.

Harrisburg

Marshall Dennehey established its first office in Harrisburg in 1984. The office is comprised of civil litigation attorneys who maintain practices in all four of our litigation departments: Casualty, Health Care, Professional Liability and Workers' Compensation. In addition to the longstanding professional relationships in the practice of defense litigation our Harrisburg attorneys also provide our clients with educational lectures and risk management seminars.

Located in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, the office is strategically located less than five miles from the Capitol and has ready access to Interstate 81, Interstate 83 and other major highways, which allows the office to efficiently access its service regions. 

Harrisburg courts serve as the focal point of law in Central Pennsylvania and include the United States District Court for Central Pennsylvania, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Dauphin County Common Pleas Court, the State Capitol Building and Pennsylvania Administrative Courts.

The Harrisburg office provides services throughout Central Pennsylvania including the following counties: Adams, Centre, Clinton, Cumberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Fulton, Huntingdon, Juniata, Lancaster, Lebanon, Mifflin, Northumberland, Perry, Snyder, Union and York. Some of the office's attorneys are barred in neighboring West Virginia and Maryland as well, and handle matters in the state and federal courts of those states.

The Harrisburg office provides our clients with a dedicated defense litigation team of professionals backed by the intellectual property and broad-based experience of the entire firm, permitting localized and economical representation of insurers and self-insured clients.

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Legislation Proposed to Reduce the Cost of Prescription Topical Drugs

June 8, 2026

In March, Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1215 was introduced in an effort to address the high cost of prescription topical drugs. According to the bill’s sponsor, the issue is excessive reimbursement rates for topical drugs that are essentially alternate versions of readily available, less expensive over the counter drugs. A study performed by The Workers’ Compensation Research Institute (WCRI), shows that Pennsylvania has the highest share of prescription reimbursements and the highest average quarterly payments for topical drugs.  The proposed bill would provide for payment for each ingredient separately, instead of reimbursing a single inflated price, deny payment if an ingredient lacks a valid National Drug Code, limit total reimbursement to $400 per 30 day supply no matter what ingredients are used, ban reimbursement for compound drugs that duplicate existing commercial drugs, and add a flat $20 compounding fee for pharmacies or physicians who prepare the medication. The goal? To eliminate inflated billing practices and reduce costs for employers and insurers.  Currently, the bill is in committee. We will monitor the proposed legislation as it advances and provide updates as to any significant developments that may occur. 

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Limiting Agent Liability in Pennsylvania: Knowledge, Reliance, and the E&O Landscape

