Defense Digest

In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 05-1074, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 6295 (U.S., May 29, 2007), the United States Supreme Court held that the time period for filing an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) begins at the time when a discrete unlawful practice takes place and not when its effects were later felt. A new violation does not occur, and a re-tolling of the statutory period does not begin, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that involve adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination.

The petitioner, Lilly Ledbetter, was employed by respondent Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company at its Gadsen, Alabama, plant for 19 years. During her employment, salaried employees were given or denied raises based on performance evaluations completed by their supervisors. Ledbetter believed that she was given poor evaluations because of her gender and, as a result, did not receive the raises she would have had she been evaluated fairly.

In March of 1998, Ledbetter filed a questionnaire with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging acts of sex discrimination, and in July of 1998, she filed a formal EEOC charge. In November of 1998, she retired and then filed, among other claims, a Title VII pay discrimination claim and a claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Goodyear on some of Ledbetter's claims, including the Equal Pay Act claim, but her Title VII claim proceeded to trial. Ledbetter contended that the company's past pay decisions affected the amount of her pay throughout her employment so that, by the end of her time with Goodyear, she was being paid significantly less than her male colleagues. The jury found for Ledbetter and awarded her back pay and damages.

Goodyear appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit contending that Ledbetter's pay discrimination claim was time barred with respect to all pay decisions made prior to September 26, 1997, which is 180 days prior to the date she filed her EEOC questionnaire. Goodyear further argued that no discriminatory act took place after that date. The Court of Appeals agreed with Goodyear and reversed, holding that a Title VII pay discrimination claim cannot be based on any pay decision that occurred prior to the last pay decision that affected the employee's pay during the EEOC charging period.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Ledbetter urged the Court to focus on the paychecks that were issued to her during the EEOC charging period, each of which, she contended, was a separate act of discrimination. The Court explained Ledbetter asserted disparate treatment, the central element of which is discriminatory intent. However, Ledbetter did not assert that Goodyear acted with discriminatory intent when it issued her paychecks within the charging period but, rather, that the paychecks would have been larger had she been fairly evaluated prior to the EEOC charging period.

The Court looked to its precedent and found this argument to be squarely foreclosed. Specifically, the Court looked to United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), where the employee was forced to resign because the airline refused to employ married flight attendants, but she did not file an EEOC charge regarding her termination. Years later she was rehired by the airline but treated as a new employee for seniority purposes. She then sued arguing that, while the original discrimination was time barred, the airline's current refusal to give her credit for her prior service had a continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits. The Court concluded that the continuing effects of the precharging period discrimination did not make out a present violation.

The Court then applied the same logic of Evans to Ledbetter's arguments that the paychecks she received during the charging period and a 1998 raise denial each violated Title VII and triggered a new charging period. The Court concluded that each paycheck was not accompanied by discriminatory intent and, therefore, held that the paychecks were simply current effects of prior, uncharged discrimination, which, like in Evans, have "no present legal consequences." 431 U.S. at 558.

*Stephanie is a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at (215) 575-2649 or skrawitt@mdwcg.com.  Meg Butler is a law clerk in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.