.

Angela M. Evangelista

Portrait of Angela M. Evangelista

Angela Evangelista is a member of  Casualty Department with more than 25 years of legal experience. She focuses her practice in all areas of general liability defense, including aviation, premises liability and product liability matters. Additionally she is experienced in the area of medical malpractice defense.

Angela is also an Adjunct Professor at Fairleigh Dickinson University and Montclair State University, where she teaches Legal Research and Writing, Tort law, and New York Civil and Federal Practice and Procedure, to students seeking Paralegal and Justice Studies degrees.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Angela devoted her career to civil defense litigation as a Partner at Jones Hirsch Connors Miller & Bull, P.C.  She is an active member of the New York State Bar Association.

    • St. John's University School of Law (J.D., 1991)
    • St. John's University (B.S., cum laude, 1988)
    • New York, 1992
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 1993
    • New Jersey, 1994
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1994
    • New York State Bar Association
    •  “Venue in New York Personal Injury Actions CPLR Article 5: Where to Be and How to Get There,” Defense Digest, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 2016
    • “New York Practice: Responding to the Complaint,” Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2015
    • New York Practice and Procedure Overview, Marshall Dennehey CLE Presentation
    • New York Practice and Procedure Discovery Process, Marshall Dennehey CLE Presentation
    • Federal Practice and Procedure for Paralegals, Montclair State University
    • New York Practice and Procedure for Paralegals, Fairleigh Dickinson University
    • Tort Law, Fairleigh Dickinson University
    • Juries and Justice, Montclair State Univeristy
    • Legal Research & Writing, Fairleigh Dickinson University
    • Adjunct Professor at Fairleigh Dickinson University
    • Classes: Tort and Personal Injury Law and New York Civil Practice, 2013 through present
    • Adjunct Professor at Montclair State University
    • Classes: Juries and Justice, Introduction to Law and Federal Practice, 2014 through present

