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David J. Fagnilli

Portrait of David J. Fagnilli

David is a member of the casualty department handling matters involving products liability, trucking and transportation, automobile liability, premises liability, construction accidents, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage and personal injury. He has represented insureds in business disputes, construction claims, complex litigation and business arbitrations. David has also handled litigation concerning defamation, contractor claims, property use disputes, and commercial and business property losses. He has extensive experience negotiating favorable settlements independently and through mediation and other forms of ADR.

Additional areas of practice include insurance coverage, contract interpretation and analysis for first- and third-party claims; appellate advocacy and post-trial practice and defense of coverage disputes and bad faith lawsuits involving commercial general liability, commercial property, commercial vehicle, umbrella, auto and homeowners’ policies; and claims for environmental damage, asbestos and other toxic torts.

David is admitted to practice in all Ohio Courts, all Federal District Courts in Ohio, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. David is a life member of the Eighth District Judicial Conference. He is a member of the American, Ohio State, Cleveland Metropolitan, and Lake County Bar Associations, the Defense Research Institute, the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, the Cleveland Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, the Claims & Litigation Management Alliance, and the Justinian Forum.

A shareholder with an AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell rating,  David has also been selected by his peers as an "Ohio Super Lawyer" annually since 2010, as published in Cincinnati Magazine and Northern Ohio Live Magazine. Since 2009, he has been listed in The Best Lawyers in America©.

David received his B.A. from Southern California College in 1980, and his juris doctor from Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in 1985.

    • Cleveland State University College of Law (J.D., 1986)
    • Vanguard University of Southern California (B.A., 1980)
    • Ohio, 1986
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit
    • Supreme Court of the United States
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Insurance Law (2009-2027)
    • Ohio Super Lawyers (2010-2020)
    • American Bar Association
    • Cleveland Association of Civil Trial Attorneys
    • Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Justinian Forum
    • Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys
    • Ohio State Bar Association
    • Insurer, Adjuster and Agent and Broker Liability: A - Z, National Business Institute, August 26, 2016, presenter
    • Ten Commandments of Working with Expert Witnesses, June 13, 2013, CLM Transportation Conference, panelist
    • Anatomy of a Complex CGL Claim, Additional Insureds – Ohio Anti-Indemnity Statute, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, November 2, 2012
    • Insurance Law from Basic to Advanced – Claims Handling Process, Akron Bar Association October 30, 2012
    • What Civil Court Judges Want You to Know, National Business Institute, November 4, 2011, moderator
    • Ohio Tort and Insurance Case Law Update, Akron Claims Association, April 14, 2010
    • Insurance Law in Ohio, Lorman Educational Services, March 21, 2003, co-author and presenter
    • Insurance Law in Ohio: Third Party Coverage in Ohio, National Business Institute, March 14, 1996, co-author and presenter
    • "Ohio Supreme Court Holds That General Contractor’s CGL Insurer Is Not Obligated to Defend Suit Alleging Subcontractor’s Faulty Workmanship," Legal Updates for Coverage & Bad Faith, March 2019
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2018-present
    • Ohio Construction Insurance Law; Policyholder and Insurer Perspective on Custom Agri, Bar Journal of the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, February 2013, coauthor
    • A.M. Best Ohio Digest of Insurance Law, Editor 2012-present

Results

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Coverage & Bad Faith

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

July 27, 2026

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Legal Updates for Coverage & Bad Faith

Ohio Supreme Court Clarifies Rule on Attorney-Client Privilege and Communications Between Insurer and Its Outside Counsel

February 27, 2026

On February 26, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued an opinion in Eddy v. Farmer’s Property Cas. Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-626, clarifying the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine in relationship to claims for alleged bad faith against an insurer.  In a 5-2 decision, the court held that the 2007 amendments to R.C. 2317.02(A)(2), the Ohio attorney-client privilege statute, supersede the court’s prior decision in Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 2001-Ohio-27.  In Boone, the court had held that: In an action alleging bad faith denial of insurance coverage, the insured is entitled to discovery claims file materials containing attorney-client communications related to the issue of coverage that were created prior to the denial of coverage. The Boone decision allowed plaintiffs to allege bad faith, and then obtain pre-suit claims file materials that might otherwise be covered by the attorney-client or work product privilege. The court’s decision in Eddy clarifies and reestablishes the attorney-client and work product privileges for insurers. The court, relying on post-Boone revisions to R.C. 2317.02, determined that those revisions abrogated the Boone decision. The court specifically held that: [P]rivileged documents may only be disclosed upon a prima facie showing of bad faith, and then only if they “are related to the attorney’s aiding or furthering an ongoing or future commission of bad faith by the client” as determined through an in camera inspection.  Questions about work-product doctrine are controlled by Civ.R. 26(B)(4): such materials may only be disclosed upon a “showing of good cause.” Eddy at ¶ 40. This issue has been extensively litigated for the past 20 years, and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision should bring clarity to the issue and instruction for lower courts in dealing with bad faith claims and discovery issues as they relate to an insurer’s claim file materials and communication with counsel.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.