.

Alan C. Nash

Co-Chair, Premises & Retail Liability Practice

Portrait of Alan C. Nash

Alan Carroll “A.C.” Nash is a senior civil defense attorney and business leader whose practice focuses on the defense of insureds, corporations, and public entities in complex, high-exposure litigation. He concentrates on negligent security, wrongful death, product liability, automobile and commercial transportation claims, liquor liability, construction liability and premises liability matters.

A.C. also maintains a substantial public-sector and municipal defense practice, representing municipalities and law enforcement agencies in state and federal civil rights litigation, including claims alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force. His experience in this space includes defending matters throughout Florida in both trial and appellate courts.

A.C. serves as the Casualty Supervisor of the Fort Lauderdale office of Marshall Dennehey, where he oversees the day-to-day operations of the casualty department and leads a large team of attorneys handling complex and catastrophic-loss cases. In this role, he is responsible not only for legal strategy and quality control, but also for client relationships, attorney development, and overall practice performance.

Before joining Marshall Dennehey, A.C. was a trial associate at a Fort Lauderdale–based law enforcement and municipal defense firm with more than 30 years of history. Working closely with firm leadership, he played a key role in defending public entities and law enforcement officers in high-stakes civil rights litigation across Florida.

A.C. earned his juris doctor from Florida State University College of Law in 2007. While in law school, he served as a certified legal intern with the Second Judicial Circuit, trying approximately 40 jury and non-jury criminal cases. He was a member and coach of the Mock Trial Team, served as a student ambassador and traveling recruiter, sat on the Dean’s Cabinet, acted as the Fifth Circuit Governor for the American Bar Association, and received the Distinguished Pro Bono Award upon graduation.

A South Florida native, A.C. earned his undergraduate degree in Public Relations from the University of Florida, graduating early. Prior to law school, he worked in public relations and marketing, including managing state and national accounts for a Miami-based firm and later executing advertising and marketing programs for two Fortune 100 companies. This background continues to inform his approach to client development and litigation strategy.

A.C. is deeply committed to mentorship and community involvement. He mentors students at the elementary, secondary, undergraduate, and law school levels and has served in leadership and advisory roles with multiple professional and civic organizations. 

