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Results

  • Favorable Verdict Obtained in Palm Beach County Property Damage Case

    We recently secured a favorable verdict in a high-value property damage claim following an extensive Palm Beach County jury trial. The plaintiff sought more than $1.3 million in damages after water from a broken pipe spigot on an upstairs balcony damaged the master suite of the plaintiff’s 3,400-square-foot, $4.5 million luxury oceanfront condominium. Because liability was stipulated, the trial focused solely on the amount and scope of damages, consisting of repair/remediation costs to the master suite together with the plaintiff's claim for 21 months of loss of use at a valuation of $33,000 per month totaling $673,000. The defense successfully demonstrated that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for the majority of the claimed loss-of-use period (16 months). The jury awarded only five months of loss-of-use damages, along with nearly $200,000 in repair and restoration costs, substantially reducing the plaintiff's overall recovery to only $364,615.

    Favorable Verdict Obtained in Palm Beach County Property Damage Case

  • Per Curiam Affirmance Obtained in Florida Fire-Loss Subrogation Case

    We succeeded in obtaining a per curiam affirmance in the First District Court of Appeal of a final order dismissing the plaintiff’s fire-loss subrogation claim against our client, a tenant in a leased property the plaintiff insured. The First District affirmed the trial court’s finding that the specific fire-loss provisions in the lease shifted the risk of loss to the landlord, the plaintiff’s insured. As a result, our client was a co-insured under the plaintiff’s policy. An insurance company cannot sue its own insured.

  • Summary Judgment Secured in a Neighborhood Dispute Alleging Excess Water Runoff

    We obtained summary judgment in the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas in favor of our clients in a dispute over alleged excess water runoff. Our clients, a married couple, were sued by their neighbors for claims related to water runoff due to the installation of gutters and downspouts on a shed near the property line. We effectively argued for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ injunction, trespass, nuisance and negligence claims, demonstrating that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert testimony to substantiate their case as required under Pennsylvania law. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ negligence claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, which had expired at least six years before the suit was filed.

  • Jury Defense in High-Stakes Catastrophic Litigation Case

    We obtained a defense verdict in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case where the plaintiff sought $24.1M for alleged property damages and lost revenue.     In 2014, our client defendant, a marine construction company, was retained by the U.S. Navy to conduct pile driving activities at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The plaintiff, a neighboring commercial property owner, alleged that our client's pile driving and related activities damaged its property and caused it to lose revenue. All other defendants settled before trial. The plaintiff claimed $20 million in damages against our client. A bifurcated trial began on January 17, 2023. The plaintiff’s demand dropped throughout the nine-day liability phase, which involved numerous scientific and engineering experts and other witnesses. On January 27, 2023, the jury returned its unanimous verdict, attributing 60% of the fault to plaintiff itself and 25% to the Navy, which resulted in a defense verdict for our client. As a result of the defense verdict on liability, there will be no damages phase.  

  • Summary Judgment in Property Litigation Dispute Over Water and Septic Intrusions

    The plaintiff alleged that his client and a neighboring property owner were responsible for water and septic intrusions onto the plaintiff’s property. The three Bucks County properties formed a large triangle between two roads in Perkasie, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff’s complaints against his neighbors went back over seven years. We argued the trespass onto the plaintiff’s property was permanent in nature and was barred under the statute of limitations, and that the plaintiff’s experts failed to establish the intrusion emanated from our client’s property.

  • Marshall Dennehey Successfully Represents Client in Multi-Million Dollar Chemical Spill Case

    In a lawsuit seeking $279 million in alleged property damages, Marshall Dennehey attorneys successfully defended their client, a subcontractor of a railroad repair shop, against any and all liability.  The case involved the August 2016 rupture of a railroad tank car containing 178,000 lbs. of liquefied chlorine at the plaintiff’s chlorine manufacturing plant in West Virginia. The tank car had recently been returned to the plaintiff after undergoing extensive repairs in the spring of 2016. The chemical producer-plaintiff filed suit against three parties as a result of the chlorine release: its fleet maintenance manager, the railcar repair shop that performed the 2016 repairs to the tank car and our client, a subcontractor of the railroad repair shop involved in the aspect of the repairs which the plaintiff claimed were performed negligently.  At the time of the 2016 repairs, the tank car was 37 years old and had several characteristics associated with it that were known in the railroad industry to cause cracks in the tank’s shell. It was undisputed at trial that there was a small, pre-existing crack in the tank shell prior to the 2016 repairs at issue, and that, but-for this pre-existing crack, the tank car would not have ruptured in August of 2016, which was the first time the tank car was loaded with chlorine since the repairs were completed. Allegations of comparative negligence were asserted by all of the defendants against the plaintiff for its decision to repair, rather than scrap, the tank car in 2016.  During trial, the plaintiff asserted it was entitled to $278 million in replacement-value property damage associated with alleged damage to its equipment at its 500-acre chlorine manufacturing plant. The plaintiff requested, and the trial judge granted, a jury instruction providing that the jury could award replacement value damages. The nearly six-week trial encompassed over 30 witnesses and 10 expert witnesses. After deliberations, the jury awarded only $12.8 million in damages, assessing the railcar repair shop with 40% of liability, the plaintiff’s fleet maintenance manager with 20% of liability, and the plaintiff itself with the remaining 40% of liability. No liability was assessed to our client.   

  • Directed Verdict in Property Damage Case

    We obtained a directed verdict following a six-day jury trial in York County, Pennsylvania under COVID-19 restrictions. In this property damage case, the plaintiff claimed that his house was flooded when his local property manager and water company failed to coordinate the turn-on of water service while he was residing in Colorado. Brooks represented the water company at trial and demonstrated that the plaintiff failed to prove that the water company owed any additional duties of care to him, or that any breach of those duties was a factual cause of the harm which occurred—namely, flooding of the house for seven days. A directed verdict was granted in favor of the water company at the end of trial. The plaintiff passed on a joint offer of $100,000 in the days leading up to trial. The property manager secured a defense verdict just hours after the water company’s directed verdict. The judge, jury, staff, and all counsel wore masks and socially distanced during trial. Testifying witnesses were asked by the court to remove their masks in order to testify, with the witness stand encapsulated in Plexiglass. All but one witness consented.

Firm Highlights

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

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News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.