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David E. Williamson

Portrait of David E. Williamson

Dave is an experienced civil litigator and trial lawyer, handling a wide range of claims over the course of his career. His practice includes defending insurance company clients in disputes with insureds, other insurers, and claimants. Those cases involve questions about whether coverage is available for a claim, the value of the claim, the priority of multiple coverages, and whether the insurer acted in bad faith in its handling of the claim.

Dave also defends clients in general liability cases, in which a party claims to have suffered bodily injury, property damage, etc., as a result of the negligent acts or omissions of another – including complex bodily injury cases.  He has also handled cases in federal court defending a variety of claims asserted against cities, counties, and municipalities. Other areas of his practice include transportation law, environmental litigation, workplace injury claims, property disputes, grade crossing accident cases, interactions with local municipalities, medical malpractice cases - defending doctors and other health care providers, as well as a variety of commercial litigation involving disputes between businesses.

As managing attorney of the Cincinnati office, Dave oversees the day-to-day operations for the entire office, ensuring that client matters are handled promptly, professionally and effectively.

Dave received his juris doctor from Salmon P. Chase College of Law in 1999, after completing his undergraduate work at Hanover College in 1995. He is admitted in both state and federal courts in the state of Ohio and Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Dave is married with two sons. He is active in his community and currently serves on the Executive Board of Oak Hills Youth Athletics.

    • NKU Salmon P. Chase College of Law (J.D., 1999)
    • Hanover College (B.A., 1995)
    • Ohio, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio, 2004
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit, 2008
    • Kentucky, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Kentucky, 2013
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Kentucky, 2021
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2025)
    • Cincinnati Bar Association
    • Kentucky Bar Association
    • Northern Kentucky Bar Association
    • Ohio State Bar Association
    • Obtained summary judgment for a local city against a plaintiff’s claim for violation of civil rights. The plaintiff claimed the City of Fairfield and its police department violated his civil rights by improperly evicting him, forcing him to abandon the home where he had been living, and his personal property that he was forced to leave behind. He also claimed they threatened him with arrest and physical harm. We first obtained a dismissal of the police department on grounds that it was not the proper party. We then moved for summary judgment as to the claims against the city based on the evidence—the body cam footage from the responding officers—and political subdivision immunity. The court granted our motion for summary judgment based upon immunity from performing a police function and the plaintiff's failure to prove the city had adopted any custom or practice that violated his civil rights.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an insurance company client in a bad-faith case pending in Jefferson Circuit Court in Louisville, Kentucky.  

Results

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Ohio Supreme Court Rules Trial Courts Must Apply Specific Standards Before Ordering Disclosure of Privileged Claims Files

April 1, 2026

In an insurance bad faith action, a trial court may order production of an insurer’s claims file documents that are asserted to be protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine without first complying with R.C. 2317.02(A)(2) and Civ.R. 26(B)(4). The plaintiffs, the Eddys, were injured in a 2020 automobile accident and pursued underinsured motorist benefits from their insurer, Farmers. After litigation over coverage was resolved and Farmers paid the policy limits, the Eddys filed a separate bad faith lawsuit, alleging Farmers unreasonably delayed settlement. During discovery, the trial court ordered Farmers to produce its entire claims file, including attorney communications and litigation related materials, without conducting an in-camera review. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the Ohio Supreme Court’s prior decision in Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co. (2001), which had allowed discovery of certain pre-denial claims file materials in bad faith cases. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, and held Boone had been superseded by statute. Specifically, the court held that discovery of attorney-client communications and work product materials in insurer bad faith cases was governed by R.C. § 2317.02(A)(2) and Civ.R. 26(B)(4), both of which require specific threshold showings and judicial review. Specifically, the court held that privileged insurer-attorney communications may be disclosed only after: the insured makes a prima facie showing of bad faith, and the trial court conducts an in camera inspection to determine whether the communications relate to an attorney’s aiding or furthering ongoing or future bad faith conduct. Importantly, the court ruled that allegations of bad faith alone are insufficient to overcome the privilege. The court further held that claims file materials prepared in anticipation of litigation are presumptively protected. Disclosure of those materials is only permitted upon a showing of good cause. This protection applies to information generated during or in anticipation of litigation, not merely to attorney testimony. Finally, the court held that in-camera review of the disputed documents is mandatory, i.e., a trial court must conduct an in-camera inspection of any disputed documents before ordering production of file materials when privilege or work product protection is asserted. The Eddy decision establishes stronger privilege protections for insurers in Ohio bad faith litigation. It eliminates reliance on the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Boone as a standalone basis for compelled production of claims file materials. Trial courts must now follow a structured, statute-based analysis before ordering disclosure, providing clearer guidance and greater predictability for discovery disputes in insurance bad faith cases.

