Results

We convinced the Commonwealth Court to affirm a workers’ compensation judge’s decision. The judge had denied the claimant’s petition to review a Utilization Review (UR) determination and rejected the claimant’s argument that the judge was barred from ruling on UR petitions by the rules of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion.

We persuaded the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to deny a claimant’s petition for allowance of appeal. In this workers’ compensation matter, the claimant challenged the constitutionality of Act 111 and its Impairment Rating Evaluation (IRE) provisions.

The Appeal Board rejected the claimant’s argument that the testimony of the employer’s medical expert did not support the judge’s finding of a termination of benefits for a low back injury because the employer’s medical expert testified that if the claimant was asymptomatic in her back prior to her slip and fall in a kitchen at work, the injury may have aggravated a pre-existing, underlying condition in her lumbar spine. But, at the judge level, the claimant admitted under cross examination that she had a prior work injury to her low back that she did not report, which caused her to experience ongoing low back symptoms. The Board noted that the potential expansion of the claimant’s low back injury, based upon the testimony of the employer’s medical expert, was dependent on whether the claimant had no prior low back complaints, which said she did (and failed to disclose). The Board, thus, held that the judge correctly found the claimant’s low back injury was limited to that of a lumbar strain and sprain from which she was fully recovered. The decision was affirmed. 

We secured partial summary judgment for a Central Pennsylvania obstetrician and health system in a birth injury case that also alleged significant urogynecological injuries to the mother. The plaintiff’s firm had previously secured a $10 million award for a similar maternal claim. In this matter the court agreed that the plaintiff’s expert reports were insufficient, and dismissed the corporate negligence claim, the claim for injuries and future economic and non-economic damages of the child, and the mother’s claim for future economic and non-economic damages.

We obtained dismissal of a six-figure claim in Philadelphia County via preliminary objections. The plaintiff homeowner sued a lighting designer for breach of contract, negligence for $23k in remediation costs, statutory remedies for treble damages and legal fees. The plaintiff alleged the lighting designer was a home improvement contractor who violated the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act (HICPA) and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. The plaintiff omitted pertinent facts from the complaint. Using judicial notice, we presented facts from public records to show that the design services were performed in the construction of a new home. We argued that HICPA does not apply to new construction and that the gist of the action doctrine barred the contract claim. The court agreed, dismissed the statutory and contract claims, and remanded the $23k negligence claim to Common Pleas Court arbitration.

We obtained a defense verdict in a Bucks County bench trial. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant homeowners’ association was obligated to replace an old stone bridge that provided the only access to the plaintiff’s residence and open public space. As part of the initial community development approval, the township directed the builder to carve out open space and repair the stone bridge so that emergency vehicles could access the open space. Continued maintenance/replacement of the bridge would thereafter pass to the the homeowner’s association. The builder never made the repairs to the bridge despite multiple requests by the township. The homeowner’s association successfully argued that its obligation to replace the bridge did not arise as the builder had not fulfilled the condition precedent of repairing the bridge and bringing it up to a current safe standard.

The defense prevailed on preliminary objections in Philadelphia County as the court found that the ​case involved a medical malpractice action involving the plaintiff’s allegations of an alleged assault by three patients while the plaintiff was a patient at a behavioral health hospital. In the complaint, the plaintiff pleaded ordinary negligence. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were filed by the defendant, raising immunity under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act since there was no claim of gross negligence. After the preliminary objections were filed, the plaintiff attempted to cure the defect in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint, which added allegations of gross negligence and additional facts, in an attempt to support the claim of gross negligence. We again filed preliminary objections, arguing that the allegation of gross negligence was a new cause of action that was now barred by the statute of limitations. Since the amended complaint was filed more than two years after the event at issue and raised a new claim, the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred the claim. We also argued that the amended complaint failed to provide any factual support for gross negligence or willful misconduct and, therefore, the hospital was immune from suit. Plaintiff’s counsel did not file a response in opposition. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas agreed that the new claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the immunity provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

