Defense Digest

Posture Can Be Everything (Or How To Win Cases And Save Money)
By Timothy C. Nies, Esq. & R. David Ravine, Esq.*

Florida's well reasoned opinion on crashworthiness, D'Amario v. Ford, 806 So.2d 424 (Fla. 2001), has affected not only "crashworthiness cases" throughout the state but has found application in other cases involving two or more incidents or tortfeasors, such as typically found in medical malpractice or nursing home litigation. The court's discussion of fundamental concepts of negligent torts and litigation is both persuasive and instructive.  Additionally, as illustrated by Jackson v. York Hannover Nursing Centers, 2004 Fla.App.Lexis 6427; 29 Fla. Weekly D 1121, a recent case involving alleged negligence in a nursing home, an understanding of these fundamental concepts can affect the posturing of the case and thereby significantly influence the value of a claim.

The "crashworthiness" doctrine fundamentally holds that as to manufacturers of cars, motor vehicle collisions are reasonably foreseeable.   Florida's Supreme Court reasoned that a manufacturer has a responsibility to build vehicles that are "reasonably safe" in collisions.  Typically, the plaintiff will allege that in an accident, a collision of the plaintiff himself with some portion of the interior of the vehicle (a faulty airbag or a defective seatbelt) enhanced or caused greater injury than that which would have otherwise occurred.  In states where this is a concern, the issue becomes the proper apportionment of damages and negligence as between the manufacturer and the tortfeasor who caused the accident in the first place. 

Since the crashworthiness doctrine was established some 36 years ago, two lines of cases have emerged nationwide.   The majority position is that a manufacturer's fault in causing the enhanced injuries may be reduced by the fault of those who caused the initial collision.  States which have adopted this view include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

On the other hand, the minority position reasons that, since a manufacturer is exclusively responsible for its product's defects, it should also be exclusively liable for the enhanced injuries caused by the defects. Their position is that the fault of those who caused the initial collision is not relevant and, therefore, does not reduce the liability of the manufacturer.   Consequently, testimony and other evidence regarding the cause of the "initial collision" may not be admissible in a trial relating to the "second collision."  However, evidence relevant to a determination of the extent to which the plaintiff's injuries were enhanced is admissible.

In D'Amario, the claimant was a passenger in a vehicle that struck a tree due to the speeding of its intoxicated driver. The enhanced injuries occurred when the car's allegedly defective fuel pump caused the vehicle to burst into flames after the collision.   This resulted in severe burns to the plaintiff's body and the loss of three limbs.  The plaintiff did not bring suit for the injuries caused by the initial collision with the tree, but instead sued Ford Motor Company for the injuries caused by the allegedly defective fuel pump. 

Ford raised the defense that the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the driver's negligence and that its liability should be reduced or eliminated by the negligence of the at-fault driver.   At trial, the court permitted Ford's apportionment defense and admitted into evidence the driver's actions in causing the accident.  The jury returned a verdict for the defense, and the plaintiff appealed.

Despite the weight of the authority of states on the majority side, Florida's Supreme Court aligned itself with the minority view.   The Court concluded that allowing a manufacturer to apportion fault in a claim where only its fault was at issue would effectively allow it to avoid liability for designing and manufacturing a defective product. The Court noted that the testimony of the intoxicated driver would unduly confuse the jury by focusing attention on the conduct giving rise to the accident instead of issues related to the allegation of a product defect and its role in causing enhanced injuries. Comparing the case to medical malpractice cases, the Court noted that "under the crashworthiness doctrine, as in medical malpractice cases, the initial collision and its separate cause is always presumed, and the cause of the initial collision is simply not at issue in the determination of the second collision." 

Now consider the outcome and reasoning in the Jackson nursing home case.  In that case,   the claimant/decedent was admitted to York Hannover Nursing Center for rehabilitation following a stroke. She had previously been hospitalized and treated for her stroke at a medical center. The claimant became severely dehydrated and died three weeks after admission to the nursing home. The nursing home raised the defense that the medical center was negligent in its care and treatment of the decedent prior to her admission and was, in fact, responsible for her death.  Pursuant to Florida law, the medical center was named as a non-party defendant and placed on the verdict form for the jury to apportion liability if they so chose.

The claimant's expert testified that the medical center failed to complete a form which would have identified the claimant's potential dehydration problem.   The jury assessed 75 percent of the negligence to the non-party medical center, leaving the nursing home defendant with 25 percent of the fault and a reduction in their responsibility for the damages.  The submission of the medical center's negligence to the jury was appealed. 

The appellate court found that medical malpractice cases involving resolution of issues wherein a medical provider is alleged to have either aggravated an existing injury or caused a separate and additional injury are similar to resolution of issues is a crashworthiness case wherein a party's separate negligence is alleged to have enhanced an original injury.

The court found that both the medical center and the nursing home were dealing with a continuum of the same injury. The claimant was dehydrated when she left the medical center and when she arrived at the nursing home.   The court found the case involved a single injury and the trial court properly allowed apportionment of the damages.  The court found that had it been the fact that there were two distinguishable injuries - one caused by the medical center and a second separate and distinct injury caused by the nursing home, or an aggravation by the nursing home of an existing injury originally caused by the medical center - D'Amario would have applied.  If that were the case, the nursing home would then be liable for all of the claimant's damages. 

In conclusion, for both claims professionals and attorneys, these are very fine distinctions, indeed.   In practice, they are often raised simply by a different framing of the issues in negotiations or responsive pleadings.  We should all continue to be aware that this divergent posturing of claims and defenses may have a significant impact on the outcome of the claim. 

*Tim, an associate, and Rick, a shareholder, are in our Ft. Lauderdale, Florida office and can be reached at (954) 745-4930 or by E-mail at tnies@mdwcg.com  and rravine@mdwcg.com.