Case Law Alerts

Ohio Supreme Court Enforces Broad Arbitration Clause in Insurance Policy, Extending to Bad Faith Claims

January 1, 2026

In this medical malpractice lawsuit filed against an emergency services provider, the insurer for the provider assigned counsel and undertook a defense on behalf of the provider. The insurer and provider then disagreed about strategy in the lawsuit and whether the claim should be settled. The provider decided to self-fund a settlement of the malpractice lawsuit in order to avoid receiving an excess verdict. The provider then sued the insurer in Ohio for bad faith claim handling, seeking reimbursement of the amount it paid in the self-funded settlement. The insurer then invoked the policy’s arbitration clause in the bad faith lawsuit. The provider argued the arbitration clause did not apply to a bad faith claim. The policy originally contained an arbitration clause which provided that “any dispute between” the insurer and provider relating to the policy—including any disputes regarding the insurer’s extra-contractual obligations—would be resolved by binding arbitration.” That arbitration provision was then superseded by a change endorsement which stated: “Any dispute between [provider] and [insurer] relating to this Policy (including any disputes regarding [insurer’s] contractual obligations) will be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures of the American Arbitration Association.” The Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio law is strongly in favor of arbitration, and that if an arbitration clause is broad, all doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitration. Further, even though bad faith claims are torts in Ohio, the court adopted the reasoning of a federal court, which held that “real torts can be covered by arbitration clauses if the allegations of underlying the claims ‘touch matters’ covered by the [policy]." The court held the provider failed to show any express exclusion of bad faith claims from arbitration. Nothing in the change endorsement showed an intent to expressly exclude legal disputes regarding bad faith insurance claim handling from arbitration. The decision is important to the extent that broad arbitration clauses in insurance policies will be enforced even for tort claims alleging bad faith (and “creative pleading”—identifying something as a tort instead of a contractual claim—will not avoid arbitration when the dispute is related to the policy.)

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirmed Workers’ Compensation Order Striking Defenses and Ordering Treatment