May 7, 2026

Errors & Omissions (E&O) claims against real estate professionals in Pennsylvania frequently arise from allegations of nondisclosure or misrepresentation. However, Pennsylvania law provides meaningful guardrails for defense counsel, particularly where plaintiffs attempt to impose duties on agents that exceed statutory and common law obligations. A key principle, often dispositive at summary judgment, is that a seller’s agent does not owe an independent duty to investigate or discover latent defects. Under Pennsylvania law, a real estate agent representing a seller is not required to inspect the property for defects or to disclose conditions of which the agent has no knowledge. This principle aligns with the statutory framework governing licensee conduct, including the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act (RELRA), which imposes duties of honesty and good faith, but does not create an affirmative obligation to uncover unknown defects. As a result, liability exposure in E&O claims often turns on whether the agent had actual knowledge of the alleged defect and whether the buyer’s reliance was justifiable. The Gordon v. McManus decision illustrates these principles in practice and remains a useful tool for defense practitioners. No. 972 EDA 2013, 2014 WL 10917627, at 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 30, 2014). In Gordon, the plaintiffs asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement against real estate agents, alleging that the agents were aware of a recurring water infiltration issue and failed to disclose it. The plaintiffs further contended that the agents negligently misrepresented the condition of the property when questioned directly about potential water issues. The factual record, however, undermined these claims. The defendant agents maintained that they had no knowledge of any water infiltration problem. Critically, the plaintiffs had been informed by a neighbor that the basement had flooded on multiple occasions prior to closing. They also conducted their own inspection of the property and observed conditions – including the presence of a sump pump – that could reasonably signal potential water concerns. Despite these indicators, the plaintiffs did not pursue additional investigation or specialized inspection. The Superior Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the agents, emphasizing two key points that frequently arise in E&O defense. First, the absence of actual knowledge was fatal to the plaintiffs’ fraud claims. Without evidence that the agents knew of the defect, there could be no intentional misrepresentation or concealment. Second, and equally important, the court found that the plaintiffs’ reliance was not justifiable. Having been placed on notice of potential water issues, the plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence in investigating the condition. Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that where a buyer is aware of facts that would prompt further inquiry, reliance on generalized or informal assurances is insufficient to sustain a fraud claim. The Gordon court also disposed of the plaintiffs’ claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, reinforcing that such statutory claims cannot survive where the underlying fraud theory fails. For defense counsel, this linkage provides an additional pathway to narrow or eliminate exposure early in litigation. From an E&O perspective, Gordon highlights several recurring themes. Plaintiffs frequently attempt to recast nondisclosure claims as affirmative misrepresentation, particularly where there are informal communications between agents and buyers. Yet, absent proof of knowledge, these claims often collapse under scrutiny. Moreover, the decision underscores the importance of the buyer’s own conduct. Evidence that a buyer received notice of a potential defect, whether through third parties, inspection findings, or observable conditions, can significantly weaken claims of justifiable reliance. Practically, this framework offers clear guidance for both litigators and real estate professionals. For defense attorneys, early case assessment should focus on developing the evidentiary record regarding the agent’s knowledge and the buyer’s pre-closing awareness. For agents and brokers, risk mitigation remains centered on disciplined communication practices and encouraging independent inspections without offering definitive assurances about property conditions. Ultimately, while E&O claims in Pennsylvania continue to test the boundaries of agent liability, decisions like Gordon reaffirm a consistent judicial approach: liability cannot be imposed where knowledge is absent and reliance is unreasonable. In an environment where plaintiffs increasingly rely on hindsight to construct claims, these principles remain a critical line of defense.

Results

Summary Judgment Won in a Premises Liability Action

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners in a premises liability action. One of the homeowners called his father, the plaintiff, asking him to come to his house because he was having his roof replaced and had concerns about the work being done. The plaintiff arrived at the home and observed nails and other debris strewn about the entire property. Nonetheless, he entered the property to assess the roofing work and took care to avoid stepping on any nails. As he was leaving the property, he stepped on a nail, which went through his foot. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence against both homeowners and also attempted to assert that, because his son requested that he come to inspect the roofing work, he was a business invitee rather than a licensee. We argued that the plaintiff was a licensee as he was a social guest who was merely providing advice to his son. They further argued that the homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff as he knew the nails were strewn about the property and he understood the risk involved in walking there. We also argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by assumption of risk because as he was aware of the nails on the property and, nonetheless, voluntarily proceeded to walk onto the property. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.

Successfully Denied Claim and Penalty Petitions Related to the Timing of the Alleged Injury

We successfully had the claimant’s claim and penalty petitions denied by proving the alleged injury occurred much later than claimed. The claimant, a technical operator responsible for shaping and packing cheese, alleged that he suffered a left shoulder tear with internal derangement, requiring surgery, as a result of using a long stick-like tool to dislodge cheese that had gotten stuck in a machine during the production process. The claimant asserted that he provided timely notice of his work-related injury to his supervisor; within a few days after the injury occurred. Through cross examination, the claimant admitted that he provided notice of his injury four or five months after the alleged injury occurred. Through employer witness testimony, we were also able to show that, while the claimant did leave early on the day of the alleged injury, the reason was because he was sick, and there was no written documentation to support notice being provided in a timely manner. Through medical expert testimony, we were also able to establish that the claimant’s injury likely occurred on a later date than the one alleged, based upon the medical evidence showing that the bicep did not show any signs of retraction 10 months after the alleged injury date. The workers’ compensation judge found the defendant’s expert testimony more credible than the claimant’s medical expert. The claimant’s claim petition seeking temporary total disability benefits and his penalty petition were denied, resulting in a successful outcome for the defendant.

Events

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order

All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate.  The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.