate professionals in Pennsylvania frequently arise from allegations of nondisclosure or misrepresentation. However, Pennsylvania law provides meaningful guardrails for defense counsel, particularly where plaintiffs attempt to impose duties on agents that exceed statutory and common law obligations. A key principle, often dispositive at summary judgment, is that a seller’s agent does not owe an independent duty to investigate or discover latent defects. Under Pennsylvania law, a real estate agent representing a seller is not required to inspect the property for defects or to disclose conditions of which the agent has no knowledge. This principle aligns with the statutory framework governing licensee conduct, including the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act (RELRA), which imposes duties of honesty and good faith, but does not create an affirmative obligation to uncover unknown defects. As a result, liability exposure in E&O claims often turns on whether the agent had actual knowledge of the alleged defect and whether the buyer’s reliance was justifiable. The Gordon v. McManus decision illustrates these principles in practice and remains a useful tool for defense practitioners. No. 972 EDA 2013, 2014 WL 10917627, at 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 30, 2014). In Gordon, the plaintiffs asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement against real estate agents, alleging that the agents were aware of a recurring water infiltration issue and failed to disclose it. The plaintiffs further contended that the agents negligently misrepresented the condition of the property when questioned directly about potential water issues. The factual record, however, undermined these claims. The defendant agents maintained that they had no knowledge of any water infiltration problem. Critically, the plaintiffs had been informed by a neighbor that the basement had flooded on multiple occasions prior to closing. They also conducted their own inspection of the property and observed conditions – including the presence of a sump pump – that could reasonably signal potential water concerns. Despite these indicators, the plaintiffs did not pursue additional investigation or specialized inspection. The Superior Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the agents, emphasizing two key points that frequently arise in E&O defense. First, the absence of actual knowledge was fatal to the plaintiffs’ fraud claims. Without evidence that the agents knew of the defect, there could be no intentional misrepresentation or concealment. Second, and equally important, the court found that the plaintiffs’ reliance was not justifiable. Having been placed on notice of potential water issues, the plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence in investigating the condition. Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that where a buyer is aware of facts that would prompt further inquiry, reliance on generalized or informal assurances is insufficient to sustain a fraud claim. The Gordon court also disposed of the plaintiffs’ claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, reinforcing that such statutory claims cannot survive where the underlying fraud theory fails. For defense counsel, this linkage provides an additional pathway to narrow or eliminate exposure early in litigation. From an E&O perspective, Gordon highlights several recurring themes. Plaintiffs frequently attempt to recast nondisclosure claims as affirmative misrepresentation, particularly where there are informal communications between agents and buyers. Yet, absent proof of knowledge, these claims often collapse under scrutiny. Moreover, the decision underscores the importance of the buyer’s own conduct. Evidence that a buyer received notice of a potential defect, whether through third parties, inspection findings, or observable conditions, can significantly weaken claims of justifiable reliance. Practically, this framework offers clear guidance for both litigators and real estate professionals. For defense attorneys, early case assessment should focus on developing the evidentiary record regarding the agent’s knowledge and the buyer’s pre-closing awareness. For agents and brokers, risk mitigation remains centered on disciplined communication practices and encouraging independent inspections without offering definitive assurances about property conditions. Ultimately, while E&O claims in Pennsylvania continue to test the boundaries of agent liability, decisions like Gordon reaffirm a consistent judicial approach: liability cannot be imposed where knowledge is absent and reliance is unreasonable. In an environment where plaintiffs increasingly rely on hindsight to construct claims, these principles remain a critical line of defense.

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Misrepresentations of the Next Degree: Expanding Broker Liability After Penn Outdoor

