Results

We received a defense jury verdict before the Delaware Superior Court, New Castle County. Although liability was undisputed at trial, damages were disputed. The plaintiff sought damages for head, neck, back and left shoulder injuries. He had $350,000 in future medical bills and $78,000 in past medical bills that he could board. The plaintiff also had a $5 million lost wage claim that we were able to get dismissed prior to trial on a motion in limine.

The Industrial Accident Board (IAB) granted our petition to terminate the ongoing receipt of temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits on the basis that the claimant had voluntarily removed himself from the workforce. The claimant was a correction officer who suffered head injuries in an altercation with an inmate. He was out of work for a time and eventually released to return to work on modified duty. His restrictions were permanent and, because they could not be accommodated by his employer, he was placed on TPD. After more than a year with no indication of an attempt to return to the workforce, we challenged his ongoing entitlement to receive TPD. We worked with the employer to obtain documentation regarding the claimant’s job search (or lack thereof), other sources of income (pension, Social Security) and recreational/social activities since he had been separated from employment. In addition, we put forward both medical and vocational expert testimony at the hearing. As a result, the IAB reasoned that the claimant was able to work in a medium-duty job, that jobs were available within his restrictions, the he had conducted a minimal job search since his work release more than a year and a half earlier, and that his description of his daily activities was consistent with a person content with a retirement lifestyle rather than someone who intended to continue to work. Accordingly, he was no longer entitled to wage replacement benefits.

We were successful in having our petition to terminate the ongoing receipt of temporary partial disability benefits granted on the basis that the claimant had voluntarily removed himself from the workforce. The Industrial Accident Board reasoned that the claimant was able to work in a medium-duty job, that jobs were available within his restrictions, the he had conducted a minimal job search since his work release more than a year and a half earlier, and that his description of his daily activities was consistent with a person content with a retirement lifestyle rather than someone who intended to continue to work. Accordingly, he was no longer entitled to wage replacement benefits.

Defense verdict on behalf of a real estate broker and agent. The plaintiffs, homebuyers, claimed that the sellers’ broker and agent were liable to them for the value of fixtures that were taken by the sellers when they vacated the property, which were alleged to have been included in the sale. At a bench trial, the judge determined that neither the broker nor the agent could be held liable to the plaintiffs because the representations regarding what was included in the sale were made by the sellers. Supreme Court affirmance of dismissal of a complex legal malpractice lawsuit. Aaron and Carol Vanderwoude obtained a Delaware Supreme Court affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of a complex legal malpractice claim. The plaintiffs, seven affiliated companies and their owners in the business of developing property, had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple lines of credit. The bank filed multiple lawsuits against the property developers, claiming approximately $7 million in damages, plus attorneys’ fees, which were recoverable pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. The property developers retained our client to defend the lawsuits, asserting that the amounts claimed to be owed to the bank were significantly overstated. Our client vigorously defended the bank’s underlying lawsuits. Ultimately, the property developers settled the bank’s lawsuits for the entire amount owed, plus interest and the bank’s legal fees. The developers argued that its attorneys should have advised them to settle the bank’s claims after the lawsuits were commenced and that, if they had done so, they would not have had to pay the bank’s legal fees, our client’s legal fees, or expert witness fees, or the additional interest on the loan. The property developers also claimed that not settling with the bank earlier caused them lost business opportunities valued at nearly $1 million. The plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were dismissed because their expert witness, a Maryland attorney with no business litigation experience, was not qualified to serve as an expert and because their damages claims were speculative. Motion to dismiss in complex matter involving claims of fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with contractual relations, and piercing the corporate veil. The plaintiff, an investment fund, had purchased a business that was controlled and primarily owned by our client. The business ultimately went bankrupt, and the plaintiff claimed that the purchase was premised upon misrepresentation by our client. The plaintiff maintained that jurisdiction in Delaware was proper pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. The District Court was persuaded by arguments reflecting that it lacked personal jurisdiction over our client, a citizen of Canada, even though he signed the Asset Purchase Agreement which included language conferring jurisdiction over claims arising from the sale in Delaware. The court agreed that our client did not sign the agreement in his individual capacity, and the plaintiff’s piercing the corporate veil allegations were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim. Obtained dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim brought by a condominium unit owner against the attorneys who represented her condominium association. The unit owner claimed that the law firm was liable to her for unjust enrichment in connection with legal fees it received from the association for legal services provided in efforts to collect on past due assessments owed by the unit owner. Pursuant to the association’s governing documents, the charges were passed on to the unit owner. The court agreed that the fees that were paid to our client by the condominium association were properly earned.

