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Thomas A. Specht

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TASpecht@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Thomas A. Specht

Thomas concentrates his practice on insurance coverage disputes, defense of insurance bad faith claims, post-trial matters and appeals.  He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 

In 1993, Thomas graduated magna cum laude from the University of Scranton.  He then went on to attend Villanova University School of Law, receiving his juris doctor in 1996. 

Thomas is a member of the Wilkes-Barre Law and Library Association, the Lackawanna County Bar Association, the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Defense Research Institute, where he is currently the Third Circuit reporter for DRI's Certworthy publication.  Thomas is also the current editor in chief of Defense Digest--Marshall Dennehey's quarterly newsletter that updates its clients on important legal cases and issues. 

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 1996)
    • University of Scranton (B.A., magna cum laude, 1993)
    • Pennsylvania, 1996
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2001
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2010
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, “Lawyer of the Year,” Northeastern Pennsylvania, Insurance Law (2025)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Insurance Law; Litigation – Insurance (2024-2027)
    • BV® Distinguished™ by LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Lackawanna County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Wilkes-Barre Law & Library Association
    • Obtained complete dismissal of all claims on eve of trial where plaintiff’s demand was $10 million. Plaintiff was an emergency medicine technician (EMT) who was severely assaulted during an ambulance transport of a minor patient to a psychiatric facility. The client-physician discharged the patient with orders for sedation and restraints, if needed, during transport. The plaintiff alleged these discharge orders were insufficient and violated standard of care. The defense successfully argued that under Pennsylvania’s Mcare Act, the client-physician did not owe a duty to the plaintiff-EMT, only to the minor patient, and further, that the plaintiff’s Emergency Medicine expert was not qualified to opine on the standard of care provided by client-physician who is an Internal Medicine specialist in that plaintiff’s expert had no expertise in the long-term management of psychiatric patients. Without an expert to opine on the applicable standard of care, the plaintiff’s claim must fail. As a result, the court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff’s claims.
    • Achieved dismissal, and affirmance of dismissal on appeal, of an insurance bad faith/UTPCPL/breach of contract action seeking $1,000,000 in permanent total disability benefits and extra-contractual damages, where court agreed that the Plaintiff's Complaint did not allege facts sufficient to come within the Policy's terms of coverage, and was not ambiguous.
    • Won summary judgment for insurer in an excess verdict bad faith case, where the underlying verdict came in at 14 times the last offer made by insurer, and subsequently achieved affirmance of summary judgment on appeal.
    • Obtained favorable coverage decision, that resulted in the dismissal of Luzerne County UIM case, in which the Claimant sought UIM policy limits of $200,000.00, and had contended that her status as a "driver listed" on her former boyfriend's automobile policy, and payment of premiums for that status, entitled her to UIM coverage for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.
    • Won motion for summary judgment that resulted in dismissal of coverage matter in which insured sought recovery for rain-damaged property, alternative living expenses and depreciation holdback, where wind during storm had blown tarp off of house during renovation project.
    • Obtained reversal of $700,000 trial court award on appeal, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that dam owner was not responsible for flooding of downstream property owners and was not negligent as a matter of law.
    • In a case dealing with a novel issue in Pennsylvania insurance bad faith practice, convinced district court to grant a motion to dismiss portion of bad faith claim relating to denial of first party medical benefits, on the basis of PA MVFRL preemption, even though insurer had not utilized PRO process, but an IME, in which doctor had opined that Plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement.
    • Attained dismissal of a UIM action on Preliminary Objections, where the trial court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to UIM coverage under his employer's commercial automobile policy, on the basis that the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act precluded an action against the co-employee/tortfeasor directly.
    • Accomplished dismissal of breach of contract/insurance bad faith claim, and affirmance of dismissal on appeal, where the plaintiff sought coverage under Businessowners Coverage Form and Cargo Endorsement for spoilage of frozen veal product, convincing the courts that the Cargo Endorsement superseded, and did not conflict with, the language of the Coverage Form, and did not provide coverage for the loss.
    • Persuaded U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to affirm dismissal of civil rights lawsuit alleging that local police officer engaged in a conspiracy to violate civil rights of plaintiff through an allegedly wrongful citation that lead to an adverse employment action being taken against the plaintiff.
    • In an action alleging that School District Defendants had defamed Plaintiff Charter School, convinced the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to affirm dismissal of the defendants on the basis that the defendants were protected by high official immunity for defamation claims made against them in their official capacities, and because the charter school, as a governmental entity, was barred by the First Amendment from asserting a defamation claim against the defendants in their individual capacities.
    • Shamnoski v. PG Energy, 858 A.2d 589 (Pa. 2004) 

