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General Liability


By Carol Vanderwoude, Esquire - Philadelphia, PA (cavanderwoude@mdwcg.com or 215-575-2643)

Pennsylvania

Court Affirmed An Order Denying Indemnification For A Party's Own Negligence.
Lane v. Commonwealth, 2008 PA Super 157, 2008 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)

The plaintiff, who was training as a bicycle patrol officer, was riding on a bike path when she struck a steel reinforcement bar that had been placed partially on the path. The area was part of a construction site. The jury found the appellant, Neshaminy Constructors, Inc., 100 percent responsible for the plaintiff's injuries and exonerated the appellee, James J. Anderson Construction Co. The court stated that a contract would not be construed to provide indemnification against a person's own negligence unless that intent was expressly and unequivocally stated and the circumstances indicated that the contract was intended to so apply. The appellant was seeking indemnification for its own negligence. The language of the contract established that the appellee's indemnification obligation did not extend to injuries or claims that bore no relation to its work. The jury determined that the appellee's work did not cause the fall, and that determination was fully supported by the record. The court held that indemnity for another party's negligence, causing injuries to persons on the construction site, would be a hazard so unusual and extraordinary that the appellee could not be presumed to have assumed such an obligation absent express language in that regard.

"NO DUTY" Rule Precludes Finding Of Liability Against The Amateur Softball Association Of America For Injuries Sustained By A Player Struck In The Head.
Craig v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 2008 PA Super 123, 951 A.2d 372 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)

The appellant player sued appellee Amateur Softball Association of America in the court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil Division (Pennsylvania), for injuries sustained when he was struck in the head by a softball. The trial court granted the Association's summary judgment motion, and the player appealed. The player suffered severe injuries. The appellate court held he could not state a prima facie case of the Association's liability because the "no-duty" rule applied, as the risk of being struck by a softball was inherent in the game. The player did not show the Association organized the game in which he was hurt, but, if he had, any duty the Association would have had did not extend to the inherent risk of being struck in the head by a ball. It was not shown that his indirect payment of dues to the Association created a contract giving rise to a duty of care because he showed no provision of such a contract stating that the Association contracted out of the no-duty rule. The foreseeability of being struck did not create a duty on the Association's part because, once the risk was deemed inherent, it did not matter if it was also foreseeable. Public policy did not create any duty on the Association's part. It was not shown that the Association deviated from established custom so as to create an exception to the no-duty rule. He was not entitled to conduct further discovery which would only ascertain irrelevant evidence, given the applicability of the no-duty rule.

New Jersey

New Jersey High Court Holds That A Cause Of Action For Prima Facie Tort Is Limited Exclusively To Those Instances That Do Not Fall Within A Traditional Tort Cause Of Action.Richard A. Pulaski Constr. Co. v. Air Frame Hangars, Inc., 195 N.J. 457, 950 A.2d 868, 2008 N.J. LEXIS 797 (2008)

The contractor plaintiff obtained a judgment against the corporation for breach of contract for failing to pay for its work at an airplane hangers site. As the corporation lacked assets, the contractor sued the president for fraud. The trial and intermediate appellate courts ruled that this claim failed as the contractor did not show it relied on the president's alleged false statements. The intermediate appellate court remanded for consideration of a prima facie tort theory, raised by the corporation for the first time on appeal. On remand, the trial court held that by executing an affidavit in respect of the transfer of title to hangers, in which the president falsely claimed that no liens had been filed against the corporation, he committed a prima facie tort as his conduct was culpable and not justifiable. The president appealed, and the high court held that assuming, without deciding, that New Jersey common law could admit of a cause of action for prima facie tort, its availability was limited exclusively to those instances that did not fall within a traditional tort cause of action. Because the contractor had available another cause of action-piercing the corporate veil-the separate claim for a prima facie tort failed.

Florida

Plaintiff's Claim Failed As A Matter Of Law Because It Was Not An "Accident" Under The Montreal Convention Governing Air Travel.
Ugaz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67317 (S.D. Fl. September 4, 2008)

The plaintiff, Brigitte Espinoza Ugaz, an American Airlines passenger traveling from Peru, fell walking up an inoperable escalator shortly after her flight arrived at the Miami International Airport. As a result, the plaintiff, who is a surgeon, injured her ankle and proceeded to sue the defendants, American Airlines and Miami-Dade County. American Airlines filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in which the Airport joined for purposes relevant to the disposition of this case. The court granted the defendants' motions, holding that recovery was foreclosed because the plaintiff's injury did not result from an accident as defined by the Montreal Convention governing air travel. The court also noted that the plaintiff's contributory negligence barred her recovery because, inter alia, even if an inoperable escalator could be considered a hazard at all, it is so "open and obvious" that there was no duty of care on the part of the defendants.

Ohio

Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defendant Affirmed Because A Trailer Is Not A Structure Under R.C. 3781.06(C)(2) And Because The Lack Of A Handrail On The Steps Was Open And Obvious.
Sutton v. Delong, 2008 Ohio 2771 (Ohio Ct. App., Licking County June 9, 2008)

The appellants, a business invitee and her husband, sought review of the judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas (Ohio), which granted summary judgment to the appellee trailer owner and dismissed the appellants' suit to recover for injuries the invitee sustained when she fell while exiting the owner's trailer. The appellants visited the owner's trailer on the grounds of a horse riding competition. While exiting the trailer, the invitee allegedly fell down a set of steps and suffered an injury. The court held that summary judgment was properly granted to the owner. Since a trailer was not generally classified as a "structure" under R.C. 3781.06(C)(2), the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the owner on the appellants' claim that the owner violated the Ohio Basic Building Code. Further, summary judgment was properly granted on the question of the open and obvious nature of any hazards associated with the trailer's steps. The invitee admitted that she had been in and out of the trailer quite a few times prior to the day of the fall and that she was aware of the lack of a handrail on the steps. Nothing blocked or obstructed the invitee's view of the steps. Moreover, an independent witness, who was at the scene of the fall, testified that she saw no defects around the steps or the exit area of the trailer.

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