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

New York Practice: Responding to the Complaint

March 1, 2015

Key Points: What initial steps should be taken when preparing an answer in New York? What issues must be evaluated when preparing the answer? This article will address the issues that should be evaluated when preparing an answer. It pertains to answers in New York State courts and, to a limited extent, answers in federal court in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. When a case is first assigned, defense counsel is provided with the initial pleadings, generally the summons and complaint. These are often the only documents provided by our clients. Under New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), litigation is commenced by the filing with the court of a summons and complaint (or summons with notice or endorsed complaint). The filing stops the running of the statute of limitations and is the official commencement of the litigation. Service of process on the defendant must be properly effectuated within 120 days of commencement of the action. (CPLR §306(b).) The first issue that an attorney should address is the practical one: when is the answer due? CPLR §320 prescribes the time periods for when a responsive pleading must be served. This is generally 20 or 30 days from completion of service (20 days when service is by personal delivery to the defendant within New York State, 30 days all other times). Service is not always complete when the papers are delivered by the process server. This is especially so when service is effectuated through substituted service (leaving the summons and complaint with someone of suitable age and discretion with follow-up mailing CPLR §308). In such a situation, service is complete ten days after the filing of the proof of service (the summons and complaint together with an affidavit of service is known as “proof of service”) with the court. The time periods for other methods of service are provided for in CPLR Article 3 and, in the interest of brevity, will not be discussed here. Unfortunately, clients are not always the best judge of when service was actually effectuated upon them. Therefore, it is recommended that one obtain an affidavit of service from the plaintiff’s counsel or from the documents filed with the court’s e-filing website. Once the due date of the responsive pleading is established, one must next determine if an extension of time to respond will be required. This additional time is not always required because the attorney is unable to find the time to prepare the answer but, rather, because the attorney is experiencing difficulty making formal contact with the client for whom they will be entering an appearance in the case. Although New York is a “notice pleading” state, where specific detailed facts are not required in an answer, an answer (or other appearance) should never be filed on behalf of a client (or business entity) without obtaining their consent to your representation of them. This first contact is the initiation of the attorney-client relationship. In addition, during this initial client contact, the basic facts about the case and corporate structure, which are necessary to formulate responses to the averments in the complaint, can be obtained. Other issues, such as the proper corporate or business entity name, proper venue, jurisdiction and potential affirmative defenses, should be discussed during this initial attorney-client conference. These issues will be discussed below. Once the question of “when” the responsive pleading is due has been determined, one must then focus on how to respond. If the case is such where a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211 is appropriate, then a motion in lieu of answering should be considered after consulting with the claims professional. The attorney must also determine if an answer will be served. If the action was commenced by the filing of a summons with notice, then an answer is not the proper response. Rather, pursuant to CPLR §3012(b), a defendant must serve a notice of appearance and demand for the complaint. The plaintiffs will thereafter have 20 days to serve the complaint. The complaint in this instance will properly be served by sending it via mail to the attorneys who have entered an appearance on behalf of the party. There will be no need for service of the complaint upon the client through typical service of process methods. (Service of interlocutory papers – CPLR §2103(b).) The answer is thereafter due 20 days from receipt of the complaint (CPLR §3012). When litigation is commenced by either the filing of a summons and complaint or a summons and endorsed complaint, an answer is then to be served. A summons and endorsed complaint is generally responded to with a general denial answer, which must include the required affirmative defenses. Also to be addressed are jurisdiction and venue. The attorney will need to evaluate whether the court has both subject matter jurisdiction over the case and whether the court has obtained in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Most cases pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York have subject matter jurisdiction as the Supreme Court is a court of “general jurisdiction.” However, cases that are worth less than $25,000 should be transferred to the Civil Court of the State of New York pursuant to CPLR §325(d). If at any time it appears that a case is worth less than $25,000, a motion can be made pursuant to CPLR §325(d) to have the case transferred to the lower court. Such can also be done sua sponte by the court. However, when a case is transferred pursuant to 325(d), the plaintiff will not be limited to relief within the jurisdictional limits of the lower court. In addition, when evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the attorney should also consider the possibility of removal of the case to federal court. Generally, such is done when the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction based upon (complete) diversity of citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. In addition, subject matter jurisdiction in the federal court can be obtained when the case involves a federal question, such as violation of a civil right or other federal law. If such is the case, a notice of removal must be timely served and filed in conjunction with the federal court answer. (28 U.S.C. §1446.) Timing of removal is critical and should, therefore, be evaluated as soon as the matter is assigned to counsel. Personal jurisdiction over the individual defendant will be based upon either their “presence” in the state of New York (CPLR §301) or their activity, which falls under one of the provisions provided for in New York’s long-arm statute. (CPLR §302.) The second part of personal jurisdiction is dependent upon the proper service of the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR Article 3. Venue is generally more clear cut. Pursuant to CPLR Article 5, venue in transitory actions (most personal injury cases, including automobile cases) is properly placed in the county of residence of any party. (CPLR §503.) Residence is determined at the commencement of the litigation, and a party may be