School's Out: The Third Circuit Precludes, DD 9/07

Defense Digest

A.W., a former student of the Jersey City Public Schools system ("JCPS"), suffered from dyslexia. A.W. filed suit in federal court against JCPS, several JCPS officials, the New Jersey Department of Education ("NJDOE"), NJDOE's Director of Office of Special Education Programs ("OSEP"), NJDOE's former Director of its Division of Special Education, and NJDOE's Compliance Coordinator, alleging in pertinent part that the defendants failed to comply with IDEA and §504 and as a result deprived him of a free, appropriate public education. A.W. also asserted claims against NJDOE's Director of OSEP and Compliance Coordinator, in their individual capacities, alleging they were liable under §1983 for infringing upon his IDEA and §504-created rights in failing to conduct an adequate investigation into the nature and extent of his disability. The NJDOE defendants moved for summary judgment on numerous grounds, including a challenge to the viability of §1983 to remedy the alleged IDEA and §504 violations. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on that basis, relying upon Matula. The district court also rejected the defendants' argument that the individual defendants could not be sued under §1983 in their individual capacities for the alleged IDEA and §504 violations because those statutes impose liability only upon entities that receive federal funding, not persons. The individual NJDOE defendants appealed.

On appeal, the Third Circuit embraced the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005), concerning the limited availability of §1983 as a vehicle for redressing federal statutory rights, particularly where federal statutes explicitly contain private remedies, as well as opinions of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits rejecting the holding of Matula, and concluded that it "should not continue to adhere to the principle we established in Matula." With regard to IDEA, the Third Circuit noted the statute provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that allows an aggrieved party to lodge a complaint with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a child, or the provision of a free, appropriate public education. The party may elect to have the complaint investigated by a state educational agency or avail itself of an impartial due process hearing. A party dissatisfied with the outcome of a due process hearing may bring an action in federal court, which is authorized to grant relief to a prevailing plaintiff in the form of equitable and injunctive relief, reimbursement for private educational placement, compensatory education and attorney's fees. (Traditional compensatory damages and punitive damages are not available under IDEA, and school officials cannot be sued in an individual capacity under the statute.) In light of this comprehensive scheme, and in the absence of any "textual indication," either explicit or implicit, that the scheme was intended to complement, rather than supplant §1983, the Third Circuit held that "Congress did not intend §1983 to be available to remedy violations of the IDEA." Similarly with regard to §504, the Third Circuit noted that, although there is no express private cause of action under §504, Congress effectively provided a private right of action under §504 by incorporating the remedial scheme of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into the statute. The remedies for §504 violations are coextensive with those remedies available under Title VI and include compensatory damages, injunctive relief and other forms of relief traditionally available in suits for breach of contract. (Punitive damages are not available under §504, and §504 actions cannot be maintained against individuals.) The Court reasoned the remedial scheme of Title VI (and, thus, §504) is comprehensive and that Congress, therefore, did not intend for violations of §504 to be remedied through §1983. The Court further reasoned that the remedial scheme of §504 was intended to supplant, rather than complement, §1983, and, accordingly, the Court concluded that §1983 likewise is not available to provide a remedy for an alleged §504 violation.

A.W. indeed is a significant and favorable decision for public educational agencies and their employees, as well as for the practitioners who represent them. It is not uncommon for federal actions arising under the IDEA or §504 to be coupled with one or more claims alleging a violation of §1983 premised upon a deprivation of rights afforded by those statutes. The practical effect of A.W., however, is that a party aggrieved by a violation of IDEA or §504 is limited only to the respective remedies provided under those statutes. More significantly, punitive damages, which otherwise were available vis-à-vis §1983, cannot now be a component of a plaintiff's damages claim where an IDEA or §504 violation is alleged. Furthermore, public school officials, who were subject to suit in an individual capacity under §1983, can no longer be named as defendants individually in IDEA or §504-based actions. In addition, a plaintiff will not be able to circumvent the administrative process contemplated by IDEA by attempting to cast an IDEA claim as an action under §1983 premised upon a deprivation of IDEA-protected rights. Rather, a plaintiff unquestionably now must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before lodging an IDEA claim in federal court. Accordingly, to the extent any §1983 claim is premised upon an alleged violation of IDEA or §504, the claim likely now is subject to dismissal by dispositive motion or otherwise.

*Chris Conrad is an associate in our Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at cjconrad@mdwcg.com or (717) 651-3531.