Kneezel v. Lambertville House, No. A-2729-24 (June 1, 2026) In Kneezel v. Lambertville House, Lambertville House appealed from a workers’ compensation order to strike its defenses and directing it to authorize knee replacement surgery. By way of background, the petitioner worked as a property manager for Lambertville and injured his back and knee in December 2019. A workers’ compensation claim was filed and the petitioner treated at Rothman Institute. He underwent four injections to his low back and was recommended for surgery. The day before, Lambertville canceled and set up a second opinion exam with Dr. Lawrence Barr. The petitioner filed a motion for medical and temporary benefits (MMT), which was ultimately granted by the workers’ compensation judge. As such, he received authorized treatment for his back. The petitioner was then referred for his left knee pain and treatment was provided by Lambertville. He was recommended for a knee replacement, but the petitioner declined at that time. Approximately two years later, he sought additional treatment, which was denied. After obtaining a report from Dr. Dhimant Balar, the petitioner filed another MMT. In response, Lambertville submitted Dr. Zachwieja’s report and surveillance reports. Dr. Balar opined the left knee injury was related to the work accident, whereas Dr. Zachwieja believed it was due to his advanced degeneration as there was no evidence of acute trauma. A hearing on the MMT began in November 2024, with the petitioner testifying his knee pain never went away and he had a lot of trouble walking, especially for more than five to ten minutes. The surveillance investigators were scheduled to testify after, but had to be rescheduled a couple of times. During a conference in early February 2025, prior to when the investigators were to testify, it was discovered that Lambertville did not provide discovery to the petitioner, including the investigators’ information and surveillance footage. The petitioner moved to strike Lambertville’s defenses and sought an order to authorize the left knee treatment. Petitioner’s counsel pointed to Lambertville’s unreasonable delay in providing the necessary information and Lambertville did not file an opposition. In March 2025, the investigators’ testimonies were set for mid-March. On March 14, 2025, petitioner’s counsel advised she was still waiting for discovery and the judge directed Lambertville’s counsel to provide any missing information by March 17, 2025. Lambertville provided video clips after the petitioner had testified so the judge indicated that if everything was not provided to petitioner’s counsel by the end of March 19, 2025, the judge would sign the order granting the MMT. The next day, the judge entered the order striking Lambertville’s defenses and ordering left knee treatment. Lambertville moved for reconsideration of stay of the order pending appeal. Following oral arguments, the judge denied Lambertville’s motion, citing N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.11 (a)(4)(i) that Lambertville was required to provide surveillance after the petitioner’s testimony and that it had failed to do so even after he testified in November 2024. The judge also noted the investigators’ testimonies were rescheduled multiple times and Lambertville had more than enough time to provide the requested information and failed to do so. The judge also noted Lambertville failed to file a response to the petitioner’s motion to strike. In addition, the judge pointed to the petitioner’s testimony, finding him to be credible and observing him to have to stand and move multiple times during testimony. Lambertville appealed, arguing its due process rights were violated as there was no opportunity to be heard and the order was procedurally and factually defective. However, the Appellate Division disagreed, noting Lambertville had sufficient notice and many opportunities to be heard. It was noted Lambertville’s failure to comply with the judge’s requests led to the order. As for the motion to strike, the Appellate Division indicated Lambertville failed to oppose the motion, which provided the judge with the ability to decide without a hearing for an uncontested motion. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judge’s rulings and order.

Thought Leadership

Mitigating Long-Tail Liability: Delaware Court Reaffirms Five-Year Workers’ Compensation Deadline

Williamson v. Donald F. Deaven, Inc., No. N25A-07-004 FWW, 2026 LX 252526 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) Claimant was involved in a compensable industrial work accident on May 12, 1995, for a low back injury.  Following this, he received compensation for temporary total disability benefits from July 1996 to September 1996 and for sustaining a permanent impairment in 1997 and 1998. For the next 23 years, the claimant continued treatment and paid his own medical bills without submitting them to the employer’s insurer. In November 2021, the claimant filed a petition seeking payment for medical expenses, including prospective surgery and a resulting period of total disability. The employer moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was barred by Delaware’s five-year statute of limitations (19 Del. C. § 2361(b)). Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3914, insurers must provide prompt written notice of the applicable statute of limitations to invoke the five-year deadline. Due to the age of the case, neither party had a comprehensive file of the claim and the Board had archived its file of the matter. The carrier’s computer system retained only bare information indicating that payments occurred and agreements and receipts were filed with the Board in 1997. While the claimant argued that the employer could not prove it provided the mandatory statutory notice, the Hearing Officer recovered the archived file, which contained two “Receipts for Compensation Paid” signed by the claimant. The receipts explicitly contained the required five-year limitation language, which the claimant testified to signing at the hearing. The claimant also attempted to introduce evidence of payments he claimed the employer made, which would have extended the statute of limitations. As a preliminary matter, the hearing officer excluded the testimony about the payments because the claimant did not produce them to the employer. The Board found in favor of the employer and dismissed the claimant’s petition as time-barred. The claimant appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that he never received adequate notice of the statute of limitations and that the hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the archived, signed receipts constituted substantial evidence that the insurer fulfilled its statutory notice requirements. Therefore, the claimant’s petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361(b). Furthermore, the Court reinforced strict procedural compliance: it rejected the claimant’s attempts to introduce evidence of payment on appeal, ruling the argument was waived for failure to preserve it while the matter was still before the Board. This recent ruling by the Court underscores the importance and necessity of robust data preservation and precise compliance with notice requirements. For risk managers, employers, and insurers, the decision highlights how tight administrative execution protects against catastrophic long-tail liability.

