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Kimberly A. Boyer-Cohen

Special Counsel

KABoyer-cohen@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Kimberly A. Boyer-Cohen

Kimberly's legal practice is devoted solely to post-trial and appellate advocacy, dealing with a wide variety of substantive matters including professional malpractice, civil rights litigation, products liability, employment law and premises liability. In her capacity as an appellate attorney, Kimberly has handled over 150 appeals, including oral arguments when necessary before the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
 
In 1992, Kimberly graduated from Penn State University with a B.S. in Labor and Industrial Relations. After working for several years in the area of human resources, she attended Temple University School of Law where she received her juris doctor in 1999. While at Temple, Kimberly was involved in the Moot Court Honor Society and the Women's Law Caucus and served on the executive board of both organizations.
 
Kimberly is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. She is a member of the Philadelphia Bar Association, where she is active in the Women in the Profession Committee and the Appellate Courts Committee. Also at the Pennsylvania Bar Association, Kimberly is involved in the Commission on Women in the Profession and the Post-Trial and Appellate Practice Committee.
 
Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey in 2001, Kimberly worked for a Philadelphia law firm where her practice focused on construction litigation, labor and employment law and defense litigation. 

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 1999)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.S., 1992)
    • Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2000
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2002
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit, 2006
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2008
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Litigation Counsel of America Fellows
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer (2013-2022)
    • Top Women in Law, The Legal Intelligencer (2016)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association, Commission on Women in the Profession
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association, Post-Trial and Appellate Practice Committee.
    • Philadelphia Bar Association, Appellate Courts Committee, Co-Chair (2009 to present)
    • Philadelphia Bar Association, Women in the Profession Committee
    • Preserving Issues In The Trial Court, NACLE, April 1, 2014
    • Professionalism in the Law, Villanova Law School, September 2012
    • Creating a Win-Win Mentoring Program for Female Attorneys and the Firm, American Conference Institute's Premier Conference on Retaining and Promoting Female Attorneys, May 22, 2007
    • “Pennsylvania Supreme Court Refuses to Expand Lawyer Liability,” Defense Digest, January 2021, Vol. 27, No. 1
    • “Occupant In a Fleeing Vehicle Is Not an Innocent Bystander…Or Is He?,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • "Navigating The 1925(b) Minefield Of Waiver - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Attempt To 'Clarify The Confusion And Quell The Consternation'," Defense Digest, June, Vol. 14 No. 2, 2008
    • "Stipulating to Cap on Compensatory Damages Limits Potential Delay Damages," Defense Digest, March, Vol. 12 No. 1, 2006
    • "The Trend In Construing the Ohio Employer Intentional Tort Exception -A Consistent, Workable Standard or Confusing, Expansive Quandary?," Defense Digest, December, Vol. 9 No. 4, 2003
    • "Failure to Anticipate Potential Mail Delays May Result in a Party's Loss of Rights," Defense Digest, March, Vol. 8 No. 1, 2002
    • "A Taint of Evidence Claim of Error - It 'Taint' So Effective in Civil Cases'," Defense Digest, December, Vol. 8 No. 4, 2002
    • By a vote of 7-0, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and the trial court and ruled that Kim’s client, a general contractor, was immune from suit under Pennsylvania’s statutory employer doctrine.  The ruling nullified a large verdict against the general contractor.  Twenty-one construction and insurance industry groups joined together as amici to support John’s appeal to the Supreme Court.  Patton v. Worthington Associates, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 788 (March 26, 2014)
    • The Pennsylvania Superior Court dismissed a highly-publicized death case filed against Kim's client in Pennsylvania based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens under Pennsylvania's long-arm statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(e).  Jones v. Morey's Pier Inc., No. 2990 EDA 2012 (March 10, 2014)
    • The Superior Court vacated a large judgment against Kim's client and remanded for the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish the store had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly defective condition.  Davis v. Target Corporation, 2098 EDA 2011 (Pa. Super., March 27, 2013).
    • In a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the en banc Superior Court's finding that "a patient does have a cause of action against either a psychiatrist or a general practitioner rendering psychological care, when during the course of treatment the physician has a sexual relationship with the patient that causes the patient's emotional or psychological symptoms to worsen."  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur limited to deciding "Whether, for purposes of determining professional negligence, a general practitioner who provides mental health treatment to a patient is held to the same higher duty as a specialist in psychiatry or psychology?"  After engaging in a very exhaustive review and analysis of the law in Pennsylvania, as well as other jurisdictions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that as a general practitioner, Kim's client was under no specific or "heightened" duty in tort to refrain from sexual relations with his patient under the circumstances where he provided "incidental mental health treatment."  In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected the Superior Court's decision which held the doctor to a novel duty and standard.  Thierfelder v. Wolfert, 52 A.3d 1251 (Pa. 2012).
    • The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court vacated a large judgment against Kim's client, a township, and remanded for the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the basis that the trial evidence failed to demonstrate that the township was responsible for the decedent's death.  Rahman v. Falls Township, 2012 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 126 (Pa.Cmwlth., January 6, 2012).
    • The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the ruling of the trial court and awarded a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, vacating a large verdict against Kim's client, a mutual insurance company, on the basis that the insurer's conduct in handling a fire damage claim did not constitute bad faith as a matter of law.  Edkin v. Brethren Mutual Insurance Co., 1331 MDA 2009 (Pa. Super., February 4, 2011)
    • he Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated an adverse jury verdict and remanded for a new trial in favor of Kim's client, one of the world's leading construction firms, in its claim for contractual indemnity. Skanska USA Buildings, Inc. v. Gory Mechanical Contractors, 345 EDA 2010 (Pa. Super., January 19, 2011)
    •   The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and upheld the dismissal of all claims against Kim's client, an investigating company, on the basis that the plaintiff, who was seeking workers' compensation benefits from his employer, failed to show that he had an expectation of privacy while participating in a worship service in a sanctuary. Tagouma v. Investigative Consultant Servs., 4 A.3d 170 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    • The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated an adverse jury verdict and remanded for the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Kim's client on the basis that  the trial court failed to make the threshold determination of whether an absolute privilege applied to the hospital's use of the plaintiff's confidential personnel file at a labor relations hearing involving unionization of nurses.  Moreover, the Superior Court determined that the record showed no evidence of abuse of that privilege and made clear the purpose of the disclosure was genuine and related to the NLRB proceedings. Doe v. Wyo. Valley Health Care Sys., 987 A.2d 758 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    • Successfully argued in the Superior Court that a methadone clinic, which took steps to regulate the dissemination of methadone in accordance with federal guidelines, did not owe a duty of care to a third party who lethally overdosed after buying methadone that was stolen from a patient of the clinic." to say "The Superior Court affirmed the grant of judgment in favor of Kim's client on the basis that a methadone clinic, which took steps to regulate the dissemination of methadone in accordance with federal guidelines, did not owe a duty of care to a third party who lethally overdosed after buying methadone that was stolen from a patient of the clinic.  McCandless v. Edwards, 908 A.2d 900 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    • Successfully argued in the Superior Court that dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint was required when the cause of action arose outside of Pennsylvania, even if the trial court has jurisdiction" to say "In a case of first impression, Kim successfully arged in the Superior Court that dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint was required when the cause of action arose outside of Pennsylvania, even if the trial court has jurisdiction.  Searles v. Estrada, 856 A.2d 85 (Pa. Super. 2004)