    • Florida State University College of Law (J.D., 2007)
    • University of Florida (B.S., 2003)
    • Florida, 2007
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2008
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 2008
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2008
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, 2008
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • "Best Mentors Award" by the Daily Business Review (2022)
    • The Florida Bar Leadership Academy, Fellow (2013 - 2014)
    • Florida Legal Elite (2010, 2012)
    • Florida Super Lawyer (2019-2026)
    • Florida Super Lawyer Rising Star (2012-2018)
    • Rated for Civil Litigation by Lead Counsel, a service of Thomson Reuters, 2015
    • "Rising Star" by the Daily Business Review (2014)
    • Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Professionalism Panel (2017-2025)
    • South Florida Legal Guide, Up & Comer (2018-2021)
    • Thomson Reuters Stand-Out Lawyer (2025)
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance
    • DRI - Diversity for Success Seminar and Expo, Expo Chair 2016 - 2018
    • DRI - Diversity for Success Seminar and Expo, Marketing Chair, 2013 - 2015
    • DRI - Diversity Committee, Chair to the Marketing Subcommittee
    • DRI - Diversity Committee, Liaison to the Aviation Law Committee
    • DRI - Retail and Hospitality Seminar, Committee Member 2016 - Present
    • Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel, Member
    • Florida Association of Police Attorneys, 2010
    • The Florida Bar - Student Education/Admissions to The Bar Committee
    • Florida Defense Lawyers Association, Board Member, 2017 - 2019
    • Florida Sheriffs Association, 2020 - present
    • RIMS Broward County Chapter, Board of Directors, 2021
    • Chair, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee "H", 2018 – 2021
    • T.J. Reddick Bar Association, Executive Board, 2012 - 2013
    • AI: The Cat 5 Storm Affecting Your Claims and Employees, Florida Broward County RIMS Chapter, April 15, 2026
    • Negligent Security Claims - Premises Under Attack, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, July 25, 2025
    • Florida’s New Civil Procedure and Rules, Florida Tampa Bay RIMS Chapter, May 21, 2025
    • The Yellow Brick Road to Litigation Success – What Happens When Carriers and Defense Counsel Team Up? CLM Annual Conference, Dallas, TX, April 10, 2025
    • Relevant Procedural Rule Changes for Risk Manager, Broward County RIMS Chapter Meeting, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, January 15, 2025
    • DE&I – Your Ally in the War for Talent, Florida RIMS Educational Conference, August 1, 2024
    • New Florida Tort Reform Changes Under HB 837, Tampa Bay RIMS Chapter Meeting, Tampa, FL, October 18, 2023
    • Civil Rights for Uncivil Times, International Association of Claims Professionals (IACP) 2023 Conference, June 22, 2023
    • Claims Inflation in Property & Casualty Litigation, ILG 360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • Talkin' Bout My Generations, RIMS - Broward County Chapter Meeting & Presentation, October 19th, 2022
    • Talkin' Bout My Generations, 2022 Florida RIMS Educational Conference, Naples, FL, July 27th, 2022
    • Successful Strategies for Effective Mediation, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, July 20, 2022
    • Roundtable Discussion: Civil Litigation and Nailing On-Campus Interviews, FSU College of Law - Black Law Students Association, November 8, 2021
    • Litigation & Trial Considerations When Representing/Defending Law Enforcement, NAPO’s Annual 2021 Legal Seminar, West Palm Beach, FL, October 4, 2021
    • Anti-Social Practical Strategies Insurers Can Implement – panel member, 2021 DRI-IADC Virtual Roundtable, September 2021
    • Civil Litigation State of Affairs – The Impact of COVID-19 in Florida & What’s Next, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, June 2021
    • Negligent Security: Foreseeable Crime - Believable Risk, ILG Virtual Conference, March 22, 2021
    • 56 Feds are Coming: Strategies Using the Upcoming Florida Summary Judgment Standard, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, January 15, 2021
    • Negligence 101 - A Pennsylvania and Florida Legal Overview, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, December 15, 2020
    • Negligent Tenants Expose Negligent Landlords, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium – Casino Royale, Tampa, FL, September 20, 2018
    • Moderator: In-House Counsel Roundtable, DRI Retail & Hospitality Conference, Chicago, IL, May, 2018
    • Panelist: Broward County Bar Association - Young Lawyer's Section Boot Camp, June 6, 2017
    • Featured Speaker/Panelist: Making The Career Decision That Is Best For You, Atlantic Technical College 2017 College & Career Summit , Ft. Lauderdale, FL, January 26, 2017
    • Defending Negligent Security Claims, RIMKUS' 9th Annual CLE/CE Seminar, October 21, 2016
    • Negligent Security Claims: If the Crime is Foreseeable, the Risk is Believable, RIMS - Central Florida Chapter, November 19, 2015
    • Using Crime Grids in Negligent Security Claims, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium - The Best Defense is a Good Offense, Orlando, FL, September 17, 2014
    • Diversity for Success Seminar, DRI, Moderator, 2013
    • Stand Your Ground Forum, Nova Law School, Moderator, 2012
    • Paralegal Program - Professor of Contracts, Legal Research/Writing and Constitutional Law, Brown Mackie College, 2009 - 2010
    • Fort Lauderdale Community Development Corporation, Vice President, 2012
    • Fort Lauderdale Community Development Corporation, Board Member, 2008 - Present
    • Grant of judgment as a matter of law for the Sheriff's department and individual deputy in an excessive force federal trial involving the shooting death of a suspect.
    • Defense verdict in a federal trial for the Sheriff's department and individual deputy in an excessive force case involving the use of a canine.
    • Grant of dismissal in a federal case involving the alleged interference of a prisoner's rights to access the courts and to free speech.
    • Grant of dismissal in a federal case wherein plaintiff alleged that a private corporation acted under color of law and violated his 8th Amendment Rights.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…The Blitz Is Coming: Pranks, Perception and the Risk of Draft Day

