Results

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners in a premises liability action. One of the homeowners called his father, the plaintiff, asking him to come to his house because he was having his roof replaced and had concerns about the work being done. The plaintiff arrived at the home and observed nails and other debris strewn about the entire property. Nonetheless, he entered the property to assess the roofing work and took care to avoid stepping on any nails. As he was leaving the property, he stepped on a nail, which went through his foot. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence against both homeowners and also attempted to assert that, because his son requested that he come to inspect the roofing work, he was a business invitee rather than a licensee. We argued that the plaintiff was a licensee as he was a social guest who was merely providing advice to his son. They further argued that the homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff as he knew the nails were strewn about the property and he understood the risk involved in walking there. We also argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by assumption of risk because as he was aware of the nails on the property and, nonetheless, voluntarily proceeded to walk onto the property. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.

We successfully had the claimant’s claim and penalty petitions denied by proving the alleged injury occurred much later than claimed. The claimant, a technical operator responsible for shaping and packing cheese, alleged that he suffered a left shoulder tear with internal derangement, requiring surgery, as a result of using a long stick-like tool to dislodge cheese that had gotten stuck in a machine during the production process. The claimant asserted that he provided timely notice of his work-related injury to his supervisor; within a few days after the injury occurred. Through cross examination, the claimant admitted that he provided notice of his injury four or five months after the alleged injury occurred. Through employer witness testimony, we were also able to show that, while the claimant did leave early on the day of the alleged injury, the reason was because he was sick, and there was no written documentation to support notice being provided in a timely manner. Through medical expert testimony, we were also able to establish that the claimant’s injury likely occurred on a later date than the one alleged, based upon the medical evidence showing that the bicep did not show any signs of retraction 10 months after the alleged injury date. The workers’ compensation judge found the defendant’s expert testimony more credible than the claimant’s medical expert. The claimant’s claim petition seeking temporary total disability benefits and his penalty petition were denied, resulting in a successful outcome for the defendant.

We won a motion for summary judgment in Schuylkill County, PA, in a premises liability and product liability case. We represented the manufacturer of a concrete railroad crossing that was installed at an intersection in 2005. In 2021, the plaintiff was riding his bike across the crossing when his bike tire allegedly became stuck in a gap in the concrete. There was ample evidence that the railroad was responsible for inspecting and maintaining the crossing while our client did nothing other than supply the prefabricated crossing. We argued the gap that developed in the crossing was not the responsibility of the crossing manufacturer and that the statute of repose barred the lawsuit. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.

We won dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal of a defense verdict. Our client issued a professional liability insurance policy to the plaintiffs. When the plaintiffs were sued for legal malpractice, they notified our client of the suit and asked them to provide counsel to defend the matter. However, the plaintiffs never agreed to counsel proposed by our client. The plaintiffs then proceeded to mediation in the legal malpractice action and settled the matter without notifying our client. As a result, our client denied the plaintiffs’ request for indemnification. The plaintiffs then brought suit against our client for breach of contract and bad faith, alleging they wrongly denied indemnification and failed to provide counsel. The matter went to jury trial from April 8–11, 2024, where we successfully defended our client as the jury returned a defense verdict. The plaintiffs filed post-trial motions and then appealed the decision to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the jury to see a copy of the insurance contract during their deliberations. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal and found that the plaintiffs waived their argument by failing to cite relevant legal authority in their appellate brief. The Superior Court also stated in a footnote that, should the court have reached the issue on appeal, it would have found it meritless because the insurance contract was a central piece of evidence to which the plaintiffs did not object during trial.

We successfully convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to affirm the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County’s grant of our preliminary objections and dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint in mandamus. In its complaint in mandamus to the Court of Common Pleas, the plaintiff argued that our client’s letter denying its plan and application for the development of solar panels was insufficient under the Municipalities Planning Code, thus entitling it to a deemed approval of its plan. We had successfully filed preliminary objections to the complaint on the grounds that the Township’s letter, which identified the plan’s defects with specific reference to provisions of the Municipal Planning Code that had not been satisfied, was sufficient under Section 508 of the Municipal Planning Code. This section requires that, when a municipality denies an application for approval of a development plan, “the decision shall specify the defects found in the application and describe the requirements which have not been met and shall, in each case, cite to the provisions of the statute or ordinance relied upon.” 53 P.S. Section 10508(2). The plaintiff appealed the decision, and we attended oral argument before the Commonwealth Court, following which the court affirmed the decision of the lower court on the same grounds.

We secured summary judgment for a homeowners’ association. The plaintiff owned an apartment in a planned community and sought to drill a hole through the exterior wall of the building to vent an HVAC unit. The HOA denied his request, and the plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealings, alleging that the HOA treated him unfairly by denying his request. Despite providing numerous photos of other holes through the exterior wall of the building, the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that they did not know whether the HOA had ever permitted another unit owner to drill a hole in the exterior wall. We successfully argued that the plaintiff could not put forth any evidence demonstrating unfair treatment, or that the request had been denied in bad faith. 

