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Results

  • Successful appeal of order against a physician’s license.

    We successfully appealed an emergency restrictive order issued by the Department of Health against a physician’s license. ​After allegations by a patient of sexual misconduct, the Department issued an emergency order restricting the physician’s license, thereby preventing him from treating any female patients in his practice. On appeal, the First District Court agreed that the emergency order was facially insufficient to demonstrate that sexual misconduct occurred or that an immediate threat of danger to the public existed, thereby quashing the emergency order and removing the restrictions on the physician’s license to practice medicine.

  • Defense verdict in dental malpractice action.

    We successfully obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a dentist in a dental malpractice action in Luzerne County. ​The plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence and lack of informed consent. Regarding negligence, the plaintiff alleged the dentist used excessive force in extracting a lower third molar, thereby causing a fracture of the mandible and alleged permanent paresthesia. In response, the defense admitted that the mandible was fractured during the extraction, but offered expert testimony that the fracture was an extremely rare complication and was not caused by negligence. The defense argued there was no evidence of the use of excessive force, such as TMJ disorders or dislocation, lacerations or broken adjacent teeth. As for informed consent, the plaintiff argued the dentist did not obtain informed consent because he did not discuss the risk of fracture. The dentist testified that he discussed the possibility of permanent numbness as a risk, but he admitted that fracture was a risk of the extraction and that he did not discuss this risk because the chances of it occurring were astronomically low. The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s experts both agreed that the chances of a fracture occurring were less than 0.0009%. The jury returned a defense verdict on all causes of action in less than one hour.

  • Defense arbitration award in a podiatric surgical malpractice case.

    The 55-year-old plaintiff underwent tarsal tunnel surgery. She developed post-operative complications, including infection, and required two additional surgeries, including a sural artery flap graft. The plaintiff gained over 100 pounds after the podiatric surgeries and underwent gastric bypass surgery. She alleged it was required as the result of being sedentary from the podiatric surgeries and complications. The plaintiff has significant lower extremity surgical scarring, chronic pain and a gait abnormality. She was never able to return to work. She  alleged that the defendant intentionally kept fraudulent, incomplete and untimely electronic medical records. The defense argued that the podiatric surgeries were indicated and performed within the standard of care, and that the plaintiff developed post-operative complications resulting in the need for additional surgeries due to her own noncompliance—prematurely and repeatedly walking on her surgical foot and getting her surgical dressings wet.

  • Defense prevails at trial and appellate level in medical malpractice action.

    We prevailed at the trial court level and on appeal in a medical malpractice action filed against a Florida hospital and three of its trauma/critical care physicians. ​It was alleged that the patient was overmedicated with narcotics during her 64-day hospital stay, resulting in acute respiratory failure and other complications, which caused her death. The plaintiff’s sole expert on liability and causation was a retired internal medicine physician. On the eve of trial, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the plaintiff’s expert lacked the requisite qualifications under Florida law to render opinions against the hospital and its three specialist physicians. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the final judgment without an opinion and granted the defendants’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees.

  • Plaintiff’s complaint dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

    In this medical malpractice action, the defendant, a New York doctor with no connection to New Jersey, was sued in New Jersey by a former patient who was a New Jersey resident. The court first found that the defendant did not waive consideration of the issue by waiting until after a dispute concerning the sufficiency of the affidavit of merit was resolved. The court then found that the evidence presented by the plaintiff was simply insufficient to establish either general or specific jurisdiction. The fact that the doctor had no connection to New Jersey and that the treatment occurred in New York were key to the decision, as the advertising activity by the New York hospital where the doctor is on staff, which the plaintiff relied upon, was insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the physician, especially as those activities had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s decision to treat with the defendant. In a published decision, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

  • Successful defense of Florida medical malpractice action in the trial court and on appeal.