Results

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Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Action per Lease Agreement Dispute

We obtained the dismissal of a legal malpractice action against our client arising from its representation of the plaintiff in a lease agreement dispute. After the deadlines passed for completion of discovery and production of the plaintiff’s expert report, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of our client on the basis that the plaintiff’s claim for professional negligence failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff failed to produce an expert report to support its allegations of professional negligence. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the dismissal and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that it had been improperly sanctioned for a discovery violation. In support of its affirmance, the Superior Court found that summary judgment was properly granted because the plaintiff had been given ample time in which to satisfy its evidentiary burden of producing an expert report, but failed to act with due diligence and could not substantiate each element of its claim without an expert report. 

Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Action Obtained

The plaintiff brought a professional negligence claim against our client arising from the firm’s representation of the plaintiff in a lease agreement dispute. After the deadlines passed for the completion of discovery and the production of the plaintiff’s expert report, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of our client on the basis that the plaintiff’s claim for professional negligence failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff failed to produce an expert report to support its allegations of professional negligence. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the dismissal and rejected the plaintiff’s argument, that it had been improperly sanctioned for a discovery violation. In support of its affirmance, the Superior Court found that summary judgment was properly granted because the plaintiff had been given ample time in which to satisfy its evidentiary burden of producing an expert report but failed to act with due diligence and could not substantiate each element of its claim without an expert report. True Railroad Realty v. McNees Wallace and Nurick, LLC, _ A.3d _, 2022 PA Super 70 (April 19, 2022).