We were granted summary judgment on behalf of a national truck manufacturer in an asbestos case where the plaintiff claimed his mesothelioma diagnosis was the result of his work on his employer’s trucks. The plaintiff claimed he developed mesothelioma as a result of his alleged exposure to asbestos while working on the trucks and products manufactured by the other defendants. The plaintiff had worked and resided the majority of his life in Mississippi; therefore, Mississippi law was applicable. In granting summary judgment, the court found that any alleged exposure to the manufacturer’s products was de minimis in relation to his other alleged asbestos exposures. The court also found that under the “bare metal” defense, the manufacturer was not liable for third-party manufacturers’ parts, which they did not manufacture or supply, used in conjunction with their trucks.

We obtained a summary judgment dismissal on behalf of our client, a law firm, that was sued by its former clients for legal malpractice. The plaintiffs, seven affiliated companies and their owners in the business of developing property, had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple lines of credit. The bank filed several lawsuits against the property developers, claiming approximately $7 million in damages, plus attorneys’ fees, which were recoverable pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. The property developers retained our client to defend the lawsuits, arguing the amounts claimed to be owed to the bank were significantly overstated. Our client vigorously defended the bank’s underlying lawsuits. Ultimately, the property developers settled the bank’s lawsuits for the entire amount owed, plus interest and the bank’s legal fees. The developers argued that its attorneys should have advised them to settle the bank’s claims after the lawsuits were commenced and that, had they done so, they would not have had to pay the bank’s legal fees ($825,000), our client’s legal fees ($485,000), expert witness fees ($335,000) or the additional interest on the loan. The property developers also claimed that not settling with the bank earlier caused them lost business opportunities valued at nearly $1 million. The plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were dismissed because their expert witness, a Maryland attorney with no business litigation experience, was not qualified to serve as an expert and because their damages claims were speculative.   

We successfully obtained dismissal of claims brought derivatively and directly by a corporation, including aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract. The claims were brought against our client, an out of state attorney who previously represented the corporation and its former director. The Court granted the attorney’s Motion to Dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts that would confer personal jurisdiction over the attorney under a conspiracy theory.

We successfully obtained dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than policy limits. After five years of litigation, the Court granted the attorney defendants’ summary judgment motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to adduce facts that would reflect that the attorneys prosecuted the underlying action in a grossly negligent manner, or without probable cause. The Court also held that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the underlying lawsuit was prosecuted for an improper purpose.

The claimant injured her right wrist in 2016 while working as a teacher for the State. Her injury eventually developed into complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) involving multiple extremities. From 2017 to 2021, the State paid for 23 ketamine infusion treatments to treat the claimant’s CRPS. The treatment was rendered by an out-of-state provider. In 2019, the State contracted with a new bill-review company that paid substantially lower amounts than was previously paid for the same treatment. The claimant filed a petition that alleged these lower payments were insufficient and inconsistent with Delaware law. The Industrial Accident Board determined that the payments made by the State were correct under the Delaware Workers’ Compensation Act’s health care payment system and Fee Schedule. The Superior Court affirmed the decision. The claimant appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, arguing that the Board failed to correctly apply the Act and Fee Schedule regulations, as interpreted in the Superior Court opinion Delaware Veterans Home v. Dixon. Specifically, the claimant alleged that the Board failed to assess the adequacy of medical billing codes by referring to resources from the American Medical Association or the National Correct Coding Institute. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The claimant bore the burden of proving whether the billing codes used by the provider for the ketamine infusion treatments were insufficient or inaccurate. The resources cited by the claimant were, indeed, referenced in the Fee Schedule administrative regulations, but no evidence was presented by the claimant at the Board hearing. It was neither the employer’s nor the Board’s responsibility to present that evidence. Therefore, there was no legal error. The court further advised that the Act’s Oversight Panel is the proper forum to determine whether specific billing codes provide reasonable compensation for particular treatment, which was a secondary argument advanced by the claimant. The decisions were affirmed.

We obtained summary judgment, dismissal and an award of attorneys’ fees for a condominium association. Judgment was entered in favor of our client against the plaintiff in an earlier action that sought unpaid assessments. In order to sell its property, the plaintiff sent the association a check in the amount of recorded liens. The association returned the check, demanding the full payoff amount, and claimed a statutory lien for all amounts owed. The plaintiff paid the full amount and then filed its complaint, seeking a declaration from the court that the association should have satisfied a lien for the recorded amount even though additional amounts were owed under a statutory lien. The court found that the statutory liens which applied to the property created both in rem and in personam liability and, therefore, the association had no legal obligation to mark the lien as satisfied until it was fully paid. The court awarded our client’s attorneys’ fees for the plaintiff’s failure to appeal the lower court’s decision awarding the initial judgment and attorneys’ fees and, instead, bringing an additional action, which resulted in further delay and expenditure of additional sums by the association.

We obtained a denial for workers’ compensation in a claim that involved alleged injuries to the entire left upper extremity and neck from a work accident. Through the use of an expert witness, we were able to prove that the claimant had sought treatment for his injuries well prior to his employment with our client. As a result, all claims for compensation were denied.