June 1, 2025

In April, the high-stakes world of the NFL Draft took over the airwaves. Millions were made and fumbled away as each round unfolded. Scouting reports were dissected, 40-yard dash times debated, and the patience of each player was tested. Beyond the fanfare stood a cautionary tale for civil defense lawyers. In litigation, as in football, perception, reputation, and outside interference can blindside the best-prepared team.  Shadeur Sanders and his father, Deion, commanded headlines throughout the college football season and into the draft. However, it was Jaxson Ulbrich, son of Falcons defensive coordinator, Jeff Ulbrich, who stole a moment of spotlight both infamously and immaturely. After obtaining a private draft-day phone number, Jaxson prank-called Sanders, whose draft stock had unexpectedly fallen. He claimed that Sanders would be drafted by the Saints but would have to wait. While it was quickly revealed that he had been “trolled,” this event signifies how easily misinformation can spread and how pranks can carry real consequences. The NFL fined Jeff Ulbrich $100,000, and the Falcons organization was fined $250,000.  In civil defense cases, surprises, misinformation, public manipulation, and ambush tactics are commonplace. Plaintiff lawyers, while mostly ethical, can sometimes push the envelope. According to the ABA, almost 300,000 lawyers are publicly disciplined for ethical misconduct each year. Therefore, a video that paints your client in unfavorable light, one that it is selectively edited, like Shannon Sharpe alleges, or one that is outright misleading, may become the order of the day. Once public, the reputational harm spreads faster than the truth can catch up. Headlines follow, juries are tainted, and the reputation of your client can plummet overnight. Insurers then start asking hard questions.  The call to Sanders wasn’t just a joke. It could be actionable. In Florida and many other jurisdictions, the actions of Ulbrich could possibly be considered tortious interference with a current or prospective business relationship. This tort occurs when a third party intentionally disrupts a known business relationship, thereby causing damages. More specifically, the elements of the tort for tortious interference with a business relationship includes: (1) the existence of a business relationship or contract, (2) knowledge of the business relationship or contract on the part of the defendant, (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the business relationship, and (4) damages. See Howard v. Murray, 184 So. 3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). An action for tortious interference with a prospective business relationship requires a business relationship evidenced by an actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which, in all probability, would have been completed had the defendant not interfered. See Ferguson Transp., Inc. v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 687 So. 2d 821, 822 (Fla. 1996). Although numerous explanations for his draft slide exist (i.e., his lack of a real agent, combine opt-out, alleged poor interviews, etc.), Sanders could argue that the prank compounded doubt, shifted teams’ perceptions about drafting him, and thereby contributed to his slide. The same dynamic applies in tort litigation. When perception turns, the liability profile of a company can collapse, even without wrongdoing.  In 2005, Anna Ayala alleged that she found a human finger in her chili at a Wendy’s in California. After a month-long investigation, it was determined that the incident was a hoax orchestrated by Ayala. Unfortunately, Wendy’s suffered work cutbacks as business fell as much as 50% in some areas.  In 2020, rumors began on Reddit that Wayfair was allegedly involved in child trafficking. The claims were that their throw pillows and storage cabinets were a front for these nefarious activities. Social media ran with this information, complete with photographs, screen shots, and celebrity statements. The rumors were a hoax.  In 2011, not even the Golden Arches was safe. A photo was captured and spread on social media that provided that, as an insurance measure due, in part, to a string of robberies, certain customers would be required to pay an additional fee of $1.50 per transaction. This, too, was a hoax, and McDonald’s stated: “This is, unfortunately, an example of how rumors can out speed the truth. Over the last 48 hours, we've been tweeting and striving to clarify that this is a hoax.” Nevertheless, the public was slow to believe McDonald’s statement, and the hashtag #SeriouslyMcDonalds trended. The law is catching up to the age of virility and meme culture. However, as the aforementioned warnings demonstrate, hoaxes can have impacts that far outlive the “joke.” It can be a draft-day prospect losing millions or a client losing trust; in all scenarios, narrative controls and perception matters.  Whether it is Sanders waiting for a life-changing call or a business defending its decades of good will, the threats aren’t always head-on. Sometimes, the blitz is coming from your blindside.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Update for Florida Civil Litigation

