Intentional Act Exclusions & the Doctrine of Inferred Intent in Ohio

In Allstate Insurance Company v. Campbell, 942 N.E.2d 1090 (Ohio 2010), the Ohio Supreme Court clarified Ohio law regarding coverage for intentional acts. In that case, the court held that the inferred intent doctrine invokes an insurance policy’s intentional act exclusion when the intentional act of an insured and the resulting harm are intrinsically linked so that the act necessarily results in the harm. Under such circumstances, testimony on harmful intent is irrelevant because the intentional act could not have been done without causing harm.

In Campbell, several teenagers placed a Styrofoam target deer on a curvy, hilly, two-lane country road at night, just below the crest of a hill, so that motorists would not see it until they were just 15 to 30 yards away. The group then remained in the area, driving back and forth along the roadway so that they could watch the reactions of passing motorists. Although several cars successfully avoided the decoy, one motorist lost control of his automobile while swerving to avoid it. The vehicle overturned and came to a rest in a nearby field, resulting in serious injuries to the driver and his passenger. The teenagers denied any intent to harm. The Campbell court ultimately decided that the doctrine of inferred intent did not apply to the facts and circumstances of that particular case where the intentional act of placing a deer decoy in the roadway and the resulting harm to a passing motorist were not so intrinsically tied that it could be said, as a matter of law, that the act necessarily resulted in the harm. The court did, however, conclude that when intent may be inferred as a matter of law—when the act necessitates the harm—an insurer’s motion for summary judgment is properly granted.

In its analysis, the court was required to review the intentional act exclusions contained in liability policies written by Allstate, Erie, Grange and American Southern. The Allstate, Erie and Grange policies all contained essentially the same exclusionary language barring coverage for “bodily injury or property damage expected or intended” by any insured. In contrast, American Southern’s policy contained exclusionary language that differed from the Allstate, Erie and Grange policies. Instead of excluding coverage for injury or damages expected or intended, American Southern’s policy excluded coverage for bodily injury or property damage resulting directly or indirectly from “an intentional act of any insured.” Thus, while the other policies contained exclusionary language that focused on whether the harm was intended, the American Southern policy focused on whether the insured’s act was intentional. The court found that by using broad exclusionary language that excluded coverage for harm caused by any intentional act—regardless of whether the harm is expected or intended by the insured—American Southern worded its policy in a manner that freed it from the line of cases analyzing whether coverage was excluded for harm “caused intentionally” or “expected or intended” by the insured. Because the policies of Allstate, Erie and Grange contained exclusions for an intentional or expected injury and the American Southern policy addressed an intentional act, the court concluded that, as a matter of law, American Southern was under no duty to defend or indemnify its insured for the damage that resulted from the intentional act of placing a deer decoy in the roadway. However, the court found that summary judgment was not proper with respect to the Allstate, Erie and Grange policies, since all three required an analysis of whether the harm was intended. Rather, for those policies it was up to the trier of fact to determine whether the defendants intended or expected the harm.

The Campbell opinion provides two main takeaways for Ohio insurance carriers. First, where an insured’s intentional act and the resulting harm or damage are intrinsically tied together so that the act necessarily resulted in the harm, the doctrine of inferred intent in Ohio invokes an insurance policy’s intentional acts exclusion. Under these circumstances, moving for summary judgment is the appropriate course of action for the insurer.

Second, insurers should employ intentional acts exclusion policy language that focuses on whether the insured’s act was intentional, as opposed to whether the harm was intended. By utilizing policy language that specifically states that coverage does not apply to injury or damage that results from an intentional act of any insured, the insurer can avoid having to address the issue of whether an insured’s harm can be inferred as a matter of law because such language does not require an analysis of whether the insured subjectively intended to cause harm. Rather, an intentional act exclusion that addresses an intentional act (as opposed to an intentional or expected injury) merely requires an objective determination of whether the harm was caused by an intentional act and will provide for a much broader exclusion from coverage.

*Dave is an associate in our Cincinnati, Ohio office. He can be reached at 513.372.6817 or djoberly@mdwcg.com.

^{Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2015}

^{Defense Digest is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2015 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.}