Law Alerts

Product Liability

By Justin Oravetz, Esquire - Philadelphia, PA  (jworavetz@mdwcg.com or 215-575-2871) 

Federal

The Pre-Emption Clause In The Medical Device Amendments Of 1976, 21 U.S.C. §360k, Bars Strict Liability Claims Challenging The Safety And Effectiveness Of A Medical Device Given Premarket Approval By The Food And Drug Administration (FDA).
Estate of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 169 L.Ed. 2d. 892, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2013, 76 U.S.L.W. 4087 (February 20, 2008)

The plaintiff brought suit after a catheter ruptured in the plaintiff-decedent's coronary artery during surgery. The catheter was a Class III medical device which received premarket approval by the FDA. The plaintiff's claims included common law and strict liability claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of the catheter. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. §360k, provides that, with respect to a medical device, no state may impose any requirements that are different than, or in addition to, any federal requirements. The court held that since the state tort claims affect the safety and effectiveness of the catheter [medical device], the state tort claims are preempted.

Florida

The Doctrine Of Strict Liability Does Not Apply To Structural Improvements To Real Estate.
Plaza v. Fisher Development, Inc., 971 So. 2d 918 (Ct. App. Fl., 3rd Dist., December 19, 2007)

The plaintiff alleged that she was injured when she fell onto a conveyor system in the scope of employment at Pottery Barn. The subject conveyor transports items from the second floor storage area to the first floor retail area and is affixed to a stretcher that has an electrical system affixed to the building. The court held that conveyor systems are not products but, rather, are structural improvements to property and, therefore, strict liability does not apply.

Ohio

Ohio's Statute Of Repose, R.C. §2305.10, Provides That No Cause Of Action Based On A Product Liability Claim Shall Accrue Against The Manufacturer Or Supplier Of A Product Later Than Ten Years From The Date The Product Was Delivered To Its First Purchaser Or First Lessee Is Constitutional.
Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2008 Ohio 546 (February 21, 2008)

The plaintiff was injured when a trim press came down on his arm and wrist. The court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's Statute of Repose, R.C. §2305.10, which provides that no cause of action based on a product liability claim shall accrue against the manufacturer or supplier of a product later than ten years from the date the product was delivered to its first purchaser or first lessee.

Ohio's R.C. §2315.18, Limiting Non-Economic Damages In Tort Actions, And R.C. §2315.21, Limiting Punitive Damages In Tort Actions, Are Facially Constitutional.
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007 Ohio 6948 (December 27, 2007)

The plaintiff initiated a product liability action against the defendant when she suffered blood clots and other serious medical side effects from using a birth control patch. The court held that R.C. §2315.18's limits on non-economic damages are constitutional. Section 2315.18 limits non-economic damages to the greater of: (1) $250,000 or (2) three times the economic damages up to a maximum $350,000, or $500,000 per single occurrence. The limits on non-economic damages do not apply if the plaintiff suffered a permanent physical deformity, loss of use of a limb, loss of a bodily organ system, or prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for self. Additionally, the court held that R.C. §2315.21's limits on punitive damages are constitutional. Section 2315.21 limits punitive damages to a maximum of two times the total amount of compensatory damages awarded to a plaintiff per defendant. The limits on punitive damages do not apply if, in causing the injury, the defendant purposely or knowingly committed a felony and was convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, the felony. There are further limitations if the defendant is a "small employer" or individual.

Pennsylvania

Asbestos - It Is Appropriate For Courts At The Summary Judgment Stage To Make A Reasoned Assessment Concerning Whether, In Light Of The Evidence Concerning Frequency, Regularity And Proximity Of A Plaintiff's Exposure, A Jury Would Be Entitled To Make The Necessary Inference Of A Sufficient Causal Connection Between The Defendant's Product And The Injury.
Estate Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts Co., 2007 Pa. LEXIS 2935 (Pa. December 28, 2007)

The plaintiff alleged that the plaintiff-decedent died of mesothelioma after occupational and non-occupational exposure to asbestos. The plaintiff was unable to adduce evidence to support occupational exposure. Therefore, all defendants were dismissed except V-J Auto. The plaintiff alleged that V-J Auto supplied products for use in the plaintiff-decedent's personal automotive maintenance activities. The Supreme Court followed the 7th Circuit Court's rationale in Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1992) and stated that there is no bright line distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in the determination of whether there is a sufficiently significant likelihood that the defendant's product caused the alleged harm. It is appropriate for courts at the summary judgment stage, in light of the direct and circumstantial evidence concerning frequency, regularity and proximity of a plaintiff's exposure, to make a reasoned assessment concerning whether a jury would be entitled to make the necessary inference of a sufficient causal connection between the defendant's product and the injury.