Florida Passes Tort Reform: What You Need to Know

March 27, 2023

On March 24, 2023, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed House Bill 837, “Civil Remedies,” into law. HB 837 contains sweeping tort reform that will uproot the landscape of Florida civil litigation. The changes apply to causes of action accruing after the effective date—March 24, 2023. Prior to the bill becoming law, plaintiffs’ firms, anticipating this monumental change, filed approximately 100,000 lawsuits. These filings represent approximately 77% of the total cases filed since January 1, 2023.[1] Below is a brief summary of the changes and the potential impact the new law brings.    NEW MODIFIED COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD    HB 837 changes Florida’s standard from “pure” comparative negligence to “modified” comparative negligence. This aligns Florida with a majority of the other states who have already adopted a “modified” comparative negligence standard. This new standard does not apply in medical negligence actions.   Previously, a plaintiff was entitled to recover a percentage of damages proportionate to the degree of fault of the defendant. Under “modified” comparative negligence, if a plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover.    This new standard will likely reduce the number of cases brought in which the plaintiff was the predominant cause of his or her own harm.    TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR GENERAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS   HB 837 amends section 95.11, Florida Statutes, which sets forth the statutes of limitations for various causes of action. The bill now reduces the statute of limitations for general negligence from four years to two years.    This may encourage plaintiffs to file suit earlier as plaintiffs and their counsel will prepare their cause of action and evaluate the validity of their claims at an earlier juncture. This will also increase the ability to obtain evidence closer to the time of the alleged incident.    Where liability is contested, plaintiffs may be deterred from filing suit sooner. The two-year statute of limitations could also be used as leverage to effectuate earlier settlement and resolution of claims, especially pre-suit.    ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN PAST AND FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES    HB 837 changes the evidence that plaintiffs can introduce to establish past and future medical expenses. Previously, with the exception of services paid by Medicare or Medicaid, plaintiffs were permitted to board the full amount of medical bills charged for services rendered. This was without evidence of any adjustments or reductions and was prior to a post-verdict setoff for adjustments by private insurance. If plaintiffs had Medicare or Medicaid, only the amounts actually paid by Medicare or Medicaid were admissible as evidence of past medical expenses.    Now, the evidence offered to prove the amount of damages for past medical bills that have been satisfied is limited to the evidence of the amount actually paid, regardless of the source of payment. For unpaid past medical bills, admissible evidence will depend whether the plaintiff has health care coverage, Medicare, or Medicaid:    •    If plaintiff has health care coverage but obtains treatment under letter of protection or does not submit charges, evidence of amount that health care coverage would have paid to satisfy charges, plus plaintiff’s share of medical expenses, is admissible. Evidence of reasonable amounts that were billed to plaintiff for medically-necessary treatment or services is also admissible.  •    If plaintiff does not have insurance, or has Medicare or Medicaid, evidence of 120 percent of Medicare reimbursement rate in effect is admissible.  •    If there is no applicable Medicare rate, evidence admissible is 170 percent of applicable state Medicaid rate.    Damages that may be recovered may not include any amount in excess of the evidence of medical treatment and services expenses admitted. Further, it cannot exceed the sum of amounts actually paid, amounts necessary to satisfy charges due and owing, and the amounts necessary for reasonable and necessary future medical treatment and services.    For future medical bills, the “usual and customary” amount also depends on whether the plaintiff has health care coverage:    •    If plaintiff has health care coverage other than Medicare or Medicaid, evidence of amount that could be satisfied if charges were submitted, in addition to portion of medical expenses under insurance contract, is admissible.  •    If plaintiff does not have insurance, or has Medicare or Medicaid, evidence of 120 percent of Medicare reimbursement rate in effect is admissible.  •    If there is no applicable Medicare rate, evidence admissible is 170 percent of applicable state Medicaid rate.    LETTERS OF PROTECTION AND REFERRALS MUST BE DISCLOSED    If a plaintiff treats under a letter of protection, the letter of protection must be disclosed, as must all bills for medical expenses, which must be itemized and coded. Whether the plaintiff was referred for treatment under the letter of protection must also be disclosed, along with who referred the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is referred for treatment under a letter of protection by their attorney, disclosure of the referral is permitted, notwithstanding the attorney-client privilege, as the financial relationship between the law firm and the medical provider is relevant to the issue of bias of the testifying medical provider. This new law overturns the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Worley v. Central Florida Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, Inc., 228 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2017).    BAD FAITH – NEW DUTY OF INSUREDS AND IMPACT ON DAMAGES    Now, in every bad faith action in Florida, the insured, claimant, and/or their representative have a duty to act in good faith in providing information, making demands, setting deadlines, and attempting to settle the claim. The trier of fact may consider whether the insured, claimant and/or their representative acted in good faith and may reasonably reduce the amount of damages awarded. Mere negligence remains insufficient to bring a claim for bad faith against an insurer.   BAD FAITH – CHANGES TO 90-DAY PERIOD, ADMISSIBILITY, AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS    No bad faith action can lie if an insurer tenders the lesser of the policy limits or the amount demanded by the plaintiff within 90 days after receiving actual notice of the claim and sufficient evidence supporting the claim. It is not bad faith if the insurer does not tender, and the existence of the 90 days is inadmissible in any action seeking bad faith. Should the insurer not tender, the statute of limitations is extended for an additional 90 days.    BAD FAITH – WHEN INSURER IS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO PAY POLICY LIMITS FOR MULTIPLE CLAIMS EXCEEDING LIMITS    If multiple claims arising out of a single occurrence exceed the policy limits, the insurer is not liable beyond the policy limits for failure to pay any or all of the policy limits within 90 days if:   •    The insurer files an interpleader to determine rights of claims, and if found in excess of policy limits, claimants are entitled to a prorated share; or  •    The insurer makes full policy limits available at binding arbitration, in which claimants are entitled to a pro rata share of policy limits as determined by the arbitrator, who must also consider comparative fault and the likely outcome of trial. If a claim is resolved by the arbitrator, a general release must be executed by the claimant to the insured party whose claim is resolved.    NEGLIGENT SECURITY – NEW PRESUMPTION AGAINST LIABILITY AND CONSIDERATION OF FAULT OF ALL PARTIES   In a negligent security action against the owner or operator of real property by a person lawfully on the property who was harmed by the criminal act of a third party, the trier of fact is now required to consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the injury or death, including the criminal actor. Moreover, the owner or operator of the property cannot be held negligent for damages to a third party attempting to commit, or engaged in committing, any criminal act on the property.    HB 837 also creates a presumption against negligent security liability for the owner or operator of a “multifamily residential property” if the burden of proof is met to demonstrate “substantial compliance” with crime assessments, crime and safety training for employees, and safety and security measures which include:   •    Security camera system at points of exit and entry that maintains the video retrievable for 30 days;  •    A lighted parking lot from dusk to dawn;  •    Lighting in common areas, porches, walkways, and laundry rooms from dusk to dawn;  •    A deadbolt measuring at least one inch in every door;  •    Locking devices on every window and sliding door;  •    Locked gates at pool fence areas; and  •    A peephole or viewer on door that does not have a window or window next to the door.    CONTINGENCY FEE MULTIPLIER – NEW LODESTAR FEE PRESUMPTION   Previously, Florida case law allowed for courts to consider and award contingency fee multipliers to attorneys’ fees, based on factors which included but were not limited to: the relevant market if contingency fee multipliers were required to obtain competent counsel; whether the attorney mitigated the risk of nonpayment; the amount involved, the results obtained, the type of fee arrangement between the attorney and client; and likelihood of success at the outset of the action.    HB 837 now changes the ability to obtain a contingency fee multiplier by creating a “strong presumption” that the “lodestar” fee, the number of hours which would have reasonably been spent by an attorney and multiplying that number by a reasonable hourly rate, is sufficient and reasonable. This can only be overcome in rare and exceptional circumstances in which evidence has been presented that competent counsel could otherwise not have been retained.    ONE-WAY ATTORNEYS’ FEES – LIMITED APPLICABILITY    Previously, “one-way attorneys’ fees” applied in situations in which an insured prevailed in an action against an insurer. One-way attorneys’ fees in insurance cases now only apply to declaratory judgment actions for the determination of insurance coverage against an insurer after a denial of coverage of a claim, which does not include a defense under a reservation of rights. If a declaratory judgment is granted in favor of the insured against the insurer, the court shall award reasonable attorneys' fees, which are limited to those incurred in the action.    Further, section 768.79, Florida Statutes, also known as the “offer of judgment” or “proposal for judgment” statute, will apply to any civil action involving an insurance contract.   ______________________________________________   [1] Ron Hurtibise, Civil Case Filings Surge Before DeSantis Signed Sweeping Lawsuit Reform Bill, SUN-SENTINEL, (March 24, 2023, 6:55 p.m.), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-bz-case-filing-surge-before-tort-reform-20230324-7ze7uzxslbcndcaaessd4bmgzy-story.html. The material in this law alert has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Expands Family Leave Protections Effective July 17, 2026

