Defense Digest

USING CAUSATION AS A DEFENSE TO NEGLIGENCE

By G. Jay Habas, Esq.*

Claims based upon principles of negligence require a plaintiff to establish that the defendant was negligent, but also that the negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. The importance of the causation element in a negligence case was recently reaffirmed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Peterson v. Shreiner, 822 A.2d 833 (PA Super. 2003). The court in that case held that, where there is a dispute in the evidence as to whether a plaintiff's injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence, a jury may properly find in favor of the defense. This case confirms that the defense may properly contest liability based upon a challenge to the causal relationship between the negligence and the alleged injuries.

Peterson v. Shreiner involved a rear-end motor vehicle collision. The defendant, Shreiner, rear-ended Mrs. Peterson's vehicle, but the plaintiff reported no injury at the scene of the accident. However, her condition deteriorated steadily during the day, and she began to complain of pain in her shoulder, neck and right leg. She was unable to sleep that night because of the pain, and the next morning she went to a medical clinic and received pain killers and muscle relaxants. She subsequently underwent physical therapy. Her pain interfered with her baking business and she was eventually forced to give up that employment.

At trial, the plaintiff presented medical testimony from an orthopedic surgeon, who stated that, as a result of the car accident, the plaintiff suffered soft tissue spinal injuries and an annular tear in her lumbar spine. The doctor further stated that the plaintiff's pre-accident spinal narrowing was aggravated by the incident.

The defense of the case was premised on a challenge to the causal relationship between the accident and the plaintiff's injuries. The defense did not present its own medical witness, but instead relied upon cross examination of the plaintiff's treating orthopedic surgeon. The defense obtained important concessions on cross examination, which allowed it to challenge the causation element of the negligence claim. The plaintiff's expert conceded that Mrs. Peterson's degenerative back condition could have occurred in the absence of trauma and, indeed, could have been caused by a prior automobile accident of which the doctor had been unaware. The defense further pointed out that the plaintiff's physician first examined her three years after the accident. He further conceded that the symptoms of which the plaintiff complained could be attributed to the pre-existing spondylosis or arthritis, and that such a condition had been present in an x-ray months before the motor vehicle accident. The defense further pointed out that the plaintiff's physician had authored an expert report one week before he even examined her based solely upon information supplied by her attorney, and he never reviewed records from a previous motor vehicle accident.

The jury returned a verdict for the defense, finding on the jury verdict slip that the defendant was negligent, but that the defendant's negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. Following the verdict, the plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial on damages. The trial court initially denied the motion, but upon the filing of a written post trial motion by the plaintiff, the court entered JNOV in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of causation and awarded a new trial on damages. The defense appealed the trial court's order.

In the Superior Court, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in granting a new trial because the determination of whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries is solely within the province of the jury, and the trial court usurped the jury's function in granting JNOV. In support of this position, the defense distinguished the case relied upon by the trial court, Majczyk v. Oesch, 789 A.2d 717 (PA Super. 2001), which also involved a rear-end motor vehicle collision. In Majczyk, the court highlighted the principle that, where a defendant concedes liability and injuries resulting from the accident, a jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence wherein it finds for the defendant.

The court in Peterson argued that Majczyk did not apply and, instead, relied upon the case of Andrews v. Jackson, 800 A.2d 959 (PA Super. 2002), where a jury determined that the defendant was negligent, but also found that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. In that case, as distinguished from Majczyk, the medical experts disagreed over whether the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the accident. The court in Andrews had relied on prior decisions, which noted that, where the experts disagree that the accident caused the plaintiff's injuries, the jury is permitted to find for the defendant. See Henery v. Shadle, 661 A.2d 439 (PA Super. 1995), and Holland v. Zelnick, 478 A.2d 885 (PA Super. 1984).

In Peterson, the court concluded that there was no concession by the defense that the plaintiff's injuries were the result of the rear-end collision. Although there was no conflicting medical testimony presented by the defense, the cross examination of the plaintiff's expert created a genuine dispute concerning causation. Given that there was an issue of fact for the jury as to whether the defendant's alleged negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries, the court concluded that the trial judge erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial since, by doing so, it substituted its judgment for that of the jury.

The court's decision in Peterson v. Shreiner, that a defendant may be negligent but not liable where there is no causation between the negligence and the plaintiff's alleged injuries, is important to the defense of all negligence cases. In addition, the court emphasized that cross examination of the plaintiff's medical expert may supply the necessary conflict in the testimony in order for the defense to establish a basis for a jury to conclude that the alleged negligence was not a substantial factor in the plaintiff's injuries. This decision places greater emphasis on the defense's ability to obtain a full and complete medical history of the plaintiff in order to provide the foundation for effective cross examination of the plaintiff's expert on the issue of causation.

* Jay, a shareholder, is the managing attorney of our Erie, PA office. He can be reached at (814) 461-7802 or jhabas@mdwcg.com.