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Defense Digest

Mental Health and Collateral Jurisdiction: Perfect Together
By Jeffrey Bates, Esq.*

In a recent case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clarified two long-standing issues: the coordinate jurisdiction rule and the Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA"), 50 P.S. §7101, et seq. 

In Zane v. Friends Hospital, 2003 Pa. LEXIS 2149 (Pa. 2003), Jerilyn Zane brought a negligence action against Friends Hospital and Ronald Anderson.  Zane met Anderson while both were inpatients at Friends.  Zane was discharged but maintained her friendship with Anderson, visiting him on several occasions while he was still an inpatient at Friends.

Zane and Anderson arranged to get together outside the hospital setting and, in furtherance of their plan, Anderson obtained a day pass to visit his doctor.  Zane picked him up and took him to his appointment, and afterwards she was going to take him to look at apartments.  However, when Zane met Anderson at the doctor's office, he drugged her, kidnapped her, and physically and sexually assaulted her.

In her complaint against Friends, Zane alleged that the assault was the result of negligent care, supervision, and treatment rendered to Anderson by Friends, and that Friends failed to warn her about Anderson or protect her from him.  During discovery, Zane served Friends with a request for production of all psychiatric records pertaining to Anderson.  Friends refused to respond to the request for production on the basis that it violated the confidentiality provisions of the MHPA.

Zane filed a motion to compel, and Judge Sheppard of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas entered an order compelling Friends to produce, for in camera inspection, all documents concerning the history Anderson gave to Friends, including social security number and date of birth.  Friends had the matter certified for immediate appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, but the appeal was rejected.  When the matter was sent back to the Common Pleas Court, Zane moved for sanctions due to Friends' refusal to comply with the order entered by Judge Sheppard. 

The motion for sanctions was heard by a new judge, Judge Alejandro, who refused to enter any sanctions and went further to deny Zane's request for compliance with the previous discovery orders.  This order was in direct contradiction to the order entered by Judge Sheppard.  Based on Judge Alejandro's order, Friends moved for summary judgment on the basis that Zane would be unable to meet her burden of proof against Friends (that it knew or should have known of Anderson's violent propensities) without Anderson's psychiatric records.  The motion for summary judgment was granted, and Zane took an appeal.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated Judge Alejandro's order, stating that it violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule.   Zane v. Friends Hospital, 770 A.2d 339 (Pa. Super. 2001).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal on two issues: (1) the scope of the coordinate jurisdiction rule, and (2) the scope of the confidentiality provisions of the MHPA.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Zane noted that, generally speaking, the coordinate jurisdiction rule provides that when a matter has been transferred between judges of coordinate jurisdiction, i.e. judges of the same level, the second, or later, judge cannot change the resolution of any legal issue already resolved by the first, or earlier, judge.  The reasoning behind the rule is to foster a sense of finality in orders issued by the court and to maintain judicial economy.

However, this general prohibition against re-visiting the orders of a judge of coordinate jurisdiction is not absolute.  The Zane court pointed out that exceptions exist: (1) where there has been a change in controlling law; (2) where there has been a substantial change in the facts or evidence; and (3) where the prior ruling was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed.  Friends argued that Judge Sheppard's ruling was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice because of the violation of the MHPA confidentiality provisions found at 50 P.S. §7111.  In determining whether Judge Sheppard's ruling was clearly erroneous, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court turned to the language of the MHPA for guidance.

Section 7111 of the MHPA clearly states that records concerning treatment for mental health issues shall remain confidential in the absence of patient consent.  There are four limited exceptions to this rule, none of which applied in the Zane case.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the confidentiality provision applied to all documents relating to treatment, not just medical records.  Furthermore, the language of the statute is mandatory and not discretionary.  Accordingly, this ruling holds that no records relating to mental health treatment can be disclosed absent applicability of one of the limited exceptions.

This portion of the Zane ruling is of particular importance because it is the first pronouncement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on this issue.  Courts of intermediate appellate jurisdiction have previously ruled in a similar fashion, but practitioners have been left to wonder how the Supreme Court would rule.  This ruling now crystallizes the application of the confidentiality provisions of the MHPA and clarifies the issue for practitioners.  It is now clear that the confidentiality provision will be strictly enforced, even if it proves fatal to a plaintiff's case.

In holding that the MHPA would not allow the disclosure of any documents relating to patient treatment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Judge Sheppard's ruling was clearly erroneous and would have resulted in a manifest injustice; therefore, Judge Alejandro's order fell into one of the exceptions to the coordinate jurisdiction rule.  The Court found that both prongs of the exception (clearly erroneous and manifestly unjust) must be met in order for the exception to apply.  Clearly, the import to the practitioner in this instance is that it is necessary to argue both clear error and manifest injustice when arguing this exception in order to be successful.

*Jeff is an associate in the firm's Philadelphia, PA office, and he can be reached at (215) 575-2629 or via e-mail at jbates@mdwcg.com. 

 


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