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Case Law Alerts

Superior Court of Pennsylvania holds that a motion to seal a petition to approve settlement agreement was not supported by good cause.

A.A. v. Glicken, 2020 Pa. Super. 197, 237 A.3d 1165 (Aug. 14, 2020)

January 11, 2021

by Gabor Ovari

The case deals with a motion to seal a petition to approve a settlement agreement in a case involving a medical malpractice case filed by the parents of a newborn against health care providers for negligent circumcision. As part of reaching an agreement to resolve the dispute, the parties also agreed that the settlement agreement should include a confidentiality provision. The motion was uncontested. However, the trial court issued an order denying the motion. The health care providers appealed.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that an appeal was appropriate under the collateral order doctrine because the appeal was entirely separable from the merits of the underlying medical malpractice action. As such, the court reinforced that an order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine, even if the order constitutes an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order, if the issues are totally unrelated to the underlying factual and legal dispute.

Finally, the court held that the motion was appropriately denied by the trial court because the health care providers failed to establish that there was good cause for sealing the petition to approve the minor’s settlement because the providers failed to offer any evidence to substantiate the claim that disclosure would chill future settlements. This potential chilling effect is also insufficient, on its own, to overcome the public’s interest in maintaining open records.

Therefore, this case is significant as it clearly demonstrates that without a factual foundation a trial court can properly deny efforts to seal a settlement agreement. Defense counsel must be careful to present facts establishing that failing to seal the settlement agreement would have a chilling effect on future potential settlements.

 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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