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Jonathan C. Magpantay, CPCU

Portrait of Jonathan C. Magpantay CPCU

Jonathan is a member of the firm's Fraud and Special Investigation Unit (SIU) practice group. His practice is dedicated to large loss and medical provider fraud and has litigated and filed affirmative litigation recovery actions, as well as RICO, in many states as his practice is national. His practice also includes insurance coverage disputes, representing insurance carriers across multiple states for the purposes of SIU investigation and litigation, bad faith litigation, and general defense litigation. Jonathan has negotiated on behalf of the insurance industry his entire career as he seeks new ways to solve complex problems. He routinely advises clients on initiatives to modernize and administrate automobile first-party medical claims. In addition, he has taken Examinations Under Oath in private passenger auto, commercial and first party property matters throughout the country. He has broad and extensive experience in New Jersey Personal Injury Protection (PIP) litigation and appears regularly before the courts and administrative bodies. 

Before joining Marshall Dennehey, he was claim litigation counsel for a national insurance carrier where he handled PIP disputes, coverage matters, and automobile and fire claim litigation. There, Jonathan led review teams in assessing and evaluating ethics, best practices, and continuous improvement within national staff counsel operations.

Jonathan is admitted to practice in New Jersey, the District of Columbia, Michigan and the United States Supreme Court. He is a member of the Asian Pacific American Lawyers Association of New Jersey (APALA-NJ), National Filipino American Lawyers Association (NFALA), Camden County Bar Association and is currently a member of the New Jersey Superior Court, Camden Vicinage, Diversity, Inclusion & Community Engagement Committee (DI&CE). 

Additionally, Jonathan earned his Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriter (CPCU), Associate in Insurance Services (AIS), and Associate in Personal Insurance (API) designations from the American Institute of Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriters (The Institutes).

Jonathan received his B.A. and B.S. from the University of Pittsburgh and earned his J.D. from Rutgers University School of Law – Camden. He was Law Clerk to the Honorable Ronald J. Freeman, J.S.C. (ret.) in the civil division of the New Jersey Superior Court, Camden Vicinage. 

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 2006)
    • University of Pittsburgh
      • B.S. and B.A., 2002
    • New Jersey, 2008
    • District of Columbia, 2009
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • Supreme Court of the United States
    • Michigan, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan, 2024
    • Tagalog
    • Asian Pacific American Lawyers Association of New Jersey (APALA - NJ), 2010 - present
    • National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (NAPABA), 2012 - present
    • National Filipino American Lawyers Association, 2013 - present
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • Modern Staged Accidents & Provider Fraud, NICB Mid-Atlantic Region Training Event 2026, February 4, 2026  
    • Detecting Insurance Fraud: The Role of the Special Investigation Unit (SIU), New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education (NJICLE), Identifying and Handling Insurance Fraud Cases, April 2023
    • Coding Edits Revisited: A Perspective from Both Sides, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education (NJICLE), 2022 PIP No Fault College, December 2022
    • Things That Make You Go Hmmmm: A Closer Look at Trending Off-Schedule Medical Procedures in NJ PIP and their Impact on Claims Handling and Investigations, Speaker, New Jersey Special Investigators Association (NJSIA) Annual Conference, Atlantic City, NJ, October 2021
    • Associate in Insurance Services (AIS), The American Institute of Casualty and Property Underwriters, 2019
    • Chartered Property Casualty Underwriter (CPCU), The American Institute of Casualty and Property Underwriters, 2016
    • Project Management Certificate, Rutgers University School of Business-Camden, 2011
    • Associate in Personal Insurance (API)
    • Tagalog
    • Past President, Philippine Community of Southern New Jersey, Inc.

Thought Leadership

SIU Spotlight

Changes in Insurance Fraud Law Takes Case for a Ride

July 1, 2024

The unpublished case of Settler v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2023 WL 5157685, illustrates the impact of evolving case law and changes in insurance fraud litigation in the state of Michigan. In Settler, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2017. The plaintiff sought no-fault benefits from his insurance carrier and submitted an application for benefits. The application contained material misrepresentations regarding the nature of the plaintiff’s injuries. Moreover, the plaintiff continued to make material misrepresentations through statements and related documents during the claims process. Three months after the plaintiff submitted his application for benefits, formal litigation against the defendant insurance carrier for no-fault benefits commenced.  At the trial level, the insurance carrier sought summary judgment, asserting that under the fraud provision of the insurance policy, it was entitled to deny coverage because the plaintiff made numerous fraudulent statements with respect to the accident, his prior medical history and his need for attendant-care services. The trial court concluded that the fraud provision of the insurance policy was enforceable against the plaintiff, granting the defendant’s motion based on the plaintiff’s submission of attendant-care forms, which the trial court concluded contained fraudulent statements about services needed or performed. The plaintiff appealed, arguing the defendant was not entitled to deny all coverage on the basis of the purported fraud in the attendant-care forms. On appeal, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred when it granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition as to all of the plaintiff’s claims because, under Meemic Ins. Co. v. Fortson, 506 Mich. 287; 954 N.W.2d 115 (2020), an insurer may only void the policy when the fraud is committed when procuring the policy. In addition, the appellate court noted that under Haydaw v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 332 Mich. App. 719; 957 N.W.2d 858 (2020), a defendant could not rely on allegedly fraudulent statements made by the plaintiff in his attendant-care forms because the “statements” were made after the litigation commenced. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s order for summary judgement and remanded for the trial court to render a decision consistent with the framework set forth in Meemic and Haydaw, which were decided after the trial court rendered its decision.  On remand, the trial court granted the defendant insurance carrier’s renewed motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff argued that the trial court erred since the application for benefits was post-procurement and any such fraud cannot form a basis to dismiss the entire claim. The appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s argument and found the trial court’s decision consistent with Meemic and Haydaw. The appellate court found that, regardless of whether the plaintiff’s application for benefits is considered pre- or post-procurement, there was no dispute that the application was submitted to the defendant before litigation commenced. Thus, even if the application was considered post-procurement, the defendant was still entitled to deny coverage on the basis of the purported fraud. The defendant was not entitled to void the policy as a result of the plaintiff’s application for benefits, but it was entitled to deny the claims that flowed from it. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it concluded that the plaintiff’s application for benefits could serve as a basis for the defendant’s fraud defense and denial of coverage. As seen in Settler, the framework of Meemic and Haydaw created nuance and potential limiting factors as to when a fraud defense can be asserted. Now more than ever, claim analysis and strategic discovery are critical. The added complexity requires insurance carriers to diligently investigate and ascertain the basis of potential fraud defenses in order to navigate a legal landscape that is constantly evolving.  Jonathan is a member of the firm’s Fraud and Special Investigation Unit (SIU) Practice Group. His practice is dedicated to large loss and medical provider fraud and he has litigated and filed affirmative litigation recovery actions multiple states and jurisdictions. He is admitted to practice in Michigan, New Jersey, and District of Columbia.     SIU Spotlight, Issue 1, Vol. 1, July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.