Results

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Emergency Injunctive Relief Denied in a Data Center Matter

Emergency Injunctive Relief Denied in a Data Center Matter

Dismissal of all claims on the eve of trial where EMT plaintiff’s demand was $10 million.

The plaintiff was an Emergency Medicine Technician who was severely assaulted during an ambulance transport of a minor patient to a psychiatric facility. The client-physician had discharged the minor patient with orders for sedation and restraints, if needed, during transport. The plaintiff alleged these discharge orders were insufficient and violated standard of care. Our attorneys successfully argued that under Pennsylvania’s Mcare Act our client-physician did not owe a duty to the plaintiff-EMT, only to the minor patient. Further, they successfully argued that the plaintiff’s Emergency Medicine expert was not qualified to opine on the standard of care of our client, an Internal Medicine specialist, in that the plaintiff’s expert had no expertise in the long-term management of psychiatric patients. Without an expert to opine on the applicable standard of care, they reasoned the plaintiff’s claim must fail. As a result, the court granted their motion for summary judgment and dismissed the EMT’s claims.   

Thought Leadership

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Defense Digest

Denial of Insurer’s Petition for Limited Intervention in Trial Court Action Against Insured to Determine Whether Coverage Exclusion Applies Is Immediately Appealable

March 1, 2024

Key Points: Trial court’s denial of insurer’s petition for limited intervention to determine whether coverage exclusion applied was immediately appealable pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 313(b).  Trial court’s denial of petition to intervene under Pa. R.C.P. 2327(1) was erroneous because, unless insurer was permitted to intervene for the limited purpose of submitting a special interrogatory to the jury, the entry of a judgment in the action would impose liability upon insurer to indemnify insured.  Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded to trial court to determine whether intervention should be refused under Pa. R.C.P. 2329.  In Hannibal v. Solid Waste Services, Inc., 2023 WL 8761934 (Pa. Super. Dec. 19, 2023), the Superior Court reversed a trial court order that had denied Admiral Insurance Company’s (Admiral) petition for limited intervention in an action brought by Ahmed Hannibal (Hannibal) against Admiral’s insured, Solid Waste Services, Inc. d/b/a J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. (Mascaro), and remanded for further proceedings. The appeal was an immediate interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 313, which permits immediate appeals from collateral orders of trial courts.  Admiral had issued a commercial general liability insurance policy to Mascaro that provided defense and indemnity coverage. The policy excluded coverage for “‘bodily injury,’ ... allegedly or actually arising out of, related to, caused by, contributed to by, or in any way connected to or with the ownership, maintenance, use, or entrustment to others, by or on behalf of any insured of an ‘auto,’ ... ‘Use’ includes, but is not limited to, operation and ‘loading or unloading.’”  Hannibal was injured when a trash dumpster platform he was standing on moved and caused him to fall and sustain injuries. At the time of the accident, the trash dumpster platform was connected to a dumpster being serviced by Mascaro.  Hannibal filed suit against Mascaro, asserting that Mascaro was responsible for the maintenance, care, and upkeep of the dumpster; that Mascaro was negligent and careless; and that such negligence and carelessness caused his injuries. The complaint asserted a claim for premises liability and a claim for negligence but no claim based on the ownership, maintenance, or use of an auto.  Mascaro tendered to Admiral, seeking defense and indemnity coverage under the policy. Admiral agreed to provide a defense to Mascaro subject to a full reservation of rights to deny coverage and withdraw its defense should evidence reveal that the policy did not cover Hannibal’s claims.  Discovery revealed that the platform on which Hannibal was standing moved because it was resting on a dumpster attached to a Mascaro truck that was pulling away, thereby causing the accident. Admiral subsequently filed a federal declaratory judgment action that was dismissed as premature. Admiral thereafter sought to intervene in the state trial court action for the limited purpose of submitting a special interrogatory to the jury as to whether Hannibal’s injuries and damages were caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of any auto. Admiral alleged that, if intervention were denied, the jury would simply be asked if Mascaro was negligent and if such negligence was the proximate cause of Hannibal’s injuries and damages, without specifying the precise manner of such negligence or whether such negligence involved the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle. The special interrogatory would only be submitted if the jury found that Mascaro had been negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of Hannibal’s injuries and damages. Both Hannibal and Mascaro opposed intervention, and the trial court denied intervention without a hearing. Admiral filed a notice of appeal from the putatively interlocutory order to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Since most interlocutory orders in Pennsylvania are not immediately appealable, the Superior Court preliminarily dealt with the issue of whether it had appellate jurisdiction over the order denying limited intervention. The court noted that such an order might be appealable as a collateral order or as an interlocutory order by permission. However, Admiral only appealed on the basis that the order was appealable as a collateral order pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 313(b).  