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Results

  • Successful Defense of High‑Profile Condo Board Election Challenge as Court Dismisses Claims With Prejudice

    In a case successfully tried by John Slimm, attorney in Marshall Dennehey’s Mount Laurel, NJ office, a New Jersey court upheld the 2024 board election of a major Atlantic City condominium association, rejecting claims that the process was fraudulent or fundamentally unfair. Although the court acknowledged that the community had become sharply divided and that the election season was marked by tension and mistrust, it found that the association’s procedures complied with its governing documents and state requirements. The ballot‑handling methods challenged by the plaintiffs—including coded envelopes and signatureless absentee ballots—had been formally adopted, disclosed to residents, and overseen by a neutral third‑party inspector. Throughout the litigation, the plaintiffs pointed to a series of alleged irregularities, from ballot‑collection events to delays in providing voter lists to candidates. Slimm emphasized that while these issues may have caused frustration, they did not amount to intentional misconduct or anything that could have changed the outcome. The court agreed, noting that Honest Ballot, the independent inspector, verified voter eligibility, processed challenges, and certified the results. Plaintiffs, by contrast, offered no credible evidence of ballot stuffing, fraudulent voting, or systemic disenfranchisement. The court also rejected arguments that the absence of signature verification invalidated the election, finding that neither the Master Deed nor New Jersey regulations require signatures as part of the voting process. What the rules do require—proof of eligibility and a verifiable counting method—was satisfied through the use of coded envelopes, government‑issued identification, and inspector review. Likewise, while “ballot harvesting” events did occur, Slimm successfully argued that the election rules did not prohibit bulk ballot submission, and the court found no evidence that these events altered the results. Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to show fraud, illegality, or any systemic deprivation of voting rights. It declined to order a new election or impose new election procedures, instead encouraging the community to consider adopting more transparent practices voluntarily in the future. Thanks to the arguments advanced by Jack, the action was dismissed with prejudice, the 2024 election results were confirmed, and the current board remains firmly in place.

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  • Summary Judgment Obtained for a Homeowners’ Association

    We secured summary judgment for a homeowners’ association. The plaintiff owned an apartment in a planned community and sought to drill a hole through the exterior wall of the building to vent an HVAC unit. The HOA denied his request, and the plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealings, alleging that the HOA treated him unfairly by denying his request. Despite providing numerous photos of other holes through the exterior wall of the building, the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that they did not know whether the HOA had ever permitted another unit owner to drill a hole in the exterior wall. We successfully argued that the plaintiff could not put forth any evidence demonstrating unfair treatment, or that the request had been denied in bad faith. 

  • Summary Judgment Secured in Favor of a New Jersey Homeowners Association

    We won summary judgment for a homeowners association. Our client filed a lawsuit to enforce the Covenant of Restrictions banning barnyard animals and claiming that the homeowners failed to obtain necessary approvals to build a coup and run for six chickens. The homeowners claimed the six chickens were emotional support animals, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD). The court held that the chickens are not emotional support animals, pursuant to both FHA and NJLAD, and granted summary judgment. This is an area of first impression for the New Jersey courts as to whether non-domesticated animals can be considered emotional support animals.

  • Motion to Enforce Oral Settlement Agreement Affirmed by First District Court of Appeals

    We won a decision from the First District Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision to grant our client’s motion to enforce an oral settlement agreement. We defended a condominium owners association against a lawsuit filed by several unit owners. The parties went to mediation, during which their attorneys agreed on the settlement terms. However, several of the plaintiff unit owners refused to sign the written settlement agreement. We argued at the trial court that the oral agreement should be enforced because memorializing the agreement in writing was not a material term of the parties’ agreement, and that the parties did not intend for the settlement agreement to only be enforceable upon the execution of the writing. Further, all the material terms of the agreement had been agreed on. The First District Court agreed and upheld the decision in favor of the condominium owners’ association.