We obtained summary judgment for residential renters in a trip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped and fell on a set of porch steps at our clients’ home while attending a barbeque, breaking her ankle. She brought claims against the homeowner. The homeowner then joined our clients, asserting claims of negligence and contractual indemnity under the lease agreement. During her deposition, the plaintiff testified that she was familiar with the poor condition of the steps, had spoken with the renters about the steps prior to her fall, and witnessed two people, an adult and a child, trip on the steps during the same barbeque event. The homeowner also testified at his deposition that it was his responsibility to repair and maintain the subject stairs. We argued that our clients were not required to indemnify the homeowners under the Perri-Ruzzi rule, and that they owed no duty to the plaintiff, a licensee, as she knew of the condition of the steps and the risks involved in using them. The court agreed and dismissed all claims against the clients.

We achieved summary judgment on behalf of an art store chain in a racial discrimination suit over a caricature drawing of a Black woman and her infant son. She, her father and her father’s girlfriend, all visitors of HersheyPark, sued the owner of the kiosk for race discrimination, retaliation and interference under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, alleging that they were drawn with exaggerated and offensive features rooted in harmful racial stereotypes. The kiosk owner argued that while the caricatures might have been poorly drawn, they were not drawn in any manner intended to be offensive. Judge Bloom determined on summary judgment that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the plaintiffs on all three claims and dismissed the action.

We secured a defense award on behalf of a skilled nursing facility in a hotly contested “wound” case after a two-day arbitration. The 93-year-old plaintiff had been a resident at the nursing facility for over three years without having suffered any pressure injuries, despite a plethora of risk factors. In August 2019, she was transferred emergently to an acute care hospital where she was diagnosed with a myocardial infarction (MI) and cardiogenic shock. The hospital administered five days of a vasopressor, a life-saving medication that can increase the risk of pressure injuries, and recommended that she consult with palliative medicine due to her poor condition and prognosis. Within several weeks of her return to our client’s facility, she was found to have a Stage III left heel wound and a Stage II left buttocks wound. The wounds were treated and resolved within four and five months, respectively. At 99 years of age, she still resides at the facility.

We obtained a medical malpractice defense verdict on behalf of a skilled nursing facility in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court in Cleveland, Ohio. The children of an 82-year-old skilled nursing resident brought a lawsuit after their mother developed shingles and associated meningitis and passed away. They claimed the facility had inadequate infection control and failed to identify signs/symptoms of developing changes in their mother’s condition. The defense proved the facility offered the appropriate vaccinations that were required by the state of Ohio and that the standard of care did not require the facility offer or administer the Shingrix vaccine to its residents. They also proved the facility properly monitored the resident’s signs and symptoms; that she did not exhibit any classic signs or symptoms of shingles at the facility; and that the facility timely sent her to the ER for evaluation when her condition changed.  In closing arguments after a five-day trial, the plaintiffs asked the jury for $3 million. The jury deliberated for 75 minutes and returned with a defense verdict. 

We secured a decision denying a claimant wage loss benefits for an accepted work injury. The claimant sustained a left wrist contusion and extensor carpi ulnaris (ECU) peri-tendonitis injury when a 50-pound lid crushed his left arm in the course and scope of his employment. The claimant alleged that as a result of the injury, he was unable to perform light-duty work as a system operator. Through medical evidence, we were able to establish that the claimant had medical issues unrelated to the accepted work injury that were the cause of his inability to work. The workers’ compensation judge found our expert testimony more credible than that of the claimant’s medical expert. Wage loss benefits were denied, resulting in a successful outcome for the defendant/employer.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two school districts in a matter brought by various plaintiffs against the Career and Technology Center of Lackawanna County (CTC) and four of its sending school districts. The plaintiffs had asserted claims under Title IX, the 14th Amendment, and Section 8542(b)(9) of the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act based on their sexual abuse by an automotive technology instructor at CTC. While permitting some claims to proceed against CTC, the court dismissed all claims against the sending school districts on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that any individual at any of the defendant-school districts had actual knowledge of the automotive technology instructor’s conduct, and the instructor was not an employee, independent contractor or ostensible agent of any school district by virtue of his employment by CTC.

We secured a decision denying the claimant wage loss benefits for an accepted work injury. The claimant sustained a left wrist contusion and extensor carpi ulnaris peri-tendonitis injury when a 50-pound lid crushed his left arm in the course and scope of his employment. The claimant alleged that, as a result of the injury, he was unable to perform light-duty work as a system operator. Through medical evidence, we were able to establish that the claimant had non-work-related medical issues unrelated to the accepted work injury that caused him to be out of work. Wage loss benefits were denied, resulting in a successful outcome for the defendant.

We prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a precedential decision upholding application of a household vehicle exclusion. A fifteen-year-old was seriously injured while riding an uninsured dirt bike on private property. After recovering the bodily injury limit of the tortfeasor’s policy, he also recovered UIM benefits under the two household policies. However, the other household policy underwritten by the same carrier contained a household vehicle exclusion, which excluded UIM benefits under the facts of the accident, so coverage was denied. The carrier then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania, but lost because the District Court concluded that the household vehicle exclusion acted as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking as a result of the carrier paying UIM benefits under the other household policy. On appeal, a unanimous panel of the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s Order, holding in a precedential opinion that the household vehicle exclusion was valid and enforceable because the dirt bike involved in the underlying accident was uninsured.   

We achieved dismissal of a suit against a school district by way of preliminary objections. The Dauphin County case involved allegations that the district deprived the plaintiffs of certain educational rights, premised on procedural due process violations, negligence and subornation of perjury. Preliminary objections were filed to the plaintiffs’ original complaint on both procedural and substantive grounds. Following the filing of an amended complaint and additional preliminary objections on similar grounds, argument was held. As a result, the court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice. 

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a university in a slip and fall case. The plaintiff, a university student, slipped and fell during an active winter storm as she was walking from one campus building to another. Discovery showed that the plaintiff received an emergency alert from the university warning of potentially icy conditions prior to exiting the building and that freezing rain was still falling as the plaintiff was walking. We argued, and the court agreed, that the university owed no duty to the plaintiff to protect against general slippery conditions or to pretreat sidewalks prior to, during or immediately after the storm.

We secured a jury verdict in a breach of contract/statutory bad faith action that arose under a legal malpractice policy issued to a law firm by our insurance company client. The plaintiffs settled a malpractice claim set forth against them without our client’s knowledge or consent. The insurance company then denied coverage for that claim, and the plaintiffs filed suit. Because the case included a bad faith claim, if the plaintiffs prevailed on both counts, the damages could have been seven figures or more. We took the case to trial before Judge Patrick in Philadelphia County. The jury returned a verdict on the breach of contract claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their damages by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge then dismissed the statutory bad faith claim.

We defended a school district in a special education matter involving a high school student identified with a specific learning disability and ADHD. The student sought out a peer during the school day, went into the peer’s classroom and physically attacked her, punching and kicking her several times. After the incident, the student’s Individualized Education Program team determined the conduct was not a manifestation of the student’s disabilities. The student and her parent disagreed with this determination and requested an expedited due process hearing. At the hearing, the parent argued that the student’s conduct was a result of trauma she had experienced from a previous fight she had with her peer and that the student’s decision to fight the other student was on impulse and attributable to her ADHD condition. We presented testimony from the dean of students that she had talked to the student earlier in the school day, and during the conversation, the student expressed to the dean that she wanted to fight her peer to “squash the beef” they had between them. With this, we argued the student’s behavior was not impulsive, and her decision to attack the student was premediated and thought out. The hearing officer agreed and found the school district was correct in concluding the student’s conduct was not a manifestation of her disabilities. The hearing officer permitted the school district to seek further discipline of the student, including expulsion.

We obtained a defense verdict following a compulsory arbitration in a motor vehicle pileup. The plaintiff alleged that while she was stopped in traffic, the co-defendant’s vehicle rear ended her, pushing her into the vehicle in front of her. To the contrary, the co-defendant contended that our client caused the entire accident by being the first to rear-end his vehicle, pushing him into the plaintiff’s vehicle just once. Despite the conflicting testimony, we convinced the arbitration panel that, although our client was involved in the accident, the plaintiff testified the first strike she felt from the co-defendant’s vehicle was harder, and that the impact caused by her client’s vehicle was minimal due to the lack of damage to her vehicle. The arbitration panel assigned no liability to our client.

We secured summary judgment and dismissal of nine claims brought by an individual employer against two former employees and their new place of employment. The plaintiff, who owned an insurance business and a tax preparation business, alleged claims of breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, tortious interference, violations of the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and other related claims against two former employees, one at-will and one independent contractor, and their new employer. The plaintiff was imprisoned for violations of insurance fraud and barred from continued participation in the business of insurance. While imprisoned, one defendant, an at-will insurance underwriter employee, sent a letter to the business’s customers informing them that the plaintiff was no longer legally allowed to participate in the business of insurance. The plaintiff also alleged that the other defendant misappropriated trade secret information by taking a customer list with him to his new employer. We argued that the plaintiff lacked a trade secret interest over the customer list, and that all remaining claims should be dismissed because the statements made in the insurance employee’s letter were truthful. The trial judge agreed and dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims against the three defendants, with prejudice.