Rule 313(b) provides that an interlocutory order is collateral and, therefore, immediately appealable if: (1) it is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost. See Pa. R.A.P. 313(b). The Superior Court determined that the order denying limited intervention was immediately appealable under Rule 313(b).  Relying on Bogdan v. Am. Legion Post 153 Home Ass’n., 257 A.3d 751, 756 (Pa. Super. 2021), it concluded that the order denying the petition satisfied the separability prong under Rule 313(b) because Admiral’s right to intervene was peripheral to the ultimate resolution of the action brought by Hannibal. Admiral merely sought to ensure that, when the jury would reach its determination as to whether Mascaro was liable to Hannibal, it would make certain factual findings which would resolve the coverage issues. The Superior Court also found that the order satisfied the second prong of Rule 313(b)—that the right involved was too important to be denied review. The court noted that Admiral sought limited intervention to obtain a clear determination of the basis for any potential jury verdict to assist with subsequent coverage determinations regarding its indemnity obligations in a declaratory judgment action. The court indicated that the petition to intervene was “the only way for Admiral to secure the specific factual reasons for any potential verdict against Mascaro, and, if appropriate, to sustain its burden of establishing—in a subsequent declaratory judgment action—whether any policy exclusions apply to preclude indemnity coverage for any verdict that Hannibal may secure against Mascaro.”  The Superior Court also decided that if review of the order denying intervention were postponed until after final judgment, the claim would be irreparably lost. Citing Butterfield v. Giuntoli, 670 A.2d 646, 658 (Pa. Super. 1995), the court stated that, if the jury were to return a general verdict against Mascaro, without making any factual determinations necessary to resolve the coverage issues, Admiral would be permanently deprived of the ability to establish whether a policy exclusion applied and precluded indemnity coverage for any judgment against Mascaro. In Butterfield, the Superior Court had affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insured in a declaratory judgment action brought by the insurer because it was the insurer’s burden to prove that the claim was excluded from coverage, and the insurer had failed to seek intervention or request special interrogatories, rendering it impossible to determine the basis of the jury’s findings in order to determine whether a policy exclusion applied. Finding that the appeal was properly before it, the Superior Court looked to the denial of the petition to intervene. The court stated that who may intervene in an action and when that intervention may be prohibited is determined by Pa. R.C.P. Nos.: 2327 and 2329.  Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 2327, “at any time during the pendency of an action, a person not a party thereto shall be permitted to intervene therein, subject to these rules if (1) the entry of a judgment in such action or the satisfaction of such judgment will impose any liability upon such person to indemnify in whole or in part the party against whom judgment may be entered.” Pa. R.C.P. 2327(1). Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 2329:  [u]pon the filing of the petition and after hearing, of which due notice shall be given to all parties, the court, if the allegations of the petition have been established and are found to be sufficient, shall enter an order allowing intervention; but an application for intervention may be refused, if (1) the claim or defense of the petitioner is not in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the action; or (2) the interest of the petitioner is already adequately represented; or (3) the petitioner has unduly delayed in making application for intervention or the intervention will unduly delay, embarrass or prejudice the trial or the adjudication of the rights of the parties. Pa. R.C.P. 2329. The trial court had found that Admiral failed to satisfy Rule 2327(1), but the Superior Court disagreed. It concluded that, “unless Admiral is permitted to intervene for the limited purpose of submitting a special interrogatory to the jury, the entry of a judgment in this action will impose liability upon Admiral to indemnify Mascaro.” The court noted that, when the insurer relies upon exclusionary language in the policy as a defense to coverage, the burden shifts to the insurer to prove that the exclusion applies to the facts of the case and that, to sustain that burden, Admiral was required to prove that Hannibal’s injuries and damages were caused, in whole or in part, by the ownership, maintenance, or use of an auto, and sought limited intervention in this action for the sole purpose of submitting a special interrogatory to the jury to make this narrow factual determination.  The Superior Court opined that, as per Butterfield, 670 A.2d at 658, Admiral would be unable to determine the applicability of its potential coverage defense to any claim asserted against its insured if it was not not permitted to intervene. And Admiral would be obligated to indemnify Mascaro for any judgment imposed against it in the action.  The Superior Court, therefore, concluded that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in determining that Admiral failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 2327(1). It remanded for the trial court to conduct a hearing pursuant to Rule 2329. So, in sum, there are two large takeaways from Hannibal. First, orders denying coverage counsel petitions for limited intervention into underlying actions are immediately appealable pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 313. Second, coverage counsel would be wise to attempt to intervene in underlying actions against insureds, pursuant to Butterfield, where there are fact issues relating to whether coverage defenses apply and there is a danger that the verdict could be ambiguous as to those coverage issues. *Tom is a shareholder in our Scranton, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at (570) 496-4612 or taspecht@mdwcg.com.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

