Defense Digest

On July 9, 2002, Mr. Mark Arnoldy was struck while standing behind a forklift being operated in reverse by a co-worker. Why Mr. Arnoldy was standing behind the forklift and why the forklift was being operated in reverse is not mentioned in the opinion. Presumably he was looking for Helga. (This is, of course, a reference to the cartoon "Hey Arnold" which any of you with children are too familiar with.)

Because Mr. Arnoldy was injured, he had to sue. And he sued not only the manufacturer of the forklift, Clark, but also the company that leased the forklift to his employer (IMHSI). Obviously, the employer was immune under Pennsylvania's workers' compensation statute.

Mr. Arnoldy's complaint contained claims of both negligence and strict liability. The basis of the claim - as are most products liability cases - is the manufacturer and the lessor failed to install certain safety devices which would have prevented the accident-that the forklift was unreasonably dangerous because it had only a minimum of safety devices and lacked any warning system when it was moving in reverse. In this case it may have been true that additional safety devices may have prevented the accident, but, unfortunately for Mr. Arnoldy, OSHA has standards particular to forklifts. OSHA, which is part of the federal government (uh oh!), adopts and requires forklifts to meet the standards set forth in ANSI B56.1-1969. Yep, the one originally published in 1969, not the current version of the ANSI standard nor the one which was in effect when the forklift was manufactured.

So the defendants both filed summary judgment motions arguing essentially "that our forklift complied with the governmental regulations governing which type of safety devices forklifts are required to have." Therefore, allowing the claim to go forward would impose liability on a manufacturer for complying with a federally-imposed option which went against Congress's intent. Essentially, it would allow state tort laws to impose a greater standard on a manufacturer and are preempted. Pretty simple argument, right? The trial court thought so and granted both defendants' summary judgment motions. THE END (almost).

The plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff essentially argued that OSHA regulations do not preempt state tort law under the doctrine of conflicts preemption and that they are not admissible because the reasonableness of the actions of the manufacturer are not at issue in a strict liability case.

Let me diverge for a constitutional second. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized three ways in which federal law may preempt - and displace - state law: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption a/k/a implied preemption; and (3) conflict preemption. Express preemption is where there is an explicit statutory command that state law be displaced. Field preemption kicks out state laws if the federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it. Conflict preemption occurs when state law conflicts with federal law and makes it physically impossible to comply with both, or when the state law interferes with the execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

Back to the case...

The plaintiffs' argument that OSHA and ANSI standards are inadmissible in a strict liability case is a pretty good one because it is generally true and admission of such constitutes reversible error. Here, however, the complaint sounded in both strict liability and negligence. The Superior Court has previously stated and re-affirmed that, in cases in which both strict liability and negligence are plead, evidence of industry standards is generally relevant on the issue of negligence.

The court also found that the objectives of Congress preempted the state's tort law. Essentially, manufacturers would be placed subject to varying standards from state to state, which could not be complied with simultaneously.

Therefore, the court affirmed the granting of the motions for summary judgment.

*Brad is a shareholder in the firm's Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at bdremick@mdwcg.com or (215) 575-2762.