    We prevailed on an appeal to the 5th District Court of Appeal in a medical malpractice action filed against a hospital and three of its trauma/critical care physicians. ​It was alleged that the patient was over-medicated with narcotics during her 64-day hospital stay, resulting in acute respiratory failure and other complications, which caused her death. The plaintiff’s sole expert on liability and causation was a retired internal medicine physician. On the eve of trial, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff’s expert lacked the requisite qualifications under Florida law to render opinions against the hospital and its three specialist physicians. The Fifth District affirmed the final judgment without an opinion and granted the defendants’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees.

  • Order for new medical malpractice trial reversed.

    We obtained a unanimous decision in the New Jersey Supreme Court reversing an order for a new trial. ​In this medical malpractice action, the defendant was a physician who allegedly committed malpractice when he prescribed a drug to a patient. According to the plaintiff's experts, she was not an appropriate candidate for the drug. The matter was tried by another law firm before a jury, which reached a defense verdict. However, on appeal to the Appellate Division, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the defendant's change of testimony at trial, from what it had been in his deposition, prejudiced the plaintiff. The matter was then transferred to Marshall Dennehey for further appeal in the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the defense’s argument that the precedent which the Appellate Division had relied upon in ordering the new trial was distinguishable. Further, the fact that plaintiff's counsel failed to object to the changed testimony at trial was likely strategic and, therefore, did not prejudice the plaintiff sufficiently to compel the reversal. The court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict. 

  • Plaintiff’s case not on the right foot.

    We received a defense verdict in a podiatric surgical malpractice arbitration. ​The plaintiff alleged that the defendant podiatrist negligently performed foot surgery, causing her foot deformities to worsen and resulting in shooting pain in her big toe, pain under her second and third toes, and imbalance. Her husband claimed loss of spousal consortium. The defense successfully argued that the surgery was performed reasonably and within the standard of care, and that the plaintiff developed known and accepted risks and complications of the surgery. 

  • Medical Malpractice Case Dismissed in the New Jersey Appellate Division.

    The case involved a woman with significant cardiac problems who suffered cardiac arrest and death. Her estate alleged that our clients, a medical resident and an intern, improperly administered certain pharmaceuticals, leading to her death. The plaintiff originally named two physicians as experts, a cardiologist who was offered to testify to the standard of care, and a physician board certified in occupational medicine, medical toxicology and emergency medicine, who was initially named to give testimony on causation. Before deposition, the expert cardiologist withdrew, and the plaintiff did not obtain the services of another expert, choosing instead to attempt to proceed with the other expert providing both standard of care and causation testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court which dismissed the case, finding that because the expert did not devote the majority of his professional time in the year prior to the decedent’s death in a clinical practice that encompassed the medical condition or procedure at issue, he was not qualified under New Jersey law to offer standard of care testimony. As such, the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.

  • Defense Verdict for a Pennsylvania Health System and Urologist.

    We received a defense verdict on no causation in a binding arbitration of a matter venued in Montour County, Pennsylvania, involving a bowel leak following urologic cancer surgery. We represented a Pennsylvania health system and its chief of urology who performed major cancer surgery upon the plaintiff (cystoprostatectomy and creation of ileal conduit). The plaintiff was discharged once his bowel function was returning and he was tolerating a normal diet, despite a slightly elevated temperature and white blood cell count (neither of which had the residents informed the attending physician about). Over the next two days, the plaintiff’s wife made multiple calls to the on-call residents, who did not feel readmission was warranted. Ultimately, he was readmitted, underwent a second surgery and then suffered more complications, likely due in part to poor blood supply to the bowel from years of heavy smoking. The defense team, through motions, secured the dismissal of corporate negligence and future medical expense claims and, through internet research, found that the plaintiff’s expert had previously been precluded from testifying by a court in Ohio for “making up facts.” Challenges in the case included that the attending surgeon readily admitted that the patient should have been readmitted sooner. However, he maintained that the outcome would have been no different. The arbitrator found his testimony credible and found no negligence on his part. 

  • Defense Verdict for Midwife.