We represented a national internet retailer in the successful denial of a proposed lumbar fusion surgery and indemnity benefits. The claimant was awarded the injury and conservative medical treatment, however, the lumbar spine fusion surgery was denied, as were total and partial disability benefits. The client avoided a complex multi-level lumbar spine fusion surgery (L3-S1), total and partial disability benefits, and the post-surgical care. Because the surgery will not occur, the client is also relieved of a large post-operative permanent impairment award and surgical disfigurement. Key to the Board’s determination was our defense medical expert casting doubt on the surgery; our cross-examination of the claimant and his spine surgeon; and our closing argument, which was quoted by the Industrial Accident Board in their decision on the merits. 

A panel of the the Third Circuit unanimously affirmed an order of the U.S.D.C. for the District of Delaware which granted a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in favor of law enforcement officials. The plaintiff filed suit under Section 1983, seeking damages for the alleged violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights following a traffic stop, for driving under the influence of alcohol, and the lawful seizure of blood alcohol evidence. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were barred by the claim accrual rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The district court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff appealed.  Counsel argued on appeal that the plaintiff was convicted of “reckless driving” and was subject to the “alcohol-related” penalty provision of Delaware’s reckless driving statute. As such, the imposition of the plaintiff’s sentence requires his willful or wanton disregard for safety of others be related to alcohol use. The Third Circuit agreed. In affirming, the court explained, “[c]onsidering that alcohol involvement was the basis for the alcohol-related penalty provision and considering the evidence obtained through the challenged search was integral to establishing the involvement of alcohol, any error in the search would not be harmless.” Because the plaintiff failed to show his sentence has been set aside, the court agreed that the plaintiff cannot bring his claims at this time.  

We succeeded in having the Industrial Accident Board grant reimbursement of an amount of total disability benefits tendered that were offset by contemporaneous short-term disability payments. The Board denied the claimant’s motion to compel production of paystubs that he claimed were required to determine the appropriate offset amount, if any. The Board reasoned that the information provided was sufficient to calculate the overpayment amount and that the Fair Labor Standards Act did not require the pay records be kept in any particular form.

The plaintiff alleged she was exposed to COVID-19 while caring for a patient and infected both of her adult sons. One son died from COVID-19. We argued that COVID-19 was not an occupational disease and that she could not establish she contracted COVID-19 at work. The Industrial Accident Board agreed, resulting in a significant win for the employer.

The claimant alleged several injuries. The Board denied the claimant’s petition for additional compensation due on all counts, and granted the employer’s petition for review to terminate total disability benefits. Specifically, the Board concluded that (1) a proposed left ankle reconstruction surgery was not reasonable and necessary, (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove a compensable left knee injury, (3) there was insufficient evidence to prove a compensable lumbar spine injury and (4) the claimant was capable of unrestricted return to work. 

The plaintiff was named as a defendant in a debt collection action for failing to pay her attorney’s legal bills. Judgment was entered against her but never fully enforced. More than five years later, our client filed a Praecipe to Issue Writ of Revival and then mistakenly filed a Praecipe for Writ of Execution before the judgment was revived by the court. Although the Sheriff’s Sale of the plaintiff’s home never proceeded, she nonetheless sued our client for due process violations, abuse of process, conspiracy, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act. Most of the claims were dismissed early in the proceedings. Thereafter, we successfully argued in a summary judgment motion that the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that our client acted in a manner to harass, oppress or abuse her, or that our client engaged in any other activity in violation of the FDCPA or FCEUA. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims.

We successfully defended a legal malpractice claim where the plaintiffs alleged their former attorneys caused them to sustain more than $1.3 million in damages. ​The plaintiffs, a collection of property developers, were named as defendants in a series of debt collection actions brought by their lender. Our attorney client represented them in those matters and sought to renegotiate the debt; however, they were unsuccessful, and the lender prevailed. In the legal malpractice matter, the plaintiffs sought to recover amounts they were required to reimburse the bank for its legal fees, their own expert witness fees and the legal fees they paid to our client. In a matter of first impression, the Delaware Superior Court held that a legal malpractice plaintiff who was a defendant in an underlying matter must demonstrate that it was caused to lose a judgment in order to prevail on its legal malpractice claim. It was insufficient to suggest that the attorneys should have settled the cases before the attorneys’ fees escalated. Because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that they would have prevailed in the underlying cases, they could not prevail on their subsequent legal malpractice claim.

​In its order, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Superior Court that had affirmed a Board decision regarding the compensability of travel expenses for trips to and from medical appointments. The claimant had petitioned for parking and toll expenses incurred during her trips to visit a doctor at University of Pennsylvania from her residence in Dover, Delaware. Although the amounts in question were low, the case is significant as it potentially applies to every Delaware workers’ compensation case. Specifically, the court agreed with the employer’s arguments that the plain language of the applicable Delaware statute provides that mileage expenses are to be reimbursed by the employer for travel to and from compensable medical appointments.