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James is an experienced litigator with over fifteen years of experience. During the course of his career James has represented design professionals in a wide variety of construction law matters, including construction defect, delay and personal injury claims. In addition, he has represented design professionals in fee disputes and is also available to assist in contract review as a pre-emptive measure to avoid potential litigation. James comes from a proud family of engineers dating back to his grandfather who worked with Robert Moses in designing and building Jones Beach on Long Island. Prior to becoming a lawyer, James worked at his father's engineering firm assisting on numerous highway and roadway projects throughout the New York metropolitan area.

James also has vast experience in representing design professionals, owners, contractors and subcontractors in New York State Labor Law matters. Where possible, James obtains early resolution of all claims by way of obtaining voluntary discontinuances or by motion practice. If an early resolution cannot be achieved, James has the skill and know how to vigorously defend all claims up to an including mediation and trial.

When James is not busy representing the interests of his clients, he enjoys spending time with family, attending his son's baseball games, swimming and surfing.

    • Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University (J.D., 2001)
    • State University of New York at Albany (B.A., 1997)
    • New York, 2002
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2002
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2002
    • American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC)
    • “A Fall in the Right Direction: The Court of Appeals Requires More Than Just a Fall to Show a Violation of New York Labor Law § 240,” Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

A Fall in the Right Direction: The Court of Appeals Requires More Than Just a Fall to Show a Violation of New York Labor Law § 240

December 1, 2022

Key Points: New York Labor Law § 240 imposes strict liability against owners and contractors for height-related accidents. In Cutaia, the Court of Appeals now requires that plaintiffs prove that a ladder is defective or failed, and that it is the cause of an accident. Plaintiffs must do more than show that a fall occurred to prove a violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1). As you may be aware, New York Labor Law § 240 imposes strict liability against owners and contractors for height-related accidents. New York Labor Law § 240(1), also known as the scaffold law, provides in relevant part: All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed. Cases in New York State involving falls from a ladder have persistently proven to be arduous claims to defend against. Significantly, plaintiffs’ attorneys have relied on prior rulings that established that, if a ladder fails in some manner (i.e., it moved, shifted or swayed) because it was unsecured, then it was inherently inadequate to perform the work and, therefore, the use of the ladder was a per se violation of New York Labor Law § 240. When being faced with case of a fall from a ladder, defense counsel faces a seemingly insurmountable task of succeeding on liability. But wait—all hope is not yet lost. In the recent decision of Cutaia v. Board of Managers of the 160.170 Varick Ste. Codo., 190 N.E.3d 28 (N.Y. 2022), the Court of Appeals held that questions of fact existed regarding whether “the ladder failed to provide the proper protection,” whether the “plaintiff should have been provided with additional safety devices,” and whether the ladder’s purported inadequacy or the absence of additional safety devices was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident. In Cutaia, the plaintiff was using a ladder to cut and re-route ceiling pipes. Due to space limitations, the plaintiff leaned an A-frame ladder in its closed position against the wall. During the course of his work, he was electrocuted and fell from the ladder. The plaintiff had no recollection of whether the ladder had failed thereby precipitating his fall. The Appellate Division, First Department, like its brethren before it, held that the failure to properly secure the ladder was the precise foreseeable elevation-related risk against which Section 240(1) was designed to protect. Accordingly, the use of the ladder was a per se violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1). In a departure from the long-standing proposition that a fall from a non-defective ladder in and of itself is a violation of the Labor Law, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, holding that “questions of fact exist[ed] as to whether ‘the ladder failed to provide proper protection,’ and whether ‘plaintiff should have been provided with additional safety devices.’” In simple terms, the court questioned whether the ladder itself was defective, and required more than just a showing of a fall to prove a violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Cutaia appears to be a welcome lifeline to the defense bar. Hopefully, gone are the days of plaintiffs’ counsels’ reliance upon the mere use of a ladder to support and prove a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. After the Cutaia decision, plaintiffs’ counsel will now need to establish that the ladder was defective or failed in some manner, or that it was not the proper device to accomplish a task. Notably, the fact that the ladder shifted, moved or swayed is not enough to show a violation. The long-established principles of proximate cause will once again become a factor in deciding whether a fall from a ladder is a violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1). Plaintiffs will need to show that the ladder was defective. Defense counsel may now establish that the plaintiff failed to properly secure or set up the ladder, and argue that, since the ladder was not defective, liability should not attach.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.