News

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Firm Highlights

Ellen C. Bodenmiller Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Tampa Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Ellen C. Bodenmiller Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Tampa Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Adopts Traditionally More Expansive Concept of Occupational Causation

The Florida Supreme Court issued a significant decision rebuking the First District Court of Appeal (1st DCA) in the high-profile case of Bouayad v. Normandy Insurance Co., a case addressing the compensability of workplace injuries resulting from assaults by third-party tortfeasors. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found the claimant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits, relying in part on the Florida Supreme Court's earlier decision in Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria from 1980. In Strother, the Court upheld an award of benefits to a cashier who was assaulted and robbed by individuals who followed her home from work under the mistaken belief that she was carrying restaurant cash deposits. In Bouayad, the 1st DCA concluded that the claimant's injuries were not compensable because they did not arise out of his employment. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the 1st DCA applied too narrow an interpretation of the "arising out of employment" requirement. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a broader and more traditional view of occupational causation than that recently adopted by the 1st DCA. The claimant in Bouayad was the general manager of a car rental business operating from a hotel near an airport. Around midnight, while walking along a covered outdoor walkway from the hotel's atrium, where the rental kiosk was located, to an office near the pool, he was shot multiple times by an unidentified assailant. As part of his regular duties, the claimant carried rental agreements and cash receipts from the kiosk to the office at the end of each shift. After the shooting, the claimant managed to return to the hotel atrium, where he stated that he believed "Robert" had shot him, referring to an individual who had threatened the claimant's son the previous day. The assailant, however, was never identified. Consequently, the Supreme Court analyzed the case as involving an unknown third party while the claimant was acting within the course and scope of his employment. The central issue therefore was whether the injury "arose out of" the claimant’s employment. At the final hearing, the claimant presented evidence regarding the risks and hazards associated with his employment, including the nature of his duties, his late-night work schedule, and the location of the business in a high-turnover hotel near a major airport. His expert opined that these factors exposed him to an increased risk of becoming the victim of a crime while at work. In contrast, the employer/carrier's expert characterized the shooting as a targeted attack rather than a robbery and asserted that the risk of violent crime was actually higher near the claimant's residence than at the hotel. Based on that analysis, the expert concluded that the claimant was not exposed to an increased workplace risk. The 1st DCA focused narrowly on the specific activity the claimant was performing at the moment of injury. According to the court, the claimant's “work performed” at the time of the shooting was simply "walking" between two employer-operated locations, and that act of walking did not itself cause the injury. The Florida Supreme Court found this analysis far too myopic and inconsistent with decades of workers' compensation precedent. Reaffirming longstanding principles of workplace causation, the Court explained that the proper inquiry is not whether the precise physical task being performed at the moment of injury directly caused the harm. Rather, the relevant question is whether the employment, viewed as a whole, exposed the worker to risks and hazards that contributed to the injury. The decision is significant because it reinforces a broader conception of work-relatedness in the “arising out of” compensability analysis. Instead of limiting the causation analysis to the employee's discrete physical activity at the time of injury, courts must consider the totality of the employment circumstances, including the employee's duties, work environment, hours, and occupational risks. Under that framework, an injury may arise out of employment when the employment places the employee in a position of increased hazard, even if the specific task being performed at the moment of injury is not itself the direct cause of the harm.