On January 17, 2026, Governor Murphy signed into law legislation expanding the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA). Beginning July 17, 2026, significant amendments to the NJFLA will expand job-protected family leave to smaller businesses and more employees across the state. The new law broadens coverage by lowering the threshold for private employers from 30 employees to 15 employees, meaning many smaller businesses will now be subject to the NJFLA. Employees of state and local government agencies will continue to be covered regardless of the size of the employer. The amendments also make it easier for employees to qualify for leave. Under the revised law, an employee will be eligible after three months of employment and at least 250 hours worked during the preceding 12 months, replacing the previous requirement of 12 months of employment and 1,000 hours worked. Currently, New Jersey's Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) and Family Leave Insurance (FLI) programs provide eligible employees with wage replacement while they are on leave but do not independently guarantee job protection. The recent amendments to the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA) expand these protections by extending job-protected leave to additional employees. Under the amended law, employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits may be entitled to return to the same position they held before taking leave, or to an equivalent position with the same seniority, status, pay, and benefits. Although the legislation also states that it does not expand or modify an employee's reinstatement rights under the NJFLA, the amendments appear to provide job protection to eligible employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits without requiring them to separately satisfy the eligibility requirements of the NJFLA or the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). As a result, some employees may be entitled to longer periods of job-protected leave than were previously available under existing law. With these amendments, New Jersey continues to strengthen workplace protections by expanding access to job-protected family leave for eligible employees. These changes significantly expand access to job-protected family leave and may require employers to update their leave policies, employee handbooks, and HR practices. Notably, employers who were previously not required to administer NJFLA may need to amend their policies and/or create new protocols to come into compliance with the NJFLA. Failure to do so would prove costly, as the penalties for non-compliance are significant.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