May 7, 2026

Services v. Harleyville Insurance Co. There has been a noticeable increase in claims against insurance brokers over recent years, with plaintiffs beginning to frame coverage disputes as actions sounding in negligence and negligent misrepresentations. In this ever-shifting world, disputes regarding coverage have devolved into claims that brokers failed to secure, explain, or accurately advise as to coverage. Such claims, requiring no proof of intent, allow insureds facing scrutiny to look beyond the spoken word of brokers and into the text of standard transaction documents. Pennsylvania’s Superior Court’s decision in Penn Outdoor Servs., LLC v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 323 A.3d 231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024), reargument denied (Sept. 6, 2024), highlights the evolution of the misrepresentation claims against brokers. There, Penn Outdoor Services, LLC subcontracted for snow removal services at an apartment complex it owned with Longford Landscape and Excavation. The contract between Penn and Longford included a hold harmless clause in favor of Penn with respect to the services to be provided by Longford, which specifically stated: Subcontractor agrees to indemnify and save and hold harmless Penn and Penn's clients/customers from and against all claims for damages arising out of the performance of Subcontractor's duties under this Agreement and agrees to, at Subcontractor's expense, defend any suit or action brought against Penn or Penn's clients/customers on account of such claim or damage. Consistent with the parties’ agreement, Longford’s insurance broker, Wharton, Lyon & Lyon provided Penn with a certificate of insurance, naming Penn as an additional insured under Wharton’s insurance policy with Harleysville Insurance Company. Specifically, the subject policy included an endorsement relating to Penn’s coverage as an additional insured, endorsement CG-7524, which provided, If specifically required by the written contract or agreement referenced in Paragraph A above, any coverage provided by this endorsement to an additional insured shall be primary and any other valid and collectible insurance available to the additional insured shall be non-contributory with this insurance. While the contract between Penn and Longford was in effect, a woman was injured in a slip and fall at the complex where Longford provided snow removal services. The woman filed suit and named Penn as a defendant. With the impression it was an additional insured under Longford policy, Penn sought a defense in the matter from Longford and Harleysville; a request that was denied because, as per Harleysville, the coverage provided under Penn’s policy was excess coverage, not primary. After settling the underlying action and incurring extensive legal fees in the course of the same, Penn filed an action against Harleysville and Wharton, including a claim for negligent misrepresentation against Wharton. After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of Penn, Wharton filed a motion for j.n.o.v. arguing that the evidence established that it made no negligent misrepresentation. The trial court disagreed, pointing out that the contract between Penn and Longford required Penn to be named as an additional insured, however, it did not specify that such coverage be primary as required by the applicable endorsement to the Harleysville policy. Wharton’s representative testified that she did not review the complete language of the endorsement in question, thus creating the negligent misrepresentation. By providing the COI naming Penn as an additional insured, Wharton represented that to be the status of insurance extended to Penn. The endorsement of the Harleysville policy provided that “if specially provided” by the contract between the parties, the coverage afforded would be primary, correlating with the text of the COI. The contract in question, however, did not specifically call for the coverage to be primary. Therefore, it was not. While reading like a choose your own adventure novel, Penn Outdoor highlights the need for attention to detail in the issuance of COI’s by brokers. In a world where a broker’s spoken word can get them into hot water, the case casts a light on a new potential pathway to broker liability. While the COI in the present matter contained the necessary buzz words, i.e. “additional insured,” that language alone could not carry the day. Penn Outdoor evidences how critical it is for brokers to choose their words wisely, but also carefully ensures the text of the COI, policy language, and other transaction documents provide the coverage reasonably expected by the insured. By making it ones practice to always reconcile the policy language with the COI, and any applicable contracts, brokers can avoid potential liability in an increasingly litigious world.

Results

Appellate Reversal in the Third Circuit Obtained in Fourth Amendment Civil Rights Case

In a unanimous precedential opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with our attorneys that a law enforcement officer’s attempted arrest of the plaintiff did not constitute an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Our client was instructed by a neighboring police department to hold a burglary suspect who was subject to a search warrant, but not an arrest warrant. After the officer tried to detain the suspect, he fled, and a fight ensued. While the district court held that the officer’s initial attempt to detain the plaintiff was an unlawful seizure, the Third Circuit accepted our reasoning that no seizure occurred because the plaintiff never submitted to the officer.

Dismissal of claims against a Pennsylvania city and a police officer.

In this civil rights litigation, we obtained summary judgment and the dismissal of all claims against a Pennsylvania City and one of its police officers. The court found that the traffic stop of the plaintiff was proper and did not violate his constitutional rights. The plaintiff filed a federal civil rights action against the police officer and the City, alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because of unlawful search and seizure as well as a malicious prosecution. The plaintiff further alleged that the City was liable for the constitutional violation based upon a failure to train its officers. These claims were based, in part, upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Hicks, which was filed approximately two months before the plaintiff’s arrest. In this civil rights case, the parties agree to forego discovery and instead rely solely upon the record developed in the plaintiff’s state criminal prosecution. After considering the record evidence, the arguments of each side, and the motions and briefs submitted, the District Court issued an opinion finding that the police officer possessed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying the traffic stop of the plaintiff’s vehicle. Because the court concluded that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights had not been violated, an analysis of qualified immunity was unnecessary. Finally, after finding that the officer did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the court dismissed the Monell claims raised against the City.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.