News

106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America

Marshall Dennehey is proud to highlight the firm’s 106 attorneys who have been recognized in the 2027 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America. Less than 6% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. were selected by their peers for this recognition. Additionally, four of the firm’s attorneys received the Best Lawyers® 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” awards in their respective practice areas and demographic regions. Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. For more information, please visit https://www.bestlawyers.com/. OUR 2027 LAWYERS OF THE YEAR Harrisburg, PA Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers Compensation Law - Employers Roseland, NJ Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants   OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Philadelphia, PA Nicholas D. Bowers, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Josh J. T. Byrne, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Jefferey J. Chomko, Insurance Law James H. Cole, Insurance Law John J. Delany III, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Laurianne Falcone, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John P. Gonzales, Employment Law - Management John Hare, Appellate Practice Daniel D. Krebbs, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Michele Punturi, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Bradley D. Remick, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Andrea Cicero Rock, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robin M. Romano, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Daniel J. Ryan, Jr., Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Gary M. Samms, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Christopher N. Santoro, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation -Defendants Josh D. Scheets, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Robert P. Schenk, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robert E. Smith, Insurance Law Robin Snyder, Litigation - Health Care Michael L. Turner, Commercial Litigation; Criminal Defense: White-Collar; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Claire Breaux Ventola, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Melissa Devich Cochran, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants  John F. Deasy, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Daniel W. Deitrick, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Douglas C. LaSota, Litigation - Construction; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Joseph V. Lesinski, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants   Christian D. Marquis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia A. Monahan, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Patrick T. Reilly, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Brett C. Shear, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Teresa O. Sirianni, Education Law; Employment Law – Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment Stuart Sostmann, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Scranton, PA Sarah E. Argo, Litigation - Insurance Michael J. Connolly, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Matthew Keris, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants John T. McGrath, Jr., Insurance Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants William J. McPartland, Insurance Law John R. Nealon, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Victoria Scanlon, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Michael A. Sebastian, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Thomas A. Specht, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Suzanne Tighe, Litigation Insurance Harrisburg , PA Casey Alan Coyle, Administrative/Regulatory Law; Appellate Practice; Commercial Litigation Brittany E. Bakshi, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Shannon P. Fellin, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Allison Krupp, Insurance Law John R. Ninosky, Litigation – Insurance; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers King of Prussia, PA  Michael L. Detweiler, Construction Law Joseph L. Hoynoski III, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Gregory J. Kelley, Construction Law, Litigation - Construction Anthony Natale III, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Francis X. Wickersham, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers A. Judd Woytek, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers Erie, PA Patrick M. Carey, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Joel M. Snavely, Health Care Law; Insurance Law New Haven, CT Michael Wrona, Commercial Litigation, Litigation - Bankruptcy  Mount Laurel, NJ David D. Blake, Litigation - Insurance Barbara Davis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lynne Nahmani, Litigation - Health Care John H. Osorio, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John L. Slimm, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants Roseland, NJ Robert T. Evers, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Julia Klubenspies, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard C. Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia M. McDonagh, Appellate Practice Sunny Sparano, Litigation - Construction Randall S. Watts, Health Care Law New York, NY Tonya M. Lindsey, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Tampa, FL Michael Archibald, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lindsay G. McCormick, Litigation – Construction Orlando, FL Thomas F. Brown, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Dante C. Rohr, Commercial Litigation Fort Lauderdale, FL Kimberly Kanoff Berman, Appellate Practice Patrick M. Delong, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Jacksonville, FL  Heather Byrer Carbone, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Linda Wagner Farrell, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Elizabeth B. Ferguson, Litigation - Construction James P. Hanratty, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Wilmington, DE Sarah B. Cole, Litigation - Insurance Benjamin K. Durstein, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Maria R. Granaudo, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants  Keri L. Morris-Johnston, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Cincinnati, OH Timothy B. Schenkel, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David E. Williamson, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Cleveland, OH Vincent E. Cononico, Litigation – Insurance, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Jillian L. Dinehart, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David J. Fagnilli, Insurance Law Jason P. Ferrante, Health Care Law, Litigation - Health Care Andrew H. Isakoff, Transportation Law Leslie M. Jenny, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendant OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS: ONES TO WATCH Jacksonville, FL Sean J. Reeves, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Orlando, FL Carolin A. Pacheco, Insurance Law Mount Laurel Stacey Gorin, Insurance Law Melville, NY Kimberly Gitlin, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Matthew A. Gray, Insurance Law; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Philadelphia, PA Holli K. Archer, Health Care Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law Emily Pritchyk, Commercial Litigation; Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Taylor E. Kosko, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Alana Staniszewski, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Michael D. Winsko, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants; Transportation Law King of Prussia, PA Richard Lechette, Commercial Litigation; Insurance Law, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.