  • Directed Verdict in Favor of Our Client in a High-Exposure and High-Risk Defamation Lawsuit

    We secured a directed verdict in favor of our client in a high-exposure and high-risk defamation lawsuit. We were called to try the case on behalf of the CEO of a local chapter of a well-known national non-profit after the plaintiff was permitted to amend the complaint to seek punitive damages from the CEO personally. When we received the case, the trial was set to begin in four weeks. We secured a brief continuance and built a client-specific defense focused on the CEO while working with a team of other firms representing other defendants, including the non-profit organization which had formerly represented all of the defendants jointly.  Background: The plaintiff was a volunteer at a camp. A decision was made to separate him from the camp and the organization. The plaintiff alleged that the CEO personally defamed him by alerting other volunteers and committees of the decision. He demanded an eight-figure sum prior to trial.  After a six-day trial and several hours of argument at the close of the plaintiff’s case, the court granted our motion for directed verdict, ruling that the evidence presented confirmed that the communications by the CEO were covered by a qualified privilege and that, based on cross examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses, the defense established that there was no malicious conduct by the CEO.  The case had been pending since 2020, and in fewer than 100 days, we became familiar with the factual and legal details to bring home a win for the client.   

  • Summary Judgment Secured for a Condominium Association

    We obtained summary judgment, dismissal and an award of attorneys’ fees for a condominium association. Judgment was entered in favor of our client against the plaintiff in an earlier action that sought unpaid assessments. In order to sell its property, the plaintiff sent the association a check in the amount of recorded liens. The association returned the check, demanding the full payoff amount, and claimed a statutory lien for all amounts owed. The plaintiff paid the full amount and then filed its complaint, seeking a declaration from the court that the association should have satisfied a lien for the recorded amount even though additional amounts were owed under a statutory lien. The court found that the statutory liens which applied to the property created both in rem and in personam liability and, therefore, the association had no legal obligation to mark the lien as satisfied until it was fully paid. The court awarded our client’s attorneys’ fees for the plaintiff’s failure to appeal the lower court’s decision awarding the initial judgment and attorneys’ fees and, instead, bringing an additional action, which resulted in further delay and expenditure of additional sums by the association.

  • Dismissal With Prejudice Secured in Complex Florida Litigation Matter

    We obtained a dismissal with prejudice in an action based on an alleged violation of contract, constitutional challenge of a Florida statute, and enforcement of a third-party settlement agreement. We represented an international nonprofit private membership organization in an action by a former member for violation of his membership in said organization. The plaintiff attempted to use a settlement agreement from a prior case to show that he was in compliance with the organization’s membership requirements. He also argued that the requirement to be a member of an underlying organization was unconstitutional because of an antiquated Florida law. We argued that a settlement agreement could not be enforced against a third party with no connection to a settlement agreement, in addition to pointing out the plaintiff’s failure to follow procedural requirements. Agreeing with our arguments, the judge ruled from the bench after oral arguments, dismissing the case with prejudice for failure to state a breach of contract and failure to state a cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

  • Defense Verdict for Homeowners' Association

    We obtained a defense verdict in a Bucks County bench trial. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant homeowners’ association was obligated to replace an old stone bridge that provided the only access to the plaintiff’s residence and open public space. As part of the initial community development approval, the township directed the builder to carve out open space and repair the stone bridge so that emergency vehicles could access the open space. Continued maintenance/replacement of the bridge would thereafter pass to the the homeowner’s association. The builder never made the repairs to the bridge despite multiple requests by the township. The homeowner’s association successfully argued that its obligation to replace the bridge did not arise as the builder had not fulfilled the condition precedent of repairing the bridge and bringing it up to a current safe standard.

  • Successful Defense of Condominium Association Board and Property Manager

    The lawsuit was brought by 54 condominium unit owners of a 608-unit, age-restricted planned development against the homeowner’s association board, the property manager and the sponsor/developer, for the early transfer of control of the condominium association. Dismissal of the board and the property manager was granted in what was properly a unit owner-sponsor/developer dispute over control of the association. The unit owners alleged that the sponsor/developer was no longer offering new units for sale; rather, they were only renting units, thereby triggering the turn-over provisions in the by-laws. No claims against either the board or the property manager were properly pled in the complaint. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed as to both.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.