Thought Leadership

Employer/Carriers Must Explicitly Invoke Right to Deny Claim Under “Pay and Investigate” Statutory Provision; Employes Must Always Prove Medical Necessity of Treatment

Koren v. City of Kissimmee/PGCS, ___So.3d___(Fla 1st DCA 6/10/26) The majority opinion in Koren holds that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) properly denied psychiatric treatment because the claimant did not challenge on appeal the JCC’s finding that the requested treatment was not medically necessary. However, Judge K. Thomas authored a detailed concurrence agreeing with the result on the ground that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving medical necessity. In doing so, Judge K. Thomas also emphasized an important principle: employer/carriers must expressly invoke the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act if they intend to preserve their right to deny compensability. Merely authorizing evaluations, without explicitly invoking the 120-day rule, may be insufficient to preserve the right to deny compensability of specific injuries. In Koren, the claimant sustained injuries to his upper lip, tooth, right knee, and right foot when a board gave way on a deck he was repairing for the employer/carrier. The accident was accepted as compensable, and multiple specialists were authorized to treat his physical injuries, including an ear, nose, and throat physician, dentist, orthopedist, and plastic surgeon. The claimant later sought psychiatric treatment and attended an independent medical examination (IME) with a psychiatrist. The IME diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, opining that the condition was caused by “the actual appearance of the scar” resulting from the industrial accident. The IME recommended continued medication, including an antidepressant, as well as follow-up care with a psychiatrist and psychologist. Critically, however, the IME did not offer an opinion regarding the medical necessity of this treatment. The claimant then filed a petition for benefits attaching the IME report and requesting authorization of psychiatric care. The employer/carrier responded by authorizing a psychiatrist, whom the claimant did, in fact, see. However, the employer/carrier neither denied the claim nor issued written notice invoking the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision. The authorized psychiatrist subsequently opined that the claimant’s psychiatric condition was unrelated to the industrial accident and instead attributable to prior employment as a law enforcement officer and volunteer firefighter. The psychiatrist further concluded that the work accident was not the major contributing cause of the condition. Although the employer/carrier stipulated to the authorization of the psychiatrist, it ultimately denied the claimant’s entitlement to psychiatric treatment. The JCC denied the requested benefit. The majority opinion affirmed on the narrow ground that medical necessity had not been established. Judge K. Thomas’s concurrence, however, expands on the legal framework. Under Florida law, an employer/carrier presented with a claim must “pay, pay and investigate, or deny.” To avail itself of the 120-day pay-and-investigate protection, the employer/carrier must affirmatively and explicitly invoke that option, typically through a written 120-day letter. The statutory investigative period does not arise automatically upon the provision of care. Furthermore, an attempt to characterize authorization as a “one-time evaluation” does not avoid waiver, as even a single evaluation may constitute the provision of a compensable benefit. By authorizing psychiatric care without invoking the 120-day provision, the employer/carrier in Koren effectively accepted compensability of the claimant’s PTSD condition. Nonetheless, it retained the ability to contest entitlement to ongoing treatment. While the employer/carrier failed to demonstrate a break in the causal chain, the claimant still bore the burden of proving that the requested treatment was medically necessary. Because the JCC found that the claimant failed to meet this burden, and the claimant did not challenge that finding either below or on appeal, the denial of psychiatric benefits was ultimately affirmed.