Jason Banonis Holds PDI Attorney of the Year Award with the PDI President

News

Jason Banonis Named Attorney of the Year by the Pennsylvania Defense Institute

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Deemed Worker an Employee Despite Independent Contractor Agreement; Insurer Estopped from Denying Coverage

In this case, the claimant filed a Claim Petition for injuries sustained on October 28, 2019, naming J&S as his Employer, and alleging that the injuries occurred when he fell from a ladder while installing a satellite dish for Dish Network. Dish Network contracted with J&S to install satellite dishes. Subsequently J&S filed a Petition to Join Brickstreet Insurance Company and the claimant filed a Claim Petition against the Uninsured Employer Guaranty Fund. The Fund then joined Dish Network as another employer.  Before the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), the claimant testified that he was hired in 2015 by J&S and at the time signed an Independent Contractor Agreement (IC Agreement). J&S defended the case on the basis that the claimant was not an employee, but was an independent contractor, even after the IC Agreement expired. Additional evidence showed that, at the time of the October 28, 2019, work injury, J&S’ workers’ compensation insurance with Brickstreet had lapsed, even though a Brickstreet agent had been working to renew J&S’ policy and had a Certificate for coverage from September 25, 2019 to September 25, 2020 issued, with Dish Network listed as the Certificate Holder. A renewal policy was not in effect at the time the Certificate was issued and the agent learned on October 25, 2019 that Brickstreet was not going to renew their policy with J&S, due to an unpaid premium.    Ultimately, the WCJ found that the claimant was an employee of J&S at the time of the work injury and that J&S did not have a workers’ compensation policy in place at the time, due to their failure to pay the renewal premium to Brickstreet. The WCJ also found Dish Network was a Statutory Employer under Section 302(a) of the Act. The Claim Petition and the Guaranty Fund Claim Petition were both granted, as was the Guaranty Fund’s Petition to Join Dish Network. The WCJ also denied J&S’ Petition to Join Brickstreet, finding that neither J&S or Dish Network showed that Brickstreet was estopped from denying coverage. J&S and Dish Network appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) and the Board affirmed. J&S and Dish Network appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court rejected J&S' argument that the claimant was an independent contractor. In doing so, the court noted that the claimant credibly testified that he worked for J&S full time, could not work for another company, and that J&S, scheduled his jobs, tracked him, and scheduled additional installations, if he finished early. Additionally, the court noted the claimant lacked discretion in the manner he performed his job, because all questions had to be referred to J&S.  As for Dish Network’s appeal, the court held that the WCJ erred in holding that Brickstreet was not estopped from denying coverage as to Dish Network. According to the court, the insurance agent was an authorized representative of Brickstreet and, at the direction of J&S, issued the Certificate of Insurance that he knew was not accurate at the time, and was aware would be presented as proof of coverage for J&S. Dish Network relied upon that information and continued to use J&S, ultimately leading to Dish Network being named as the Statutory Employer liable for payment of benefits because of J&S’ uninsured status. The court held that the Board erred in affirming the WCJ ’s conclusion that Dish Network did not establish that Brickstreet was equitably estopped from denying coverage, reversed the decision below, and remanded the case to the WCJ. 

