Defense Digest

Relinquishment Of Right To Sue Enforeable

In Nissley v. Candytown Motorcycle Club, Inc. and Richard Bellaman, 913 A.2d 887 (Pa. Super. 2006), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County which granted summary judgment to the defendants. In short, the Superior Court agreed with the trial court that a Release signed by the plaintiff stating, "I hereby give up all my rights to sue and make claim against [the defendants]," meant exactly that and was enforceable.

The plaintiff was a member of the defendant motorcycle club. The individually named defendant was the club's vice president. As part of the membership process, the plaintiff was required to sign a Release and Indemnity Agreement.

On the date of the accident, the plaintiff was riding his motorcycle at the club track. At the time, the club vice president and another individual were performing maintenance on the track with a tractor and backhoe. The plaintiff rode off a jump and collided with the tractor driven by the club vice president, suffering personal injury.

Following commencement of suit, the defendant club and its vice president moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by the provision of the Release quoted above.

In response to the motion, the plaintiff argued that the terms of the Release were at least sufficiently ambiguous as to require extrinsic evidence as to their scope, thereby overcoming the defendant's motion. Specifically, the plaintiff relied on a sentence found later in the Release which stated, "Relying upon my own judgment and ability [I] assume all such risks of loss and hereby agree to reimburse all costs to those persons or organizations connected with this club for damages incurred as a result of any injury that I cause or receive."

The Superior Court rejected the plaintiff's argument, finding that the language cited by the plaintiff created a separate indemnity obligation distinct from the exculpatory clause wherein the plaintiff gave up all rights to sue.

The court applied long-standing law to find the exculpatory clause unambiguous, reviewing standards necessary to relieve the defendants of liability: (1) the provision is construed strictly since it is not favored by the law; (2) it must specifically spell out the intentions of the party; (3) it is construed against the party who seeks immunity; and (4) the burden to establish the immunity from liability is upon the party who asserts it. On this basis, the Superior Court upheld summary judgment granted for the defendants by the trial court.

In its decision below, the trial court found that the defendants were also entitled to summary judgment based on assumption of the risk. On the date of the accident, the plaintiff had passed the maintenance equipment 10 to 20 times as he proceeded around the track but continued to ride. For part of that day, a flagman was present, directing riders around the equipment. At the time of the plaintiff's accident, the flagman was not present, and the tractor was hidden from the plaintiff's view behind the jump.

The trial court found that, even if the exculpatory clause was restricted to inherent risks, track maintenance was such an inherent risk. The plaintiff assumed the risk of injury since he was aware of the presence of the maintenance equipment and continued to ride.

The Superior Court disagreed with this portion of the trial court's opinion regarding the assumption of the risk doctrine. Perhaps wisely, the Superior Court simply held that it did not need to address the issue of the assumption of the risk because it did find that the exculpatory clause in the Release barred all claims, regardless of whether they arose from an inherent risk.

The Superior Court suggested that other than in specifically enumerated activities (e.g., downhill skiing, baseball, off-road vehicle driving), the Supreme Court has held that assumption of the risk has been supplanted by comparative negligence in Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 762 A.2d 339 (Pa. 2000).

*Gordon is a shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office, who can be reached at (610) 354-8286 or gbsimmons@mdwcg.com.