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Harrisburg

Marshall Dennehey established its first office in Harrisburg in 1984. The office is comprised of civil litigation attorneys who maintain practices in all four of our litigation departments: Casualty, Health Care, Professional Liability and Workers' Compensation. In addition to the longstanding professional relationships in the practice of defense litigation our Harrisburg attorneys also provide our clients with educational lectures and risk management seminars.

Located in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, the office is strategically located less than five miles from the Capitol and has ready access to Interstate 81, Interstate 83 and other major highways, which allows the office to efficiently access its service regions. 

Harrisburg courts serve as the focal point of law in Central Pennsylvania and include the United States District Court for Central Pennsylvania, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Dauphin County Common Pleas Court, the State Capitol Building and Pennsylvania Administrative Courts.

The Harrisburg office provides services throughout Central Pennsylvania including the following counties: Adams, Centre, Clinton, Cumberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Fulton, Huntingdon, Juniata, Lancaster, Lebanon, Mifflin, Northumberland, Perry, Snyder, Union and York. Some of the office's attorneys are barred in neighboring West Virginia and Maryland as well, and handle matters in the state and federal courts of those states.

The Harrisburg office provides our clients with a dedicated defense litigation team of professionals backed by the intellectual property and broad-based experience of the entire firm, permitting localized and economical representation of insurers and self-insured clients.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

Superior Court Upholds Stacking Waiver Despite Substituted‑Vehicle Policy Amendment

July 21, 2026

In this non-precedential decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court confirmed the precedent set by prior decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that substitution of an automobile on an insurance policy does not require that a new waiver of stacked underinsured motorist coverage in order for the previously, valid stacking waiver to remain valid. In this case, Erie had issued an insurance policy to Beutler insuring four vehicles and Beutler had signed a waiver of stacked UIM coverage. Later, Beutler had purchased a new vehicle, replacing one of the four previously listed on the policy. Erie issued an amended policy indicating that the prior auto had been “deleted” and the new auto had been “added.” Beutler later died in a motor vehicle accident and his estate made a claim for stacked UIM benefits under the Erie Policy. Erie brought a declaratory judgment action asking the court to confirm that Beutler’s estate was not entitled to stacked UIM coverage. The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Erie where the trial court had held that the original stacking waiver signed by Beutler remained in effect on the date of the accident because when he had substituted the new auto, no new UIM coverage was purchased and a new waiver was not required. The estate argued that Erie’s usage of “deleted” and “added” on the amended declarations page rendered the amendment a purchase of new UIM coverage and not a substitution, requiring Erie to obtain a new executed stacking waiver. However, the Superior Court noted, “[r]egardless of the language used by the amendment, the policy covered four vehicles prior to the amendment and covered four vehicles after the amendment, with exactly the same amount of monetary coverage.” The Superior Court also affirmed the trial court’s granting of a protective order in favor of Erie, protecting Erie from discovery sought by the estate that would “answer the question of why the . . . amendment indicated ‘AUTO 3 DELETED. AUTO 5 ADDED’ as opposed to using the word ‘replacement’ or ‘replaced’.” While the estate argued that such discovery was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the Superior Court disagreed and noted that the estate failed to explain how Erie using the word “replacement” would constitute a purchase of UIM coverage and thereby requiring a new stacking waiver. While this decision of the Superior Court has been marked as “non-precedential,” it is nonetheless available to be cited as persuasive authority. The decision here confirms that the relevant analysis as to whether a new UIM stacking waiver required is the amount of UIM coverage at issue, and whether there has been an expansion or not. What the Superior Court makes clear, however, is that the language used in the policy amendments has no bearing on this analysis.

Case Law Alerts

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

July 21, 2026

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Results

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Summary Judgment Won in a Premises Liability Action

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners in a premises liability action. One of the homeowners called his father, the plaintiff, asking him to come to his house because he was having his roof replaced and had concerns about the work being done. The plaintiff arrived at the home and observed nails and other debris strewn about the entire property. Nonetheless, he entered the property to assess the roofing work and took care to avoid stepping on any nails. As he was leaving the property, he stepped on a nail, which went through his foot. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence against both homeowners and also attempted to assert that, because his son requested that he come to inspect the roofing work, he was a business invitee rather than a licensee. We argued that the plaintiff was a licensee as he was a social guest who was merely providing advice to his son. They further argued that the homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff as he knew the nails were strewn about the property and he understood the risk involved in walking there. We also argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by assumption of risk because as he was aware of the nails on the property and, nonetheless, voluntarily proceeded to walk onto the property. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.