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

Result

Federal Statute Declared Constitutional

In this products liability case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court and upheld the constitutionality of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which resulted in judgment as a matter of law for the defendant manufacturer.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirmed Trial Judge’s Orders Granting Summary Judgement for Defendants on COVID-19 Case

In Dunne v. Advanced Subacute Rehab Servs. at Sewell, LLC, et al., the plaintiffs appealed from two Law Division orders. By way of background, Louis Doto, Sr. (Doto) worked for BP & SC Services, Inc. (BP). BP leased Doto to Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell, LLC (Advanced Subacute) and it had control of his work, paid wages, and had the power to hire or fire him. A BP employee was assigned to the facility to train and supervise him and BP was responsible for securing workers’ compensation coverage. Doto worked as an aide in the laundry department. Linen from COVID-19 residents were delivered in clearly marked bags and he had no direct contact with residents. A co-worker, Sheila Smith, was also an aide and she never contracted COVID-19 at the facility. Advanced Subacute did not require Doto to wear an N-95 mask, but instead a surgical mask, though N-95 masks were available to all employees. He was also required to attend period mandatory meetings with other high-risk employees, the last of which he attended was in November 2020. All employees were required to test for COVID-19 and there were no reported cases from June to October 2020. On December 23, 2020, Doto tested positive for COVID-19 and passed away on January 18, 2021. The last member of housekeeping that Doto may have encountered tested positive 22 days earlier. After his death, OSHA found two “serious” violations concerning the N-95 masks worn by housekeepers. In response, Advanced Subacute fit tested all non-clinical staff. Doto’s estate filed a workers’ compensation claim and named both BP and Advanced Subacute as his employer. The estate received an award. In July 2022, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Law Division, alleging wrongful death and survivor causes of action. In October 2024, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing: 1) immunity pursuant to the Emergency Health Powers Act: 2) the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act; 3) Doto’s inability to establish infection at the facility; 4) net expert opinions by the plaintiffs’ expert; and 5) inadmissibility of the OSHA report. The plaintiffs opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing: 1) no immunity as Advanced Subacute engaged in gross negligent or willful misconduct; 2) no preclusion by the Workers’ Compensation Act as Doto was not Advanced Subacute’s employee; and 3) no net expert opinions. In February 2025, the judge issued a written decision granting the defendants’ motion. Specifically, he found Advanced Subacute’s COVID-19 immunity precluded the plaintiffs’ claim as no reasonable jury could find any gross negligence or utter disregard for Doto’s safety. He also addressed the other defenses for completeness. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and the judge issued another written decision denying the plaintiffs’ motion in April 2025. The plaintiffs then appealed both decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the orders for reasons stated by the judge in his written decisions. The Appellate Division only added: 1) Advanced Subacute acted consistently with the legislative grant of immunity; 2) there was no doubt Doto was an employee of both BP and Advanced Subacute and the latter may have inadvertently failed to follow some precautions; and 3) confirmed the plaintiffs’ experts did not identify a basis for their opinions. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found no reason to disturb the judge’s well-reasoned decisions and affirmed the judge’s orders.