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Christopher W. Woodward

Portrait of Christopher Woodward

Christopher is a member of the Professional Liability Department where his practice is focused on insurance coverage and bad faith litigation. As an experienced litigator, he has developed a deep understanding of insurance policy and coverage issues arising from commercial, personal, and specialty property and casualty policies, professional liability policies, health/life policies and workers’ compensation policies.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Christopher worked as a senior claims examiner where he dealt with coverage issues and the management of professional liability lawsuits with a focus on municipalities. This experience has provided Christopher with a unique perspective in understanding the tactics utilized by plaintiffs to leverage settlement issues both before and during litigation, as well as analyzing available coverage, responses to civil remedy notices, pre-suit investigations and coverage evaluations. Christopher also presents seminars to clients about issues in the insurance coverage and bad faith practice area.

In 2009 Christopher graduated from Penn State University, earning a Bachelor of Arts degree in English. He later attended Widener University School of Law where he earned his juris doctor, magna cum laude, in 2013.

During his time in law school, Christopher was a senior staff member of the Widener Law Journal, which published his survey analyzing a Pennsylvania Supreme Court administrative law decision in its Spring 2013 issue. Christopher also held an internship for the Pennsylvania Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund and clerked for the local staff defense counsel of a national insurance company.

    • Widener University Commonwealth Law School (J.D., magna cum laude, 2013)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 2009)
    • Pennsylvania, 2013
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • Cumberland County Bar Association
    • Dauphin County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Untying Tangled Titles – How Property Insurance Drives Fraud, Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority (IFPA) Conference, Pocono Manor, PA, April 27, 2023
    • Untying Tangled Titles – How To Recognize How Property Title Issues Drive Fraud, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June, 2022 
    • PIP in PA: Questions & Answers, Client Webinar, December 2020
    • "'Regular Use Exclusions' Stand: Pa. Supreme Court's Latest Ruling Post-'Gallagher',"The Legal Intelligencer Insurance Law Supplement, August 20, 2024
    • “Your Residence Is Not Necessarily Where You Live,” Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022
    • "Pa. Ruling Leaves Auto Policy Stacking Questions,"Law360, November 10, 2021
    • “Just How Hard Does Gallagher Hit the Household Vehicle Exclusion?,” Defense Digest, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2019
    • “The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Clarifies the Standard that Courts Must Use When Considering Claims Made for Insurance Bad Faith Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371,” Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 2018
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2016-present
    • "PA Superior Court Decision Means Bad Faith Claims May Live to See Another Day, Rancosky v. Washington National Insurance Co., 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 822, 2015 PA Super 264 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2015)," Legal Updates for Insurance Coverage and Bad Faith, March 3, 2016

Results

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Court Finds Fatal Shooting “Arises Out of” Vehicle Use for UIM Coverage

April 1, 2026

In this tragic case, James Hunt was stopped at a red light while driving a vehicle owned by his employer when he was accidentally shot and killed by the operator of another vehicle stopped at the red light, heading in the same direction. The accidental shooter was attempting to unload a firearm which he kept in his glove compartment. The employer-owned van that Hunt was operating at the time of his killing was insured by Allmerica Financial Benefit Insurance Company with non-stacked underinsured motorist limits of $1,000,000.00. Hunt’s family reached a settlement with the shooter’s auto insurer and demanded the UIM policy limits from Allmerica. Allmerica disclaimed the Hunts’ UIM claim and filed a declaratory action. The Eastern District was then tasked with Allmercia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings wherein it argued that Hunt’s death did not result from the ownership, maintenance, or use of an underinsured motor vehicle, which is required for Allmerica to pay UIM benefits, per their policy. Allmerica argued that “result from” is a proximate causation standard for the payments of UIM benefits. In response, the Hunts argued that Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law codified a “but for” causal standard for the payment of UIM benefits where it requires UIM coverage “provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . . .” Determining that the Allmerica policy language directly contradicts the MVFRL mandate, the Eastern District applied a “but for” standard to determine if UIM coverage applied. After an extensive review of precedent, the Eastern District determined that, since the shooter’s vehicle was being used to transport himself and the firearm to and from work, and since the discharge of his weapon was the result of negligent and unintentional conduct, the shooter’s use of his vehicle was the “but for” cause of the death of Hunt.

Case Law Alerts

Court Confirms UIM Claimants Must Qualify as an ‘Insured’ Under the Policy Insuring Their Employer’s Vehicles in Order to Stack Their Personal Auto UIM Policy

January 1, 2026

While in the course and scope of his employment and while operating a vehicle owned by his employer, Russo was injured in a motor vehicle accident. He submitted a claim for and obtained underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits from the insurer of his employer’s vehicle. Russo next submitted a claim for UIM benefits under his personal auto insurance policy, issued by Erie. Erie denied the claim based upon the regular use exclusion. Litigation ensued, with the trial court ultimately finding in Erie’s favor as a result of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch., where the court found that the regular use exclusion remained valid and enforceable. Russo appealed to the Superior Court, which upheld the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that Russo was owed no UIM coverage under his personal auto policy issued by Erie, albeit on different grounds. The court first reiterated that Section 1738 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (regarding the stacking of uninsured and UIM benefits) states: “[w]hen more than one vehicle is insured under one or more policies providing uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, the stated limit for uninsured or underinsured coverage shall apply separately to each vehicle so insured. The limits of coverages available under this subchapter for an insured shall be the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured. Russo argued that he was an “insured” of the auto policy issued to his employer, which provided coverage for the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident. Erie argued that “insured” is a term of art and is limited to only “class one insureds,” who are the named insureds, resident relatives of the named insured and, if the named insured is a corporation, officers of the corporation. The court reiterated that a claimant must be an insured under both policies implicated in a stacking situation in order to effectuate inter-policy stacking of UM/UIM insurance. The Superior Court ultimately held that Russo was not an insured under the policy issued to his employer and, therefore, was unable to stack his personal auto policy and no benefits were owed by Erie. In its conclusion, the court stated: “[s]imply receiving UIM coverage for injuries sustained as an occupant in a first priority vehicle does not make one an ‘insured’ under the vehicle’s policy who is then entitled to stack one’s personal auto policy UIM coverage.” UIM stacking cases often involve claimants operating or occupying their employers’ vehicles. This case is a reminder to confirm that the claimant qualifies as an insured under the employer’s policy and as statutory defined by Section 1738 before stacking of their personal policies can apply. This reminder should also extend to claimants operating or occupying any non-owned motor vehicle.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.