deemed to have more that one county for residence purposes. Interestingly, the CPLR does not provide for venue to be determined by the county of the site of the accident, as provided for in other states such as New Jersey. The upper right-hand corner of the summons generally sets forth the basis for the plaintiff’s choice of venue. If venue is improperly chosen by the plaintiff, a demand for change of venue must be served with the defendant’s answer. The plaintiff will thereafter have 10 days to consent to the change to a proper venue or provide an affidavit as to why their initial choice of venue was proper. If the plaintiff does neither, the defendants have five days to serve a motion seeking a change of venue. (CPLR Article 5.) These time requirements are strictly enforced, and if they are not complied with, objection to venue can be deemed waived. Therefore, defense counsel should be familiar with the requirements and time provisions set forth in Article 5 of the CPLR. The next issue one should address is to make sure that one is appearing in the correct name of the client. Such is straightforward when you are appearing for an individual. Simply make sure that you have the proper spelling of their name when discussing the case with them during your initial conference. Oftentimes, plaintiffs misspell the defendants’ names when preparing initial pleadings. It is even more common that errors are made by plaintiffs’ counsel when naming corporate entities. It is common for plaintiffs to erroneously name a non-corporate or business entity by referring to a d/b/a, such as a hotel name or store name. A formal appearance, such as an answer to a complaint, should only be entered on behalf of an actual legal entity. It is extremely important that an answer only be served on behalf of and in the name of an actual business entity, or an individual. The client is usually the best source of information as to the formal corporate or business name. However, the New York Secretary of State (and most other states) have websites that are very useful for ascertaining official corporate/partnership/LLC names (www.dos.ny.gov/). Once the aforementioned issues have all been addressed, it is finally time to evaluate the substantive allegations contained within the complaint. CPLR §3018 formally provides for three options for responding to allegations in a complaint. These are admit, deny, or deny knowledge or information as to the facts set forth in the complaint. However, by practice, additional responses have been extended to include a denial in the form alleged, which has the effect of a denial, but is generally used when the allegation is improperly worded, contains compound allegations or refers to more than one defendant. Another often used response is to “deny in the form alleged and refer all questions of law to the court.” This, too, has the effect of a denial. It is often used as a response to allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint in which it is alleged that the defendants had a “duty” to do a certain thing. Finally, the “deny in the form alleged but admit portions of the allegations in a specific paragraph of the complaint” is an option. This response is not used as often as it should be. It provides for a defendant to deny portions of an allegation while admitting other portions. Such a response is required in federal court answers. (FRCP 8.) A failure to respond to a specific numbered paragraph or allegation within a plaintiff’s complaint will be deemed an admission. Therefore, the attorney should be sure to do a count of all of the paragraph numbers in the answer to confirm that all allegations have been properly answered. It is suggested that, even if defense counsel intends to admit an allegation in the complaint, such not be left out of the answer. A formal admission should be included with the answer to avoid an inadvertent admission. Once all of the allegations have been responded to, the attorney must next address the proper affirmative defenses to be included in the answer. CPLR §3018 provides for certain affirmative defenses that must be asserted in the answer or they will be deemed waived. However, there are usually additional affirmative defenses a defendant will assert in an answer. Generally, the rule is that the answer should contain any affirmative defenses to put the plaintiff “on notice” of a reason why the defendant will be claiming that they are not liable or responsible to the plaintiff. (CPLR §3018.) A defendant in a civil action is also entitled to include in its answer a counterclaim against one or more plaintiffs. This is in essence a separate lawsuit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff seeking affirmative relief. It is generally related to the facts of the original action, but such is not a requirement. An answer to a counterclaim is required and is called a reply to counterclaim. (CPLR §§3011 and 3019.) The answer may also contain cross-claims against co-defendants. These cross-claims are generally for contractual/common law indemnification or for contribution, but they are not limited to such. An answer to a cross-claim is not required in New York unless the cross-claim specifically demands an answer thereto. (CPLR §3011.) Good practice also suggests that an answer to cross-claims, whether required or not, should include appropriate affirmative defenses because it is a formal responsive pleading, subject to the requirements of CPLR §3018. (Siegel, New York Practice §223, 5th Edition.) In federal court, a party must serve an answer to a cross-claim within 21 days after being served with the pleading that includes the counterclaim or cross-claim. (FRCP 12.) Finally, the defense attorney needs to evaluate if a verification is required and by whom such should be signed. A verification is a statement under oath that certifies the truth of the allegations contained in the pleadings. The rules as to verification of pleadings are found in CPLR §§3020-3023. Once a pleading is verified, all pleadings thereafter must be verified. If the complaint is not verified, it is still a good idea to file a verified answer as it will require that the plaintiff serve a verification to their bill of particulars, and that any subsequent amended pleadings be verified. Generally, the verification is signed by the attorney preparing the answer, unless the client resides or has offices in the same county where the attorney has his or her office. If such is the case, then the client or authorized representative/officer of the business entity must execute the verification. Verifications are not used in federal court pleading practice. Answers in federal court are not verified. It should be noted that in federal court answers, each paragraph is answered separately and that responses are not grouped together. Generally, a demand for trial by jury must be included in the federal court answer. If a plaintiff has not demanded a trial by jury and the defendant fails to do so, the court may deem that a trial by jury has been waived by the parties. It is hoped that this article has addressed the basic issues that should be evaluated when preparing an answer in New York State practice.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.