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Law Alerts EmploymentFederal Employees Can Proceed With Age Discrimination Lawsuits After Filing An Intake Questionnaire And Not A Charge Form With The EEOC Within The Statutory Period. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that one employee's filing of an intake questionnaire was adequate to meet the requirement of 29 U.S.C.S. § 626(d) and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed. Paul Holowecki and other employees of Federal Express sued the corporation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A district court judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had met the time limits and filing requirements of the ADEA. The EEOC has an "Intake Questionnaire" form and a "Charge" form, but the EEOC regulations state only that "A charge shall be in writing and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s)." One of the plaintiffs completed an intake questionnaire, but the EEOC did not take the steps it should have taken after the filing of a charge. Holowecki sued over 60 days later, but the judge ruled that the intake questionnaire did not qualify as a charge for purposes of the ADEA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, allowing Holowecki's suit to go forward. The Second Circuit ruled that the minimal written information required for a charge was contained in the intake questionnaire. The Supreme Court agreed that the questionnaire met the ADEA's implicit requirement that the charge be intended to start the process of an ADEA suit. It Is Within The Discretion Of The Trial Court On Whether To Allow Age Discrimination Plaintiffs Introduce Testimony By Workers Companywide That They Were Treated Differently Because Of Their Age. The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether age discrimination plaintiffs can introduce so-called "me, too" evidence, testimony by workers companywide that they were treated differently because of their age. This case arose during a company-wide reduction in force, when Sprint fired 51-year-old employee Ellen Mendelsohn. Mendelsohn sued, alleging that Sprint had discriminated against her on account of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At the trial, Mendelsohn attempted to present evidence from other Sprint employees who alleged that they were also discriminated against by the company. The district court judge refused to admit the testimony claiming it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The jury returned a verdict for Sprint, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial claiming the testimony was relevant. The ruling conflicted with those of several other Circuit Courts which approved the exclusion of "me, too" testimony. The Supreme Court decided that it was not an abuse of the District Court's discretion in deciding that the evidence was not relevant. The Supreme Court decided that the District Court had not, as the Court of Appeals argued, made a per se exclusion of "me, too" testimony. Because Rules 401 and 403 do not make such evidence per se admissible or per se inadmissible, and because the inquiry required by those Rules is within the province of the District Court in the first instance, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals. New Jersey The Distribution Of A Mandatory Arbitration Policy For All Employment-Related Disputes, Either In An Employee Manual And/Or In A Separate Handout, Is Legally Sufficient, Binding And Enforceable. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act stemming from alleged retaliatory actions taken against him based upon his refusal to cooperate in and/or his complaints about sexual harassment directed at his supervisor. The District Court granted the employer's motion to dismiss the claims, finding that the employer had adopted a mandatory arbitration policy of employment disputes and that the policy was clear, unambiguous and had been distributed to all staff both in the Employee Manual and by a separate notice. Further, the court noted that the time limit imposed to demand arbitration, while shorter then the Statute of Limitations governing both statutes, was permissible. The Employer's Right To Seek Recovery For Fees And Costs Incurred In Defending A Claim Brought It Under The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Is Premised Upon A Showing Of The Claimant's "Bad Faith." The plaintiff alleged age discrimination and a hostile work environment, and all claims were dismissed by way of a motion for summary judgment. The Hospital then sought reimbursement for the $129,000 in fees and costs they had incurred in defending the action. The court noted that the statute permitted an employer to seek fees and costs but only upon a showing of bad faith. The court interpreted this language to mean a showing of "a reckless disregard or purposeful obliviousness of the known facts." Further, the analysis must take into account the claimant's ability to pay the award. A Parent Corporation Is Not Generally Liable For The Employment Discrimination Of Its Subsidiary Absent A Showing That They Are Integrated Enterprises. The Most Important Factor Is The Independence Of The Subsidiary In Making Employment Related Decisions. The plaintiff brought an ADA and NJLAD claim against her employer premised upon a claim of a failure to accommodate her disability. The plaintiff also sued the employer's parent corporation