We obtained a defense verdict in a case involving medical and property damages. While riding a bicycle through a shopping center parking lot, the plaintiff collided with our client, who was driving a vehicle, at an intersection that did not have stop signs. The plaintiff alleged that our client was responsible for his medical damages, as well as property damage to his bike and clothing. At the hearing, we obtained testimony from the plaintiff that his medical bills had been full covered by his health insurance, and that he could not demonstrate that the alleged property damage stemmed from the incident at hand. The judge agreed and granted a defense verdict.

We prevailed on a motion to dismiss a hazing lawsuit filed against a school district. The plaintiff, who was a member of his high school football team, alleged he was subject to hazing and physical abuse by several other members of the team while attending a dinner at the home of one of his teammates. The plaintiff claimed that the school district had been aware of the hazing, but failed to prevent it. He asserted claims against the school under Title IX for emotional distress damages and punitive damages. The court eventually agreed with our arguments that emotional distress and punitive damages are nor recoverable under Title IX, and that all other claims were barred by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

We prevailed on termination, suspension and review petitions, where the workers’ compensation judge found that the claimant was fully recovered as of the date of our medical expert’s examination. The judge found our witnesses more credible than the claimant’s and denied the claimant’s review petition to expand the accepted injury. We successfully recovered $33,508 from the Supersedeas Fund for our client.

We secured summary judgment in a Fourth Amendment civil rights claim involving an unlawful search and seizure. The plaintiff, a former social worker employed by a school district, alleged that the assistant superintendent and Right to Know Law officer conducted an illegal search of her work space, who then produced these records to the plaintiff’s estranged husband, with whom she was in the midst of a contentious divorce. The court agreed that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to show that either the assistant superintendent or the Right to Know Law officer actually searched her filing cabinet or seized her personal property. All claims, including those under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, were previously dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.

We successfully defended a local school district and its board members in a lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The petitioner is a resident of the school district and a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board's appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court's original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Chris filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The Commonwealth Court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court's exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board's actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.  

The petitioner resides in the school district and is a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board’s appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court’s original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. We filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board’s actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

After the plaintiff was struck as a pedestrian by a motor vehicle, she recovered the bodily injury limits from the driver’s policy and her personal UIM policy. The plaintiff then submitted UIM claims under her daughter’s and granddaughter’s UIM policies. Both insurers denied the claims, citing to the “other insurance” clause in the policies, and claiming the plaintiff was not entitled to stacked coverage under her relatives’ policies as she and her relatives waived stacking under each of their respective policies. After the plaintiff responded to our motion for summary judgment, the court held argument on the motion. The court granted our motion, dismissing all claims against the insurer, including for breach of contract, bad faith and unjust enrichment. In granting the motion, the court adopted our arguments that: (1) the plaintiff and her relatives knowingly waived inter-policy stacking; (2) the “other insurance” clause applies to bar the plaintiff’s claims; and (3) the “other insurance” clause does not violate public policy or the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

We presented medical evidence, including a record review of all diagnostic study films and medical records from a Board-certified physiatrist, to establish that the claimant’s physiological complaints were unrelated to a work injury. The judge accepted our evidence as fully competent, persuasive and credible, and, as a result, terminated the claimant's benefits.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of an orthopedic surgeon based on the statute of limitations despite the plaintiff’s claimed application of the discovery rule. After conducting written discovery and deposing the plaintiff to solidify that the medical professional liability action was untimely commenced, we early on filed a motion for summary judgment in an effort to avoid the incurrence of significant additional expense in defending the case through the remainder of the discovery process. At oral argument, the presiding judge commented that the matter was “extraordinarily briefed” and “even better presented.” Our success on the timeliness issue, which is almost always reserved for decision by the jury, brought a quick end to the litigation, in which there were significant liability concerns.

The real estate agent represented a buyer in the purchase of a home in Adams County. Prior to closing, the buyer had the property’s septic system inspected, and the system passed the inspection. Several months after closing, the real estate agent’s client decided to sell the property. When the new prospective buyers had the septic system inspected, the system failed the inspection, and they would not agree to close until the client fixed the system. The client then learned after the fact that the original sellers had experienced many issues with the septic system, that the system had failed several prior inspections because the ground would not perc, and that the sellers failed to disclose this information when they sold the property to the client. The client filed a complaint against the real estate agent with the BPOA under the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, alleging the agent engaged in misrepresentation and unprofessional conduct, and claimed that the agent allegedly had knowledge of the prior history with the septic system but failed to disclose it to her. We were able to demonstrate to the BPOA investigator that the real estate agent had no knowledge of the prior history with the septic system, that neither the sellers nor their agent ever disclosed information about the system, and that if she was aware, she would have advised the client not to close on the purchase until the septic system was repaired. The BPOA declined to prosecute and closed its investigation.