Successfully Denied Claim and Penalty Petitions Related to the Timing of the Alleged Injury

We successfully had the claimant’s claim and penalty petitions denied by proving the alleged injury occurred much later than claimed. The claimant, a technical operator responsible for shaping and packing cheese, alleged that he suffered a left shoulder tear with internal derangement, requiring surgery, as a result of using a long stick-like tool to dislodge cheese that had gotten stuck in a machine during the production process. The claimant asserted that he provided timely notice of his work-related injury to his supervisor; within a few days after the injury occurred. Through cross examination, the claimant admitted that he provided notice of his injury four or five months after the alleged injury occurred. Through employer witness testimony, we were also able to show that, while the claimant did leave early on the day of the alleged injury, the reason was because he was sick, and there was no written documentation to support notice being provided in a timely manner. Through medical expert testimony, we were also able to establish that the claimant’s injury likely occurred on a later date than the one alleged, based upon the medical evidence showing that the bicep did not show any signs of retraction 10 months after the alleged injury date. The workers’ compensation judge found the defendant’s expert testimony more credible than the claimant’s medical expert. The claimant’s claim petition seeking temporary total disability benefits and his penalty petition were denied, resulting in a successful outcome for the defendant.

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Events

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Speaking Engagement

Pennsylvania Appellate Update 2025-2026

August 21, 2026

Casey A. Coyle

Portrait of Casey A. Coyle

Conference

25th Annual Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Conference

May 28-29, 2026

Hershey, PA

Kacey C. Wiedt, Shannon Fellin, and Perry D. Merlo

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

Not So Fast. . . The Limitations of the Pennsylvania RELRA in Plaintiffs’ Civil Actions Against Real Estate Broker and Licensee Defendants

Much has been made of the importance and weight of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, 63 P.S. §§ 455.101, et. seq. (RELRA or Act). After all, a real estate broker generally cannot recover any commission absent a signed agreement that complies with RELRA. But can a plaintiff rely on RELRA as a distinct cause of action in a civil action as to a real estate broker or licensee defendant? The Superior Court has emphatically held that he or she cannot. In the unpublished opinion P. Perez Real Est. Holdings, LLC et. al. v. Home Sale Real Est. Servs., Inc., et al., No. 256 MDA 2025, 2025 WL 35389888 (Pa. Super. Ct. December 10, 2025), the Superior Court held that the Act “does not contemplate private actions for money damages as an enforcement mechanism and consequently, does not create a private cause of action.” citing Schwarzwaelder v. Fox, 895 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa. Super. 2006). While the Act authorizes the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Real Estate Commission, to regulate the conduct governed by RELRA, the Act alone does not create a stand-alone legal cause of action as to a broker-defendant in a civil action. See P. Perez, citing Schwarwaelder at 620. Nor can it be stated that RELRA creates or imposes any legally cognizable duties on real estate brokers or licensees. While the Act contains and refers to general concepts of duty (e.g. the agent must “exercise reasonable professional skill and care which meets the practice standards required by this act” and “to deal honestly and in good faith” 63 P.S. §§606.1 (a)(1),(2), or the broker has a duty to the buyer of property to take “action that is consistent with the buyer’s interest in transaction.”  63 P.S. §§606.3 (1)), these general concepts are secondary to the duties imposed by the required written agreement between the broker and consumer. For example, in P. Perez, a case in which the buyers-plaintiffs argued that the real estate broker failed to investigate recent legislation that would affect buyer’s intentions to convert the property to commercial space, the agreement between buyer and broker contained the following provision in the “Buyer’s Due Diligence” clause: Buyer acknowledges that Brokers, their licensees, employees, officers or partners have not made an independent examination or determination of the structural soundness of the property, the age or condition of the components, environmental conditions, the permitted uses, nor of conditions existing in the locale where the property is situated. . . Accordingly, the broker defendants expressly disclaimed any duty to buyers to inform them or determine whether any applicable zoning classifications, laws, or ordinances in the township applied to the properties in question. Moreover, the Superior Court refused to read provisions of the Act into the Agreement, citing Skiff re Buss, Inc. v. Buckingham Review, LP, 991 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. 2010). In defending civil actions it is important for the defense attorney to identify any causes of action predicated solely on RELRA. Preliminary objections may be warranted to the extent that the plaintiff asserts RELRA as a stand-alone cause of action for monetary damages, a position struck down by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in P. Perez.  Moreover, any attempt to create or heighten duties as to the broker defendants may be countered by the general proposition that the courts will not inject the vague concepts of “reasonable professional skill” or “good faith” where the written agreement has express provisions regarding the duties of the parties. Ironically, although RELRA is an important Act with which all realtors, brokers, and licensees should be familiar to guarantee that their commissions are in fact timely paid, it is not a strong stand-alone mechanism for a plaintiff’s attempts to recover monetary damages in a civil action.

