.

The Quarterly Dose

An Overview of the Protections Afforded by the Peer Review Protection Act

The Quarterly Dose – November 2025

November 1, 2025

by Sandrine Gibbons

As scientific and medical advancements have accelerated, so has the complexity of medical decision-making, exposing a need for standardization in the United States. In 1952, the Joint Commission created the mandatory clinical peer review process. Often referred to as “medical peer review,” it is the process by which health care providers establish and maintain reliable standards of quality in patient care.

Clinical peer review entails periodic meetings of professional health care providers to evaluate the quality and efficiency of the services performed by other professional health care providers within the same hospital or health system. Today, countries with reputations for the most exceptional health care all mandate clinical peer review processes. In the United States, the clinical peer review process is so trusted to maintain and improve the quality of health care that every state has enacted a statute preventing certain information and documents discussed in peer review meetings from disclosure in litigation.

In 1974, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Peer Review Protection Act (PRPA) to provide an evidentiary privilege to protect the “proceedings and documents of a review committee,” conducting peer review activities by professional health care providers, in conformity with its provisions. Reginelli v. Boggs, 181 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. 2018). The PRPA’s evidentiary privilege is set forth in Section 425.4:

The proceedings and records of a review committee shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a professional health care provider arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of such committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of such committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions or other actions of such committee or any members thereof.

Between 2018 and 2021, courts both narrowed and broadened the application of this privilege.

Narrowing: Only “Peer Review Committees” Can Assert the Privilege
In Reginelli v. Boggs, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the defendants were not entitled to this privilege primarily because the physician’s employer was not a “professional health care provider” covered under the PRPA. UPMC Emergency Medicine, Inc. (ERMI) staffed the physician to Monongahela Valley Hospital (MVH) and was therefore the physician’s employer. The court held ERMI was not a “professional health care provider” because it was not regulated and licensed to practice medicine. The PRPA defines the term “professional health care providers” as “individuals or organizations who are approved, licensed or otherwise regulated to practice or operate in the health care field under the laws of the Commonwealth.” Because the PRPA’s language explicitly states the “individual or organization be `approved, licensed or otherwise regulated to practice or operate in the health care field under the laws of the Commonwealth- to benefit from the privilege—and the employer at issue was not—the court found the PRPA privilege did not apply.

Furthermore, the court found each of the defendants could only be construed as mere “review organizations” that engaged only in a process of reviewing professional qualifications credentialing). Therefore, they were not “review committees” under the PRPA. The PRPA defines a “review organization” as “any committee engaging in peer review....” Although the language of Section 425.4 suggests it pertains to review organizations, the substantive text sets forth confidentiality mandates and testimonial privileges relating to the work and records of review committees. Since the PRPA privilege does not explicitly extend to any review organization that merely conducts credentialing review, the defendants did not qualify for the privilege. Here, the court determined that MVH’s physician merely reviewed the credentials of hospital staff and did not engage in review of the quality and efficiency of the services staff performed.

Narrowing: Credentialing Files are Not Protected
In Estate of Krappa v. Lyons, the Pennsylvania Superior Court interpreted the PRPA and Reginelli to mean a credentialing file will not be entitled to the PRPA’s evidentiary privilege if it (1) consists entirely of credentialing materials, and (2) was maintained by the hospital’s “credentialing committee.” In Krappa, a patient’s estate brought suit alleging a delay in diagnosis after the patient had died of cancer. During discovery, the estate sought unredacted copies of the medical center’s files concerning two physicians who treated the patient. As discussed in Reginelli, the Superior Court determined credentialing files generated and maintained by a hospital’s credentialing committee are not protected under the PRPA because a credentialing committee does not qualify as a “review committee” engaging in peer review.

