.

Brittany E. Bakshi

Portrait of Brittany E. Bakshi

Brittany has developed valuable litigation experience in several defense practice areas including personal injury, automobile liability, premises liability, property damage and products liability as a member of the Casualty Department. Through her practice, Brittany has represented a variety of clients, including contractors, non-profit organizations, corporations, small businesses and individuals.

Within her diverse practice, Brittany has taken cases to trial, arbitration, and magistrate court and obtained favorable results at all levels. Moreover, she has resolved numerous cases through effective settlement negotiations and mediation. Brittany has represented clients in both state and federal courts.

Brittany earned her juris doctor in 2011 from The University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Brittany attended Franklin & Marshall College where she received her Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology in 2008.

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 2011)
    • Franklin & Marshall College (B.A., 2008)
    • Pennsylvania, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2015
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a trial in a matter where the plaintiff sustained personal injuries following a slip and fall on snow and ice.
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of clients from premises liability and personal injury lawsuits after the Court's favorable rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment.
    • Obtained a client's dismissal in a matter following the Court's entry of a favorable ruling on Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff's Complaint.
    • Defense verdicts at the arbitration and magistrate levels in personal injury, property damage and premises liability matters.
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2026)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2019-2026)
    • Dauphin County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania State Bar    

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Pennsylvania Trip-and-Fall Case

We obtained summary judgment for residential renters in a trip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped and fell on a set of porch steps at our clients’ home while attending a barbeque, breaking her ankle. She brought claims against the homeowner. The homeowner then joined our clients, asserting claims of negligence and contractual indemnity under the lease agreement. During her deposition, the plaintiff testified that she was familiar with the poor condition of the steps, had spoken with the renters about the steps prior to her fall, and witnessed two people, an adult and a child, trip on the steps during the same barbeque event. The homeowner also testified at his deposition that it was his responsibility to repair and maintain the subject stairs. We argued that our clients were not required to indemnify the homeowners under the Perri-Ruzzi rule, and that they owed no duty to the plaintiff, a licensee, as she knew of the condition of the steps and the risks involved in using them. The court agreed and dismissed all claims against the clients.

Summary Judgment Secured in Slip and Fall Case

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a university in a slip and fall case. The plaintiff, a university student, slipped and fell during an active winter storm as she was walking from one campus building to another. Discovery showed that the plaintiff received an emergency alert from the university warning of potentially icy conditions prior to exiting the building and that freezing rain was still falling as the plaintiff was walking. We argued, and the court agreed, that the university owed no duty to the plaintiff to protect against general slippery conditions or to pretreat sidewalks prior to, during or immediately after the storm.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

July 21, 2026

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Case Law Alerts

Commonwealth Court Affirms Defense Verdict for SEPTA, Clarifies Limits of the Jerk‑and‑Jolt Doctrine

July 20, 2026

In a personal injury case, the plaintiff alleged that she was injured after falling on a SEPTA bus when it began moving before she was fully seated. An appeal followed and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial courts judgment in favor of SEPTA. Musser v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 354 A.3d 593 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2026). In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the bus restarted aggressively and asserted the legal theory of liability known as the jerk and jolt doctrine, under which a common carrier, such as SEPTA, may be liable for negligence that causes an injury to a bus passenger who falls because the bus experiences a sudden, unusual, or extraordinary jerk or jolt. SEPTA presented video evidence contradicting Musser's account and testimony from its Chief Training Officer (CTO) that drivers are trained not to wait for passengers to be seated unless requested. The jury attributed 74% fault to Musser and 26% to SEPTA, barring Musser from recovery under Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from SEPTA’s CTO regarding driver training without proper notice and relevance; that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting plaintiffs cross examination of the CTO regarding Federal Transit Administration (FTA) standards; and that the trial court abused it’s discretion by including a non-standard jury instruction clarifying that a bus driver is not required to wait for passengers to be seated unless asked. The court reasoned that Musser's opening statement and testimony raised the issue of restarting before she was seated, making SEPTA's training testimony relevant. The brief duration of challenged testimony in context of multi-day trial was insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. The non-standard jury instruction properly clarified that mere restart before seating doesn't satisfy jerk and jolt doctrine, consistent with established precedent. In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.