    Marshall Dennehey's health care attorneys obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a midwife in a case involving alleged failure to properly manage and care for a patient’s labor and delivery, resulting in catastrophic injury to her child. Counsel for the minor-plaintiff argued that the pregnancy and labor were high risk. Therefore, it was below the standard of care to use intermittent auscultation (IA) during the second stage of labor. The plaintiff argued that the fetus suffered a catastrophic brain injury during the second stage of labor, resulting in cerebral palsy and daily intractable seizures. The child is six years of age, wheelchair bound, unable to speak or feed himself, and will require lifetime supervision and care. The defense argued that the patient’s pregnancy remained low risk; that IA was within the standard of care; a sentinel event did not occur during the second stage of labor; and that the child’s brain injury occurred in the days leading up to the hospital admission for labor. 

  • Defense Verdict in a Two-Week Medical Malpractice Trial in Bronx County, NY.

    The plaintiff suffered a perforated uterus following an ambulatory IUD removal surgery that was performed by our Ob/Gyn client. The following day, the plaintiff was readmitted with worsening symptoms and underwent surgery to repair the perforation. The plaintiff alleged that our client was negligent in failing to timely and properly manage the uterine perforation and that the delayed treatment resulted in the plaintiff requiring two open surgeries and ultimately a hysterectomy. With $4.4 million at stake, the jury returned a complete defense verdict.  

  • Defense Verdict in Nursing Negligence Case.

    The plaintiff alleged to have suffered a fall in a hospital bathroom three days post-operatively that reinjured his surgically repaired knees. The nurses denied the patient fell to the ground and testified, consistent with their charting, that the patient lost his balance in the bathroom and sat on a commode. There was a significant economic damage claim in that the plaintiff was a young restaurant owner who suffered two distinct orthopedic injuries that required multiple surgeries and additional future care. The jury returned a defense verdict 50 minutes after deliberations began, finding that the nurses were not negligent.

  • Court Finds Social Worker's Correspondence with Family Court Immune from Liability

    Obtained summary judgment for a licensed clinical social worker in a negligence, defamation, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress case. ​The plaintiff (the father, a police officer and president of the local school board) brought these claims after the social worker informed the Family Court of the children's allegations of physical and emotional abuse by the plaintiff, which were revealed to her during the minor children's therapy sessions. In granting summary judgment, the court found that the social worker's correspondence with the Family Court was immune from liability pursuant to the litigation privilege, irrespective of the fact that the court had not specifically sought her opinions and that she did not testify in the Family Court litigation. New Jersey recognizes immunity for all statements made in the course of litigation, regardless of their form, intent or truthfulness. The court also concluded that the plaintiff's claims for negligence and defamation were partially barred by the statute of limitations.

  • Defense Verdict for Primary Care Physician

    Obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a primary care physician. ​The plaintiff alleged the physician failed to order a blood test that would have detected a rare blood disorder called TTP. Five days after seeing our client, the decedent’s condition rapidly declined, and two days later, he died. Prior to trial, the plaintiff’s demand was almost $1 million. The defense was multifaceted. First, our client directed the decedent to the hospital where a blood test would have been performed, but the decedent refused. Furthermore, the decedent refused outpatient testing, which would have included a blood test. Our client tried to comply with the standard of care but was prevented from doing so because of the decedent’s choices. Second, We contended that the decedent did not die from TTP but, rather, from a related blood disorder called DIC, which is only caused by another underlying pathology, which, in this case, was suspected to be lung cancer. 

  • Jury Sides with Defense in High Stakes Medical Malpractice Case

    Obtained a defense verdict in a medical malpractice case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. ​The plaintiff alleged to be permanently disabled and in a wheelchair, requiring home health care for the rest of her life, as a result of an Emergency Room physician’s failure to timely diagnose and treat a viral infection involving the 7th and 8th cranial nerves (Ramsay Hunt Syndrome). We represented the ER physician, his employer (who staffed the ER) and the hospital. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a $4 million life care plan to the jury for consideration, and the final settlement demand was $2 million. The jury agreed with the defense’s position that the doctor did not deviate from the standard of care. Because of this, no liability could be found against our client, nor any of the other defendants.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.