Our General Liability Practice Group regularly defends insureds, insurance companies and self-insured entities in a variety of matters including:
- Owners and contractors protective liability
- Owners, landlords and tenants coverage
- Bailor/bailee
- Premises liability
- Assault and battery
- Security
- Commercial liability
- Advertising injuries
- Defamation
- Privacy
- Elevator incidents
- False arrest
- Malicious prosecution cases
- First-party and third-party property damage cases
- Fire legal liability litigation
We understand that every client is concerned with the extent of legal fees and costs incurred. Savings are achieved in a number of ways. With offices situated within a seven-state region, we are able to provide our clients with defense attorneys who are close to and very familiar with the litigation forum. Secondly, we are cognizant of the need to deliver legal services in a prompt and efficient manner, coupled with considerable emphasis on being results-oriented.
Results
Defense Jury Verdict Obtained Before the Delaware Superior Court
We received a defense jury verdict before the Delaware Superior Court, New Castle County. Although liability was undisputed at trial, damages were disputed. The plaintiff sought damages for head, neck, back and left shoulder injuries. He had $350,000 in future medical bills and $78,000 in past medical bills that he could board. The plaintiff also had a $5 million lost wage claim that we were able to get dismissed prior to trial on a motion in limine.
Defense Verdict Obtained in a Theft Case in New York Civil Court
We obtained a defendants’ verdict in New York Civil Court where we represented an appliance company and their employee, who was accused of stealing a Rolex watch. The client’s employee installed a light fixture in the plaintiff’s residence. After the installer left the residence, the 85-year-old plaintiff could not locate his $31,000 Rolex watch. He filed a claim with his homeowner’s carrier and received $500 because the watch was not scheduled. He also filed a police report. He then retained counsel and commenced suit against the defendants for conversion, breach of contract and negligent hiring. During dispositions of both the plaintiff and his wife, we elicited testimony that neither had any proof that the defendants stole his Rolex watch. He further elicited that no criminal charges were ever brought against the employee. We filed for summary judgment, denying the allegations, and included affidavits from the employee and the owner of the appliance company in which it was indicated that there were no prior complaints regarding the company and/or the installer. The motion was denied. At the trial conducted in June 2025, Chris again elicited testimony from the plaintiff that he had no proof that the installer stole his Rolex watch, nor did the plaintiff provide any proof that the installer’s employer engaged in negligent hiring, as there were no prior complaints regarding this employee. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, we again moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the plaintiff had not established his claim for damages or proven the allegations in the complaint. The motion was denied. Rather than hearing oral summations, the court directed the parties to submit written summations. In our written summation, we outlined dismissal of the case, arguing that any finding against the defendants for theft would be tantamount to accusing them of stealing when neither the police nor the district attorney found any probable cause to criminally charge them. The court dismissed the case in its entirety.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Linking Riders, Not Liability: Limits on Duty for Rideshare Platforms
April 1, 2026
In Cooper, the Second District Court of Appeals addressed whether a transportation network company (TNC) owes a duty of care to a driver harmed while using its platform. The plaintiff argued that a TNC owes a duty to its drivers based on its control over the rideshare platform, its safety policies, and its role in matching drivers with riders. The court, however, analyzed duty through traditional Ohio negligence principles governing entities that engage independent contractors, emphasizing that a hiring entity is generally not liable for injuries arising from the contractor’s work absent specific exceptions. Central to the court’s reasoning was the “active participation” doctrine, which limits when a company who hires an independent contractor assumes a duty of care. Under Ohio law, active participation requires more than general oversight, arising only when the hiring entity directs the injury-causing activity, gives or denies permission for the critical act, or retains control over a key variable in the work. Applying this framework, the court rejected the argument that Lyft’s operation of its platform—such as allowing users to create accounts or assigning ride requests—constituted active participation. The court also clarified that a TNC’s general safety measures, policies, and monitoring capabilities do not, standing alone, create a duty. Consistent with longstanding precedent, retaining authority to enforce safety standards or coordinate activity does not rise to active participation. The decision is particularly relevant because it suggests that platform-based controls—such as algorithmic dispatch, account verification, or general safety rules—are analogous to supervisory functions traditionally insufficient to impose a duty on a company hiring independent contractors. Thus, even where a TNC has superior knowledge or implements safety-related systems, those features must be tied directly to the injury-producing act to establish duty. Finally, Cooper reinforces the importance of the independent-contractor relationship in limiting negligence liability for TNCs. By treating drivers as independent contractors, it restricts when a hiring entity owes a duty for injuries arising from the contractor’s work. The ruling signals that, absent evidence of control over the specific conduct causing harm, courts are unlikely to expand duty based solely on a TNC’s platform design or contractual safety commitments. For negligence claims against TNCs, generally, Cooper underscores that liability will turn not on the existence of platform-level control in the abstract, but on whether the company meaningfully controlled—or actively participated in—the precise risk that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury.
Case Law Alerts
Pennsylvania Superior Court Refines Co-Employee Immunity
April 1, 2026
In this matter, the plaintiff was seriously injured while operating a skid steer. The skid steer was owned by the defendant personally, but was loaned to the defendant’s separate business entity, which the plaintiff worked for. The plaintiff filed an uncontested worker’s compensation claim against the business, but then brought suit against defendant-owner for claims related to a lack of maintenance of the skid steer. The defendant-owner sought summary judgement, arguing he was the plaintiff’s ‘co-employee’ and immune from suit pursuant to 77 P.S. § 72. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that for 77 P.S. § 72 to apply, the injury must be caused by negligence that occurred within the co-employee’s course and scope of his employment; indicating while not expressly stated, it is implicit to the statute. In the instant case, the defendant’s personal maintenance of the skid steer occurred outside of the course and scope of the defendant’s operation of his business. Thus, claims related to the maintenance of the skid steer would be separate from those concerning the operation of business, and therefore, not subject to immunity under 77 P.S. § 72. This holding narrows co-employee immunity for negligence under the Worker’s Compensation Act to only those injuries caused by a co-employee while in the course/scope of their employment. This strengthens opportunities for employee-plaintiffs to file suits against owners who operate multiple entities.