Thought Leadership

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Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Refuses to Expand Lawyer Liability

January 29, 2021

Key Points: Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to adopt the continuous representation rule to toll the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action. Statutes of limitations are legislative in character and consideration of tolling doctrines, such as the continuous representation rule, is most appropriately viewed as an exercise in statutory construction. By refusing to adopt a different rule for legal malpractice cases, this decision has strengthened the public policy of prompt claim resolution and eliminated the prospect of a lawyer's indefinite liability for stale claims. On December 22, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an opinion in Clark v. Stover, _ A.3d _, 2020 WL 7502334 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2020), in which it refused to adopt the continuous representation rule to toll the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action. Under the continuous representation rule, the applicable statute of limitations would not begin to run until the date on which the attorney-client relationship is terminated. Edwin Schwartz and Nicole Ehrhart, shareholders in our Professional Liability Department, litigated the case at the trial court level, and Kimberly A. Boyer-Cohen, special counsel in our Appellate Advocacy and Post-Trial Practice Group, was successful in defending that result before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. David Clark brought claims of professional negligence and breach of contract against Jeffrey Stover, Esquire, and his law firm. Mr. Stover had represented Mr. Clark in an underlying estate dispute in which Mr. Clark sought to contest the will of his deceased brother. Mr. Clark's claims in the underlying action were dismissed on November 10, 2009, and he admittedly learned of their dismissal within one week of the order. Mr. Stover subsequently appealed the decision in the underlying action on Mr. Clark's behalf, but the trial court's dismissal of the claims was affirmed on May 19, 2011, and allocatur was denied on May 16, 2012. Mr. Clark did not commence his action against Mr. Stover and his law firm until October 1, 2015, at which time he alleged that Mr. Stover had failed to adequately prosecute the underlying action on his behalf. Upon Mr. Stover's motion, the common pleas court awarded summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that the claims were untimely and barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. In doing so, the trial court found that Mr. Clark was aware of the alleged negligence and the asserted breach more than four years before filing the malpractice action such that the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment doctrine did not apply. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed. The Superior Court also addressed Mr. Clark's request for adoption of the continuous representation rule to permit statutes of limitations for causes of action sounding in legal malpractice to be tolled until the attorney’s ongoing representation is complete. In rejecting Mr. Clark's request, the Superior court explained that it was bound by its previous rejection of the continuous representation rule in Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang, 839 A.2d 437, 442 (Pa. Super. 2003), aff’d per curiam, 881 A.2d 1266 (Pa. 2005). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently allowed discretionary appeal solely to consider whether to adopt the continuous representation rule. On appeal, Mr. Clark argued that strong policy justifications support the rule's implementation, including the client's entitlement to repose confidence in a lawyer's abilities, avoidance of disruption of attorney-client relationships and providing the opportunity for lawyers to cure mistakes before being sued. Mr. Clark also argued the continuous representation rule was favored by a majority of other jurisdictions. In response, Mr. Stover argued that adoption of the continuous representation rule would adversely impact the purpose of the statute of limitations—"to expedite litigation and thus discourage delay and the presentation of stale claims which may greatly prejudice the defense of such claims." With regard to policy, Mr. Stover explained that the longer four-year statute of limitations which applies to legal malpractice claims sounding in contract, as well as the discovery rule and the fraudulent concealment doctrine, already provides substantial protections to plaintiffs. Furthermore, application of the continuous representation rule would also serve as a disincentive for lawyers to remain involved in matters to attempt to remediate difficulties which may arise during the course of legal representation. Finally, Mr. Stover highlighted that the rejection or refusal to adopt the continuous representation doctrine is in keeping with the approach of many other jurisdictions and pointed out that, of the jurisdictions that apply a continuous representation approach, several limit the application to instances in which the plaintiff/client lacks knowledge of the alleged malpractice prior to the termination of the attorney-client relationship. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Stover’s position. The court reasoned that statutes of limitations are legislative in character and that consideration of tolling doctrines, such as the continuous representation rule, is most appropriately viewed as an exercise in statutory construction. Notably, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Mr. Clark's argument was entirely policy-driven and that he pointed to nothing in the relevant statutes that would militate in favor of application of a continuous representation approach. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate balance should be determined by the General Assembly and affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Clark's legal malpractice claims. By refusing to adopt a different rule for legal malpractice cases, the decision in Clark has bolstered the public policy of prompt claim resolution and eliminated the prospect of a lawyer's indefinite liability for stale claims. As has historically been the case, the statutory period for a legal malpractice cause of action commences upon the happening of the alleged breach of duty and may only be tolled, in appropriate cases, by the discovery rule or the fraudulent concealment doctrine. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Clark confirms the long-standing rejection of the continuous representation rule in the Commonwealth and makes clear that attorneys will not be subjected to a more stringent statute of limitations than other professionals. *Ed is a shareholder in our Harrisburg, Pennsylvania office and can be reached at (717) 651-3700 or easchwartz@mdwcg.com. Kim is special counsel in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office. She can be reached at (215) 575-2707 or kaboyer-cohen@mdwcg.com. Nicole, a shareholder, works in our Harrisburg office and can be reached at (717) 651-3512 or nmehrhart@mdwcg.com. Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Refuses to Expand Lawyer Liability