under the theory that it controlled its subsidiaries. In dismissing the parent corporation, the District Court indicated that a parent corporation is a proper defendant under the ADA and LAD only when they meet the "integrated enterprise test," which includes the following factors: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) centralized control of labor relations; (3) common management; and (4) common ownership of financial control. Although no one factor of the integrated enterprise test is conclusive, the extent to which labor relations are centralized is the most significant. The defining inquiry under the integrated enterprise test concerns the parent company's actual role in the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory employment practices. Ohio Ohio Supreme Court Holds That An Employee Who Is Terminated From Employment While Receiving Workers' Compensation Has No Common Law Cause Of Action For Wrongful Discharge In Violation Of The Public Policy Underlying R.C. 4123.90. The Ohio Supreme Court had ruled in Coolidge that an employee who is receiving temporary total disability benefits may not be discharged solely on the basis of absenteeism or inability to work when the absence or inability to work is directly related to an allowed condition. In its December 20, 2007, decision in Bickers, however, the Ohio Supreme Court limited Coolidge to holding that terminating a teacher for absences due to a work-related injury while the teacher is receiving workers' compensation benefits is a termination without "good and just cause" under R.C. 3319.16 (providing for teacher contracts). Importantly, the Court refused to apply the principle to at-will employment. Instead, the Court held that an employee who is terminated from employment while receiving workers' compensation has no common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy underlying R.C. 4123.90, which provides the exclusive remedy for employees claiming termination in violation of rights conferred by the Workers' Compensation Act. Chief Justice Moyer, joined by Justice Pfeifer, dissented. The Filing Of A Lawsuit By An Employer Against An Employee Or Former Employee Who Has Engaged In Protected Activity Is Not Per Se Retaliatory. After a jury found against the employee in her sexual harassment suit against her employer, the employer initiated an action against the employee for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission held that the employer's lawsuit was a prohibited retaliatory violation under R.C. 4112.02(I). The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed and held that the filing of a lawsuit by an employer against an employee or former employee who has engaged in a protected activity is not per se retaliatory. The Court also held that, if an employer can demonstrate that a lawsuit against an employee who has engaged in a protected activity is not objectively baseless, the suit shall be allowed to proceed and the proceedings before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission are stayed. Justice Lanzinger, joined by Justices Pfeifer and Lundberg Stratton, concurred in part and dissented in part. An Employee Fails To Establish A Prima Facie Case Of Retaliation Or Violation Of Public Policy Where The Supervisors Who Terminated Him Were Unaware Of The Complaints He Made To Other Supervisors Regarding Co-Worker Racial Harassment. The employee, an African-American, observed a Caucasian employee making monkey or ape-like gestures and noises toward him, to the amusement of another Caucasian employee. The employee reported the incident to his immediate supervisors, who said they would investigate. Before any action on the complaint was taken, the employee was terminated for work performance and attendance issues. The supervisors who fired the employee were unaware of his complaint about racial harassment. The Twelfth District Court of Appeals held that the employee could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation and could not establish a violation of public policy because he could not establish that the supervisors who actually terminated him had any knowledge of his complaint about racial harassment. Second Appellate District Upholds City Manager's Termination For E-Mail Abuse. A City Manager appealed, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506, the decision of the City of Dayton Civil Service Board (DCSB) to dismiss her from her employment for e-mail abuse. The trial court concluded that the DCSB's decision was supported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, illegal, or unconstitutional. The Second Appellate District affirmed, holding that the record contained substantial, reliable, and probative evidence to support the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals observed that the City established, both through testimony and the City Manager's own stipulations, that the City Manager's user accounts were responsible for the invasion of the e-mail accounts on the City's system and for the deletion of the audit record that would have shown exactly what actions those accounts took and when. This and other evidence was sufficient to show that the City Manager violated municipal policies regarding computer use. The City did not have to prove the precise mechanism or mechanisms that the City Manager employed with regard to the computer system.
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