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

Event

Pennsylvania Appellate Update 2025-2026

On August 21, 2026, Casey will serve as a panelist for the live webcast program, “Pennsylvania Appellate Update 2025-2026” presented by the Appellate Advocacy Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and Pennsylvania Bar Institute. The program is divided into three parts—Criminal, Civil, and Administrative. Casey will serve as a panelist for the Civil portion, along with Christina McKinley of Blank Rome, Ben Baer of Injury Law Partners, John Masslon of Keller Postman, Jonathan Bruno of Bruno Litigation LLC, and moderator, Ezza Ahmed of Buchanan Ingersoll.  Registration and more information: https://www.pbi.org/product/pennsylvania-appellate-update-2025-2026/

Portrait of Carolyn Schweizer, with text below: Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

News

Marshall Dennehey Names Carolyn Schweizer New Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Superior Court Confirms RESDL Claims Are Subject to a Two-Year Statute of Repose

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently concluded that claims under the Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (“RESDL”) are subject to a two-year statute of repose running from the settlement date. This decision will further assist defending errors and omission claims against real estate agents as it bars any RESDL action commenced more than two years after the settlement date regardless of when the defect was discovered.  In Hollinger v. Deitrich, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 328 (June 23, 2026), the buyers entered into an agreement of sale in April of 2017 to purchase a residential property. The settlement occurred in June of 2017. The buyers reviewed the seller disclosures that revealed the property had a sump pump in working order and a sump pit. The disclosures further noted no water infiltration into the basement, but disclosed rehab, an addition to the property and prior sewage backup.  Shortly after the settlement and closing, the buyers experienced flooding in their basement. In March of 2020, the buyers filed suit against the seller, the buyers’ real estate agent and broker and the seller’s real estate agent and broker alleging various causes of action including a violation of RESDL. The buyers alleged that they sought assurances from the agent defendants that no water infiltration occurred on the property. They further alleged that both agents lived in the area and should have known about the neighborhood water infiltration issues. The trial court granted summary judgment for the seller and the seller’s agents and dismissed the RESDL violation.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 345 A.3d 629 (Pa. 2025), the court explained that a statute of limitation begins to run from the time of the injurious occurrence or a discovery of the same. However, a statute of repose runs for a statutorily determined period after a definitively established event. Notably, a statute of repose eliminates a cause of action regardless of when the claim accrues. Because of this, a plaintiff may not invoke the discovery rule or other equitable tolling considerations.  RESDL requires that an action for damages, as a result of a violation of this chapter, must be commenced within two years after the date of final settlement. The court found that Section 7311(b) was clear and unambiguous that an action for damages pursuant to this chapter must be commenced within a certain time after a definitely established event that is independent of any injury or discovery of any injury. Since the buyers sued over two years after closing on the property, their statutory claims were time-barred. The court explained that the seller disclosure statement could not support common law or consumer protection claims, as using it would improperly expand remedies beyond the statute’s terms. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s summary judgment ruling that the buyers’ claims under RESDL were barred by the statute of repose.  Accordingly, defense counsel should scrutinize complaints involving RESDL claims to ensure that such claims have been timely brought within two-years of the settlement date. A plaintiff will no longer be able to invoke the discovery roll to expand the time frame.

Jason Banonis Holds PDI Attorney of the Year Award with the PDI President

News

Jason Banonis Named Attorney of the Year by the Pennsylvania Defense Institute

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Result

Summary Judgment Secured for Life Insurance Agent

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial