Municipal Liability / Civil Rights Law Alerts
New Jersey
By Matthew Behr, Esq. (856-414-6048 or mjbehr@mdwcg.com)
The Age Of 70 Exception In New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Does Not Apply To Non-Renewal Of Existing Employee's Contract.
Nini v. Mercer County Community College, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 501 (2010)
The plaintiff worked for the public entity Mercer County Community College for approximately 25 years, each year working on a yearly contract that had to be renewed for her to work the next year. In June 2005, the plaintiff was over 70 years old, and her contract was not renewed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the over the age of 70 exception in the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination does not apply to the non-renewal of an existing employee's contract.
Internal Documents of NJ State League of Municipalities Not Subject To Public Scrutiny Under Open Public Records Act.
Fair Share Housing Center, Inc. v. New Jersey State League of Municipalities, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 88 (App. Div. 2010)
The New Jersey Appellate Court held that the New Jersey State League of Municipalities is not a government agency and, therefore, its internal documents are not subject to public scrutiny under the Open Public Records Act.
Pennsylvania
By Deirdre Collins, Esq. (610-354-8497 or decollins@mdwcg.com)
In A Section 1983 Claim By An Inmate, The Third Circuit Reversed Summary Judgment Granted To The Officer But Refused To Hold That The PLRA Imposes A Strict Timing Requirement On Institutional Defendants.
Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 2010)
The Third Circuit faced a challenge to the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the officer in an inmate's 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit claiming denial of prompt medical treatment. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant corrections officer failed to notify the appropriate authority after observing the inmate's injured leg. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the officer because the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The inmate appealed. The court first declined to hold as a matter of law that the Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes a strict timing requirement on institutional defendants. Next, in holding that the district court violated Rule 6(b) by granting the officer's third and final motion for summary judgment on the eve of trial, the court remanded the case to permit the defendant to file a motion for an extension of time under Rule 6(b)(1)(B) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3rd Circuit Issues Conflicting Rulings On Student Internet Speech And Vacates Both Opinions.
Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2010) and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3rd Cir. 2010)
On February 4, 2010, the 3rd Circuit issued two opinions that reached separate conclusions regarding whether schools can discipline students for material posted on social networking websites. As a result, the 3rd Circuit vacated both opinions and scheduled a rehearing of the two cases before the full circuit court. The Layshock and Blue Mountain cases both involved students in Pennsylvania who used their home computers off the premises of the school to create fake MySpace pages for their schools' principals. In both cases, the students were punished with a suspension from school. In Layshock, a unanimous three-judge panel ruled that a student could not be punished for his off-campus speech. However, in Blue Mountain, a different panel issued a 2 to 1 decision favoring the school district's right to punish students for certain speech that occurs off the premises of the school.
In Blue Mountain, the court affirmed the district court, relying on Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a school may not suppress a student's expression of speech unless school officials conclude that the conduct "would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school." The court found that the suspensions could be upheld because "the profile presented a reasonable possibility of a future disruption" if the school did not punish the creators of the page.
In Layshock, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of Layshock, and the school appealed. The 3rd Circuit panel affirmed that Layshock's suspension had violated his First Amendment rights, stating that Layshock's use of a photograph on the school district website did not constitute "entering the school." The court noted that "[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state in the guise of school authorities to reach into a child's home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that they can control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities."
On April 9, 3rd Circuit Chief Judge Anthony J. Scirica vacated the conflicting opinions and granted the en banc motions filed by attorneys on the losing sides of both cases. The entire panel of 3rd Circuit judges heard oral argument on June 3, 2010, and the parties await a decision.
Third Circuit Holds That Correctional Officer Is Entitled To Qualified Immunity For Incarcerating The Plaintiff Prisoner Beyond The Expiration Of His Maximum Term Of Imprisonment.
Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2010)
The plaintiff, a former inmate, sued Graterford Prison and other defendants, including corrections official Pat Thompson, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating the plaintiff's rights under the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied Thompson's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and Thompson's counsel appealed. The plaintiff Miguel Montanez alleged that he was incarcerated beyond the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment as a result of the defendants' deliberate indifference in responding to his inquiries and challenges. The Pennsylvania Parole Board had recommitted Montanez but later rescinded a portion of the sentence. Montanez was also imprisoned in a separate case. Eventually, he was given commitment credit and was released.
The Third Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the official's interlocutory appeal to determine whether the set of facts identified by the district court was sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established right. The court held that in order to do so, it was not necessary to determine whether the inmate was actually held beyond his maximum release date. The court found that it was objectively reasonable for Thompson to have believed that her conduct in response to the inmate's claims was lawful and in keeping with the inmate's constitutional rights, therefore, the official was entitled to qualified immunity. The official forwarded the commitment credit issue to the appropriate parties for review. Although the process took a significant amount of time to resolve, the claim did not involve simple issues for determination.
The Third Circuit Court held that Thompson was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Montanez's Eighth Amendment claims. The district court's denial of summary judgment was reversed, and the matter was remanded.
