Trucking & Transportation

By Joshua Romirowsky, Esq. (215.575.2742 or jhromirowsky@mdwcg.com)

Pennsylvania
SEPTA entitled to claim of sovereign immunity in a stopped bus accident.
Wright v. Denny, PICS No. 11-4368 (Commw. Ct. Oct. 25, 2011 )(Kelley, J.)

The plaintiffs may not recover damages from SEPTA in a case where a man alleged he was injured while on a stopped bus when it was rear-ended by an uninsured motorist, a three-judge Commonwealth Court panel has ruled. The unanimous judicial panel rejected the plaintiff's contention that the stopped vehicle was not in "operation" and that, therefore, the transportation agency could not invoke sovereign immunity. The court decided that, because the bus was not moving while at a West Philadelphia stop, the plaintiff was precluded from recovering from SEPTA under the vehicle liability exception to sovereign immunity. Judge Kelley cited the 1988 Supreme Court Opinion in Love v. City of Philadelphia, a case dealing with an exception to governmental immunity, where "operation" was defined as meaning "'to actually put into motion,'" to explain his reasoning. Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that exceptions to immunity for government entities should be "narrowly interpreted and strictly" construed in order to insulate state parties from liability. The relevant exception to sovereign immunity was the vehicle liability exception, which defines "motor vehicle" as "any vehicle which is self-propelled and any attachment thereto, including vehicles operated by rail, through water or in the air."

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denies "negligent spoliation of evidence" as an independent cause of action.
Pyeritz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State Police Dept., 2011 Pa. LEXIS 2831 (Pa. Nov. 23, 2011)

The appellants, an estate Administratrix and others, sought review of an order from the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed a trial court order that granted summary judgment to appellees, the state police department and various troopers, in the appellants' action that alleged negligent spoliation of evidence. "Spoliation of evidence" is the non-preservation or significant alteration of evidence for pending or future litigation. When a party to a suit has been charged with spoliating evidence in that suit, courts have allowed trial courts to exercise their discretion to impose a range of sanctions against the spoliator. However, courts have never imposed a duty in tort not to commit negligent spoliation of evidence, and such a cause of action is not viable in Pennsylvania.

This matter arose from destruction of a safety harness that was allegedly crucial evidence in another action. A decedent had used a black nylon tree stand safety harness to hold himself to a tree stand. However, he was found dead at the bottom of the tree with the harness ripped in two. The harness was seized during the criminal investigation of the death. Although a state police officer had agreed to retain the belt in police custody for the appellants' later use, it was destroyed before it was returned to appellants. The harness was allegedly crucial evidence in a separate civil action, and the appellants sued the appellees based on the destruction of personal property. The Court affirmed that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence. Upon analysis as to whether to impose a duty under a negligence standard, the Court concluded that, on balance, the negative consequences of imposing a duty not to commit negligent spoliation of evidence outweighed any benefits the recognition of the tort might afford.

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