We won a case on appeal, reversing the judge’s decision. ​Our insurance carrier client issued a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable (NTCP), agreeing to pay both indemnity and medical benefits for a lumbar strain allegedly sustained by the claimant. The 90-day period began on April 22, 2018, and ended July 20, 2018. On June 21, 2018, the claimant filed a claim petition for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging a low back injury. On July 17, 2018, the carrier issued a Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation Payable, stopping benefits as of June 5, 2018, and a Notice of Compensation Denial. Thereafter, the claimant filed a petition for penalties, averring the carrier violated the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act by failing to stop benefits within five days of receipt of the last payment of benefits. Accordingly, the NTCP converted to a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). The judge issued an Interlocutory Decision, ordering the carrier to reinstate disability benefits due to its failure to stop the claimant’s benefits within five days of the last payment. The carrier appealed, arguing that the Interlocutory Order was a final adjudication, merely labeled as “Interlocutory.” The carrier argued that because the judge’s order drastically altered the procedure and burdens of the litigation, it was a final adjudication and the carrier had a right to appeal therefrom. The carrier further argued that, even when a defendant fails to file a notice stopping within five days after the last payment, but does so within the 90-day NTCP timeframe, the NTCP does not convert to a NCP. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board agreed and reversed the judge’s order.

Our appellate attorneys succeeded in convincing the Pennsylvania Superior Court to vacate a $40.2 million medical malpractice verdict and remand for a new trial. ​In its unanimous, precedential decision, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court had erroneously allowed plaintiffs’ counsel to utilize hearsay medical literature as substantive evidence. The case involved a spinal cord birth injury and was tried in Delaware County.

We successfully tried a premises liability action to a defense verdict in favor of a resident’s association in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, and also successfully defended against the plaintiff’s appeal. ​The plaintiff, who was a community resident (formerly married to a unit owner but not an owner herself), claimed that she tripped and fell on a tree branch on common area steps at night as a result of a burned out PECO-owned lamp, and that the Association failed to ensure that the light was fixed. The plaintiff had asked for either invitee status or a hybrid charge on duty, but the court agreed with the defense that she was able to use the common areas by permission, not by invitation, making her a licensee only. This resulted in the duty owed being only to make the property as safe as it appeared. The defense presented multiple instances of notice to PECO of the burned-out light, and the plaintiff conceded the defense contention that it could not change the bulb itself because PECO owned the lamp. The plaintiff also conceded that she had been aware of the light being out for some time. The jury unanimously found in favor of the Association and, on appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment on the jury verdict, finding that the trial court did not err by charging the jury that the plaintiff was entitled only to the care due to a licensee on the property, and not an invitee.

The defense prevailed on a motion to dismiss our real estate agency client. The plaintiff filed counts of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, conspiracy, conversion, invasion of privacy-false light, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel against the agency regarding an allegedly fraudulent transfer of a private residence by the co-defendant seller of the property. We filed preliminary objections, arguing that the plaintiff's claims lacked sufficient specificity and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court dismissed all claims against our client. 

We received a defense verdict on no causation in a binding arbitration of a matter venued in Montour County, Pennsylvania, involving a bowel leak following urologic cancer surgery. We represented a Pennsylvania health system and its chief of urology who performed major cancer surgery upon the plaintiff (cystoprostatectomy and creation of ileal conduit). The plaintiff was discharged once his bowel function was returning and he was tolerating a normal diet, despite a slightly elevated temperature and white blood cell count (neither of which had the residents informed the attending physician about). Over the next two days, the plaintiff’s wife made multiple calls to the on-call residents, who did not feel readmission was warranted. Ultimately, he was readmitted, underwent a second surgery and then suffered more complications, likely due in part to poor blood supply to the bowel from years of heavy smoking. The defense team, through motions, secured the dismissal of corporate negligence and future medical expense claims and, through internet research, found that the plaintiff’s expert had previously been precluded from testifying by a court in Ohio for “making up facts.” Challenges in the case included that the attending surgeon readily admitted that the patient should have been readmitted sooner. However, he maintained that the outcome would have been no different. The arbitrator found his testimony credible and found no negligence on his part.