Narrowing: Event Reports, Root-Cause Analyses are Not Protected
In Ungurian v. Beyzman, the Pennsylvania Superior Court articulated that the PRPA privilege does not encompass event reports and root-cause analyses where there is no indication those documents were generated “exclusively for a PRPA 'review committee.' This was a case where the patient’s mother brought a medical malpractice action against physicians, hospital staff, clinics, corporations, and the hospital itself alleging their collective negligence caused the total and permanent incapacity of her child who had undergone a cystoscopy at the hospital. The mother-plaintiff sought to compel various documents, including event reports and root cause analysis, and the defendants appealed arguing protections pursuant to the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 and PRPA. Consistent with the Superior Court’s reasoning in Lyons, the court reasoned that, because neither event reports nor root-cause analyses were generated in the course of peer review and merely constituted business records of the hospital, these documents were not entitled to the privilege.

Broadening: Privilege Extends to Peer Review as a Function, not just a “Peer Review Committee”
In Leadbitter v. Keystone Anesthesia Consultants, Ltd., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded the potential applicability of the PRPA’s evidentiary privilege in contrast to its opinion in Reginelli where, consistent with the plain language of § 425.3-425.4, the court found the title or name of the body conducting the review was determinative of whether the privilege would apply. Here, however, the Leadbitter court articulated that it is instead the actual function or “activity” of a review organization/committee which determines whether the privilege applies. In this case, a physician applied to be appointed to the medical staff of St. Clair Hospital and for orthopedic surgery clinical privileges. After performing surgery on a patient, the patient suffered a series of strokes and filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital, seeking that they produce documents relating to the physician’s credentials, as they claimed the physician lacked expertise.

The hospital denied the requests, arguing the PRPA privilege applied because the work of their credentials committee was multifaceted and included peer review. Specifically, the hospital argued that this work included both privileging and credentialing and that, because privileging is covered by the PRPA as a peer review activity, the hospital was entitled to statutory protection. It pointed out—and the Leadbitter court acknowledged—that Reginelli’s reasoning was limited to credentialing review for purposes of appointment to a hospital’s medical staff. The Leadbitter court agreed that privileging is distinct from credentialing as it involves giving the physician permission to treat patients at the hospital, and not merely to exercise political rights in relation to staff and committee meetings. As such, it agreed with the proposition that a credentials committee is entitled to the PRPA’s protections to the extent it performs a peer-review function—in this case, privileging. In short, because of Leadbitter, the PRPA’s evidentiary privilege extends to those who engage in “peer review activities” as the actual function of the committee—not the title—determines whether the privilege applies.

Narrowing: Private Physician Practice Groups Cannot Assert the Privilege
In 2021, the Eastern District considered whether a report authored by a radiologist who reviewed care provided at a hospital was protected under PRPA. In Lasheena Sipp Lipscob v. Einstein Physicians Pennypack Pediatrics, the plaintiff sued both a hospital and a private radiology practice that provided radiology services to the hospital, arguing the defendants failed to diagnose testicular torsion resulting in the loss of a testicle. A report generated by a radiologist employed by the practice was identified in discovery which reviewed the quality of care rendered to the plaintiff’s minor-patient. The defendants argued this report was protected under the PRPA because it was created for a “peer review purpose.” The court disagreed, reasoning first that the radiology group (i.e., a private medical practice) was not a “professional healthcare provider” within the meaning of the PRPA and therefore not eligible for the evidentiary privilege. The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled consistent with this conclusion in 2021 in the non-precedential decision of Bousamra v. Excela Health.

Second, while the hospital defendant was clearly a “professional health care provider” under the PRPA, it too could not assert the evidentiary privilege over this report because the authoring radiologist did not generate the report as part of any hospital “committee” as contemplated under the Act. In other words, because the report was not generated for or provided to any hospital “committee” performing a “peer review function,” the PRPA privilege was not extended.

Key Takeaways
In enacting the Peer Review Protection Act, the Pennsylvania legislature recognized that candid and rigorous clinical peer review is essential to upholding the quality of patient care. Accordingly, the evolving body of case law interpreting the PRPA’s evidentiary privilege carries substantial implications for health care providers and institutions, particularly in the context of medical malpractice litigation. To preserve the confidentiality afforded by the PRPA, documents assessing the quality of care should be created by or for a hospital committee engaged in peer review functions, such as privileging. As with any legal privilege, the integrity of protection depends on strict adherence to confidentiality—such materials must not be disclosed to unauthorized parties, whether internal or external to the institution. 


The Quarterly Dose – November 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.