SIU Gets a Boost: NJ Supreme Court Affirms Insurers' Right to Litigate, Not Arbitrate, Fraud Claims

In a significant win for insurers' Special Investigation Units, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that statutory insurance fraud and racketeering claims may proceed in court rather than through PIP arbitration. At issue was whether insurance fraud claims brought under New Jersey's Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA) and the state's Anti-Racketeering Act (NJ RICO) are subject to mandatory arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act’s (AICRA) PIP dispute-resolution framework. Allstate had sued a network of medical practices, physicians, and related corporate entities, alleging a scheme to extract more than $1.7 million in PIP benefits through fraudulent and misleading billing. The trial court dismissed Allstate's complaint and compelled arbitration, reading AICRA's arbitration clause — which covers "any dispute regarding the recovery of... benefits" under PIP coverage, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) — as sweeping in fraud and racketeering claims along with routine benefit disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal, adopting Judge Gilson's opinion below (480 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div. 2025)) as its own reasoning. The Court held that IFPA and RICO claims fall outside the scope of AICRA's PIP arbitration mechanism because that "streamlined and specialized" process cannot grant the relief those statutes contemplate — treble damages, injunctive relief, broad discovery, and joinder of third parties — and because arbitrators lack authority to award compensatory or treble damages to an insurer. The Court also rejected the argument that Allstate's own Decision Point Review Plans independently compel arbitration, finding those plan provisions no broader than AICRA's own arbitration clause. Notably, the Court expressly disagreed with the Third Circuit's contrary holding in GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024), concluding it is not bound by that federal interpretation of New Jersey law. Insurers retain the right to pursue IFPA and RICO claims in the Law Division, with a jury trial. For SIU units and NJ insurance carriers, this decision is a significant win: it forecloses defense clinics' primary procedural tool for shunting fraud investigations into limited-scope PIP arbitration, where treble damages, RICO relief, and meaningful discovery were never realistically available. Carriers building cases against fraudulently structured clinics, straw-owned practices, or coordinated billing networks can now proceed with confidence that a well-pleaded IFPA/RICO complaint stays in the Law Division rather than being diverted to arbitration on a motion to compel. Practically, this strengthens SIU's leverage in settlement negotiations, preserves civil discovery tools (subpoenas, depositions, joinder of related corporate entities) critical to unwinding complex ownership and referral schemes, and resolves the split with the Third Circuit in favor of NJ insurers — at least as a matter of state law. Expect increased reliance on IFPA civil actions, rather than PIP arbitration demands, as SIU's primary enforcement vehicle going forward.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.