January 6, 2021

On December 22, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an opinion in Clark v. Stover, _ A.3d _, 2020 WL 7502334 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2020), in which it refused to adopt the continuous representation rule to toll the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action. Under the continuous representation rule, the applicable statute of limitations would not begin to run until the date on which the attorney-client relationship is terminated. Kimberly A. Boyer-Cohen, special counsel in our Appellate Advocacy and Post-Trial Practice Group, was successful in defending that result before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. David Clark brought claims of professional negligence and breach of contract against Jeffrey Stover, Esquire, and his law firm. Mr. Stover had represented Mr. Clark in an underlying estate dispute in which Mr. Clark sought to contest the will of his deceased brother. Mr. Clark's claims in the underlying action were dismissed on November 10, 2009, and he admittedly learned of their dismissal within one week of the order. Mr. Stover subsequently appealed the decision in the underlying action on Mr. Clark's behalf, but the trial court's dismissal of the claims was affirmed on May 19, 2011, and allocatur was denied on May 16, 2012. Mr. Clark did not commence his action against Mr. Stover and the law firm until October 1, 2015, at which time he alleged Mr. Stover had failed to adequately prosecute the underlying action on his behalf. Upon Mr. Stover's motion, the common pleas court awarded summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that the claims were untimely and barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. In doing so, the trial court found that Mr. Clark was aware of the alleged negligence and the asserted breach more than four years before filing the malpractice action such that the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment doctrine did not apply. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed. The Superior Court also addressed Mr. Clark's request for adoption of the continuous representation rule to permit statutes of limitations for causes of action sounding in legal malpractice to be tolled until the attorney’s ongoing representation is complete. In rejecting Mr. Clark's request, the Superior court explained that it was bound by its previous rejection of the continuing representation rule in Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang, 839 A.2d 437, 442 (Pa. Super. 2003), aff’d per curiam, 881 A.2d 1266 (Pa. 2005). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently allowed discretionary appeal solely to consider whether to adopt the continuous representation rule. On appeal, Mr. Clark argued that strong policy justifications support the rule's implementation, including the client's entitlement to repose confidence in a lawyer's abilities, avoidance of disruption of attorney-client relationships and providing the opportunity for lawyers to cure mistakes before being sued. Mr. Clark also argued the continuing representation rule was favored by a majority of other jurisdictions. In response, Mr. Stover argued that adoption of the continuing representation rule would adversely impact the purpose of the statute of limitations "to expedite litigation and thus discourage delay and the presentation of stale claims which may greatly prejudice the defense of such claims." With regard to policy, Mr. Stover explained that the longer four-year statute of limitations which applies to legal malpractice claims sounding in contract, as well as the discovery rule and the fraudulent concealment doctrine, already provides substantial protections to plaintiffs. Furthermore, application of the continuous representation rule would also serve as a disincentive for lawyers to remain involved in matters to attempt to remediate difficulties which may arise during the course of legal representation. Finally, Mr. Stover highlighted that the rejection or refusal to adopt the continuous representation doctrine is in keeping with the approach of many other jurisdictions and pointed out that, of the jurisdictions that apply a continuous representation approach, several limit the application to instances in which the plaintiff/client lacks knowledge of the alleged malpractice prior to the termination of the attorney-client relationship. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the position of Mr. Stover. The court reasoned that statutes of limitations are legislative in character and consideration of tolling doctrines, such as the continuous representation rule, is most appropriately viewed as an exercise in statutory construction. Notably, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Mr. Clark's argument was entirely policy-driven and that he pointed to nothing in the relevant statutes that would militate in favor of application of a continuous representation approach. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate balance should be determined by the General Assembly and affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Clark's legal malpractice claims. By refusing to adopt a different rule for legal malpractice cases, the decision in Clark has bolstered the public policy of prompt claim resolution and eliminated the prospect of a lawyer's indefinite liability for stale claims. As has historically been the case, the statutory period for a legal malpractice cause of action commences upon the happening of the alleged breach of duty and may only be tolled, in appropriate cases, by the discovery rule or the fraudulent concealment doctrine. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Clark confirms the long-standing rejection of the continuous representation rule in the Commonwealth and makes clear that attorneys will not be subjected to a more stringent statute of limitations than other professionals.   The material in this law alert has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

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Firm Highlights

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Casey Alan Coyle Joins Marshall Dennehey's PA Appellate Practice as a Shareholder in Harrisburg and Philadelphia

News

Marshall Dennehey Expands Leading Pennsylvania Appellate Practice With Addition of Shareholder Casey Coyle

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

empty courtroom photo

Result

Summary Judgment Secured for Life Insurance Agent

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Portrait of Carolyn Schweizer, with text below: Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

News

Marshall Dennehey Names Carolyn Schweizer New Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney