Chris is a shareholder in the Casualty Department where he concentrates his practice mostly in the areas of product liability, admiralty and maritime litigation, and aviation litigation. He previously served as Chair of the firm's Executive Committee Advisory Council.
In the area of product liability, Chris primarily defends the manufacturers and distributors of tools, automatic doors, machinery, and other heavy industrial equipment.
As Co-Chair of the Maritime Litigation Practice, Chris handles maritime personal injury defense cases, including recreational boating cases, marine construction cases, cases involving the Jones Act and Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, and maritime product liability matters. He also handles cargo matters, including those involving warehouses and transportation brokers. Other maritime experience includes claims involving allisions, collisions, groundings, shipboard fires, and marine insurance disputes.
As Co-Chair of the Aviation and Complex Litigation Practice, Chris has experience representing airports in aircraft crash cases, as well as representing a flight training provider and one of its pilots. He also has experience handling matters on behalf of a major airline, including baggage and ticket disputes, and claims involving travel agencies. Through his experiences with these matters, he has gained knowledge about airport operations, flight operations, manufacture of aircraft and engine components, aircraft repair and maintenance, Federal Air Regulations and FAA oversight. Chris is also a member of the Aviation Insurance Association, as well as a member of the Insurance Law Global Aviation Subgroup.
Chris graduated with honors from Villanova University with a bachelor's degree in Political Science. He obtained his juris doctor from Brooklyn Law School.
Chris has been recognized for the last several years as a New York Metro and New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star.
Chris is admitted to practice in New York, New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and he actively handles litigation in all of those jurisdictions.
Results
Claims Dismissed in Marine Construction NY Labor Law Case
Our team successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction NY Labor Law case pending in Supreme Court Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, which was a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case. They sought contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client causing the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found that there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused in whole or in part the injuries the plaintiff sustained.
Successful Defense of Marine Construction New York Labor Law Case
Marshall Dennehey successfully obtained summary judgment, dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction New York Labor Law case in the Supreme Court in Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case, all seeking contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client in causing the injuries sustained to the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused, in whole or in part, the injuries the plaintiff sustained. The plaintiff and general contractor filed motions to reargue, which were denied.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
U.S. Supreme Court Held that Choice-of-Law Clauses in Maritime Contracts Are Presumptively Enforceable Under Federal Maritime Law
April 1, 2024
On February 21, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, held that choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, subject to two narrow exceptions: (1) when the chosen law would contravene a controlling federal statute or established federal maritime policy; or (2) when the contracting parties cannot show any reasonable basis for the chosen jurisdiction. The second exception must be applied with “substantial deference to the contracting parties.” Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, Case No. 22-500, Slip Op. at 10-11 (Feb. 21, 2024). The Court stated that “the uniformity and predictability resulting from choice-of-law provisions are especially important for marine insurance contracts given that marine insurance is ‘an integral of virtually every maritime transaction, and maritime commerce is a vital part of the nation’s economy.’” Id. at 9 (quoting M. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine Insurance: A Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J. Mar. L. & Com. 41, 45 (1998). This decision is a very favorable and significant result for marine insurers and the principle of maritime uniformity. Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.
Case Law Alerts
SCOTUS Grants Certiorari to Hear Marine Insurance Dispute
April 1, 2023
The Supreme Court of the United States recently granted certiorari to decide whether, under federal admiralty law, “a choice of law clause in a maritime contract can be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the ‘strong public policy’ of the state whose law is displaced.” The underlying claim involved damage to a vessel that ran aground, which resulted in the vessel owner filing a coverage claim under its marine insurance policy. The insurer denied coverage and subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to rescind the policy. The vessel owner then filed multiple counterclaims, including extra-contractual claims under Pennsylvania law. The insurer subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings on the Pennsylvania law counterclaims, arguing that the policy’s choice of law provision required the application of New York law, precluding those counterclaims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the insurer, and the vessel owner appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that a choice of law provision is unenforceable if it “would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The Third Circuit instructed the District Court to consider whether Pennsylvania “has a strong public policy that would be thwarted by applying New York law.” In turn, the insurer filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted, limited to the above-referenced question. The Supreme Court’s decision on this issue may have wide-ranging implications on contract cases going forward, particularly those involving choice-of-law provisions. Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.
